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Grants will be awarded annually by the Committee on Research Support. The Council has made $10,000 available for 1985 research grants. Individual grants will not exceed $1500 and are not renewable.

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The Deadline for the 1985 competition is FEBRUARY 1, 1985. Decisions will be announced by May 1, 1985.

Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981

JEFFREY A. SEGAL
State University of New York at Stony Brook

The overwhelming concensus of Fourth Amendment scholars is that the Supreme Court's search and seizure cases are a mess. This article proposes that the confusion arises from the manner in which the cases were studied, not from the decisions themselves. A legal model with variables that measure the prior justification of the search, the nature of the intrusion, and a few mitigating circumstances is used to explain the Court's decisions on the reasonableness of a given search or seizure. The parameters are estimated through probit.

The results show that the search and seizure cases are much more ordered than had commonly been believed. Virtually all of the estimates are as expected. Additionally, the Court is shown to act more favorably toward the federal government than toward the states. Preliminary analysis suggests that the model has predictive as well as explanatory value.

Protections against unreasonable searches and seizures were deemed important enough by the nation's founding fathers to be included as the Fourth Amendment to our Constitution. The desire for such protection runs deep in both English and American democratic history. Few are not aware of William Pitt's assertion that:

> The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it —the storm may enter—but the King of England cannot enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. (Landynski, 1966, p. 23)

Less well remembered is John Adams's recollection of the stirring speech of James Otis, Jr. against the writ of assistance, the colonial version of England's general warrant. The speech, Adams wrote, was the first in "the Chain of Causes and Effects" leading to independence (Landynski, 1966, p. 37). Today, the Fourth Amendment is "one of the laws most vital to our liberty" (Amsterdam, 1974, p. 377). It occupies a "place second to none in the Bill of Rights."[1]

Nevertheless, we are still not sure what makes a particular action by the government an unreasonable search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. According to Justice Frankfurter, "the course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not run smooth."[2] Justice White, joined by Justice Burger, claims that the Court has ceased even "to strive for clarity and consistency of analysis."[3] Scholarly opinion agrees. LaFave has observed that "no area of law has more bedeviled the judiciary" (Amsterdam, p. 349). Dworkin (1973) simply states that the Fourth Amendment cases are "a mess" (p. 329). Amsterdam (1974) considers all of these comments to be "understatements" (p. 349).

The question of whether a given search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment becomes even more important when one considers what happens to unconstitutionally obtained evidence. According to the Supreme Court, it may not be presented as evidence at a trial. This exclusionary rule means that, in the immortal words of Cardozo, "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."[4]

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[1] *Harris* v. *United States,* 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

[2] *Chapman* v. *United States,* 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

[3] *Coolidge* v. *New Hampshire,* 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

[4] *People* v. *Defore,* 242 N.Y. 13 (1926).

This article attempts to show that beneath the so-called mess of search and seizure decisions lies a coherent set of decisions. The Supreme Court has been more consistent in its decisions than either the Court or scholarly opinion would have us believe. These decisions can be successfully explained and predicted through the multivariate analysis of a legal model of the Court's decision making. The data are the 123 cases from 1962 until 1981 in which the Court decided the reasonableness of a search or seizure. The facts of each case, such as whether or not there was a warrant or probable cause, are the independent variables. The decision of the Court on the reasonableness of the search or seizure is the dependent variable. Probit is used to estimate the parameters.

A Legal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making

As Gibson (1978a) has shown, in order to understand judicial decision making, one must understand not only the attitudes of judges, but their role perceptions as well. Tate (1981) has identified background characteristics that directly affect roles and attitudes, and thus indirectly affect votes. All of this is very useful in trying to explain variance among judges or among courts, but when one tries to explain variance among decisions of a given judge or a given court, the roles and attitudes are stable; it is the facts of the cases that vary. Studies that try to explain variance in particular decisions are usually limited to sentencing studies (most recently, Croyle, 1983), where the dependent variable can be measured intervally.

Specification of the sentencing models almost universally is done within the context of legal or extralegal characteristics of the case (see Hagan, 1974). The legal model assumes decisions are based upon "standards set in constitution, statute, precedent or court rule" (Cook, 1977, p. 571). The most frequently used variables in these cases are severity of the crime and prior record. Extralegal models of sentencing deal with characteristics of the defendant that are legally irrelevant to the sentencing decision. More often than not, the key variable of interest is race. Hagan's exhaustive review concludes that "knowledge of extra-legal offender characteristics contributes little to our ability to predict judicial dispositions" (1974, p. 359). Nevertheless Gibson (1978b) has demonstrated that this may be true because these studies aggregate decisions by court rather than by judge. His own research gives evidence that although blacks in Fulton County receive higher sentences than whites, some judges sentence blacks more severely, whereas others sentence whites more severely.

Although findings suggest that lower court judges may not strictly follow statutory guidelines in sentencing, Supreme Court justices are probably even less constrained to follow the legal model. As Rohde and Spaeth (1976) point out, Supreme Court justices usually do not aspire to higher office, are not electorally accountable, and as an institution, are the court of last resort. Thus, they are relatively free to follow their personal policy preferences (1976, pp. 70-74). As Felix Frankfurter explained to President Roosevelt, "People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases it is *they* who speak and *not* the Constitution" (Freedman, 1967, p. 383).

Thus it would certainly increase our knowledge of the Supreme Court if it could be demonstrated that a legal model based on "standards set in Constitution, statute, precedent or Court rule" (Cook, 1977, p. 571), could convincingly explain and predict Court decisions. Of course such a model is not necessarily inconsistent with policy preferences. Nevertheless, if these policy preferences parallel a legal decision structure, we may have some protection against judicial capriciousness (see, for example, Bickel, 1963).

Previous attempts to use fact models to explain and predict particular Supreme Court decisions have not been very successful. The best known of these is Kort's (1957) right-to-counsel study. Ad hoc estimation procedures, the use of more variables than cases, and the absence of any explicit theoretical justification for expecting the Court to behave as it had, were among the problems that plagued this pioneering effort (Fisher, 1958). Schubert (1959) attempted a reasonably precise replication of Kort's methodology and thus faced many of the same problems. Improvement was to come. Ulmer (1964) used an ad hoc formula but did manage to keep the number of variables less than the number of cases. Kort (1963) did the same by using factor analysis and then estimating the coefficients in his model through least squares regression. Ulmer (1969) used discriminant analysis to distinguish Frankfurter's civil liberties decisions by subject area, but his study was somewhat limited in that it could not tell us how Frankfurter would vote within double jeopardy, or search and seizure. Kort (1973) later demonstrated that discriminant analysis, which takes into account the dichotomous nature of the Supreme Court's decisions, is more appropriate than linear regression techniques.

Search and Seizure

In order to specify a decision-making model, I review briefly the Court's major search and seizure findings. The most basic requirements for a search to be reasonable are a warrant and probable cause. Probable cause is generally required whether there is[5] or is not a warrant.[6] Warrants require a finding of probable cause,[7] by a neutral and detached magistrate,[8] supported by oath or affirmation,[9] and particularly describing the place to be searched[10] and the things to be seized.[11]

For a search to be unreasonable, it generally must occur at a place where the accused has an "expectation of privacy."[12] The greatest expectation of privacy is in one's home. "At the very core (of the Fourth Amendment) stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."[13] Commercial premises are likewise given great protection. "The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business from unreasonable official entries."[14] Yet as Lafave (1978) notes, "commercial premises are not as private as residential premises" (vol. 1, p. 338). Still receiving protection, but in lesser amounts, are one's person[15] and one's car,[16] but these are nonetheless great compared to the protection one receives when the search takes place in an area in which he has no property interest,[17] such as the home of a third person. Further, the less intrusive an actual search is, the less the justification that is needed. For example, other things being equal, a frisk is more reasonable than a full search,[18] as is detentive questioning.[19]

Finally, because most searches that are brought before the court are in fact warrantless, we must consider exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements. The first of these is the right to search incident to a lawful arrest. From 1950 through 1969, this included the right to search the person of the arrestee and the entire premises where the arrest occurred. This was limited in 1969 to include only the person and the area within his immediate control.[20] When a search occurs after, but not incident to, a lawful arrest, the Court has been split on the need for a warrant.[21] The end result has been that such searches are more reasonable than searches without a lawful arrest. An unlawful arrest cannot add to the reasonableness of a search, but it does not necessarily make the search any more unreasonable[22] unless it was dependent on that arrest.

A second mitigating factor concerns permission by those who have a property interest in the place to be searched, including the suspect,[23] a cohabitant,[24] and any participant to a wiretapped conversation.[25] Other mitigating circumstances include searches after hot pursuit,[26] searches at fixed or functional borders,[27] searches statutorily allowed pursuant to Congress's authority to regulate business,[28] and searches for evidence to be used solely in administrative[29] or grand jury hearings.[30] Seizures of objects in plain view are generally permitted.[31]

Thus the Court considers three categories of this information when deciding the reasonableness of a search. The first category involves the prior justification for the search, including the probable-cause and warrant requirements. Another category is the nature of the search itself: where the search took place, and the extent of the intrusion (i.e., a full search v. a stop-and-frisk or other limited intrusion). The Court also considers the exceptions to the probable-cause and warrant requirements. The more prior justification and the more exceptions associated with a search, the more reasonable it is. The more intrusive a search is, the less reasonable it is. Although cases often have idiosyncratic factors that affect the Court's decision, and the above factors do not determine the Court's resolution of any case, they should strongly predispose the Court toward finding the search reasonable or unreasonable.

Specification

The model will be specified using the above information about the reasonableness of the search, with one limit and one addition. The limit is that the value of all variables used must be known before the Court's decision is released. For example, the Supreme Court's decision on whether there was probable cause or whether an arrest was lawful cannot be used because, first, we do not know whether or not the Supreme Court's decision on probable cause precedes its decision on the reasonableness of the search. Thus we do not know whether the Court's decision on probable cause contributes to its decision on the reasonableness of the search or merely justifies that decision. Even if this were not a problem, the Supreme Court's decision on probable cause obviously cannot be used for prediction because its value is not known until the day the Court renders its decision. For probable cause and the lawfulness of an arrest, the lower court decisions are used as indicators. Further, while coding the lower court's subjective facts, each of its objective facts were compared to the Supreme Court's statement of facts. For the rare difference in interpretation of the facts as set out by the trial court, the lower court's interpretation was used, in order not to bias the results. Thus, all facts are as they are stated in the lower court decision.

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[5] *United States* v. *Harris,* 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
[6] *Chambers* v. *Maroney,* 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
[7] *Aquilar* v. *Texas,* 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
[8] *Coolidge* v. *New Hampshire,* 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
[9] *Whiteley* v. *Warden,* 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
[10] *United States* v. *Ventrusca,* 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
[11] *Marron* v. *United States,* 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
[12] *Katz* v. *United States,* 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[13] *Silverman* v. *United States,* 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
[14] See v. *City of Seattle,* 387 U.S. 54 (1967).
[15] *Davis* v. *Mississippi,* 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
[16] *Carroll* v. *United States,* 414 U.S. 132 (1925).
[17] *United States* v. *Calandra,* 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
[18] *Terry* v. *Ohio,* 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
[19] *United States* v. *Mendenhall,* 64 L.Ed. 497 (1980).
[20] *Chimel* v. *California,* 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
[21] *Chambers* v. *Maroney,* 399 U.S. 752 (1970).
[22] *Davis* v. *Mississippi,* 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
[23] *Schneckloth* v. *Bustamonte,* 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
[24] *Frazier* v. *Cupp,* 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
[25] On *Lee* v. *United States,* 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
[26] *Warden* v. *Hayden,* 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
[27] *United States* v. *Ramsey,* 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
[28] *Collonade Catering* v. *United States,* 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
[29] *Wyman* v. *James,* 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
[30] *United States* v. *Calandra,* 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
[31] *Coolidge* v. *New Hampshire,* 493 U.S. 443 (1971).

Additionally, rather than assume, as Kort (1957) and others have, that changes in membership do not affect the Court's decisions, the model explicitly takes these changes into account. As the Court's membership changed with the Nixon and Ford appointees, one would quite reasonably expect the search and seizure decisions of the Court to have become more conservative even after controlling for the facts of the case (for example, see Wasby, 1976).

Dependent Variable

Reasonableness of the Search

The decision of the Court in a search or seizure case is coded 1 if the Court either found a search to be reasonable or allowed questionably obtained evidence to be used; if not, it is coded 0. Thus, the smaller or more negative the estimate for an independent variable, the more that variable leads to the finding of an unreasonable search. The larger the estimate for an independent variable, the more that variable leads to the finding of a reasonable search.

Independent Variables

Nature of the Intrusion

Home. When the search or seizure took place at the home of the defendant, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. The estimate is predicted to be negative.

Business. When the search or seizure took place at the business of the defendant, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. The estimate is predicted to be negative, but less negative than home.

Car. When the search took place in the car of the defendant, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. The estimate is predicted to be negative, but less negative than business.

Person. When the search or seizure took place on the person of the defendant in public, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. The estimate is predicted to be negative, but less negative than business.

When all of these variables are 0, the search occurred where the defendant had no property interest.[32]

Extent of the Intrusion

Search. A full search or seizure is 1; limited intrusions such as a stop and frisk or detentive questioning are 0. The estimate is predicted to be negative.

Prior Justification

Warrant. When a search or arrest took place after a warrant had been obtained, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. The estimate is predicted to be positive.[33]

Probable Cause. The proportion of lower court judges finding probable cause. The estimate is predicted to be positive.

Arrest

Incident Lawful is the proportion of lower court judges finding that the search took place incident to a lawful arrest. The estimate is predicted to be positive.

After Lawful. The proportion of lower court judges finding that the search took place after but not incident to a lawful arrest. The estimate is predicted to be positive, but less than incident lawful.

Unlawful is the proportion of lower court judges finding that the search took place incident to or after an unlawful arrest. The estimate is predicted to be substantively and statistically insignificant. When all of the Arrest variables are 0, the search took place without a prior arrest.

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[32] Although it is true that within each of these categories further categorization can take place, one is nevertheless faced with the task of constructing a model that is reasonably parsimonious. Some variance must be left to the error term. It is felt that no serious distortions have taken place.

[33] A *valid* warrant will almost certainly make a search reasonable, regardless of other factors. However, since we cannot know in advance whether a warrant is valid, only some warrants (and we don't know which) will make a search valid. Thus the existence of a warrant makes a search more likely to be reasonable.

Exceptions. Because the probability of any of the following exceptions is quite small and there is no reason to believe that any one exception is more significant than another, an exceptions variable was created that takes on the value of the number of the following questions that can be answered positively; it can range from 0 to 6, but in fact ranged from 0 to 3.

Was the search or seizure after hot pursuit?
Was the search or seizure at a fixed or functional border?
Was the search statutorily allowed pursuant to Congress's authority to regulate business?
Was the evidence seized used solely for administrative or grand jury hearings?
Was the seized evidence in plain view?
Was permission for the search granted by either the defendant or a cohabitant?

The estimate is predicted to be positive.

Change takes on the value 0 during the Warren Court, 1 after Burger was appointed, 2 after Blackmun was appointed, 4 after Rehnquist and Powell were jointly appointed, and 5 after Stevens was appointed. The estimate is expected to be positive.[34]

Results

Because least squares regression is inappropriate when the dependent variable can only be measured dichotomously (Pindyk & Rubinfeld, 1976), the parameters were estimated for the variables specified above by probit, a maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) technique. The MLEs represent the change in the cumulative normal probability function, which itself has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, that results from a one-unit change in the independent variable. The MLEs divided by the standard errors have a *Z* distribution and are thus amenable to classical hypothesis testing. (For those seeking further information, Aldrich and Cnudde (1975) provide an excellent summary.) The results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Probit Estimates for Search and Seizure Decisions

Variable	MLE	S.E.	MLE/S.E.
Home	−2.31	.61	−3.78***
Business	−2.19	.64	−3.41***
Car	−2.02	.63	−3.21***
Person	−1.28	.54	−2.37**
Search	− .77	.44	−1.76*
Warrant	.95	.45	2.14*
Probable cause	− .32	.38	− .84
Incident lawful arrest	2.30	.81	2.84**
After lawful arrest	1.22	.50	2.47**
After unlawful arrest	− .57	.63	− .91
Exceptions	1.36	.35	3.91***
Change	.16	.07	2.26*
Constant	1.34		
Est R^2	.57		
$-2 \times$ LLR (X^2_{12})	56.68**		
Mean of dependent variable	.55		
% categorized correctly	76		
$n = 123$			

*Significant at .05.
**Significant at .01.
***Significant at .001.

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[34] The operationalization of this variable is the result of the observed pattern of appointments to the Court. Had Carter received any appointments, a difference measure would have to have been used.

As can be seen, the model does a good job of explaining the Court's decisions. Looking at the summary measures, we note that the overall significance of the model, as determined by $-2 \times \text{LLR}$, is significant at less than .01. The results clearly cannot be explained by chance alone. The estimated R^2 of .57 shows that the model fits rather well.

The mean of the dependent variable is .54; that is, the Supreme Court voted conservatively in 54% of its search and seizure cases. With no further information, one could predict the Court's decisions 54% of the time. By adding the independent variables, predictive accuracy has increased to 76%, a 48% reduction in error.

The parameter estimates are, with the exception of probable cause, as expected, including expectations about magnitude as well as direction. First we examine the variables that determine the nature of the intrusion, starting with where the search took place. It is quite clear that it is important to have a property interest in the area that was searched; overall, the court overturned only two of 12 searches in which the defendant did not have a property interest. The large estimates for the remaining place variables point this out. In comparisons among places in which the defendant has a property interest we see, as expected, that one's home gets the most protection. A search of one's home compared with a search where one does not have a property interests, results in the subtraction of 2.31 S.D. from the cumulative normal probability function when determining whether the search is reasonable. A search that had a probability of being upheld of .85 if it took place at the home of another (a fair guess for such a search) would have a probability of .10 of being upheld if the same search had taken place at the defendant's home.

Almost as high is the protection afforded when the search takes place at one's business. Compared to the same baseline (no property interest), 2.19 would be subtracted from the cumulative normal if an otherwise similar search took place at one's place of business. Also quite high, but again slightly lower, is the protection one gets in one's car. The search of one's car leads to a decrease of 2.02 S.D. from the cumulative normal. A search of one's person receives markedly less protection; 1.28 would be subtracted from the cumulative normal. A search that had a probability of being upheld of .85 if it took place where the defendant had no property interest (a search of a third person leading to discovery of the defendant's contraband, for example) would have a probability of being upheld of .41 if the search had instead been on the defendant's person.

The distinction between a "full search" and a "limited intrusion" is the second aspect of the nature of the search. Although 71% of the limited intrusions were upheld, only 53% of the full searches were sustained. A stop and frisk that has a probability of .70 of being upheld would as a full search have a probability of .40 of being upheld.

Against the factors that make a search more unreasonable must be weighed those factors that will make a search more reasonable. In terms of prior justification for a search, the two most important factors are having a warrant and probable cause. The existence of a warrant adds .95 to the cumulative probability function. Controlling for other variables shows that a search that had a probability of .5 of being reasonable without a warrant has a probability of being reasonable of .83 with a warrant.

The probable-cause variable did not fare as well. As discussed earlier, probable cause cannot be operationalized as the Supreme Court's decision on probable cause because its value is not known before the Court's opinion is released and, more important, because the Court's decision on probable cause is not clearly independent of its decision on the reasonableness of the search. As such, probable cause was operationalized as the lower court's decision on probable cause, which proved to be a not very reliable indicator. The estimate of −.32, although substantively small and statistically insignificant, suggests a negative relationship between a lower court finding of probable cause and the reasonableness of the search. The Supreme Court did, however, uphold 53% of the searches in which it did not find probable cause, as opposed to 65% of the searches in which it did. Probable cause is undoubtedly important; the trouble remains in trying to operationalize it.

Although probable cause and a warrant often help make an otherwise unreasonable search reasonable, searches can still be judged reasonable without them. The Supreme Court has taken note of several exceptions to the probable-cause and warrant requirements. The most important of these involves the right to search incident to an arrest. Table 1 shows clearly that when the lower court finds that a search took place incident to a lawful arrest, as compared to a search that was not preceded by an arrest, the Supreme Court will quite likely find the search to be reasonable. The cumulative normal probability function is increased by 2.30 S.D. A search that would have a probability of .50 of being upheld if there were no arrest would have a .99 probability of being upheld if incident to a lawful arrest. If the search were after, but not incident to, a lawful arrest, the probability would increase greatly but not quite as much. The parameter estimate of 1.22 would increase the probability of reasonableness from .50 to .89.

The value for an unlawful arrest was expected to be zero. An unlawful arrest certainly cannot justify an otherwise unreasonable search, but it also seems plausible that such an arrest should not make an otherwise reasonable search unreasonable. The estimate of -.57 is statistically insignificant, yet if this is the true value, it would have a moderate affect on the reasonableness of a search. A search that had a probability of .50 of being reasonable without an arrest has only a probability of .28 of being reasonable if preceded by an unlawful arrest.

The other exceptions were added together to form an exceptions variable. For each exception found in a case, 1.36 is added to the cumulative normal probability function. The typical effect is not much different from that of a search after a lawful arrest.

Finally, I have suggested that we must be concerned with at least one factor that does not directly affect the reasonableness of a search: change in the Court's membership. The change variable, which ranges from 0 to 5, is 0 during the Warren Court and increases by 1 for each Nixon and Ford appointee. The full difference between the Warren Court and the Burger Court after the appointment of Stevens is .80 (.16 × 5). A search that for the Warren Court had a probability of .38 of being upheld (they in fact upheld 38% of the searches before them) would have a probability of .69 of being upheld by the Burger Court. A search that for the Warren Court had a probability of being upheld of .50 would have a probability of .79 of being upheld by the pre-O'Connor Burger Court. It is interesting to note that a search with a warrant during the Warren Court would be almost as likely to be upheld as a similar search without a warrant by the pre-O'Connor Burger Court.

The United States as a Party to the Suit. Thus far only legal variables are considered in the model, those that relate directly to the reasonableness of the search, and one variable that measures changes in the Court's personnel, which is included not because it helps to gauge the reasonableness of a search, but because it helps to gauge the given Court's belief about the reasonableness of a search. It is possible, however, that the Court's decisions in search and seizure cases are concerned with more than the reasonableness of the search; there might be extralegal factors unrelated to the reasonableness of the search that nevertheless affect the Court's decisions.

Rokeach (1968) has argued that attitudes involve both an attitude toward an object (AO) and an attitude toward a situation (AS). Spaeth and Parker (1969) have shown this to have relevance to Supreme Court decisions. In the search and seizure cases the situation is obviously a search, a seizure, or both. The objects conducting the search are either state or federal officials. It therefore might be interesting to question whether the Court acts differently when the United States is a party to the suit.[35]

Much has been written claiming that the Supreme Court's responsiveness to the United States as a party is a vital factor in the Court's decision to grant certiorari (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1963). Does this favorable predisposition carry over to final decisions? Analysis by Spaeth and Teger (1982) shows the Court supporting the government 69.7% of the time in the 1966-1967 terms and 67.8% of the time in the 1969-1973 terms. Throughout these terms, only Douglas supported the federal government less than half of the time. The general support trend holds for criminal procedure cases. These and other studies showing support for the federal government as opposed to its adversaries are enlightening and might lead us to believe that in our search and seizure cases the Court may, on the whole, be predisposed to favor the government. But before we can use this information to help us explain specific Court decisions, we must have a point of comparison. In our population of search and seizure cases, those cases that do not involve the federal government do involve the state government. Our question is not whether the Supreme Court is more favorable to the United States than its adversaries; rather, we are concerned with whether the Supreme Court is more favorable to the federal government than it is to the states.

The model was rerun including a dummy that measured when the United States was a party to the suit. A comparison of the two models is presented in Table 2. Although the estimated R^2 barely improved and the percentage of cases categorized correctly did not improve, the overall fit of the model, as measured by $-2 \times \text{LLR}$, represents a statistically significant improvement over the fit of the first model (see Aldrich, 1977). Furthermore, the point estimate of .59 is of moderate size and is statistically significant. A state search that had a probability of .50 of being upheld would have a probability of .72 of being upheld if it had been a federal case. What is so important about this finding is that it is the result *after* the facts of the case have been taken into account. The preference given to the United States does not

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[35] Although other factors such as race or social class might have some influence, they do not seem to be salient for search and seizure decisions. This point is supported by Spaeth and Parker (1969), who found that Warren Court did not decide cases on the basis of whether or not the litigants were black. In addition, such information is contained neither in the Supreme Court's nor the lower court's statement of facts.

Table 2. Probit Estimates With and Without the United States as a Variable

	Without U.S.	With U.S.
Home	−2.31***	−2.12***
Business	−2.19***	−2.06***
Car	−2.02***	−1.86**
Person	−1.28**	−1.15*
Search	− .77*	− .91*
Warrant	.95*	.94*
Probable cause	− .32	− .29
Incident lawful arrest	2.30**	2.30**
After lawful arrest	1.22**	1.34**
Unlawful arrest	− .57	− .33
Exceptions	1.36***	1.23***
Change	.16*	.16*
U.S.	–	.59*
Summary Statistics with U.S.		
Constant	1.07	
Est R^2	.58	
$-2 \times$ LLR (X^2_{13})	57.51**	
Mean of dependent variable	.55	
% categorized correctly	76	
$n = 123$		

*Significant at .05.
**Significant at .01.
***Significant at .001.

appear to be the result of federal searches being less severe than state searches.

The Residuals. The first model correctly categorized 76% of the Court's decisions. As Table 3 shows, the model predicted the Court's conservative decisions (81% correctly categorized) more accurately than its liberal decisions (67% categorized correctly). Table 4 shows what happens when the predictions are broken down by Court. The Warren Court's decisions were predicted with significantly greater accuracy: 86% to 70%. for the Warren Court, 12 of 15 conservative decisions were categorized correctly, as were 24 of 27 liberal decisions. The Burger Court's conservative decisions were predicted with the same degree of accuracy as the Warren Court's, but only 14 of the 28 liberal Burger Court decisions were correctly categorized.

Predicting from the Model: The 1981 Term. It is one thing to fit a line to previous behavior; it is quite another if that line fits future behavior as well. The original model was applied to the search and seizure decisions of the October 1981 term. This set involves seven different decisions over five different cases. (Two of the cases had two distinct decisions.) Five of the decisions were conservative, two were liberal. The model predicted all five of the conservative decisions correctly and one of the two liberal decisions. The incorrect prediction involved the admissibility of a voluntary confession made after an unlawful arrest. To the 5-4 majority, the confession could not be admitted because it was the result of an unlawful seizure. Although we are dealing with a limited population, that six of seven cases were predicted correctly suggests that the model has predictive as well as explanatory value.

Discussion

The parameter estimates are certainly interesting, but great care must be taken in interpreting them. Since dummy variables were used, it is important not to compare the magnitude of the coefficients without considering the baseline from which they were measured. For the prior justification variables, the arrest variables, and the exceptions variable, the baseline was zero. When prob-

Table 3. Predicted Decisions Compared with Actual Decisions[a]

Predicted	Actual Conservative	Actual Liberal	Total
Conservative	55 (81%)	17 (33%)	72
Liberal	13 (19%)	38 (67%)	51
Total	68	55	123

[a] 76% of the decisions were predicted correctly.

able cause had the value zero, there was no probable cause; when the arrest variables all had the value zero, there was no arrest. Compare this to the search variable; when the search variable was zero, there was no search, but there still was some form of intrusion. If we were measuring this from a baseline of no intrusion the value would be very large, because if there were no intrusion, it would be extremely doubtful that the search could be unreasonable. Alternatively, consider the variables that measure where the search took place; they all take on the value zero when the search occurred where the defendant does not have a property interest. The value for *home* is not so large because one's home receives extraordinary amounts of protection, but, relatively speaking, because it receives much more protection than areas over which one has no property interest.

The above notwithstanding, the parameter estimates tell us quite a bit about the Supreme Court's search and seizure decisions. Although one's home seems to have more protection than one's business, which in turn has slightly more protection than one's car, the differences are not as substantial as one might have supposed. A search of a home that has a probability of .50 of being upheld would have a probability of .61 of being upheld if it instead were a search of a car. This factor certainly affects the reasonableness of the search, but compared to other factors that can intervene, it is far from determinative. Other points might seem to belabor the obvious—it is better to have a warrant than not to, full searches are inherently less reasonable than a stop and frisk—yet these points have not heretofore been demonstrated empirically.

It must be noted that, as in other areas of political inquiry, prediction will not work as well as retrodiction. The parameter estimates are derived so as best to fit the existing data set, not future ones. Also, the model is unable to predict what tomorrow's exceptions will be. The good faith exception, for example, may or may not dramatically change the Court's decision making. The model obviously cannot predict changes in doctrine. Finally, changes in the Court's membership can always have untold consequences. This fact should not, however, keep us from trying.

Conclusions

The results presented herein are very pleasing. It seems as if the model has taken one of the Court's most difficult areas, one characterized as "inconsistent," "bedeviling," and even "a mess"

Table 4. Predicted Decisions Compared with Actual Decisions, Controlling for Court

Predicted	Actual Conservative	Actual Liberal	Total
Warren Court[a]			
Conservative	12 (80%)	3 (11%)	15
Liberal	3 (20%)	24 (89%)	27
Total	15	27	42
Burger Court[b]			
Conservative	43 (81%)	14 (50%)	57
Liberal	10 (19%)	14 (50%)	24
Total	53	28	81

[a] 86% of these cases were predicted correctly.
[b] 70% of these cases were predicted correctly.

and found for the first time a clear and logical form. The legal model was quite satisfactory, yet evidence suggests that the Court is not immune from considering extralegal characteristics too.

Perhaps the reason for the bedevilment is that those who have been bedeviled have been too reliant on the case method as the means for analyzing these decisions. Such reliance seems reasonable enough. The opinion delivered in any given decision more often than not relies upon a single aspect of the case, for example, was there probable cause, or is a search several hours after a lawful arrest reasonable? Yet the decision itself is dependent upon many factors—presumably those mentioned above—that go largely undiscussed in the main body of the opinion. In a probable cause determination, it is all very well to know that probable cause was sufficiently established, but when it comes to understanding the decision itself, we must know where the search took place, the extent of the intrusion, and whether any exceptions were present, as well as the makeup of the Court.

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The Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable

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In the period from 1947 to 1976, the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in more than half the cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedent or intercircuit conflict. In both instances, the denial rate has been higher in the Burger Court than in the Vinson and Warren Courts, and denial has been greater for intercircuit conflict cases than for cases in which the ruling in the lower court was in conflict with one or more Supreme Court precedents. When conflict was conceptualized as a predictor of decision and examined along with federal government as petitioning party, economic issues, and civil liberty issues, it was found to have 4 to 7 times the predictive power of the other variables combined for the Vinson and Warren Courts. For the Burger Court, the petitioning party variable was found to be a better predictor than conflict, but conflict was a much better predictor than the subject variables. Discriminant function models using the four predictor variables were able to account for up to 36.9% of the variance in the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions, almost all of which was the result of the contributions made by the conflict and party factors.

In 1916, William Howard Taft recommended that the Supreme Court be given "absolute and arbitrary discretion" to grant or deny certiorari.[1] In 1984, the Court's discretion in this area is essentially absolute. But one must assume that such discretion is not exercised arbitrarily; otherwise the Court could not maintain the support of the Bench, the Bar, political leaders, and other publics so essential to its effectiveness in the American political system. In this article I investigate some of the nonarbitrary considerations that guide the Court in the exercise of its discretionary powers.

In selecting cases for plenary review, the Court constructs a plenary case agenda. How that agenda is derived has significant consequences for public policymaking in the United States. In many instances this agenda-building process determines what and whose problems are to be given national attention, discussion in the media, and possible resolution. When the Court declines to place a social, legal, or personal problem on its plenary case agenda, it may make resolution of the problem impossible because many supplicants have already sought and failed to get relief from the political branches of government. If resolution is still possible in the political branches, the failure of the Court to call the issue to center stage can have consequences for success in other policymaking arenas.

Some of those who have sought to explain the Court's agenda-building processes in this area have used traditional legal methods (Stern & Gressman, 1978). Others have constructed theoretical and statistical models of decision making to account for variation in the decisions to grant and deny certiorari (Brenner, 1979; Songer, 1979; Teger & Kosinski, 1980). The work falling in the first category is unsatisfactory because it utilizes small data bases, employs literary and essay approaches, and uses neither common nor systematic methods to derive its inferences. Moreover, the inferences drawn are so hedged with words like "ordinarily" and "usually" as to make precise meaning difficult to decipher. Most important, that work simply does not address certain questions of great interest to those who seek a better understanding of how the Court constructs its plenary case agenda. Indeed, it is precisely such shortcomings that have encouraged political scientists to apply more systematic theories and methods to the analysis of the problem.[2]

The work in this article is in the political science tradition. I go beyond earlier work by investigating concepts and variables not previously included in the systematic models, by using a dynamic perspective across a 30-year period, a data base many times larger than any previously used, and more powerful statistical methods than those generally

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[1] See Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926) for Taft's views on executive power.

[2] For work that falls between the extremes depicted, see Provine (1980).

found in the recent literature. My emphasis on comparative strengths of relationships also sets my work apart from much of the recent analyses in this area. The use of an enlarged data base and more powerful methods increases confidence in the inferences drawn from the analysis, but more important, I raise and answer important questions about plenary case agenda-building in the Supreme Court that have not been raised and answered in earlier work.

Discretionary Review and the Uniformity of Law

In theory, federal laws and the federal constitution are national in scope, granting and restricting rights and duties and allocating values equitably in all sections of the country. But a lower court decision in conflict with a Supreme Court precedent is good law until overruled, and intercircuit conflict among federal Courts of Appeals involves decisions that are binding in the circuits of origin until the Supreme Court speaks. Thus, uniformity of federal law is far from a certainty.[3]

With the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (PL 97-164) in 1982, with jurisdiction to resolve intercircuit conflict in patent law, Congress showed its sensitivity to the uniformity principle. Carving out a particular subject for national adjudication by a specialized court, however, does not do much to alleviate the more general problem of intercircuit conflict in many other subject areas. Such conflicts have clearly identifiable consequences.

At one time or another, courts of appeals have held that 1) under federal law, a bank robber who perpetrates a kidnapping while robbing a national bank commits one offense (U.S. v. Faleafine, Ninth Cir.) and commits two offenses (Clark v. U.S., Tenth Cir.); 2) under the Internal Revenue Code, the legal expenses of a corporate liquidation are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense (U.S. v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., Tenth Cir.) and not deductible (Lanrao Inc. v. U.S., Sixth Cir.); and 3) conviction for making a threat against the President of the United States requires proof that the defendant intended to carry out the threat (U.S. v. Patillo, Fourth Cir.) and does not require such proof (Watts v. U.S., D.C. Cir.).

As long as they are allowed to stand, such conflicts mean, inter alia, that the robber of a national bank is in less jeopardy in one circuit than in another; that the United States Tax Court, whose decisions are appealable to the Courts of Appeals, would have to grant a deduction in one circuit but not in another; and that it is safer to threaten the President in one circuit than in another.[4] When it is recognized that such conflicts are multiplied many times across the circuits and that they can exist for many years, the complexity of the problem is easily appreciated.

Violations of the uniformity principle are subject to review by the Supreme Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. Whether the Court will review any particular violation or class of violations is another matter. Erwin Griswold has recently remarked that "No one knows for sure why the

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[3] The importance of this principle was cogently expressed in 1816 by Justice Story. Writing in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Story recognized that different judges might interpret federal law differently. Thus, a reviewing authority was necessary. If there were no such authority, he said, "to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties and the Constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might perhaps, never receive the same construction, obligation or efficacy in any two states. The possible mischief that might attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable." (p. 348) This principle has been approvingly reiterated throughout the history of our judicial system, most recently by Justices Stevens (1982), Brennan (1982), and White (1982). Uniformity of judgments has always been a major justification for a national Supreme Court. See 21 Cong. Rec. 3407 for comments on this point. Chief Justice Taft is on record as believing that conflicts between intermediate appellate courts and the Supreme Court should be reviewed and resolved (Taft, 1925) and that a major function of the Supreme Court is "to preserve uniformity of decision among the intermediate Courts of Appeal" (1922, p. 2). He also felt that the Supreme Court had an obligation "to furnish precedents for the inferior courts in future ligitation" (Richardson, 1916, pp. 7523-7524). Compare Frankfurter's remark that "to resolve conflicts among coordinate appellate tribunals and to determine matters of national concern are the essential functions of the Supreme Court (Frankfurter & Landis, 1927, p. 257).

[4] As for the circuits not mentioned in the above examples, they are free to choose among the conflicting precedents. Thus, a conflict initially generated by two courts of appeals may lead to an intolerable jurisprudential mess. In addition, the consequences of conflict across courts have broader ramifications. Even if the Supreme Court eventually resolves a conflict, the delay that is occasioned often runs to many years. In the interim, the legal system is plagued by forum shopping, uncertainty, and repetitive litigation, often at the expense of citizens with sparse resources and to the advantage of those who have the ability to exploit the anomalies in the system. Furthermore, to the extent that the Supreme Court reviews conflict cases on its limited plenary docket, it must decline to review other cases that may be of social or legal significance. This encroachment on the review capacity is not an insignificant consideration in a situation in which the Court can, at most, review plenarily less than 5% of the cases brought to it.

Supreme Court lets in litigants. . . . Review is now a matter of grace; it's like the royal prerogative in England" (quoted in the American Bar Association Journal, 1983). Griswold does not except cases that violate the uniformity principle. Recently, Feeney (1975) identified 66 direct conflicts in the Court's 1971 term and 70 in the 1972 term that were denied review by the Court. In addition, it is not certain that conflict cases granted review received the grant for conflict reasons.

The Research Problem

To summarize, the uniformity of court rulings on federal questions is important to the functioning of our legal and political systems. The structure of our court system, however, assures that the uniformity principle will be frequently violated. The Supreme Court can correct such violations via the use of its discretionary jurisdiction to review lower court decisions. Indeed the Court is expected to do so, and it does so on a number of occasions each term. Similarly, in each term the Court allows a sizable number of conflicting lower court rulings to stand by declining to review them, which has led to various suggestions designed to alleviate the problem. Intelligent discussion in this whole area, however, tends to be hindered by lack of knowledge. We do not know, for example, how frequently the Supreme Court grants and denies plenary review of conflict cases, nor do we know how much weight the Court attaches to conflict as a reason for granting discretionary review, or whether such weights have varied across Courts.

Although one would be bold indeed to suggest that the precise amount of importance the Court attaches to conflict is discoverable, I believe it possible to go beyond the heavily caveated generalizations in the legal literature. The need to do so defines my research problem. I wish to know not just how many conflict cases are granted or denied certiorari, but whether such decisions are associated with the presence and absence of the conflict condition. Furthermore, I wish to know whether the associations discovered hold over time and whether they hold when isolated from other explanatory factors.

Orienting Questions

I examine the problem via three orienting questions:

Is the Supreme Court significantly more likely to grant plenary review of cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedent than cases in which such conflict is absent?

Is the Supreme Court significantly more likely to grant plenary review of Courts of Appeals cases, the rulings in which are in conflict with other circuit court decisions, than Courts of Appeals cases in which conflict is absent?

Have the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts differed in the way they have handled cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedents or conflicts in the circuits?

Data Selection and Operationalization Procedures

The data encompass the 1947-1976 terms of the Court, that is, the last five terms of the Vinson Court, the 16 terms of the Warren Court, and the first eight terms of the Burger Court. In this 30-year period, a 10 to 20% random sample of the Court's paid docket was drawn. Owing to the relatively few instances in which the Court grants plenary review, however, random sampling of granted cases was repeated until 88 to 100% of such cases had been selected and coded.

Within these samples, all cases granted and denied certiorari were isolated and weighted to reflect the ratio of total certiorari grants and denials for each of our three Courts. The procedure was straightforward for the 1947-1969 terms because the number of grants and denials is available from published sources. Since the 1969 term, however, the Supreme Court has not compiled a breakdown of certorari cases; that is, certiorari cases have not been separated in the statistics compiled by the Supreme Court Clerk from the cases brought on appeal.[5] Consequently, the ratio used for the Burger Court was derived from a count of the certiorari cases in 1969, 1973, and 1976 terms. The ratio for these three terms was then used in analyzing the eight Burger terms. The weights actually utilized were: Vinson Court—3.76; Warren Court—6.26; and Burger Court—10.55. All analyses and tables use the weighted samples. The weighting procedures allowed me to control for variation in the raw sample categories.

The general hypothesis to be explored is that the decision to grant or deny certiorari—a purely discretionary act—is associated with the presence or absence of a civil liberty claim, an economic issue, the federal government as petitioning party, and conflict (intercircuit or with Supreme Court precedent). This model is dictated by the literature. Tanenhaus (1981) found that federal government as a petitioning party or the presence of a civil liberty claim increased the probability of certiorari being granted during the Court's 1947-1958 terms. Although generally rejecting cue theory, Teger and Kosinski (1980) replicated Tanenhaus's results for the 1975 term. They also resurrected and showed the significance of a cue rejected by Tanenhaus, the presence or absence of an economic issue. The economic issue, conceptualized as a policy cue, was also shown by Songer (1979) to be of some consequence for the Courts sitting in the 1935, 1941, 1967, and 1972 terms. In addition, in a recent article (Ulmer, 1983), conflict with Supreme Court precedent was shown to be significantly associated with the Court's review decisions. Thus, my hypothesis encompasses earlier findings. My primary interest, however, is in determining whether conflict has any explanatory power apart from that provided by the other factors mentioned above.

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[5] Verified by letter to the author from Edward C. Schade, Assistant Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, March 31, 1983.

To test my hypothesis, it is necessary to define conflict; it is not enough to say I know it when I see it. Feeney (1975) has remarked about the difficulty of isolating conflict from nonconflict cases. In the final analysis, only the Supreme Court can determine whether or not conflict is present in a case situation and whether the conflict is direct or indirect, significant or insignificant, but rather than join the throw-up-the-hands school, I have confronted the problem head on.

For purposes of this article, I have followed Feeney's lead. He defined four categories in his examination of the problem:

> 1) Direct conflict—a case in which the decision below deals with the same explicit point as some other case and reaches a contradictory result.
>
> 2) Strong partial conflict—a case in which the decision below is in the same general area of the law as some other case and where the implications of the doctrine followed in one case would compel an opposite result in the other.
>
> 3) Weak partial conflict—a case in which there is some degree of legitimacy to the claim of conflict but where the conflict is more attenuated than in the strong partial category.
>
> 4) No genuine conflict—a case in which a conflict is claimed but in which examination indicates no genuine inconsistency in outcome or doctrine. (Feeney, 1975, p. 97)

For my purposes, these categories have been collapsed into two: genuine conflict and no genuine conflict.

Analysis of Petitioning Party Claims

My first step was to identify all cases in which attorneys petitioning for certiorari claimed that the decision being questioned established a conflict with a Supreme Court precedent or an intercircuit conflict. On doing this, I discovered that petitioning attorneys are not reluctant to claim conflict. Indeed, in many instances, they claimed that the questioned decision below conflicted with six or more different precedents. Table 1 provides the relevant breakdowns.

Table 1 shows that a petitioning attorney was most likely to claim conflict with one or more Supreme Court precedents when petitioning the Warren Court and least likely to make such a claim when petitioning the Vinson Court. However, in all three Courts, conflict was claimed more than half the time. Table 1 also demonstrates a correlation between number of claims per case and percentage of cases. In fact, the correlation for 1 to 5 claims and percentage of cases is 1. In all three Courts, more than 10% of the certiorari applications claimed six or more conflicts. Although the percentage of claims in the Warren Court tracked the percentage of claims in the other two courts, the attorneys petitioning the Warren Court were much more likely to claim six or more conflicts than attorneys in the other two Courts.

Table 1 also shows that petitioning attorneys also varied their claims of intercircuit conflict, being more likely to make the claim to the Warren Court and least likely to the Vinson Court. One may infer from Table 1 that petitioning attorneys perceived the Warren Court as more sensitive to conflict than the Vinson and Burger Courts. The two parts of the table track each other in other respects. However, claims of six or more conflicts were somewhat less when the claimed conflict was intercircuit than when Supreme Court precedents were involved, and although intercircuit conflict was claimed more than half the time in the Warren and Burger Courts, it was claimed less than half the time in the Vinson era.

To claim a conflict is not necessarily to establish that a conflict exists. As noted earlier, attorneys have good reasons to believe that the presence of conflict enhances the probability of discretionary review. Thus, it would not be surprising if petitioning attorneys padded or puffed their claims.[6] At the least, they might be expected to follow the rule for claiming tax deductions—if in doubt, claim it! The numbers in Table 1 suggest quite a bit of puffing of claims. To discount that possibility, I isolated all lower court decisions alleged to establish conflict, reading each in conjunction with the cases alleged to cause the conflicts. In each instance up to three cases were examined.

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[6] One is reminded here of Frankfurter's statement that "on the whole, the bar affords little help in the selection of cases appropriate for the Supreme Court's attention . . . lawyers see cases through their client's eyes." (1900, pp. 257-258).

Table 1. Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedents Claimed by Petitioning Attorneys, All Cases and Courts of Appeals Cases Only

	Number of Conflicts													
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6 or more	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
All cases														
Vinson Court	1575	47	567	17	387	11	241	7	164	5	108	3	338	10
Warren Court	4288	35	2154	17	1664	13	1142	9	789	6	561	4	1749	14
Burger Court	4954	40	2124	17	1654	13	1157	9	627	5	542	4	1220	10
Courts of appeals cases only														
Vinson Court	1359	154	380	15	308	12	150	6	140	5	78	3	123	5
Warren Court	3936	44	1573	18	1186	13	696	8	468	5	358	4	708	8
Burger Court	4115	47	1748	20	951	11	712	8	401	5	269	3	607	7

Note: Percentages are rounded and therefore may not equal 100%.

Table 2. Analysis of Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedents, All Cases and Courts of Appeals Cases Only

	Vinson Court	Warren Court	Burger Court
All cases			
Conflicts claimed	1804	8057	7324
Genuine conflicts	241	1426	1381
Ratio of conflicts claimed to genuine conflicts	7.48	5.65	5.3
Courts of appeals cases only			
Conflicts claimed	1179	4988	4686
Genuine conflicts	231	990	1243
Ratio of conflicts claimed to genuine conflicts	5.10	5.03	3.76

The purpose of this procedure was to separate cases of genuine conflict from those in which conflict was a mere allegation of petitioning attorneys.

Comparing Claimed Conflict with Genuine Conflict

A comparison of genuine and alleged conflict may be made with the data presented in Table 2, which shows that the padding ratio ranges from 4 to 1 to 7 to 1 and that the puffing has been more prevalent in connection with Supreme Court precedents than with intercircuit conflict. Such a conclusion depends, of course, on whether our subjective identification of genuine conflict is accurate. As I remarked earlier, only the Supreme Court can provide an ultimate answer to that question. However, I can compare my figures to the limited counts of conflict reported by Feeney and Chief Justice Burger.

Feeney reports an average of 119 conflict cases in the 1971 and 1972 terms of the Supreme Court. I show an average of 113. Chief Justice Burger has suggested that 35 to 50 intercircuit conflict cases appear currently on the Court's argument docket each term. My sample shows an average across eight Burger Court terms of 32.7. My figures are obviously in the right ball park, and when one notes that Burger's estimate includes appellate cases whereas my count is limited to the certiorari docket, there is added reason to have some confidence in my calculations.

Further examination of Table 2 shows a striking decline in the puffing as one moves from the Vinson to the Burger Court, whether for conflict with Supreme Court precedent or intercircuit conflict. Table 2 also shows that genuine conflict as a percentage of claimed conflict has been less for intercircuit conflict. It is particularly striking that the ratio of claimed to genuine conflict is generally in the same range for all three courts and for both types of conflict. Because initial examination indicated no significant correlations between claimed conflict and the Court's decisions on certiorari, all subsequent analyses are restricted to genuine conflict.

Analysis of Genuine Conflict

In Tables 3 and 4 the cases in which genuine conflict was present or absent have been cross-tabulated with the Court's certiorari decisions for each Court and for each type of conflict. In each of the six comparisons, the certiorari decisions are significantly correlated with conflict, but because significance levels are affected by marginals and large Ns, the Gs (Gammas) are more meaningful statistics. *G* is a proportional reduction in error (PRE) statistic which has a meaning beyond its own class (Kirkpatrick, 1974). It is an ordinal measure of association with tells us how well we can predict the rank order of measures on one variable from the rank order of another. A *G* of 1 indicates that prediction is perfect. A *G* of 0 means that predictive accuracy is only what one would expect from chance. In Table 3, for example, the *G* for the Vinson Court is .930, which means that if we expect one half of our predictions to be correct, the difference between the actually correct and expected correct predictions represents an improvement of 93%. This would be viewed as a high degree of association between conflict and decision.

In Table 3, there is a significant association between Court decision and conflict for all three courts, running from highest for the Vinson Court to lowest for the Burger Court. The three Courts denied from 88 to 93% of the applications when conflict was absent, but from 22 to 73% when conflict was present. The strength of the relationships is quite high in all three cases ranging from a *G* of .745 for the Burger Court to a *G* of .930 for the Vinson Court. We must conclude tentatively

Table 3. Supreme Court Cases with and without Genuine Conflict and Court Decisions to Grant or Deny Certiorari

	Vinson Court		Warren Court		Burger Court	
	Conflict	No conflict	Conflict	No conflict	Conflict	No conflict
Certiorari						
granted	188	357	781	905	368	549
denied	53	2781	645	10,014	1013	10,348
Pearson r	.467		.433		.745	
Gamma	.930		.861		.745	

$p < .001$

that the presence of a conflict with a Supreme Court precedent significantly enhances the probability that the Court will grant certiorari, but the measure of that enhancement is a declining variable. Whereas in the Vinson Court the presence of conflict made chance of review four times the probability of review without conflict, the ratio dropped to 2 to 1 in the Warren era and 1.3 to 1 in the Burger Court.

Table 3 arrays data for conflict with Supreme Court precedent, whereas Table 4 provides comparable data for courts of appeals cases and intercircuit conflict. Here, as in Table 3, there is a significant correlation between conflict and Court decision on certiorari applications. At the same time, several differences between the tables are apparent. First, the correlations are at a lower level across all three Courts. The same is true of measures on the strength of relationships. Nevertheless, prediction of certiorari decisions from information on the presence or absence of intercircuit conflict is dramatically more accurate than chance alone would lead one to expect, the Gammas indicating from 58 to 83% improvement in predictive accuracy. Unlike conflict with Supreme Court precedent, however, that which is intercircuit in nature appears to have been more important for the Warren Court than for the Vinson Court, with the Burger Court bringing up the rear as in Table 3.

Having established that conflict with Supreme Court precedent and intercircuit conflict are both indicators to the Supreme Court's decision on certiorari, one may wonder whether the correlations are spurious. Earlier research has shown that under certain conditions, the presence or absence of civil liberty or economic issues promotes the granting or denial of certiorari, as does federal government or another high status litigant as petitioning party (Ulmer, 1981). However, because conflict has not been isolated, measured, and systematically studied previously, I do not know whether it contributes to the explanatory power previously associated with alternate indicators or whether it contributes to explanation when those earlier variables are statistically controlled.

To answer these questions, I have conducted a series of discriminant function analyses with certiorari decision as the criterion and the other variables as predictors. The two-group discriminant function has been employed. The equation for the function may be stated as follows:

$$Z_i = c_1X_{i1} + c_2X_{i2} + \ldots c_nX_{in},$$

where Z_i is the discriminant function, X repre-

Table 4. Cases Involving Intercircuit Conflict and Court Decisions to Grant or Deny Certiorari

	Vinson Court		Warren Court		Burger Court	
	Conflict	No conflict	Conflict	No conflict	Conflict	No conflict
Certiorari						
granted	130	273	521	741	262	500
denied	101	2033	469	7192	981	7057
Pearson's r	.349		.390		.179	
Gamma	.810		.830		.580	

$p < .001$

sents the predictor variable, and *c* the weight assigned by the discriminant analysis. The analysis assigns weights that will maximize the ratio of the variance resulting from group differences to variation resulting from differences within the group. An easily understood geometric representation of the method may be found in Ulmer (1974).

Basically, the method enables one to distinguish between two groups of cases on the same dimension. Here the two groups are those cases in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari and those cases in which it denied certiorari. The goal is to determine the extent to which a collection of discriminating variables will cluster cases granting certiorari at one end of the continuum and cases denying certiorari at the other. For example, if the grant cases were represented as *G*1 and the deny cases as *G*2, the ability of the weighted discriminating variables to assign cases correctly to the appropriate group would be equivalent to accounting for the variance in the dichotomy: $G1 - G2$. If 100% of the variance were explained by the discriminating variables, then the sum of the weighted scores associated with the discriminating variables would be greater for any *G*1 case than for any *G*2 case, or vice versa, depending on scoring procedures for the discriminating variables. In the present instance, the aim is to ascertain the degree to which variation in the grant-deny patterns can be accounted for by four discriminating variables taken collectively, individually, and in various combinations.

A similarity between discriminant and regression analysis will be noted. However, where the dependent variable is dichotomous (or noncontinuous), discriminant function analysis has been preferred (Kort, 1973). Because my criterion is the granting and denial of certiorari, discriminant function analysis is appropriate.[7]

The most striking aspect of Table 5 is the data for the Burger Court. The levels of explained variance for each of the predictors taken singly are almost identical for the Vinson and Warren Courts. For these two Courts, conflict explains four to eight times as much of the variance in certiorari decision as federal government as petitioning party. For both, civil liberty and economic issues make trivial contributions. For both Courts, conflict with Supreme Court precedent is a better predictor than intercircuit conflict, although the disparity is less in the Warren Court.

The Burger Court, however, is a different story. Taken alone, the federal government as the petitioning party is about as effective a predictor as conflict with Supreme Court precedent, and in courts of appeals cases, it is twice as affective as intercircuit conflict. Thus, there is a distinct break in the patterns established by the Vinson and Warren Courts. The Burger Court also gives trivial weight to economic and civil liberty issues, indeed, even less weight than that assigned by the Vinson and Warren Court justices. Overall, it appears that conflict as a predictor of certiorari decision has been steadily declining in importance as one moves from the Vinson to the Burger Court.

In Table 6, I array the results of applying discriminant function analyses to all variables collectively. The results confirm the suggestion that the

Table 5. Discriminant Analysis of Certiorari Decisions with Four Predictors, All Cases and Courts of Appeals Cases (Percentage of Variance Explained by Variable Alone)

	Vinson Court	Warren Court	Burger Court
All cases			
Federal government	5.4	4.1	19.1
Economic issue	.3	.5	.2
Civil liberty issue	.1	.1	–
Conflict with Supreme Court precedent	33.9	32.8	20.7
Courts of Appeals cases only			
Federal government	5.4	5.1	22.9
Economic issue	.4	.6	.2
Civil liberty issue	–	–	.1
Intercircuit conflict	20.7	27.0	9.5

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[7] For other uses of the discriminant function in research on judicial topics, see Ulmer (1967, 1969) and Talarico (1977).

Table 6. Discriminant Analysis of Certiorari Decisions with Four Predictors, All Cases and Courts of Appeals Cases Only

	Vinson Court		Warren Court		Burger Court	
	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %
All cases						
Federal government	1.564		1.922		5.266	
Civil liberty issue	–	5.7	.051	4.7	.093	19.2
Economic issue	–.297		–.433		–.133	
Conflict with Supreme Court	4.166	36.9	3.308	34.8	2.404	33.8
Cases correctly classified (%)	86.6		87.1		87	
Courts of Appeals cases only						
Federal government	2.047		2.221		6.322	
Civil liberty issue	–.044	5.6	.1013	5.6	–.130	23.2
Economic issue	–.251		–.538		–.457	
Intercircuit conflict	3.338	23.8	3.217	29.3	1.531	29.3
Cases correctly classified (%)	84.6		86.2		83.3	

Burger Court is either marching to a different drummer or that the band is playing a march unknown to the earlier Courts. The variance explained by the nonconflict variables in the Vinson and Warren Courts totaled from 4.7 to 5.7%. For the Burger Court, the range was from 19.2 to 23.2%, essentially all of which may be attributed to the federal government as petitioning party. When conflict with Supreme Court precedent is added, explained variance jumps approximately 30 percentage points in the Warren and Vinson Courts but only 14 percentage points in the Burger Court. For intercircuit conflict, explained variance increases from 18 to 23 percentage points for the first two Courts but only 6 percentage points in the Burger Court.[8]

Conflict is clearly the most important predictor of Vinson and Warren Court decisions on certiorari. An examination of the discriminant function coefficients shows that conflict with Supreme Court precedent is 2 to 3 times as important as federal government as petitioning party. In the Burger Court, it is less than half as important. For the Burger Court, intercircuit conflict is only one-fourth as significant in explaining variance in decision as federal government as petitioning party. In the other two Courts, on the other hand, it is again 2 to 3 times as important. Thus, the Burger Court is something of an anomaly when compared to the earlier Courts.

Finally, as further check on my inferences, I have carried out a discriminant function analysis for six models of the form: $DF = a + bX + bX_1$, where X and X_1 represent conflict and federal government as petitioning party. These models recognize that these variables are the most reliable predictors of the Court's certiorari decisions. In Table 7, I summarize the results of the six analyses. This analysis shows that the contribution of the nonconflict variables in Table 6 are negligible, so trivial in fact that those factors can be dismissed as predictors. The two-predictor model is simply a better model than the four-predictor model assessed earlier.

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[8] The strength of the relationships reported here may be compared to those reported by Tanenhaus. He determined that the federal government as petitioning party explained 7.4% of the variance in the Court's certiorari decisions in the 1947-1956 terms. For civil liberty issue, he reports a comparable figure of 3.9%. For party, I report from 4.1 to 5.4%, figures within the same general range as those provided by Tanenhaus. I do not, however, replicate his findings re the civil liberty issue. His model in toto was found to account for a total of 13.7% of the variance in certiorari rulings. By contrast, I have shown that conflict (either type) does considerably better by itself, ranging from 20.7 to 33.9% for the Warren and Vinson Courts and from 9.5 to 20.7% for the Burger Court, and my two-factor model accounted for up to 36.8% of the variance. A similar comparison with the findings of Teger and Kosinski (1980) is not possible because these authors do not use standard measures of explained variance. Moreover, they deal with a population rather than a sample and tell us that tests of statistical significance are not appropriate for their data.

Table 7 also affirms that conflict is the best predictor for the Vinson and the Warren Courts; this can be read from the discriminant function coefficients. It is also seen in the fact that when federal government as petitioning party is added to conflict, explained variance increases from 1.7 to 3 percentage points as compared to a range of 18.3 to 31.3 when the variables are reversed.

For the Burger Court, conflict correlates more highly with party than is true in the other two Courts. But there is nothing in Table 7 to change my inference that federal government as petitioning party is a more important variable than conflict in that Court, four to five times more important insofar as predictive power is concerned when compared to the other two Courts.

Conclusions

To return to my three orienting questions, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court in its 1947-1976 terms has been *significantly influenced* in making certiorari decisions by factors of conflict. Moreover, when other factors are controlled or incorporated into the analysis, conflict is far and away the most significant predictor of certiorari decisions for two of our three Courts. For the Burger Court, conflict has been a significant indicator to certiorari decision, but a more important predictor is federal government as petitioning party. The "substantial doctrinal continuity" between the Warren and Burger Courts, to which Wasby (1976, p. 207) has called our attention, should not obscure the fact that these Courts differ in other significant ways.

Beginning with the work of Tanenhaus, those who construct models of certiorari decision making (including this author) have utilized such predictors as issue, petitioning party, socioeconomic status of petitioning and opposing parties, the ideological direction of the decision in the lower court, and the liberal or conservative makeup of the Court itself. None has included conflict as a variable in his or her models. The present study has shown, however, that conflict is highly germane to such models. It may now be suggested that in making up its plenary case agenda, the Court is significantly responsive to the legal-systemic variable—conflict—and less governed by case issue variables than one might have thought.[9] From a theoretical standpoint, this may suggest a shift of focus to systemic factors if the predictive power of my theories or semitheories is to be enhanced.

My results do not imply that idiosyncratic factors should now be ignored. Indeed, one might speculate that the disparities in my findings for the Warren, Vinson, and Burger Courts are the result of the varying importance different justices attach to conflict as a system problem or the extent to which they differentiate requests by the federal government for plenary review. Where conflict with Supreme Court precedent is concerned, however, I have shown that the predictive power of such conflict has steadily declined from

Table 7. Discriminant Analysis of Certiorari Decisions with Two Predictors, All Cases and Courts of Appeals Cases Only

	Vinson Court		Warren Court		Burger Court	
	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %	D.F. Coefficient	Sum of Explained Variance %
All cases						
1. Conflict	4.174	34	3.326	32.9	2.395	20.8
2. Federal government	1.583	36.8	1.937	34.6	5.280	33.7
1. Federal government		5.5		4.2		19.2
2. Conflict		36.8		34.6		33.7
Cases correctly classified	86.6				87	
Courts of Appeals cases only						
1. Conflict	3.354	20.7	3.228	27	1.534	9.5
2. Federal government	2.057	23.7	2.249	29	6.336	29.1
1. Federal government		5.4		5.1		22.9
2. Conflict		23.7		29		
Cases correctly classified	84.6		86.2		87	

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[9] Cf. Teger and Kosinski (1980) on this point.

the Vinson to the Warren to the Burger Court, which suggests the possibility that other systemic variables are at work. The most likely culprit here is increasing caseload, but whatever the case, there is nothing here that argues for the exclusion of systemic or more traditional legal variables in an effort to improve our understanding of the Supreme Court's agenda-building processes.

A secondary finding is that the Supreme Court is not greatly influenced in granting and denying certiorari by the mere claims of conflicts by petitioning attorneys. Given that genuine conflict does exert such influence, I infer that the Court recognizes the self-interest of petitioning parties and simply discounts such claims overall. However, one must assume that the conflicts claimed by attorneys include both genuine and spurious conflicts. Thus, some separation must occur at the Supreme Court level. Given the time pressures on the justices who screen certiorari petitions, this need implies a large role for law clerks in distinguishing genuine conflict cases from those where the claim is too tenuous to warrant the Court's attention.

In an earlier article I reported that the Court was sensitive to claims of conflict with Supreme Court precedent when such claims were made by dissenting judges below (Ulmer, 1983). It is possible that such a cue, as well as others, is used by clerks and justices in picking genuine intercircuit conflict cases for review. Further research on other possible cues would seem warranted.

Finally, my analysis has shown that even in the Vinson and Warren eras, the Supreme Court allowed a large percentage of conflicting court rulings to stand. In the current era, the departures from the uniformity of law principle have become more frequent, as have the Supreme Court's failure to correct or eliminate such conflicts. In short, that problem has gotten worse.

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Unraveling the Complexities of Decision Making in Face-to-Face Groups: A Contextual Analysis of Plea-Bargained Sentences

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This article uses a variety of multilevel data collected from a nine-county study of felony courts to examine the joint effects of contextual and individual level (sociopolitical characteristics of decision workers) upon decisions made in face-to-face groups. The research finds that although the sociopolitical characteristics of decision makers (attitudes toward punishment, Machiavellianism, and operating styles) made a difference in the outcome of interactions, their role could not be accessed independent of the contextual factors surrounding the interactions. Some of the most important contextual factors were the kind of criminal case being handled, prosecutor office policies restricting discretion, and the configuration of attributes in the group handling the case. Although the data are wholly derived from the criminal court setting, the implications of the findings for studying decision making in other face-to-face groups are developed.

How are political decisions reached in face-to-face groups? This question guides much of the research in legislative behavior, the study of bureaucracies, the legal process, and other subfields of political science. The importance and scope of this question are equalled by the perplexities involved in trying to answer it. The complex settings in which political actors make decisions, the fluidity of these settings, the histories of the issues, the varied rules, procedures, and kinds of decisions, plus other factors all make the analysis of who gets what, when, and how in these groups a difficult one to analyze empirically. Much of the published quantitative research on these decision processes fails to convey the complexity and richness we are predisposed to expect because it makes sweeping assumptions that oversimplify reality. The alternative approach, however, is equally troubling. Research designs drawing on extensive observation, participation, and semistructured, in-depth interviews often capture the complexity and nuance needed to weave intuitively satisfying, eclectic descriptions. But they typically rest on a weak empirical base calling into question their reliability and generalizability.

The fundamental problem was neatly summarized by what Dahl termed the "dilemma of rigor versus relevance."

> Attempts to meet high standards of logical rigor or empirical verification have produced some intriguing experiments and a good deal of effort to clarify concepts and logical relationships but not rounded and well-verified explanations of complex political systems in the real world. Conversely, attempts to arrive at a better understanding of the more concrete phenomena of political life and institutions often sacrifice a good deal in rigor of logic and verification in order to provide more useful and reliable guides to the real world. (Dahl, 1968, p. 410)

In an effort to bridge the "rigor versus relevance" gap in the study of face-to-face decision making, this article develops a contextual approach to understanding the role of individuals in one type of joint decision-making venture. In-

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stead of making a few simplifying assumptions about the cognitive abilities or political motives of the principal actors, it directs attention to the structure of microlevel influences in negotiation processes. Moreover, it identifies the basic contextual qualities of the decisions, so that the role of the sociopolitical characteristics of the actors can be better ascertained. It approaches this problem as one in which these characteristics interact with certain contextually defined features of a decision, and accordingly views individual influences as contingent in nature.

In this study we are concerned with sentencing decisions in felony guilty plea cases in nine counties. It should be made clear from the outset that sentencing in criminal courts, both in origin and effect, is intrinsically political, in the broad sense of the word. Moreover, guilty pleas are a product of negotiation and bargaining within triads of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. This domain provides fertile ground for the development of new insights into political decision making because studies of courts offer ample clues to what factors should be considered in constructing a contextual model of microlevel influences.

Contextual Factors and Individual Characteristics in Criminal Court Sentencing Decisions

Research on state trial courts has moved from a narrow concern over judicial behavior to a recognition that decisions flow from courtroom workgroups of varying stability and consistency operating within specific institutional and political settings (Gibson, 1983; Jacob, 1983). Following the well-trod path of judicial behavior scholars interested in appellate-level courts (particularly the Supreme Court), some early as well as more recent work has sought to determine whether or not the backgrounds and socioeconomic characteristics of trial judges are related to their sentencing decisions (Green, 1961; Uhlman, 1979). The effects of judicial attitudes and role conceptions have been examined by Hogarth (1971) and by Gibson (1978). These studies vary in their methodological and theoretical sophistication, but their judge-centered view limits their ability to integrate contextual factors into their analyses. Other research with a similarly narrow perspective concentrates on the legal characteristics of cases (e.g., seriousness of the charge), and extralegal features (e.g., defendant race). Unfortunately these studies rarely incorporate the attitudes of actors on the one hand, or the institutional and political features of the court's setting on the other. The latter is the particular strength of studies that, blending observational data with qualitative data on case characteristics (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Feeley, 1979; Flemming, 1982; Levin, 1977; Nardulli, 1978), highlight the political and organizational context of courtroom processes and the character of interactions among key participants. Their weaknesses, however, are mirror images of the judge-centered studies: they underplay the personal views and styles of courtroom actors.

This quick overview of the literature suggests strongly that to determine how individual-level factors affect decisions in criminal courtrooms, a contextual model must be employed that encompasses both the impact of all three principal actors and the characteristics of the setting in which they interact. The contextual factors we deal with here are: contextually relevant decision-maker attitudes other than their personal views or preferences concerning outcomes; the characteristics of the case; the nature of the workgroup (the specific configuration of judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel) dealing with the case; and relevant policies of the local justice system. Each of these variables can affect the relationship between an actor's personal views and sentencing. Moreover, the nature of the relationship may differ depending on the actor's formal role (judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney), which suggests that a model incorporating all three participants necessarily will be complex, involving many multiplicative (interaction) terms. Before developing such a model, we need to say something more about its basic components: decision-maker attributes, case characteristics, workgroup configurations, and relevant system policies.

Decision-maker Attributes

Our central concern is with the role played by the sentencing attitudes of decision makers in the negotiation of specific sentences. But these views are not the only relevant attributes of decision makers. Regardless of their attitudes toward punishment, actors with particular kinds of personalities may be better able to translate their views into decisions than others, particularly if participants with opposing opinions must be persuaded to accept the decision. A second factor is the manner with which individuals perform their work, their operating style.

Machiavellianism. Finding an efficiently obtainable measure of personality that could be expected to shape behavior in plea negotiations posed a difficult challenge. Prior research on appellate courts which developed measures of judicial role did not offer established and comparable measures of role for prosecutors and defense attorneys (Gibson, 1983). Nor were these measures particularly appropriate for trial court work. Several recent studies of judicial behavior employ the concept of self-esteem (Atkins, Alpert, & Ziller, 1980; Gibson, 1981). Although it is not role specific, the origins of this concept are not explicitly sociopsychological and its implications for interpersonal behavior are unclear. We relied instead on the notion of Machiavellianism. According to Christie and Geis (1970, p. 312):

> High Machs manipulate more, win more, are persuaded less, persuade others more, and otherwise differ significantly from low Machs as predicted in situations in which subjects interact face to face with others, when the situation provides latitude for improvisation and the subject must initiate responses as he can or will, and in situations in which affective involvement with details irrelevant to winning distracts low Machs.

The negotiations leading to plea-bargained sentences fit this description well. Furthermore, several standard Machiavellianism instruments were available to produce a comparable score for all three participants.

Operating Styles. Harold Lasswell awakened interest in how personality traits led to differences in politicians' behavior. We now have research on how legislators (Fenno, 1973), presidents (Barber, 1972), and other public officials differ in their approach to their work. Moreover, prior research on the legal process suggests that the operating styles of judges and attorneys are just as varied as those in other political roles (Alschuler, 1968, 1975; Ryan et al., 1980; Sarat, 1977). Several aspects of style are relevant to the negotiation process.

In many bargaining situations the possibility exists that, if negotiations fail, the parties have a reasonable chance of winning what they wanted through the exercise of superior resources. In guilty-plea negotiations, *trial competence* (the reputation for being a skilled courtroom combatant) is a crucial resource that makes the threat of going to trial credible and heightens the other side's perceived risk of losing. As a link between attitudes and sentencing, trial competence could have different effects depending on the lawyer's role in court. For instance, punitive prosecutors known to be accomplished trial advocates might haggle more successfully for severe sentences, particularly in serious cases, than their less feared, but equally punitive colleagues. At the other end of the courtroom table, defense attorneys highly esteemed for their trial skills with liberal punishment beliefs may secure less severe sanctions for their clients than less highly regarded lawyers who have similar views on punishment.

Judges often gain courthouse fame for how well or poorly they preside over jury trials, but an equally vital facet of their reputations is their proclivity for involving themselves in pretrial negotiations. Whereas some judges keep their distance from pretrial proceedings, others spurn this traditional hands-off role and actively immerse themselves in working out the details of dispositions. Greater involvement by judges as well as anticipation of their interests by attorneys means that their sentencing views probably will be incorporated more directly in guilty pleas than those of their aloof brethren who remain above the fray. *Judge involvement,* therefore, is a central mediating variable between the attitudes of judges and sentencing.

A final dimension of operating style, *responsiveness,* is common to all three courtroom roles. Responsiveness refers to the extent to which individuals accommodate the needs of others. Judges and lawyers often feel they are a part of a larger courthouse community, identify with its fortunes, and think it is in their long-run interests to respect local practices and customs. At times these attachments override formal role expectations, prompting responsive actors to deal pragmatically with others in order to preserve amicable ties within the courthouse.

Responsiveness could suppress the effects on sentences of an individual attitude. Accommodating judges or prosecutors may offer concessions to consummate guilty pleas, even though they hold highly punitive sentencing views. As a result punishments in cases where they are involved may be lighter than in those where the judges and prosecutors are just as punitive but less responsive. Correspondingly, compliant defense attorneys may acquiesce in pleas with stiff sentences, even though they hold lenient punishment beliefs. On the other hand, responsive individuals might hide their views within the courthouse because they believe that by being nice, they will get what they want over the long run, even at the expense of more immediate concerns (such as sentencing concessions in the case at hand).

Case Characteristics: Offense and Prior Record

The gravity of the crime charged and whether defendants have had prior brushes with the law critically affect the influence of attitudes on sentences. State criminal codes rank crimes according to their seriousness and set the levels of punishment accordingly, often with a range of penalties and minimum and maximum lengths of incarceration. Prior convictions may add to these penalties or enter into local sentencing decisions as exacerbating factors. In cases involving a minor offense or first offenders the penalty is likely to be low and discretion narrow; such cases receive probation or at most a few months in the county jail, and as a result the attitudes of participants have little sway in the decisions. As cases mount in seriousness, the opportunity for attitudes to exert themselves broadens as neither the state criminal code nor the court's going rates tightly confine the latitude of the workgroup or its members, thus producing more play within the process. Serious cases, moreover, encourage participants to advocate their views more forcefully, at least in informal settings, because such cases are professionally challenging and the basis for reputations within the court community.

Workgroup Characteristics

In guilty plea cases sentencing becomes a collective endeavor involving prosecutors and defense attorneys to a major degree, despite the formal authority and responsibility of judges. It is crucial to know, then, whether these decisions are made by workgroups with divergent or homogeneous attitudes regarding punishment or whether there are de facto coalitions of two actors against another. For example, attitudinally deviant prosecutors isolated from the other members of the workgroup face very different bargaining situations from those if they are paired with judges who share their views. Similarly, high Mach attorneys or prosecutors may succeed most often in getting what they want when the other members of the triad are less Machiavellian. Another example may be that an attorney's trial competence is a viable bargaining resource only if the opposing attorney is discernibly less competent, which suggests that the impact of attorney attitudes on sentencing decisions varies with the difference in trial skills between opposing attorneys.

Policy Characteristics of the System

A final set of factors includes the various policies of the organizations constituting the local justice system. These factors will be treated briefly because a thorough review goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. Two obvious practices are the extent to which plea bargaining is controlled by the prosecutor's office and the actual amount of discretion enjoyed by the judge.

In some prosecutor offices guilty plea offers are set by the office, and deviations from these offers are prohibited. Obviously, opportunities for a prosecutor's views to play a role in sentencing are smaller here than in locales where laissez faire practices prevail. Also, in some counties the judge's sentencing discretion is more limited than in others, especially where pre-sentence investigators and recommendations prepared by the probation office are required. Judicial latitude may also be limited where the prosecutor's office presents plea bargains that specify the sentence.

Data Sources and Variable Construction

Data for this analysis come from a larger study of nine circuit-level courts in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.[1] A thorough review of the study's research design and methodology is presented elsewhere (Nardulli, Flemming, & Eisenstein, 1984); only a brief overview can be given here. Systematic case samples with the defendant as the unit of analysis were drawn from each county, and information was collected on over 300 variables for a total of 7,475 felony defendants.[2] Almost every judge, prosecutor, and public defender with full-time felony assignments during the case sample periods were interviewed, but some difficulties arose with respect to private defense attorneys and appointed counsel for indigent defendants. In some counties hundreds of attorneys represented at least one defendant during the sampling period. Accordingly, only regular private practitioners were interviewed. All told, data were acquired on over 300 decision makers.

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[1] The Illinois counties were DuPage, Peoria, and St. Clair; the Michigan counties were Oakland, Kalamazoo, and Saginaw; the Pennsylvania counties were Montgomery, Dauphin, and Erie. The counties were selected in an effort to maximize within state variance along two dimensions: a socioeconomic well-being dimension, the other concerned the nature of the political linkages between the court system and its environment. In selecting counties, however, we were restricted by the number of large counties that fit our criteria. Size was crucial because we needed to sample a large number of cases that were handled by a sufficiently diverse set of decision makers. Thus, in each state we selected one economically declining county (St. Clair, Saginaw, Erie), one autonomous county (Peoria, Kalamazoo, Dauphin), and one suburban ring county (DuPage, Oakland, Montgomery). Variance in our socioeconomic welfare criteria is embodied in the differences between the declining counties and the suburban counties; the differences in political linkages are reflected in the autonomous and suburban ring counties. Although these distinctions are less important for this aspect of the research, an extended discussion of selection criteria and procedures, and a detailed description of the nine counties, can be found in Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1984).

[2] With respect to case sampling procedures, in most counties we selected the entire universe of cases handled in a given jurisdiction for a designated period of time (1978-1979, for instance). We then tried to interview most decision makers who handled a goodly number of cases during that time frame. In some counties we had to take only a sample of cases handled during a given year. For a more detailed discussion of case sampling procedures see Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1984).

The Case Sample

The analysis of sentencing described here focuses on a small subset of the 7,475 defendants from the case samples. Of the total sample of defendants, 13% were not convicted, leaving 6,503 sentenced. Despite efforts to interview and to administer instruments to all regular participants, the larger number of cases handled by nonregular defense attorneys (whom we did not interview) led to missing data on many cases. We obtained full information on the personal attributes of the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney triad for 2,020 sentenced defendants.

Because most of the propositions examined deal with social interactions and bargaining, we eliminated the 100 or so cases that went to trial. Analysis of the remaining cases showed that approximately 800 were decided by a triad that also handled at least four other cases. We selected these cases for the analysis because we wanted to insure a high degree of familiarity and a prior history of dealing with one another.[3] This allowed us to examine hypotheses dealing with bargaining positions, personality, and mutual perceptions of operating styles that assumed each participant knew the attributes of the other two relatively well. It also improved the chances that the relationships found reflected some stability rather than a transient set of circumstances that would obscure underlying patterns.

Pooling cases from several counties provides a means for yielding insights into collegial decision making in criminal courts not previously available. It introduces a wider range of variation on crucial variables than a sample drawn from a jurisdiction where only two or three judges and four or five prosecutors handle criminal cases. In the set of 800 cases, 21 judges, 29 prosecutors, and 51 defense attorneys combined to form 102 triads or workgroups. The larger number of participants make possible the uncovering of underlying patterns in how personal differences affect outcomes.

It should be emphasized that the merging of cases from the various counties does not result in a sample of any larger universe. Consequently, it is not possible to generalize these results to a wider universe. However, comparison of this subset with all cases from the five counties that contributed cases indicates it is not biased with respect to two of the most potent predictors of sentence: offense seriousness and prior record. The mean score of the offense seriousness measure for all sentence cases in the five counties is 8.8 months, and its correlation with the sentence variable is .66; for the pooled set of 800 cases, the mean is 8.0 months and the correlation coefficient is .66. The criminal record variable in the large sample has a mean of .02 and a .27 correlation with sentence; for the subset, the mean is .08 and the correlation .29.

Measuring Sentence Length, Offense Seriousness, and Prior Record

Prison and jail overcrowding means that few incarcerated defendants serve more than the imposed minimum, a fact that courtroom actors take into account in sentencing. Consequently, the minimum number of months of incarceration imposed provides a reasonable measure of severity. It has the additional virtues of being readily available and comparable across the three states we studied.[4] In computing this variable (*JAILMIN*), we coded defendants given probation as zero.

Measuring offense seriousness poses far more challenging problems. Measures based on statutory minimums or maximums seldom correspond consistently to the going rates of courts; they are also crude and lump together many disparate offenses. The existence of three state criminal codes and nine sets of going rates compounds these problems, making more imperative the need for an empirically based measure applicable across offenses and counties.

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[3] There was, of course, nothing magic about five cases. We initially used cut-offs of ten and eight cases, but that left us with too few cases and excluded too many counties altogether. A three-way crosstabulation showed that five was a good cut-off point—most other triads occurred in only one or two cases. Even with this cut-off four counties contributed few cases to the pooled sample. Two Michigan counties had no public defender's office, relying instead on a large panel of appointed attorneys. The two suburban counties in Illinois and Pennsylvania had unstable workgroups and consequently had no groups which met the five-case criterion.

[4] In Illinois, which has a determinate sentencing law and day-for-day sentence reductions for good behavior, all penitentiary sentences were halved. Illinois jail sentences (all confinements less than one year) were left unchanged. Michigan and Pennsylvania have indeterminate sentencing laws, but they also have statutory provisions which prohibit parole before the minimum sentence is served. Thus the minimum penitentiary times across all three states are meaningful and comparable. Two dispositions unique to Michigan and Pennsylvania, deferred prosecution and accelerated rehabilitative dispositions (ARDs), are comparable to probation in Illinois and were, therefore, coded 0. One last point should be noted. Kalamazoo and Dauphin had a handful of sentences in excess of 100 years. These distorted the results and were recoded to 20 years, the next highest code in each of the counties.

We adopted the following procedure in devising a measure of case seriousness. A dummy variable for the most serious offense at the time of sentencing was constructed for each offense with an appreciable number of cases. The resulting set of variables was then entered into a regression equation for each county's sentenced defendants with minimum incarceration time (*JAILMIN*) as the dependent variable. These equations were then used to assign to each case in each county an offense seriousness score (*OFFSER*) equivalent to the mean sentence for defendants convicted of that offense in each county. This measure can be viewed as the going rate for the offense in the county.

A few comments regarding this procedure are in order. First, although it may appear circular to predict sentences using a variable containing mean sentences for a given offense, the regression results are identical to using the traditional technique of dummy variables to represent offenses. More critically, this procedure is an economical, flexible way of controlling for the effects of offense because it is a single variable rather than several, a major advantage with interactive statistical models. Finally, this is a very conservative method for controlling offense seriousness because it lets this variable explain as much variance as possible before other variables of more theoretical import are introduced into the regression equation.

A measure of the defendant's criminal record was constructed with four highly intercorrelated variables: number of prior arrests, number or prior convictions, number of jail commitments, and number of penitentiary commitments. Factor analysis reduced these variables into a single composite variable.[5]

Measures of Decision-maker Attributes

The attitudinal survey administered to judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys contained 14 questions touching on various aspects of punishment. Factor analysis showed that 11 of them hung together moderately well in a unidimensional factor we labeled *belief in punishment* (Nardulli, Flemming, & Eisenstein, 1984). The parsimonious nature of the measure facilitates the complex analyses that follow. Although the following analysis will refer to the judge's belief in punishment (*JPUN*) or the prosecutor's belief in punishment (*PPUN*), all scores were derived from the same set of questions and the same factor analysis. These variables as well as the other individual level measures are reported in Table 1. High scores indicate a strong belief in punishment in dealing with criminals; low scores indicate a more lenient attitude. A transposed scale was created for defense attorneys because some analyses required that leniency be scored high (Table 1).

The derivation of the *Machiavellianism* measure was much less involved. Six items from the Mach V test (Rogers & Semin, 1973) were included in the last section of the attitudinal survey. The responses were scored in accordance with standard procedures, resulting in one Machiavellianism score for each respondent. High scores indicate high Machs; low scores indicate low Machs.

Measures of the decision makers' operating styles required a wholly different set of procedures. Instead of asking the decision makers about themselves, as we had in the attitudinal survey, we asked their co-workers to evaluate them. A *Q*-sort procedure was developed in which the occupants of each role in a given county were asked to evaluate occupants of the other two roles (e.g., judges evaluated prosecutors and defense counsel). Nine questions were asked about judges; eight were asked about attorneys.[6] Although some of the same general dimensions (familiarity, informality, accommodativeness, predictability) were tapped in the two sets of questions, those asked about judges were necessarily somewhat different from those asked about attorneys.

After the *Q*-sort data were assembled, a mean score was computed for each evaluatee on each question. Factor analysis was applied to these mean variables in an effort to derive a more general measure. With respect to the attorney mean variables, the factor analysis identified a very strong cluster involving the traits of trustworthiness, accommodativeness, predictability, and informality. This factor was labeled *attorney responsiveness* because these traits indicate a general concern for maintaining good working relationships among co-workers.[7] Similarly a *judge responsiveness* factor was identified. This factor was composed of questions concerning accommodativeness, reasonableness, and informality. The analysis of the judge variables also demonstrated a second general factor, composed of questions concerning the extent to which the judge actively sought to influence the outcome of a case, the judge's tendency to avoid trials, and the judge's informality. It was labeled *Judge's Involvement* because the questions largely concerned the judge's inclination to take an active and forceful part in informally resolving cases. One last variable from the *Q*-sort data was used, but it was not a composite variable. Rather, it was simply a single question tapping the attorney's trial competence.

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[5] The results of the factor analysis used to compute the criminal-record variable are reported in Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1984). They show a strong single-factor solution which yields a straightforward interpretation. The factor score for a given case is computed by summing its scores on the weighted standardized variables (weights = factor loadings) used in the factor analysis.

[6] For a more detailed description of the specific *Q*-sort questions and the analysis of the *Q*-sort data, see Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1984).

[7] The results of all the *Q*-sort factor analyses are reported in Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1984).

Measures of Workgroup and Policies

The variables described so far have dealt with individual cases or decision makers. Equally important to consider is the overall makeup of the workgroup (the configuration of attitudes or operating styles) and various system-level policies which constrain the discretion of the decision makers. Each is an important contextual influence which has implications for bargaining strategies and the success of individuals in achieving their sentencing preferences.

Workgroup Configurations. To uncover the structure of workgroup configurations, each of the 102 workgroups that met the five case requirements discussed earlier was analyzed with respect to the belief-in-punishment variable, Machiavellianism, the responsiveness variables, and the trial competence measures. For each workgroup the score of each participant on each measure was plotted on a scale. Then the resulting set of diagrams (4 sets of 102) was analyzed for relevant patterns. Although the resulting structures for the belief in punishment variable and the trial competence variable were fairly straightforward and suggestive of relevant hypotheses, the other two were not. Therefore this discussion will be restricted to an analysis of the punishment structure and the trial structure of the workgroups.

Figure 1 gives the mean role scores and major configurations of punishment attitudes in the workgroups. Traditional workgroups, in which judges have punishment attitudes roughly midway between hardnosed prosecutors and soft-hearted defense attorneys, are the modal category, although they accounted for less than half of the workgroups and handled only 40% of the cases. The second most-common pattern is the prosecutor-judge cluster, where both actors have similar high punishment scores compared to defense attorneys. This configuration, characteristic of approximately one-quarter of the workgroups, handled roughly one-quarter of the cases.

Table 1. Summary of Individual Level Measures

	Source and Derivation of Measure
Attitude	
Belief in punishment	
Judge (*JPUN*)[a]	Factor analysis of punishment related attitudinal items
Prosecutor (*PPUN*)	. . .
Defense counsel (*DPUN*)	. . .
Transposed version of *DPUN* (high is extremely lenient)	Reversed and translated *DPUN*
Personality Type	
Machiavellianism	
Judge (*JMAC*)	Six item "Mini Mach V" Test
Prosecutor (*PMAC*)	. . .
Defense attorney (*DMAC*)	. . .
Operating Style	
Responsiveness	
Judge (*JRES*)	Factor analyses of personnel evaluation data derived from *Q* Sort procedure
Prosecutor (*PRES*)	. . .
Defense counsel (*DRES*)	. . .
Judge's involvement (*JINVOL*)	. . .
Prosecutor's trial competence (*PTRL*)	Single question derived from *Q* Sort data
Defense counsel's trial competence (*DTRL*)	. . .

[a]Some of these variables also have dichotomous or trichotomous versions; they are indicated by a 1 (e.g., *JMAC1, PRES1, DTRL1*).

Figure 1. Average Punishment Scores by Role and Triad Type



The remaining configurations involved, proportionately, only a handful of workgroups and cases. These configurations are interesting, however, because most of them are characterized by defense attorneys with relatively punitive sentencing views.

The trial competence configurations are shown in Figure 2. Three patterns were identified: one in which there was parity between the attorneys and two in which either the prosecutor or the defense attorney was ranked higher than the other. The first configuration characterized more than 45% of the workgroups and handled over half of the cases. The structure in which the defense attorney ranked higher than the prosecutor accounted for roughly one-third of the workgroups and cases. Prosecutors were evaluated as outranking defense attorneys in approximately one-sixth of the triads and cases.

Policy Constraints. Besides the attitudinal or resource configurations of courtroom workgroups, policy constraints need to be considered,

Figure 2. Average Trial Competence Scores by Role and Dyad Type



especially in the instance of assistant prosecutors. Based on interviews with the assistants and the office hierarchies, a trichotomous variable was created to indicate prosecutor discretion in plea negotiations, where 1 = little discretion, 2 = some discretion, and 3 = unfettered discretion). (For more information on these categorizations, see Nardulli, Flemming, & Eisenstein, 1984.) A dichotomous variable pertaining to local judicial discretion in sentencing also was constructed (0 = some constraints; 1 = virtually no constraints). Judges who were not required to order presentencing investigations or who had much latitude in them were coded as having virtually no constraints.

The Quantitative Analysis

We present the quantitative analysis in four stages, each progressively more complex in the model it uses and more comprehensive in the variables examined. Each of the last three equations represents the final stage of an intricate and lengthy process. Although we cannot present a blow-by-blow research diary, we will from time to time discuss how some variables that initially seemed significant dropped out of the equation at later stages when additional variables were added.

Attitudes and Decisions: A Simple, Additive Model

If one were to look naively only at the bivariate correlations between the belief-in-punishment scores for each of the principal actors and sentencing, the results would be puzzling. Whereas prosecutor attitudes (*PPUN*) and defense attorney views (*DPUN*) have anemic correlations of .11 and .09 with sentences, judicial beliefs (*JPUN*) have a −.23 correlation! The value of combining individual-level attributes with contextual variables becomes immediately apparent when offense seriousness (*OFFSER*) and defendant's criminal record (*CRIMRCD*) are combined with the punishment measures in a multiple regression equation. As Equation 1 ($R^2 = .49$; $n = 792$) shows, when the effects of these two contextual variables are taken into account, the sign of the term for all three decision makers' belief in punishment is positive. (The numbers in parentheses are *F* values and beta weights.)

$$\begin{aligned} JAILMIN = {} & -6.5 + \underset{(525;\ .64)}{.87 * OFFSER} \\ & + \underset{(67;\ .21)}{4.3 * CRIMRCD} + \underset{(.87;\ .03)}{.25 * JPUN} \\ & + \underset{(4.6;\ .06)}{.54 * PPUN} + \underset{(3.3;\ .05)}{.21 * DPUN} \qquad (1) \end{aligned}$$

Tests of statistical significance based on probability theory are not strictly applicable here because the pooled data are not a sample. Still, in order to enhance the stability of the reported results, accepted conventions concerning probability levels will be followed. With the number of cases used here, an *F* value of at least 3.84 is needed for a finding to be significant at the .05 level; 6.64 for a significance level of .01; and 10.84 for a level of .001.

Although it is encouraging to find that the regression coefficients for the attitudinal variables have at least positive signs, only *PPUN* is statistically significant at a marginal .05 level. The impact of attitudes, especially when compared with the role of offense and prior record, appears exceptionally marginal. The additive model, then, seemingly warrants some skepticism about the influence of attitudes.

Case Attributes as Conditions for Individual Influence

Equation 1 represents a rather simplistic notion of sentencing processes because it assumes that if attitudinal factors are important, they are important regardless of the context of the decision or its characteristics. Our contextual approach suggests an alternative perspective: the influence of individual attitudes is *conditional.* The seriousness of the offense and (to a lesser degree) criminal record are two prime candidates for defining the conditions under which attitudes and other personal characteristics shape sentences. To recall the earlier discussion of seriousness, minor cases can be dispatched according to standard operating rules (manifested in going rates), but cases deemed important because of their gravity (and perhaps the defendant's prior criminality) affects the interests and attract the concentrated attention of the principal decision makers. Moreover, they offer more range in possible penalties. We explore the validity of this conditional model by building interaction terms between *OFFSER* and *CRIMRCD* on the one hand, and belief in punishment on the other, into the statistical model. The interaction variables were computed by multiplying the belief-in-punishment score of each member of the decisional triad by the value of the measure of seriousness and defendant's record for each case (for example, *JPUN * OFFSER*).

Preliminary results indicated that the attitude variables interacted positively, with *OFFSER* with *F* values ranging from 52 to 8. But the interaction term involving the prosecutor's belief-in-punishment (*PPUN*) eliminated the effect of the interaction terms involving the other two punishment variables (*JPUN*, *DPUN*). Further analyses showed that the prosecutor's responsiveness

(*PRES*) interacting with *OFFSER* was significantly stronger than *PPUN* * *OFFSER* and, indeed, wiped out the latter's effect on the *JAILMIN* variable. Moreover, by replacing this interaction term with the *PRES* * *OFFSER* term, collinearity between the *PPUN* * *OFFSER* variable and the interaction terms involving *JPUN* and *DPUN* (*JPUN* * *OFFSER, DPUN* * *OFFSER*) was reduced, thereby allowing these two terms to enter the equation. Subsequent analysis showed that an interaction term with defense-attorney responsiveness (*DRES*) and offense seriousness was statistically significant but that a term with judge responsiveness (*JRES*) played no significant role. Finally, although interaction terms involving the defendant's criminal record (*CRIMRCD*) and *JPUN* or *PPUN* were not found to be significant, a term involving *DPUN* and *CRIMRCD* did emerge as a significant positive factor.

Equation 2 ($R^2 = .58$; $n = 792$) encapsulates the results of these series of steps.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathit{JAILMIN} = {} & -6.3 + \underset{(66.6;\ 1.67)}{2.3 * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\ & + \underset{(.56;\ .04)}{.90 * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} - \underset{(5.7;\ -.09)}{.78 * \mathit{JPUN}} \\ & + \underset{(.57;\ .02)}{.10 * \mathit{DPUN}} + \underset{(12;\ .11)}{.98 * \mathit{PRES}} \\ & + \underset{(2.1;\ .05)}{.27 * \mathit{DRES}} - \underset{(115;\ -.68)}{.13 * \mathit{PRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\ & - \underset{(24.8;\ -.98)}{.11 * \mathit{DRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\ & + \underset{(27.3;\ .28)}{.08 * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\ & + \underset{(16.3;\ .30)}{.04 * \mathit{DPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\ & + \underset{(6.3;\ .15)}{.29 * \mathit{DPUN} * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} \qquad (2) \end{aligned}$$

Equation 2 may appear somewhat difficult to interpret because of its interaction terms and because the signs of some additive terms such as *JPUN*, reversed when the multiplicative terms including them were added to the equation. Therefore, to facilitate interpretation, the equation was used to predict sentences for various levels (high, medium, low) of relevant decision-maker traits across different types of offenses as shown in Table 2.[8] For each entry in Table 2, we computed

Table 2. Sentence Predictions based on Equation 2 (in months)

	Offense Seriousness			
	Theft	Burglary	Unarmed robbery	Armed robbery
Judge's punitiveness (*JPUN*)				
Low (3)	5.52	9.67	19.03	33.84
Medium (6.5)	3.66	9.85	23.86	46.00
High (8)	2.86	9.93	25.93	51.22
Defense attorney's punitiveness (*DPUN*)				
Low (4.5)	2.67	7.68	18.50	36.99
Medium (8.5)	3.66	9.85	23.86	46.00
High (14)	8.68	16.46	30.47	58.37
Prosecutor's responsiveness (*PRES*)				
Low (6.0)	−2.22	10.78	30.19	52.33
Medium (8.5)	3.66	9.85	23.86	46.00
High (10)	5.38	9.29	20.07	28.59
Defense attorney's responsiveness (*DRES*)				
Low (5.0)	4.08	15.09	40.06	79.49
Medium (11)	3.66	9.85	23.86	46.00
High (14)	3.44	7.22	15.76	29.25
Mean	3.1	10.4	27	53.2

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[8] The high, medium, and low scores were determined by examining the actual distribution of scores in the cases analyzed. Low scores represent the highest score in the lowest decile; high scores represent the lowest score

JAILMIN for each of the three values of the test variables, while all other variables in the equation were held constant (i.e., assigned the medium score); this permitted us to display the effects of differences in the test variable while holding other factors constant.

The impact of judicial punishment attitudes (*JPUN*) is shown in rows 1-3 of Table 2. In more serious cases (robbery, armed robbery), the punitiveness of the judge mattered more than in less serious cases, as can be seen in the widening gap between predicted sentences in Table 2. Equation 2 was less accurate in predicting sentences in theft cases because the sign of the linear term (*JPUN*) was reversed after the interaction term entered. These predictions are set off in parentheses. Although these results might suggest a negative relationship between punishment attitudes of judges and sentences in less serious cases, separate analyses uncovered no such relationship. As Friedrich (1982) has shown, the reason that the signs sometimes reverse is that they may represent extrapolations beyond observed values in the data. The interpretation of the multiplicative variable involving defense-attorney punishment views and offense seriousness is similar to that of the *JPUN * OFFSER* term. The predicted differential between sentences in cases handled by defense attorneys with low or high punishment scores goes from about six months in theft cases to 21 months in armed robbery cases.

Interpretative issues arise once more with respect to prosecutor responsiveness (*PRES*) because the sign of the linear term differs from the interaction term. What was predicted, and what Equation 2 shows is an increasingly larger negative impact by *PRES* at higher levels of case seriousness. As rows 7-9 in Table 2 indicate, more responsive prosecutors give away more in terms of sentencing if they have more bargaining room. The sentencing differential between prosecutors with low or high responsiveness scores goes from one month in burglary cases to 27 months in armed robbery cases. Independent analysis again confirmed that in less serious cases *PRES* does not have a positive relationship with sentences, and, accordingly, the predicted sentences in theft cases are in parentheses.

The variable measuring defense attorney responsiveness (*DRES*) produced unexpected, but, with the benefit of hindsight, reasonable results. Originally it was hypothesized that responsive defense attorneys—as understanding, flexible coworkers—would be more likely to acquiesce to higher negotiated sentences than their more combative, less pliable peers in the defense bar, especially in more serious cases. However, as Equation 2 and Table 2 indicate, responsive attorneys extract better or less harsh sentences than unresponsive attorneys, particularly as the stakes mount. This outcome is especially plausible in circumstances where the principals engage in ongoing social interaction and can call on a history of previous encounters, as is the case here. If judges and prosecutors reward guilty pleas with better sentences, they should give these rewards to cooperative attorneys. Although attorneys can contribute to the expeditious processing of cases in many other ways (refrain from raising motions, avoid jury trials), there are few things that judges or prosecutors can do for attorneys that are more beneficial than giving them breaks in sentencing.

The finding concerning the *CRIMRCD* variable in Equation 2 deserves attention at this point. Althougn neither *JPUN* nor *PPUN* interacted with *CRIMRCD* to affect sentences, *DPUN* did. Interestingly, the interaction was positive; that is, the impact of defense attorney punitiveness was greatest in cases where defendants had long criminal histories. Apparently more punitive attorneys are less motivated to negotiate vigorously for repeaters than less punitive attorneys. No predicted sentences were presented in Table 2 for this variable because the linear term had a positive sign and thus lent itself to a straightforward interpretation.

Equation 2 provides empirical substantiation for one of the fundamental findings of our research: Substantial improvements in explaining sentencing decisions in guilty-plea cases comes by recognizing the conditional qualities of decision-maker influence. Simple additive models like the one reflected in Equation 1, which postulate that case characteristics and decision-maker attitudes shape sentences separately and linearly, fail to convey adequately the complex nature of actual sentencing decisions.

Decision-maker Attributes as Conditional Factors

Equation 2 does not exhaust the potential of the data to capture the complex interactions between context and decision-maker views. Both prior research and our open-ended interviews identify participants' personality traits (Machiavellianism), the trial skills of the attorneys, and the extent to which judges inject themselves actively into the guilty-plea process as potential factors affecting the role of individuals in shaping sentences.

A number of hypotheses were generated concerning the role that these factors played. It was hypothesized that the views of high Machs, more

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in the highest decile. Medium scores are about at the median.

competent attorneys, and more involved judges would have a greater impact upon negotiated sentences than the views of others. The regression equation (Equation 3) that produced these results is quite complex and is reported in the Appendix. We confine our comments here to a brief summary of its findings. Equation 3 demonstrates that most of these hypotheses failed. The empirical analysis showed a significant interaction only between the judge's involvement and the judge's belief in punishment. Punitive judges who are more involved in plea bargaining are able to negotiate more severe sentences than judges with equally punitive views. Beyond this result two unexpected findings emerged from the analysis: cases involving prosecutors or defense attorneys who were high Machs had more severe sentences than others.

These results were considered unexpected because Machiavellianism was conceptualized as a mediating factor which would affect how individual views were translated into sentences. The literature on Machiavellianism leads one to view high Machs as successful manipulators. However, the literature also portrays high Machs as cynics, a view that is consistent with the findings of a more direct role for Machiavellianism, as reported here. As Vlemming (1979, p. 307) notes

> The articles discussed so far confirm that high Machs in contrast to low Machs have no trust in other people, are not conscientious, or nurturant towards others. They also have only little empathic capacity and little respect for others and besides they do not think much of equality, forgiving, or honesty.

One final point is that the trial competence variables failed to have a significant effect. However, as the discussion of workgroup structure suggested, in half of the cases trial competence is roughly equal (see Figure 2). Hence the instances were limited in which a prosecutor or defense attorney could exploit a bargaining advantage over opposing counsel because of superior trial competence.

Group Context, Policies, and Three-way Interactions

A weakness of the preceding analysis is that it ignores the characteristics of workgroups and the effects of local policies. Both may have an effect upon the role of other decision-maker traits. Thus we use three-way interaction terms incorporating these variables as the fourth stage of this analysis.

The first set of hypotheses tested here that incorporate these variables stipulates that individual views are apt to have a greater impact in counties where their discretion is largely unfettered, especially in more serious cases. Table 3 (*C*1, *C*2) presents these in a more formal manner. Hypotheses *P*1, *P*2, *P*3 (Table 3) deal with the punishment structure and are based on the discussion of Figure 1. *P*1 holds that the views of judges will have a greater impact when they are closely aligned with the views of another triad member, especially in more serious cases. *P*2 and *P*3 state that high Machs who find themselves as attitudinal deviants in a triad will be more effective in having their views prevail than low Machs, especially in more serious cases. Finally, the two hypotheses (*T*1, *T*2) concerning trial structure state that the views of attorneys will have a greater impact when they have a decided edge in trial skills, especially in more serious cases.

Table 3 also reports the results of the regression analysis. Equation (4), even more complex than equation (3), is reported in the Appendix. Of the seven hypotheses shown in Table 3, three were supported (*S*2, *P*1, *T*2), two were not (*S*1, *T*1), and although the other two (*P*3, *P*2) were not confirmed, the results produced important insights into the decision-making process.

Although no support was found for the structural hypothesis (*C*1) that judicial punishment views are enhanced in jurisdictions where judges enjoy wider discretion, very strong support was provided for the companion proposition (*C*2) that the impact of prosecutor responsiveness would be greatly limited in counties with centralized plea-bargaining policies. For instance, whereas the *B*-coefficient of the two-way interaction term, *PRES * OFFSER,* in equation (4) is not zero, its value is less than half the size of the same term in equation (2) (.06 versus .13). Most of the sentencing variance attributed to prosecutor responsiveness, therefore, came from counties where prosecutors had broad discretion. The fact that the multiplicative term involving judge discretion (*JUDGDISC * JPUN * OFFSER*) was not statistically significant undoubtedly reflects positional differences between judges and assistant prosecutors. Assistant prosecutors, of course, can be disciplined and removed from office by the head prosecutor, and their work is routinely reviewed by the office hierarchy. These conditions rarely apply to circuit-level judges.

Although only one of the hypotheses involving punishment attitudes in the workgroups was confirmed, the other results demonstrated how workgroup coalitions and individual attributes interact to mold decisions. The one hypothesis (*P*1) that gained support held that, in more serious cases, the impact of judge attitudes would be stronger when they were similar to those of one of the other actors. Not surprisingly, it appears that the impact of an individual's views are magnified in a decision when there is a de facto coalition.

Table 3. Summary of Hypotheses Concerning Structural Characteristics, and Selected Workgroup Configurations

Hypotheses	Concepts Tested in Interaction Term	Expected Impact upon Sentence	Actual Impact	Level of Significance
Constraints from local policies				
C1	*JUDGDISC * JPUN * OFFSER*	+	0	–
C2	*PROSDISC * PRES * OFFSER*	–	–	.001
Punishment structure				
P1	*JCLUSTER * JPUN * OFFSER*	+	+	
P2	*DPUNLOW * DMAC1 * OFFSER*	–	+*	.001
P3	*PPUNHIGH * PMAC1 * OFFSER*	+	–*	.001
Trial competence structure				
T1	*DIRLHIGH * DLENCY * OFFSER*	–	0	–
T2	*PIRHIGH * PPUN * OFFSER*	+	+	.01

JUDGDISC:	Amount of judge's discretion (0 = limited; 1 = not significantly limited)
PROSDISC:	Amount of prosecutor's discretion (1 = quite limited; 2 = some limits; 3 = virtually unlimited)
JCLUSTER:	Whether or not judge's belief in punishment clusters with prosecutor or defense attorney's (0 = no cluster; 1 = cluster)
DPUNLOW:	Whether or not defense attorney's belief in punishment is far below a prosecutor-judge cluster (0 = not below; 1 = below)
PPUNHIGH:	Whether or not prosecutor's belief in punishment is far above a judge-defense attorney cluster (0 = not above; 1 = above)
DTRLHIGH:	Whether or not defense attorney's trial competence is evaluated far above prosecutor's (0 = not above; 1 = above)
PTRLHIGH:	Whether or not prosecutor's trial competence is evaluated far above defense attorney's (0 = not above; 1 = above)

[a] Indicates unexpected result.

The other hypotheses dealt with the converse situation: What happens when members of triads are attitudinal deviants? It originally was thought that high Mach deviants would pull others toward their own views; instead, just the opposite occurred. They were found to be more apt to compromise if they were isolated within the group. At first glance this seemingly contradicts the literature on Machiavellianism, but if examined from a contextual perspective, a different picture emerges. By moving toward the views of others, Machiavellian actors who do not share the dominant views of the triad members fail to win what they may feel are just penalties. However, there are other goals involved in the process, and high Machs may be furthering one of them, namely, the realization of a nontrial settlement that may take priority over sentencing goals (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). Thus, because time is a scarce commodity, defense attorneys must ration it by bringing their cases to expeditious conclusions, if need be by persuading their clients to accept what may be higher sentences. High Mach defense attorneys, then, may be willing to sacrifice their clients' interests to serve their own, at least if they find themselves to be attitudinal outsiders in serious cases. Similar arguments can be made for prosecutors. Rather than stubbornly refusing to accept a sentence that fails to fit their notions of what is just, high Mach prosecutors may find it easier to compromise their own views to avoid trials.

Only one hypothesis (*T2*) pertaining to the trial competence configurations of workgroups was supported. In more serious cases more punitive prosecutors who enjoyed a decisive advantage in trial skills over defense attorneys negotiated longer sentences than equally punitive prosecutors lacking this advantage. It should be noted that the defense attorney interaction term in Table 3 (*DTRLHIGH * DLENCY * OFFSER*) initially was found to have a statistically significant, negative effect on sentences as hypothesized (*T1*). However, it was eliminated when the three-way interaction term involving the prosecutor's trial competence entered the equation. The reasons for this are clear: two of the components of the two three-way interaction terms were highly intercorrelated (*PTRLHIGH, DTRLHIGH*) and another was identical (*OFFSER*). If the prosecutor interaction term had not been in the equation, the defense attorney term would have been significant; the latter was deleted because the former term was somewhat stronger and more stable.

Conclusions

This study developed an empirical, interactive model integrating variables from various levels of analysis to describe the structure of influences in sentencing negotiations processes. The findings demonstrate that the personal views and working styles of the principal actors shaped sentencing decisions in varying ways and to a nontrivial degree. The coefficient of determination (R^2) for a regression equation including only the contextual variables for offense seriousness and prior criminal record was .49, but adding just the two-way interaction terms involving individual-level characteristics (as in equation 2) enlarged the coefficient to .58, a net improvement of .09 in the coefficient and an 18% increase. By incorporating the three-way interaction terms in equation (4), the proportion of explained variance rose to .64, fully one-third greater than the coefficient for the original linear model.

Just as important as the explanatory power of these individual-level influences is the finding that we cannot understand their role without integrating them with contextual factors into a more comprehensive model of the sentencing process. Equations (1) and (2) demonstrate that the traditional hierarchical model of sentencing which assigns to the judge the sole responsibility for the decision represents a misleading view of sentencing. Judge-centered models simplify research and comport with both popular and formal conceptions, but they do violence to empirical reality. Sentencing should be conceived as a *joint* decision in which the attributes of prosecutors and defense attorneys need to be considered. Equation (2) also demonstrates the crucial role that the nature of the decision (offense seriousness) plays in the translation of attitudes into outcomes. Finally, equation (4) confirms empirically that the nature of an actor's impact depends on the characteristics of the other members of the group (workgroup configuration) and features of their immediate environment (in this case, policies of the prosecutor's office).

That many decisions in politics emerge from interactions in face-to-face groups suggests the implications of our research reach far beyond criminal courts. A growing body of research is directed to the task of devising a general theory of decision making in face-to-face groups. Much of it focuses on "repetitive games" (Hinckley, 1981, p. 71) in which participants interact over a period of time to produce a number of decisions, each of which has its own outcome and an impact on subsequent play. Axelrod's (1981) computer examination of game strategies promoting cooperation among egoists in the absence of central authority focuses explicitly on situations where the players expect to interact an indefinite number of times. Barber's (1966) research brought real world groups into the laboratory to make decisions on simulated tasks similar to those they routinely faced. Innovative studies outside the laboratory complement these simulations. Kingdon's (1981) study of congressmen's roll call voting and Dorff's and Steiner's (1981) examination of committee meetings of the Berne Canton Free Democratic Party provide two notable recent examples. Some studies of appellate court decision making recognize the import of their "ongoing, small group" nature (Howard, 1968; Murphy, 1964), but lack direct observation or measures of judges' characteristics.

Sentences in plea-bargaining cases offer rich opportunities to examine face-to-face decisions. The decisions are clearly political, are significant both individually and cumulatively, and are produced by face-to-face groups possessing many of the characteristics assumed by formal decision models. Workgroup members, for example, occupy independent roles with no central authority. The game is repetitive, with a series of discrete decisions and no known end. The result (payoff) is easily quantified and (especially for the prosecution and defense) provides a genuine and fairly inclusive indicator of their performance.

Viewed from this larger perspective, this article has looked at how individuals interact to determine the content of decisions concluded through negotiations conducted under these conditions. In moving closer to this final stage in the evolution of decisions and disputes—rather than focusing on either the mode of decision making or the formation of coalitions as is traditional in this literature—it takes a first step toward identifying in quantitative terms the features of microlevel manipulative models (Gulliver, 1979, p. 48) that characterize negotiating behavior within triads under circumstances that are rather common in the political world. Equally as important, the data came from natural settings unlike so much of the small group research that has been done under laboratory conditions or in simulations (Golembiewski, 1978).

Our ability to examine the effects of personal characteristics on real decisions in face-to-face groups permits a significant advance in relevance without sacrificing rigor. The simplifying assumptions made in simulations are justified by the value of the insights obtained. Still, to posit that no communication takes place before a decision is reached, that the reputations of other players are unknown, that enforceable threats or commitments cannot be made, and that changes in the other players' utilities cannot be changed (Axelrod, 1981) departs substantially from real-world group decision making. The concept of political skill, which appears repeatedly in qualitative descriptions of politics, incorporates these features and rests on personal characteristics. Because we naturally turn to them to explain differences in presidential behavior (Barber, 1972), legislators' effectiveness (Fenno, 1973), agency heads' ability to get larger appropriations (Wildavsky, 1964), and mayors' ability to achieve their goals (Dahl, 1961), we sought quantitative confirmation of the significance of personal style as a factor shaping decisions in face-to-face groups.

Our research addresses another issue in decision theory, namely, the impact of the rules of the game. This issue is seen quite clearly in the role of offense seriousness and how it shapes the dynamics of the sentencing process. First, our research incorporated the legal range of sentences and consequently defined the field of negotiations. Second, because it also subsumed local going rates, the enormously difficult problem of deciding what is fair punishment was greatly simplified. As Barber notes (1966, p. 160), "simplifying techniques *must* be developed" by small decision-making groups. The going rate is an example of the rules of thumb and other devices that characterize many decisions made on the basis of satisficing standards.

It often is taken for granted that the effect of rules of the game in constraining the personal influences of those involved in the process is constant over the range of relevant decisions. This study suggests strongly that in many situations this is overly simplistic and that the factors shaping decisions do not have a linear impact. The seriousness of the offense structured negotiations more tightly when cases were relatively minor than when they were more serious. As cases grew in seriousness, the constraints slackened, so that the interpersonal dynamics measured by the interaction terms came to the forefront. This finding parallels a point of view expressed by Gist (1982) that the stability and competition perspectives in budgeting theory can be reconciled and integrated into a more general theory. Our conclusion is that although many sentencing decisions are indeed the products of simple, historically based decision rules that lend continuity and predictability to the process, other decisions emerge through complex interactive, manipulative, or competitive processes entailing the personal views, working styles, and personality traits of the people in the process.

To explore quantitatively face-to-face repetitive group decisions, research must be sensitive to (and measure) context and circumstances as well as personal characteristics of the decision makers and must explore nonlinear interactions. Doing so offers the prospect of combining rigor with relevance to enhance our understanding of real-world decision making in face-to-face groups.

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Appendix

Equation 3: ($R^2 = .60$; $n = 799$)

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathit{JAILMIN} = 3.5 &+ \underset{(12.3;.97)}{1.3 * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(1.16;.06)}{1.3 * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} - \underset{(14.3;-.27)}{2.6 * \mathit{JPUN}} + \underset{(1.21;.03)}{.15 * \mathit{DPUN}} + \underset{(5.5;.08)}{.7 * \mathit{PRES}} \\
&+ \underset{(1.9;.05)}{.27 * \mathit{DRES}} - \underset{(8.7;-28)}{6.2 * \mathit{JINVOL1}} + \underset{(8.27;.07)}{1.6 * \mathit{DMAC1}} - \underset{(.30;-.02)}{.37 * \mathit{PMAC1}} - \underset{(111.8;-.67)}{.12 * \mathit{PRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\
&- \underset{(6.8;-57)}{.06 * \mathit{DRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(44.8;.37)}{.11 * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(10.3;.24)}{.03 * \mathit{DPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\
&+ \underset{(5.2;.13)}{.26 * \mathit{DPUN} * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} + \underset{(13.4;.29)}{.22 * \mathit{PMAC1} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(10.0;.32)}{1.05 * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{JINVOL1}}
\end{aligned}$$

Equation 4: ($R^2 = .64; n = 784$)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathit{JAILMIN} = {} & 3.1 + \underset{(40.8;.66)}{.89 * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(1.43;.07)}{1.36 * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} - \underset{(3.9;-.18)}{1.69 * \mathit{JPUN}} + \underset{(2.1;.06)}{.25 * \mathit{DPUN}} + \underset{(1.37;.05)}{.47 * \mathit{PRES}} \\
& - \underset{(7.12;-.34)}{.06 * \mathit{PRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(17.2;.30)}{.09 * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(5.9;.14)}{.27 * \mathit{DPUN} * \mathit{CRIMRCD}} \\
& - \underset{(6.39;-.27)}{6.04 * \mathit{JINVOL1}} - \underset{(.17;-.01)}{.34 * \mathit{PMAC1}} + \underset{(8.0;.07)}{1.64 * \mathit{DMAC1}} + \underset{(28.1;.39)}{.3 * \mathit{PMAC1} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\
& + \underset{(2.7;.18)}{.66 * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{JINVOL1}} + \underset{(.40;.03)}{.25 * \mathit{PPUN}} - \underset{(.03;-.01)}{.19 * \mathit{PTRL}} - \underset{(.92;-.03)}{1.8 * \mathit{PTRLHIGH}} \\
& + \underset{(10.7;.13)}{5.47 * \mathit{PROSDISC}} + \underset{(.00;.00)}{.01 * \mathit{JCLUSTER}} - \underset{(.01;-.00)}{.11 * \mathit{PPUNHIGH}} \\
& - \underset{(22.3;-.41)}{.07 * \mathit{PROSDISC} * \mathit{PRES} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(6.67;.12)}{.04 * \mathit{JCLUSTER} * \mathit{JPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\
& - \underset{(13.1;-.20)}{.18 * \mathit{PPUNHIGH} * \mathit{PMAC1} * \mathit{OFFSER}} + \underset{(9.2;.11)}{.10 * \mathit{DPUNLOW} * \mathit{DMAC1} * \mathit{OFFSER}} \\
& + \underset{(6.01;.08)}{.08 * \mathit{PIRLHIGH} * \mathit{PPUN} * \mathit{OFFSER}}
\end{aligned}
$$

Political Stability of Two-Party and Multiparty Systems: Probabilistic Bases for the Comparison of Party Systems

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The stability of the American two-party system is examined from 1866 until 1980. Following the approach of Stokes and Iversen (1962), restoring forces are posited for presidential elections, but restraining forces also are suggested for congressional elections, leading to an equilibrium between the two in elections to the House. Points of maximum restoration in presidential elections are derived using autocorrelations, and these points suggest a pattern of second-term Republican victories every 28 years beginning in 1872.

Equilibrium properties of the American two-party system lead to the twin criteria of representation and restraint in multiparty cabinet coalitions in order to achieve cabinet durabilities on the order of those found in two-party systems. Minimum entropy-minimum winning coalitions satisfy these criteria. Cabinet durabilities on the order of two-party systems can be achieved by means of a 44-45 percentage of the legislative seats won by the first party in a multiparty system.

> In truth, the more I study elections the more disposed I am to believe that they have within themselves more than a trace of the lottery. That, of course, is not necessarily undesirable so long as all concerned abide by the toss of the coin.
>
> (V. O. Key)

The American political system has perhaps more than any other exhibited a remarkable resiliency in the face of strongly destabilizing elements. A bloody civil war, two world wars, a major depression, smaller but bitterly opposed wars, deep recessions, and sometimes gross incompetence of leaders in office have not significantly altered the contours of this system. This robust quality must be compared with the relative fragility of some multiparty systems, with their frequent changes of government, or indeed the prevalence of military coups in more than one-half of the world's nations.

Why do certain multiparty systems have approximately the same degree of stability, or, as an operational measure, extent of cabinet durability, as two-party systems, whereas other systems have significantly lower degrees of cabinet durability? Or, what makes one multiparty system relatively stable and another essentially less stable, given similar societal conditions. I state the answer in the form of a sufficient condition for cabinet durabilities in multiparty systems on the order of two-party systems. Interestingly, this condition, although sufficient, is found not to be necessary for a substantial degree of cabinet durability.

Methodologically, I establish a foundation for the comparison of party systems, not simply the parliamentary two-party and multiparty systems that are typically compared, but one that allows for the inclusion of two-party systems with separate and distinct executives, as in the United States. Here the answer is necessarily abstract because of the many detailed differences, but I establish certain basic similarities and differences among party systems in addition to the theoretical suggestion of a sufficient condition for cabinet durability in multiparty systems.

Because of the extraordinary longevity and stability of the American two-party system and the consequent availability of a long, unbroken time series, this instance can be examined in

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detail, and certain central properties can be compared with others. Two relatively concise equations encompass the whole of American presidential and congressional longitudinal voting behavior in the post-Civil War period. Parsimony and simple structure of this kind may lie at the heart of this continued stability over time. The American two-party system is shown to be without memory or at most to have a very short finite memory, thus providing a stark contrast with the potential for long-term memory in multiparty systems. Markovian systems are those with memory up to a certain order *n*. Sartori's (1976, p. 192) observation about the "balance and oscillation . . . maintained via the tactics of party competition" in two-party systems is also tested. Consequently, two basic properties of the American two-party system, namely the restoration of party competition (via oscillation) and restraint (via balance) of that competition emerge and have important implications for the stability of multiparty systems.

In concluding, I reflect on theories of party competition by Downs (1957), Sartori (1976), and Dodd (1976) and on theorists of the stability of party systems such as Huntington (1968), Dahl (1971), Powell (1981), and Lijphart (1984).

The principal mode of analysis is probability theory; it has the necessary degree of abstraction to facilitate comparisons across party systems, and it has also been used successfully to analyze the stability of diverse political systems (Midlarsky, 1978, 1981, 1982, 1983).

Stochastic Models of the American Two-Party System

In a highly original departure from existing research on electoral competition, Stokes and Iversen (1962) used probability models to demonstrate the existence of forces that restore party competition; however, they did not specify the precise nature of these forces.[1] In this article these forces are specified both theoretically and mathematically, followed by empirical tests of the overall formulation. Essentially, the analytic functions describing presidential elections are found to be periodic, thus suggesting the return to some previous electoral state or a restoration of party competition, which, in presidential elections, is in turn found to influence congressional elections. However, the restraint of party identification and candidate incumbency in the House limits their impact, thus yielding an overall electoral equilibrium in the House.

The following brief account of the basic mathematical models presents only the essential features of the argument; mathematical details appear in the Appendix and cited references.

The Stokes-Iversen Model

Stokes and Iversen constructed a variable *x* which is defined as the percentage departure of the vote from an equal division (50%). One of the outstanding features of American electoral history that they discovered is that from 1866 through 1960, no party ever received more than 65% of the vote. Thus the variable *x*, in absolute value, never exceeded 15%, and frequently remained below 10%. This is also true of the value of *x* carried forward to the 1980 election, as in Figure 1 (Republicans positive, Democrats negative as the result of a random selection).

It was this apparent equilibrium in the division of the vote which led Stokes and Iversen, for analytic purposes, to posit the converse—a random walk that effectively is unbounded. At each trial (here, election) the value of *x* can move either toward the equal division of 50% or away from it with equal probability (½,½). This is an equilibrium-free model, or one without restoring forces that would tend to drive the value of *x* toward 50%. By demonstrating that the variable *x* did *not* obey the model, Stokes and Iversen were able to demonstrate the existence of forces that restore party competition in American national elections. Some of these forces are

> the tendency of interest groups to remember the favors an administration has dispensed less than the favors it has not; the ability of the party out of power to make more flexible and extravagant promises of future benefit, while the party in power is limited by what it can actually deliver; the greater motivational strength of the public's negative response to an administration's mistakes than of its positive response to an administration's successes; the liability of the party in power to disastrous splits as its majority grows and its sense of electoral pressure lessens; movements of the business cycle, generating new support for the opposition party in periods of economic decline; the alternating moods of liberalism and conservatism that have marked our national temper; and a vigorous popular belief in rotation in office, which turns the peccadilloes of a party long in power into convincing evidence that the time for a change has arrived (Stokes & Iversen, 1962, pp. 159-160).

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[1] In a subsequent study, Sellers (1965) amplified historically the concept of equilibrium and contributed evidence for its existence in the American two-party system, but did not in any formal sense go beyond the Stokes-Iversen formulation. Spafford (1971), using a lagged time series analysis, found the equilibrium share of the House vote to be in the neighborhood of 50% in the period 1900-1960.

Figure 1. Values of *x* for Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1866-1980



Equilibrium Introduced

Here I posit the existence of random forces that can arise at each election time (economic changes, international influences, natural disasters) as in a random walk. A hypothesis fully consistent with that of random influences at each election is the Gaussian or normal distribution of these influences over time. Indeed, the solution to the most common form of the generalized random walk is Gaussian (see the Appendix). In addition, a systematic component demonstrated to exist by Stokes and Iversen is posited. In turn, this systematic component is divided into a) the restoring forces suggested in their work, and b) restraining forces which limit the rapidity with which restoring forces can operate, because if there were no such limit, the restoring force itself which places an opposition party in office would be unbounded and lead to thoroughly lopsided election returns upon such restoration. The fact that this rarely if ever occurs (see Figure 1) suggests that the restoring forces have definite bounds which are not exceeded, and this limiting influence is suggested to be the restraining force. Thus,

$$x = f(\text{restoration, restraint}) + g(\epsilon) \qquad (1)$$

where the first term is the systematic component of American national elections and the second is the random influence, $g(\epsilon)$.

As a first approximation, the systematic component, consisting of both restoration and restraint, is hypothesized to be Markovian.[2] This is effectively a first (systematic) step removed from the generalized random walk found to be inapplicable by Stokes and Iversen. In contrast to the purely random influence of the generalized random walk, the Markovian assumption states that the outcome of an event is dependent only on the state of the system at the time the event occurs or, in electoral terms, the previous election as the last relevant event. No prior state of the system to whatever order specified has any influence on the election outcome. Thus, the simplest form of systematic dependence is introduced.

Elections to the House are hypothesized to be first order Markovian, that is, dependent only on the previous election, but presidential elections are suggested to be second order Markovian, or dependent on the previous election plus one additional prior election, because restoring forces are considered to be demonstrated more clearly in presidential elections with their larger numbers of uncommitted and swing voters than congressional elections with a greater degree of party identification (cf. Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979, pp. 50-55).

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[2] The use of Markovian models in political science research is perhaps most readily found in the field of international relations, exemplified by applications such as Zinnes and Wilkenfeld (1971) or Zinnes, Zinnes, & McClure (1972).

The impact of interest groups cited by Stokes and Iversen (1962), p. 159) as a restoring force also would be felt more keenly in presidential elections as a focused opportunity for influence. By way of comparison, Congress proceeds incrementally (first order) in its electoral behavior with many incumbent candidates appearing again and again for reelection in contrast to the earlier limitations by custom on the number of consecutive terms for a single presidential candidate and now the more recent constitutional limitation.

Thus, the availability of uncommitted voters, an increased voter turnout, candidate personality combined with the issues of the day, and the necessity for change after two terms in office could lead to an alternation in victories for the contesting parties in presidential elections. However, the impact of presidential on congressional elections in the form of a coattails effect on the one hand, balanced by ticket-splitting, return to the party of choice in an off-year election, or simply the continued preference for an incumbent congressional candidate on the other, suggest an average equilibrium between restoration and restraint in congressional elections which leads to a first order process (see the Appendix for additional details).

Equation (1) for congressional elections now can be defined to be

$$x_c = f(\text{restoration} = \text{restraint}) + g(\epsilon) \qquad (2)$$

thus incorporating the average equality between restoration and restraint, whereas for presidential elections,

$$x_p = f'(\text{restoration} > \text{restraint}) + g'(\epsilon) \qquad (3)$$

where restoring forces are suggested to be greater than restraining ones.

Statistical Solutions

The fundamental statistical hypotheses as they emerge from the preceding analysis are that a) congressional elections are Markovian to a first order, and b) presidential elections are Markovian to a second order. These hypotheses can be tested quite easily by examining the constants of the regression equations (Anderson, 1971) $x_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x_{t-1}$ for the congressional case, and $x_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x_{t-1} + \alpha_2 x_{t-2}$ for the presidential case where α_0, α_1, and α_2 are constants of the equations. The regression coefficients should be statistically significant at $p < .05$, but the constant α_0 in both instances should not be significant because of the stationarity assumption, which implies that it should make no difference where the time analysis begins. Further tests of model specification and goodness of fit should indicate that the model is fully specified by these equations.

Using election data from 1866 through 1980 found in the files of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, the regression equations for the congressional and presidential cases are, respectively,

$$x_t = \underset{(.474)}{-.004} + \underset{(.000)}{.520}\, x_{t-1} \qquad (4)$$

and

$$x_t = \underset{(.412)}{.011} + \underset{(.008)}{.493}\, x_{t-1} - \underset{(.003)}{.553}\, x_{t-2}. \qquad (5)$$

Significance levels are in parentheses below each of the constants. As can be seen, the regression coefficients are highly significant and, as expected, the constants α_0 are not, thus supporting the stationarity assumption.

Embedding each of the models within a larger framework implies the completeness of model specification.[3] For the congressional case a third term, x_{t-2}, is added to equation (4), and its coefficient is $\alpha_2 = .154$ ($p = .265$). In the presidential instance a fourth term, x_{t-3}, is added to equation (5) yielding a coefficient, $\alpha_3 = -.072$ ($p = .767$). Thus, neither of the additional terms adds any significant information, and the models are fully specified by equations (4) and (5).[4]

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[3] I am indebted to Professor Michael B. Woodroofe, Chairman of the Department of Statistics at the University of Michigan, for suggesting this particular test of model completeness.

[4] Another approach to testing the adequacy of the Markovian models is by means of an analysis of residuals (Box & Pierce, 1970). If the squared autocorrelations of the residuals after model specification are too large, then the model clearly has not captured the principal dynamics of the process, because substantial degrees of intercorrelation still remain among the points in the time series. The statistic

$$Q = n \sum_{i=1}^{k} r_i^2(a)$$

is distributed as $\chi^2(k-p-q)$ where $r_i^2(a)$ are the squared autocorrelations of the residuals after model specification, p and q are the respective orders of the autoregressive and moving average components of the model (p is equal to 1 for the congressional and 2 for the presidential model, q here always is equal to zero), and k is the number of autocorrelations used in the test, here equal to 26, a number above 20 as recommended in Box and Jenkins (1976, p. 290). The value of n here is equal to the number of observations used to fit each of

Equilibrium between Restoration and Restraint

In order to examine more closely now the nature of the equilibrium between restoration and restraint, I assume, following standard usage in the stochastic literature (cf. Wax, 1954), that the restoring force is negatively proportional to the distance from the origin (zero difference between the parties), or the restoring force F_1 is postulated to be $F_1 = -\omega^2 x$, where x, as before, is the distance from zero difference between votes for the two parties (absolute equality) and ω^2 is a constant. (The square of the constant is used here in order to avoid the later use of a square root.) An elastic restoring force is embodied in the function $-\omega^2 x$. The larger the value of x as a departure from equilibrium in one election, the larger the restoring force in a subsequent election.

At the same time, however, the existence of such a force alone does not allow for the observed rapidity of change from one election to another, that is, how much change in the fortunes of the parties is actually evidenced over some constant time interval. If the restoring force were not countered by some restraint likely in the form of party identification or candidate incumbency, then it could exceed all bounds for some party in a given year, leading to a thoroughly lopsided election return. The existence of strong incumbency effects in elections to the House is demonstrated in Abramowitz (1980) and Collie (1981). This force, called F_2, again following normal usage, is assumed to be negatively proportional to the rate of change in difference between the votes for the two parties; that is, the greater the rate of movement to the opposing party, the greater the restraining force, or $F_2 = \beta - dx/dt$, where dx/dt is the change in x over a given time interval and β is a proportionality constant.

Consider now an equality in absolute value between restoring and restraining forces but opposite in sign, such that $F_1 = -F_2$, or

$$\omega^2 x = -\beta \frac{dx}{dt} \tag{6}$$

and

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = \frac{-\omega^2}{\beta} x \tag{7}$$

A solution to this equation is the exponential function. This now is an equilibrium condition between restoring and restraining forces and is incorporated in an equation that leads directly to the autocorrelation function (8) below (see the Appendix). This function shortly will be seen to have a unique and important property.

Politically, this equality between the two forces implies that the greater the restoring force, for example, in the form of swing votes in presidential elections which would lead to the restoration of the contesting party to office, the greater the tendency at that time or in a subsequent congressional election for the restraint of party identification or candidate incumbency to inhibit this restoring force. Ticket-splitting, return to the party of choice in an off-year election, or simply the continued preference for an incumbent congressional candidate, are some possible manifestations of this restraint. The presence of the parameter ω^2 will be significant in subsequent comparisons with multiparty systems.

Autocorrelation Function

The autocorrelation function, which effectively gives the degree of association of any point in the series with all of the other points, for the process represented in equations (2) and (6) where $\beta < \omega$ is given by

$$\rho(t) = k_2 e^{-(\omega^2/\beta)t}, \tag{8}$$

where ω^2/β is equal to a constant (Kac & Logan, 1979, p. 23), as is k_2. It is easily seen in equation (8) that if the restraining force as represented by β, for example, in the form of party identification or incumbency advantage is extremely large, then the rate of decline of the autocorrelation function will be so slow as to be virtually constant, thus suggesting a constant propensity for one party to stay in power in the absence of sufficiently large restoring forces which would place the opposing party in office. Intuitively it can be seen that because the various realizations of x are exponential and a solution to equation (7) above, the autocorrelation as an intersection of time lagged variables also will be exponential.

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the models. If the value of Q is significant, for example, at $p < .05$, then model specification is inadequate.

In the instance of the congressional autocorrelations,

$$Q = 25.345,\ df = 25,\ p < .50$$

and for the presidential

$$Q = 8.577,\ df = 24,\ p < .99.$$

Thus the goodness-of-fit test here strongly suggests, as do Box and Jenkins (1976, p. 397) for models of similar goodness of fit, that these results provide "no grounds for questioning model adequacy."

Figure 2. Cumulative Percentage of Congressional Frequency of *x* Plotted on Normal Probability Paper



For the presidential case, the autocorrelation function is (Wang & Uhlenbeck, 1945, p. 334):

$$\rho(t) = k_1 e^{-\beta\tau/2} \left(\cos \omega_1 \tau + \frac{\beta}{2\omega_1} \sin \omega_1 |\tau|\right) \qquad (9)$$

where $\tau = t - t_0$ and ω_1 is a constant related to ω. Because restoring forces are hypothesized to be paramount (equation (3)) and the process is Markovian to a second order, with negative correlations at every other election, a periodic or sinusoidal function is intuitively plausible, as in equation (9).

Empirical Tests of the Equilibrium Process

I have now identified two distinct Markovian solutions: a) the first order equilibrium process of equations (2) and (8) for congressional elections, and b) the second order restoration process of equations (3) and (9) for presidential elections. However, I have not tested empirically the autocorrelation functions implied by the equilibrium process, nor have I examined the random portion, $g(\epsilon)$, of equations (2-3). It is to these empirical tests that I now turn.

The time period of analysis is 1866-1980; the beginning of the interval was chosen to capture the onset of the modern two-party system (as did Stokes and Iversen), although analyses were conducted back to 1828 in order to examine the stability of solutions of the equations. All data are from the files of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

The test of normality implied by the Gaussian solution to the random walk process $g(\epsilon)$ in equations (2-3) is in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution of x between 1866 and 1980 for congressional elections, plotted on normal probability paper, and Figure 3 presents the comparable plot for presidential elections between 1868 and 1980. The conclusion of normality cannot be put to a formal statistical text because the observations (although not the random influences) are not strictly independent of each other. However, visually, there appear to be no substantial departures from normality, as indicated by the linear plots of the cumulative distributions.[5]

I can now examine whether the congressional

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[5] Professor Claudio Cioffi-Revilla of the University of Illinois suggested this test of normality where a formal statistical test cannot be used.

Figure 3. Cumulative Percentage of Presidential Frequency of *x* Plotted on Normal Probability Paper



election process indeed follows the equilibrium model of equations (2) and (8). According to Doob's (1942) remarkable theorem, a one-dimensional Gaussian process is Markovian if and only if its autocorrelation function is exponential, that is, conforms to equation (8). The autocorrelation function (normalized) is plotted in Figure 4. The correlation between observed and predicted values is $r = .712$, and more than one-half of the variance in the autocorrelation function is explained by equation (8).[6] In this, as in subsequent calculations of the theoretical autocorrelation functions, the algorithm used is one adapted from Holland (1975).

Despite this value of the correlation coefficient and the preceding demonstration that congressional elections are first order Markovian as in equation (4) and note 4, some of the deviations from the exponential function deserve comment. These deviations occur in clusters both above and below the theoretical exponential line, and to pinpoint the precise years I turn to the partial autocorrelation plot in Figure 5, which removes the effects of intercorrelations among neighboring elections. The highest positive partial autocorrelation, after the first, occurs at the ten election lag (20-year intervals) and the lowest, or most negative, occurs at the 22 election lag (44-year intervals). The pattern in both instances is straightforward. Twenty-year intervals after 1866 yield the elections of 1886, 1906, 1926, 1946 and 1966. These are all off-year elections which represent no major deviations or realignment patterns from the initial 1866 congressional election, hence the positive autocorrelation value. None of these elections is mentioned as having any significant realignment value in the exhaustive analysis of Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980, pp. 90-105). On the other hand, the negative autocorrelation at 44-year intervals yields the elections of 1910 and 1954, which have among the strongest realignment impacts of any of the off-year elections (Clubb, Flanigan, & Zingale, 1980, p. 105). Thus, the negative autocorrelation value suggests elections of very different characteristics from the

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[6] In order to ascertain if the oscillations in the autocorrelation function of Figure 4 add any substantial statistical information, the oscillatory equation (9) (in fact derived from a related mathematical equation) was used on the congressional data. The correlation between observed and predicted values was $r = .741$ to be compared with the value of $r = .712$ for the exponential function. Given an increase of only 4% of the variance explained, the requirement of parsimony demands the use of the simpler function. This additional result agrees with the findings in equation (4) and footnote 4.

Figure 4. Actual and Predicted Autocorrelations for Congressional Elections, 1866-1980



first in 1866 (and its successors in 1886, 1906, etc.), and this is precisely what is found in the matter of electoral realignment. Therefore, overlaid on the Markovian first-order process identified earlier and on the exponential function of Figure 4, are these processes of secondary statistical importance, but nevertheless of theoretical interest.

Turning now to presidential elections, the autocorrelation function is suggested to be oscillatory and defined by equation (9). Given the periodic properties of presidential elections with the earlier customary prohibition against more than two terms and the constitutional prohibition thereafter, one would expect an average alternation in office along the lines of equation (9). Figure 6 pre-

Figure 5. Partial Autocorrelations for Congressional Elections, 1866-1980



sents the autocorrelation function for presidential elections between 1868 and 1980. As can be seen, the plot is oscillatory, and the prediction equation for this function is (normalized)

$$\rho(t) = .671e \, \frac{-.227\,(t+1.38)}{2} \left[\cos .945\,(t+1.38) + .120 \sin .945\,(t+1.38)\right]. \tag{10}$$

The value of 1.38 is a phase factor designed to adjust the oscillations so as to be in phase; the correlation coefficient between the predicted and actual values is $r = .894$. Thus almost 80% of the variance in the autocorrelation function is explained by the prediction equation (10). The predicted and actual values demonstrate a close correspondence as can be seen in Figure 6.[7]

The partial autocorrelation function is shown in Figure 7. As before, the first order effect is significant, but now the second order effect is even stronger.[8] Analytically this means a change in the opposite direction from the outcome of two elections ago. Substantively, this is a restoring force, wherein after two presidential elections on the average, the party in power is ousted, and the contesting party in this two-party system is elected instead. By way of comparison, the application of the first order Markovian model of equation (8) yielded a correlation value of $r = .158$, thus indicating a thorough inapplicability of this model to presidential elections.

An extension of the data back to 1828 yielded no substantial difference in the explanatory power of the model ($r = .904$ for the presidential and $r = .644$ for the congressional), but the parameters differed somewhat, suggesting the emerging but not yet complete two-party system of the years before 1868.[9] Thus the analysis is most appropri-

Figure 6. Actual and Predicted Autocorrelations for Presidential Elections, 1868-1980



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[7] The value of $k_1 = .671$ in equation (10) is simply a normalization constant and therefore does not affect the form of the autocorrelation function, nor its predictive properties. The value of $\beta/2\omega_1 = .120$ is a direct result of the separate estimates of $\beta = .227$ and $\omega_1 = .945$.

[8] The partial autocorrelation function controls for any influences other than the specifically lagged elections. Neighboring elections or simultaneous influences operating across several elections therefore are excluded. In this sense, the results of Figure 7 are entirely consistent with the Markovian solution of equation (5) which also specifies the significant first and second order effects with all nonlagged elections controlled. Both findings stand in contrast to the autocorrelation function in Figure 6 which allows for the influence of simultaneous external influences. Thus, the cycles demonstrated in that figure could be the result of cohort change (Beck & Jennings, 1979) or similar economic influences over time (Hibbs, 1977; Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1978), which would not appear in the partial autocorrelations of Figure 7 or in equation (5).

[9] Converse (1969) has shown that approximately 70 years are required to establish a stable party system. If

Figure 7. Partial Autocorrelations for Presidential Elections, 1868-1980



ate for the later interval, but can be used in any interval in which restoring and restraining forces are present.

The equilibrium process also can be seen in the partial autocorrelation values of Figures 5 and 7. The value of the lag 1 Markovian autocorrelation coefficient representing continuity of elections to the House, or restraint in party competition $\rho(t) = .520$ in Figure 5, is almost exactly the same absolute value as the second order partial autocorrelation coefficient for elections to the presidency, $\rho(t) = -.540$ in Figure 7, but opposite in sign. Consequently the second order Markovian restorative force in the form of elections to the presidency almost exactly balances the first order Markovian restraint in elections to the House. The restoring force must be at least equal to that of restraint in order to effect the equilibrium in congressional elections (see equation (6)).

Selected Elections

In the instance of presidential elections now, I can use the periodic equation (10) to answer one of the questions implied at the outset of this study and one relevant to the later understanding of multiparty systems. What are those points in American electoral history where restoring forces were most prominent? The phase factor, $\phi = 1.38$, in that equation, states that the first of these points is to be found 1.38 elections after the starting presidential election of 1868. Rounding to within four-year intervals, the first election point is 1872, followed by intervals of $T = 6.649$, where T, the period, is equal to $2\pi/\omega_1$. Rounding to $T \cong 7$ elections, there then is a point of restoration every 28 years, starting at 1872. These restoration points, then, are to be found at the elections of 1872, 1900, 1928, and 1956.

All of these elections occurred during relatively stable periods and resulted in Republican victories. In addition, three of the four, 1872, 1900, and 1956, were second-term victories in which the vote for the second-term winner exceeded the winning vote in the prior election. These victories also occurred after the ending of a war (Civil War, Spanish-American War, and Korean War). This finding later will have implications for multiparty systems. The exception, 1928, of course saw a continuation of Republican platforms and policies along similar lines to the second-term victories. Normalcy, or at least the desire for it, may have been typified by a second-term victory in a Republican administration.[10]

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one counts from the first presidential election in 1788, then the year 1866 as used here is the earliest appropriate starting date subsequent to the Civil War. Of related interest here are the treatments of political change in Converse (1972) and Miller and Levitin (1976).

[10] Interestingly, the 28-year time period since the last restoration leads to the prediction of a Republican vic-

Thus there is a complement to the critical election, the most typical or stable in American electoral history—a pattern of persistence that has been reasserted throughout the past century. The analysis here systematically culls specific electoral points to attach to the "continuity of the alignment of electoral forces across virtually the whole sweep of American electoral history" (Clubb, Flanigan, & Zingale, 1980, p. 119).

Representation and Restraint in Multiparty Systems

A basic conclusion to emerge from the two-party analysis is that both the restoration of party competition and restraint on party competition are simultaneous principal components of a reasonably stable, certainly durable system. A balance, or equilibrium, between the two is probably necessary for such stability. As I demonstrate shortly, the minimum entropy-minimum winning coalition can provide such a balance for multiparty systems. In a multiparty context, restoration essentially implies direct representation because it is unlikely that a particular party would be restored to power at regular intervals in the near future, and so the analog here would be representation in a parliamentary setting in sufficient numbers to warrant inclusion in some coalition cabinet government. The presence of restraint in the form of party identification or candidate incumbency in the House suggests that one can seek the restraining features of the two-party system in some parliamentary distribution sufficient to constrain severely the representation process. It is to the form of this distribution that I now turn.

In order to establish an isomorphism between two systems, a necessary condition is that their entropies be the same. Indeed, in recent years it has been proven that in order for two systems to be isomorphic, not only must they have the same entropy (Sinai, 1976, p. 121), but further, given the transformations of two systems, the transformations are isomorphic to one another *if and only if* the entropies of the two systems are identical (Ornstein, 1973; 1974, p. 211). The transformations can be elections and the systems can be different party systems, for example, two and multiparty systems. This theorem applies to Bernoulli systems or to those systems with random independent perturbations. The demonstration that elections to the House (see the Appendix) are Gaussian and Markovian to the first order and that presidential elections are Gaussian and Markovian to the second order is sufficient to assert that American elections constitute Bernoulli transformations (Ornstein, 1974, p. 216).

With the equilibrium for the distribution value of the vote for the House around the 50% mark (see also Spafford, 1971), and using natural logarithms, the entropy of that system becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} H &= -\sum_{i=1}^{2} p_i \log_e p_i \\ &= [-.5 \log_e .5 - .5 \log_e .5] \\ &= .6931. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

(See Theil (1969), for a description of the properties of the entropy.)

Now what must be the distribution of votes in a multiparty system in order to approximate this equilibrium value associated with a two-party system? The result is quite striking. Table 1 shows the distribution of votes for three-, four-, and five-party systems. The distributions for the multiparty systems are calculated on the basis of an exponential distribution between proportions of votes (p_i) and rank of the party (a_i) or

$$p_i = Ae^{-\mu a_i} \tag{12}$$

$$A = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{-\mu a_i} \tag{13}$$

where μ is a constant and where A is a normalization constant, so that the sum of the probabilities equals unity. The exponential distribution is chosen because it conveys a maximum amount of information with independent units, as in the two-party case, and with a minimum number of assumptions (Good, 1963; Jaynes, 1957). This conformance to the exponential model will be explored more fully at a later point. In each case, the distribution is calculated with $H = .6931$ and p_i given by equation (12).[11]

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tory in the 1984 election. See the end of note 8 for some of the possible mechanisms (cohort change, economic influences) underlying these repeated restorations. These points of maximum restoration could be the culmination of processes that began well before these second-term victories and declined in importance immediately thereafter.

[11] The values in Table 1 are calculated based on the entropy of the exponential distribution which is (Hastings & Peacock, 1975, p. 58)

$$H = \log_e b + 1$$

where b is the mean of the observed distribution. H is then set equal to .6931 for the determination of b, and μ is set equal to $1/b$ in equations (12) and (13). Because of the different number of parties in each of the three calculations of p_i, it is impossible to keep H strictly con-

Table 1. Expected Percentages of Legislative Seats in Three-, Four-, and Five-Party Systems Based on the Equilibrium Entropy (H = .6931) of the Two-Party System

Party Rank (a_i)	Three Party	Four Party	Five Party
1	75.6	74.6	74.4
2	19.4	19.2	19.1
3	5.0	4.9	4.9
4		1.3	1.3
5			.3

The theoretical values of Table 1 suggest that the only form of party system that might approximate the low entropy value (restraint on party competition) of the two-party system is the predominant party system with greatly inflated values for the predominant party. The relationship between this party and the remaining ones does not change much upon the addition of fourth and fifth parties. Although these values for the predominant party are unrealistic except for possibly contrived instances such as the PRI in Mexico, they are nevertheless suggestive of possible similarities between the one-party and two-party systems at least in satisfying the function of restraint on party competition as it emerged in the equilibrium .50-.50 values for the House. This potential similarity between the two systems now can be examined empirically.

Sartori (1976) has provided data on legislative party fractionalization (Rae, 1971) for the five categories of his typology in the years from 1945 through 1973. Although Rae's fractionalization measure is not the same as the entropy, it has similar properties. More important, a test using a different but related measure and with categories established independently of the present study should constitute a fairly stringent test of the hypothesis of similarity between one-party and two-party systems. In addition, comparisons can be made with other fractionalization measures published by Powell (1981) for a somewhat later period (1965-1975). Sartori's (1976) typology of party systems is presented in Table 2 with his legislative fractionalization values as the numerical entries to the left and Powell's to the right.

As can be seen from Table 2, all of the adjacent categories demonstrate significant values of the t test, with the exception of that between the predominant and the two-party system. Here the t value is not significant, suggesting a similarity not found between any of the other categories, as implied by the analysis of Table 1. However, if the fractionalization values from Powell's later analysis are used (in the column to the right), then there is a significant difference between the predominant party and the two-party system. This is as it should be. Probability theory can only suggest certain general tendencies which clearly would appear earlier in the history of party systems. Later, the tendency to counter the aggregative effects by ideological socialization (Thomas, 1982) should increase the fractionalization, which in fact happens quite dramatically in the predominant-party system. Primarily because the earlier history of a party system should reflect the aggregative tendency and the consequent inclusion of potentially hostile elements to emerge later, the predominant-party system is probably less stable than appears at first instance, and in fact countries with predominant-party systems such as Uruguay, Turkey, and Norway, as categorized by Sartori, ceased being so, becoming instead military regimes or genuine multiparty systems. It is likely that the absence of direct representation in separate structures as in the minimum winning cabinet leads to the inability of the predominant party to sustain itself indefinitely.

The Minimum Entropy Condition

Instead of an unrealistically high parliamentary majority, as reflected in Table 1, which might well degenerate into factions, the traditional method of governing, of course, has been by means of cabinet coalitions. And here, greater stability has been demonstrated for cabinet coalitions in multiparty systems than had been suspected earlier. Dodd (1976) showed that minimum winning coalitions in multiparty systems could be as durable as one-party cabinets, and Lijphart (1982) demonstrated that minimum winning coalitions actually correlated better with five measures of cabinet durability than did one party cabinets.

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stant across party systems despite the use of the same value of μ. Thus the error in deviating from the value of $H = .6931$ varies from approximately 2% in the case of the three-party system, to approximately 9% for the five-party system.

In addition to its roots in coalition theory (Riker, 1962), a basis for the durability of minimum winning coalitions is to be found in extending representation to smaller, nonpredominant parties, and only those necessary to maintain a majority of the legislative assembly. Thus, the representation of the smaller parties often is keenly sought after, and once the coalition is formed, the representation of the smaller parties frequently is respected. However, the minimum winning coalition alone does not introduce the degree of restraint suggested by the pattern of Table 1, which in turn was suggested by the entropy value of the House in the American two-party system. The minimum winning coalition in itself does not guarantee this pattern, for clearly several small parties together could constitute a majority of the parliament.

The representation of parties in the minimum winning coalition together with the restraining pattern of Table 1, in which a larger party predominates, could yield greater cabinet durability than the minimum winning coalition alone. One can call this the minimum entropy-minimum winning coalition. It has the virtue of representation which in turn has the consequence of potentially minimizing societal conflict, as Powell (1981) demonstrated in his finding of significant negative correlations between representative political systems and various measures of domestic violence (e.g., riots, and deaths resulting from domestic violence). At the same time, the minimum entropy

Table 2. Comparison of Fractionalization Scores among Types of Party System[a]

	Sartori	Powell
Two Party, 1		
Canada	.574	.63
Australia	.565	.61
Austria	.556	.54
United Kingdom	.512	.53
New Zealand	.494	.49
United States	.483	.48
Predominant party, 2		
Norway	.691	.72
Sweden	.685	.69
Japan	.645	.61
Uruguay	.589	.61
India	.487	.60
Turkey	.461	.63
Moderate Multiparty, 3		
Switzerland	.801	.81
Netherlands	.787	.84
Israel	.784	
Denmark	.755	.79[c]
Iceland	.716	
Luxembourg	.678	
Belgium	.667	.76[c]
Eire	.649	.61
France V	.620	.71[c]
West Germany	.614	.57
Extreme and polarized, 4		
Finland	.804	.81
Chile	.796	.73
France IV	.790	
Italy	.721	.78

$t_{12} = 1.421$, $df = 5$, $p < .20$; $t_{23} = 2.680$, $df = 14$, $p < .01$; $t_{34} = 1.848$, $df = 12$, $p < .05$;
t_{12}(Powell) = 2.994, $df = 10$, $p < .01$[b]

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[a] After Sartori (1976, p. 314) and Powell (1981, p. 866).

[b] Tests are carried out using pooled variances where appropriate and are one-tailed because of the directionality of hypotheses. Where homogeneity of variance is not satisfied and $n_1 = n_2$ as in the first test, the degrees of freedom are one-half the usual number.

[c] Categorized as extremist party systems by Powell (1981).

requirement can ensure that a single party will have captured a large share of the vote, and in so doing will have prevented many smaller parties from having a sufficient number of seats to warrant invitation to become part of the cabinet. Thus, a serious restraint on legislative fractionalization and a consequent fractionalized cabinet is established by the minimum entropy condition.

An analysis of Dodd's (1976, p. 168) data on the durability of minimum winning coalitions shows that the highly fractionalized legislatures of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, and Italy had minimum winning coalitions (greater than one party) that were significantly less durable ($t = 1.994$, $df = 14$, $p < .05$) than comparable minimum winning coalitions in the remaining 11 countries with less highly fractionalized legislatures. Thus, the smaller the fractionalization or entropy of the minimum winning coalition, the greater its durability.

An additional advantage of the minimum entropy condition is the minimization of surprise to the voters upon cabinet formation. Theil (1969) used a variant of the entropy to prove that in allocating the proportion of legislative seats, q_i, particular multiples, α, of the proportion of the vote, p_i, for r parties minimized the surprisal of the voters upon viewing the selected distribution, as in equation (14), where

$$q_i = p_i^\alpha / \sum_{j=1}^{r} p_j^\alpha \qquad i = 1, 2, \ldots, r \quad (14)$$

The concept of surprise here is some systematic conformance of the q_i to the p_i as developed by Theil (1969). Here too, the minimum entropy condition would minimize surprise to the voters upon viewing cabinet selection, because a large predominant party typically would be expected to be part of such a coalition. A large number of small parties could present virtually endless possibilities for cabinet formation, many of which indeed could surprise the voters and lead to societal instabilities that could limit cabinet durability.

A Sufficient Condition for Cabinet Durability

The demands of minimum entropy give rise to a sufficient condition for cabinet durability in multiparty systems on the order of that found in two-party systems. Table 1 suggests that if one-party dominance on that order is established at least in cabinet coalitions, then government durability on the order of two-party systems can be achieved. What then must be the proportions of vote in the parliament in order to achieve approximations to the values in Table 1 for the cabinet? This question is essentially isomorphic to that of minimization of surprise to the voters upon choosing a method of calculating proportions of seats in the legislature to favor the larger parties. Theil (1969) proved that equation (14) will suffice, and so the only question remaining is the choice of a value of α in that equation. The answer is to be found in studies of the American and British two-party systems (Kendall & Stuart, 1950; March, 1957; Penrose, 1946; Theil, 1972), which found that the effect of the single-member district in such systems is to triple the legislative representation in relation to the actual vote.[12] Multiparty systems, which for the most part have some form of proportional representation, clearly would not have such disproportionate consequences.

The effect of an $\alpha = 3$ in transforming the proportional results of the parliamentary election to the one-party dominance of the cabinet would then *approximate* the consequences of single-member districts in diminishing or even eliminating the political presence in the cabinet of third, fourth, or fifth parties. The question now remains, what proportion of legislative seats would be required to achieve values on the order of magnitude of those in Table 1 for cabinet representations, given an $\alpha = 3$ in equation (14)? Allowing a second party achieving as much as 30% of the vote, as in Italy, then assuming some arbitrary values for third, fourth, and fifth parties (they contribute far less after tripling), a value of approximately 44-45% is required for the first party, as shown in Table 3.

This minimum value of 44% of the parliamentary seats captured by the largest party in order to achieve cabinet durability on the order of two-party systems also is suggested on additional theoretical grounds. Recall that the exponential distribution was used as a theoretical model for the distribution of seats in a multiparty system. This assumption is, in fact, justified by the more fundamental assumption of randomness in the distribution of voters among parties leading to the distribution of seats. This, of course, is not true for many individual political systems, especially polarized ones, but a distribution averaging all first parties, second parties, third parties, etc., could yield an idealized distribution in which local individual departures from randomness in one direction (e.g., in favor of second parties) becomes averaged with those in which the second party is not represented as strongly.

Allowing chance mechanisms to operate, in which the n voters are indistinguishable from each

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[12] This essentially is an empirical finding, although its validity does rely on a normal distribution of the observed p_i in order to conform to the underlying theoretical normality of the cubic proportion law (Kendall & Stewart, 1950).

Table 3. Transformations of Legislative Percentages into One-Party Dominant Cabinets Using $\alpha = 3$ in Equation (14)

	I		II	
Party Rank	Percentage Legislative Seats	Transformed Values	Percentage Legislative Seats	Transformed Values
1	44	74.1	45	75.6
2	30	23.5	30	22.4
3	13	1.9	12	1.4
4	8	.4	8	.4
5	5	.1	5	.1

other and are randomly assigned to r parties (thus effectively allowing no polarizations or permanent divisions), in the limit of large n/r approaching some mean value, yields the geometric distribution (Feller, 1968, p. 61; Johnson & Kotz, 1977, p. 317). The continuous analog of the geometric, in turn, is the exponential distribution. In order to test this basic model of the geometric distribution of seats among the several parties, under the assumption of randomness, all r parties were averaged for the multiparty countries[13] in Table 5, as shown in Table 4. The geometric distribution is given by

$$G = p(1-p)^{k-1} \qquad k = 1, 2, \ldots, r \qquad (15)$$

where the parameter p in practice is estimated by the reciprocal of the mean of the observed distribution. With $p = 1/\bar{x} = .435$, the theoretical values are shown in the column to the right in Table 4. As can be seen by the probability value of the chi-square goodness of fit statistic, this result is highly likely to have resulted by chance alone. Therefore, the geometric representation in Table 4 and by implication, its exponential analog, is an appropriate model for the multiparty analysis and yields a value (rounded) of 44%, which agrees with the figure for the predominant party suggested in Table 3.

There is an additional important inference. The observed value of 41% is somewhat below the purely chance expectation of 44% and suggests the center-fleeing process noted by Sartori (1976). In order to examine this possibility, only the first five parties are included in an exponential calculation; the geometric distribution is no longer appropriate because the generated distribution is no longer a true probability model. The exponential

Table 4. Observed and Predicted Values by the Geometric and Exponential Distributions of the Mean Percentages of Legislative Seats, 1945-1980

Rank (k or a_i)	Observed Percentages	Theoretical Percentages (Geometric-Full) $p = .4346$	Theoretical Percentages (Exponential-Truncated) $\mu = .7757$
1	41.0	43.5	45.0
2	25.3	24.6	26.1
3	14.7	13.9	15.1
4	9.0	7.9	8.8
5	4.5	4.4	5.1
6	2.5	2.5	
7	1.1	1.4	
8	.6	.8	
9	.3	.5	
10	.2	.3	
11	.1	.1	
12	.1	.1	

$\chi^2 = 8.523$, $df = 10$, $p < .70$

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[13] The values were calculated for the years 1945-1980 for the party systems of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France IV, France V, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden.

distribution, equation (12), can however be normalized to account for the truncation. Linearizing equation (12) by taking logarithms to the base e of both sides, leads to

$$\log p_i = \log A - \mu a_i$$

and then the regression coefficient of $\log p_i$ on a_i is an estimate of μ. This new theoretical distribution is shown in the farthest column to the right in Table 4. The second through fifth parties conform very closely to the observed values, but now the first party is at 45%. Because parties two through five did not change substantially from the observed values, it can only be concluded that the absence now of the smaller parties beyond five, enabled the largest party to attain this predicted value. Put another way, the observed slope of the exponential (geometric) pattern of the second through the fifth parties predicted this 45% value for the first.

Thus, if randomness alone is allowed to govern the distribution of seats, then the 44-45 percentage attained by the first party would be sufficient to meet the theoretical conditions for cabinet durability along the lines of a two party system. However, the center-fleeing property of multiparty systems with greater than five parties likely as a result of ideological polarization, prevents this value from being achieved. This property of multiparty systems will be treated more fully later.

Does this theoretical value of 44-45% suggested now by two theoretical arguments hold up under empirical examination? The percentages of first party seats are calculated for the years 1945-1980 and shown in Table 5 as a rank order of cabinet durabilities in this period. The two party cases clearly cluster in the top half of Table 5. From Australia to Germany, the mix is of two and moderate multiparty systems (using Sartori's definition) with Germany perhaps being an incipient two party system. With the exception of Luxembourg (to be treated shortly), no country in this grouping has an average value of first party percentage below 47% and among the countries below Germany in the list, no country is above 43.3% (Italy). Thus, the 44-45% value does constitute a minimum beyond which cabinet durabilities on the order of the two party system can be

Table 5. Rank Order of Cabinet Durability and Mean Percentage Legislative Seats Captured by the First Party, 1945-1980

	Rank Order of Cabinet Durability[a]	Mean Percentage First Party[b]
Australia	1	48.88
Austria	2	49.83
Sweden	3	47.33
Canada	4	54.28
New Zealand	5.5	56.91
United Kingdom	5.5	53.18
Ireland	7.5	49.54
Luxembourg	7.5	41.34
Japan	9	54.94
Norway	10	49.29
Germany	11	47.38
Iceland	12	37.95
Denmark	13	37.86
Netherlands	14	31.13
Israel	15	38.42
France V	16	42.04[c]
Belgium	17	41.35
Italy	18	43.33
Finland	19	26.50
France IV	20	27.26

$t = 5.861$, $df = 18$, $p < .0001$

[a] Based on four of the most highly intercorrelated measures (A-D) of the five measures of cabinet durability in Lijphart (1982).

[b] Calculations based on values published in Mackie and Rose (1974) and Mackie and Rose (1974-1981).

[c] Omitting one election value (1968) that was 4.6 standard deviations from the mean for the remaining values for France V.

achieved.[14] A *t* statistic in the table differentiates between first party percentages above the line and those below it, and is significant at $p < .0001$.[15]

Note that the 44-45% value was asserted to be a sufficient coalition, but not a necessary one. Meeting it appears to allow for a considerable degree of cabinet durability but not meeting it does not necessarily mean that the government will experience rapid turnovers. Consociational arrangements (Lijphart, 1977) as in Luxembourg, or perhaps some other method of elite agreement could guarantee a high level of cabinet durability. Nevertheless, the absence of any country exceeding 44-45% in the lower portion of Table 5 suggests that meeting this range of values for first parties constitutes a sufficient condition for cabinet durability on the order of two-party systems.

Although this theoretical result was derived solely from probabilistic considerations and then tested empirically, it does agree with prior findings. Taylor and Herman (1971) found that party fractionalization was negatively associated with cabinet durability. Sanders and Herman (1977) emphasized the number of parties in the government, as did Warwick (1979), in addition to minimum winning status, in explaining cabinet durability. Mayer (1980) analyzed the number of parties and size of the dominant party. One party cabinets also are associated with durability in Blondel's (1968), Warwick's (1979), and now Lijphart's (1982) analysis which emphasizes the three variables of one-party status, number of parties, and percent time minimum winning. This converging emphasis on the minimum winning cabinet emerges from Dodd's (1976) earlier treatment.

Note that the 44-45% range allows for any of these possibilities to occur, because with a percentage in this range, the fractionalization or entropy would be minimal, there could exist the possibility of one-party government with perhaps the tacit parliamentary support of a small party (e.g., the Communists in Sweden subsequent to 1958), or a minimum winning coalition would be relatively easy to achieve with only one additional party being needed in most instances to achieve minimum winning status. These prior findings notwithstanding, the virtue of the probabilistic treatment here has been to specify a relatively precise value needed for cabinet durability and on theoretical grounds very different from those used in these prior analyses. Most important, this value of 44-45% satisfies the simultaneous demands of representation and restraint, in allowing the formation of minimum winning cabinets which include the representation (or tacit support) of one or more small parties while at the same time including a predominant party as a restraint on party competition.

Further Comparisons between Two-Party and Multiparty Systems

Although I have demonstrated that the durability of one-party dominant coalitions is not substantially different from that found in two-party systems, significant differences still remain between the two-party and multiparty cases. These differences are found principally in the direction of entropy change when shocks to the system are received. In equation (A9) in the Appendix, reflected in the autocorrelation functions (9) and (10), the random influences or perturbations to the system are exogenous and tend to buffet the extent of the two-party majority toward one party or the other. Effectively, if in the face of some failure in war or economic performance, a more rapid restoration to the presidency (and consequently a greater degree of representation in Congress) is desired for the opposing party, then these impacts on the system can simply lead to a higher value of ω in equation (9), or increase in the frequency with which the opposing party is returned to office. In this instance, essentially that of a large majority for the opposition, the entropy in equation (11) is lowered, because any departure from equal representation for the two parties lowers the entropy. (The maximum is achieved when both parties have the same percentage.) In the multiparty system, on the other hand, because of the presence of small parties (and often a proportional representation system to support the existence of these parties), any of these small parties could be the recipient of additional votes and the overall entropy likely would increase (e.g., Weimar Germany or pre-Franco Spain).

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[14] The case of Italy, which is close to the minimum (44%) specified although still below it, argues for the use of a 44-45% range instead of a point specific value of 44%. A country such as Italy with a potentially destabilizing large second party may require the upper 45% value in the range specified in order to achieve cabinet durabilities on the order of two party systems, whereas other countries with smaller second parties may need only the 44%. There may exist a rapidly changing nonlinear relationship between the values of legislative seats in the neighborhood of the 44% minimum and cabinet durability especially in countries with large competing second parties. Sensitivity analyses around the 44-45% range in the future should clarify some of these issues.

[15] Using pooled variances because of homogeneity of variance between the two sets of countries established by means of the *F* test. This result is identical to that obtained using the later measurement by Lijphart (1984, p. 83) of cabinet durability in months duration in office. The *t* statistic is the same value because the rank orderings are very similar (Germany and Iceland for example, still respectively occupy the 11th and 12th ranks), and the overall correspondence between cabinet durability as employed here and months duration in office is $r_S = .981$, where r_S is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the rank orders of both variables.

This is a fundamental distinction between two and multiparty systems and is rooted in the entropy measure as a uniquely defined basis for the comparison of dynamic party systems (Ornstein, 1974; Sinai, 1976). Of course theorists have long detected operational differences in the performance and especially the stability of these systems (e.g., Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1968; Sartori, 1976), but here a theoretical comparison measure suggests the tendency toward lower entropy and perhaps greater stability in the two-party system as the result of increased representation attendant upon the strong restoration of an opposition to office, in contrast to the increased entropy and possibly diminished stability in the multiparty system under similar circumstances.

We have already seen the tendency towards restoration in the American two-party system maximized at the end of a war (Civil, Spanish-American, and Korean), where the external demands on the system clearly changed. This was perhaps illustrated even more emphatically in the accession of Labour to power in the United Kingdom after the two World Wars. A new set of actors was introduced into the government, thus increasing the extent of representation over time and obviously removing the incentives of opposition supporters to resort to violence or other forms of system destabilization.

The sensitivity of multiparty systems to external shocks (economic, military, international) is evidenced not only in the several European examples, but also in Jackman's (1978) finding that the extent of multipartyism in Africa is one of the most important predictors of military intervention in his analysis. It is significant that in Lijphart's (1982) ranking of countries on cabinet durability in Table 5, the third and seventh (tied) ranks are occupied by countries that have in the post-World War II years probably experienced the least severe and least numerous external stresses, respectively Sweden, Luxembourg, and Ireland, and these moderate multiparty systems are ranked amidst exclusively two-party or predominant party systems such as Australia (1), Austria (2), Canada (4), New Zealand (5), and the United Kingdom (6). Whether these multiparty systems would be able to survive intact the imposition of severe external stress, even if meeting the minimum entropy requirement, is as of now, an open question.

Ideological Polarization

The ability of a two-party system to maintain itself is enhanced by the existence of a one-dimensional Gaussian curve (Figure 2), instead of the multidimensional type which would exist in multiparty systems. In the case of three or more parties, there is no clearly determined choice to oppose the existing party in power. The Gaussian curve is multidimensional in this instance, and there exists an infinite number of possible combinations of votes even when only one party is added to the two-party system. (This can be seen in the equiprobable ellipse as a cross-section of the three-dimensional normal curve (Burington & May, 1970, p. 130).) To each point on the ellipse as an electoral outcome or overall pattern of vote distribution, there exists an infinite number of possible ways of combining the votes for the three parties to achieve that outcome. This of course is unrealistic in that it includes decimal values to many places, but it does illustrate the immense contrast with the two-party system, where given some electoral outcome in the form of a percentage vote there are only two possible ways of achieving that outcome (e.g., given 52:48, either it is Democrats over Republicans or Republicans over Democrats). The tendency to reduce uncertainty by voters may then account for the emergence of one-party or two-party systems from multiparty cases or, alternatively, ideological strife may emerge in some multiparty systems as the result of smaller parties needing to rescue a precarious existence and appealing in extreme fashion for additional votes to counter the tendency toward aggregation.[16] Abstract ideological appeals also could emerge because of the absence of clear comparative personal or political foci for competition in multiparty systems in contrast to such clarity in two-party systems.

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[16] There is an intriguing comparison here with the spatial model of Enelow and Hinich (1981), which implies ideological polarization of the electorate under conditions of increased variance in the perceptions of the candidates. Given the increase in uncertainty of perceptions by voters implied by the multi-dimensional Gaussian structure, then the arguments here concerning a possible ideological strife are congruent with their model. Interestingly, the implications in the present study were derived before I became aware of the Enelow-Hinich model. In this connection also see Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970) and for a treatment of voter preferences governed by individual decision rules, see Weisberg and Fiorina (1980).

Another consequence of a similar spatial model (Hinich & Pollard, 1981) suggests the importance of candidate incumbency and is related to the findings here in the form of the Markovian congressional dependence on party identification, candidate incumbency, or both.

This predicted outcome of the intensification of ideological conflict in multiparty systems as they grow larger already has been confirmed in at least one analysis. In a test of Downsian theory, Thomas (1982) found that increases in the number of minor parties were associated with increasing leftist tendencies among labor parties and decreases in the number of such parties encouraged centrist tendencies. Although Downs originally suggested the overall spatial conceptualization from which these results are derived, these findings are predicted more exactly by the present formulation.

Downs (1957, pp. 126-127) suggested that with an increasing number of parties each party will attempt to maintain the support of its voting constituency by enhancing its own "ideological purity," to use Downs' phrase. In this fashion, a neighboring party on the ideological continuum will be unable to capture the votes of this ideological constituency. However, Downs did not predict increasing leftism or other forms of ideological commitment as was found by Thomas (1982). He simply suggested that each party would retrench at its own ideological position on the continuum in order to avoid the loss of votes to the nearest neighboring party.

Here the target or competitive focus is not the neighboring party but one of the centrist-major parties which would be the beneficiary of a tendency toward aggregation as the result of the increased uncertainty attendant on the increased number of parties (cf. the Nazi and Communist attacks on the German Social Democratic center in the pre-Hitler period). The voter would be unable to predict the overall outcome of the vote in such a large system and consequently would tend to vote for those parties with the greatest chance of success (maximum voter impact on the system or sophisticated voting (Downs, 1957)), in the absence of ideological constraints to the contrary. Thus, it is in the interests of the smaller parties to increase their ideological appeals and even extremism with increased uncertainty of the electoral outcome, as the number of parties increases, in order to counter this tendency toward aggregation.

This prediction of the targeted center was confirmed rather dramatically by Sartori (1976, pp. 166-172), in which all of the polarized polities identified by him (Weimar, Italy, France IV, France V, Chile, Finland, and pre-Franco Spain) had center-fleeing patterns of growth of the extreme parties, as measured by the linear regression coefficient over time. This pattern was most pronounced in Weimar Germany but also was quite prevalent in Italy and Finland during the post-World War II period. Instead of relying on the extremes of ideological conflict as the sole basis for this finding, it also can be derived directly from the present stochastic analysis, as was shown in the preceding arguments and in the geometric-exponential distributions of Table 4.

Conclusion

Beginning with the American two-party system as a referent with the required stability and longevity, I have identified several properties associated with the durability of political systems. First among these are the concepts of restoration (representation over time) and restraint which, when translated into cabinet durability via entropy comparisons, demand the minimum entropy requirement for minimum winning coalitions. In turn, a sufficient condition for cabinet durability on the order of two-party systems was derived in terms of a precise percentage of legislative seats required by the first party of a multiparty system. Certain similarities exist functionally between two-party and one-party predominant systems, principally in the area of restraint on party competition, but these systems demonstrate some tendency to fractionalize over time, a characteristic that two-party systems generally do not share. Additionally, the entropy decrease in two-party systems upon a more rapid restoration and consequent strong, even landslide increase of representation as in the three post-war restorations in the United States, certainly is not matched by the increase in entropy upon increased representation in multiparty systems. The oscillating tendency of two-party systems to increase representation over time also is a very different process from the tendency of multiparty systems to increase the entropy as a consequence of increased representation, mainly in small parties, at any one point in time.

Our use of probability theory has been to facilitate direct comparisons among one-party, two-party, and multiparty systems and to suggest reasons why there exist similarities and differences. The center-fleeing property of polarized systems is suggested by the multidimensional Gaussian distribution and its inherent uncertainties, as well as the geometric and exponential analyses. The tendency to create relatively permanent, ideologically committed cohorts in these systems contrasts sharply with the Markovian property of the American two-party system with its implied absence of memory or impact from one election to the next (no more than two in the presidential case), as shown in the preceding analysis and in the Appendix. Whereas one can increase the restoration of party competition and therefore representation over time simply by the alteration of a parameter ω in two-party systems, multiparty systems very often have increased representation via an entropy increase as the result of increased voting proportions for small parties. This implies a system transformation which of course can and sometimes does lead to further, more acute transformations, as in the fall of Weimar and the rise of the Nazi regime. On the other hand, certain multiparty systems have met the sufficiency condition established here for cabinet durabilities on the order of two-party systems; whether these systems can maintain such durabilities in the face of severe external stress is a question not answered by this study and one that perhaps can be informed only by the march of future political events.

Mathematical Appendix

The Markovian assumption can be stated as follows. Given the probability $P(m/n, t)$ where m is the initial state of the system and n the current state at time t, the basic problem then is to find the probability $P(m/n, r\tau)$ where r represents some increment in units of, for example, 1, 2, 3, . . . and τ is some constant time interval, that is, the duration of each step. $P(m/n, r\tau)$ here is the probability that the system is in a particular state, n at time $r\tau$, given that it was initially in state m. Thus, we project the future state of the system from a knowledge of its current state. To do this requires a set of transition probabilities for the future state of the system. Call these $Q(k,n)$. The fundamental Markovian postulate then is that

$$P(m/n, r) = \Sigma P(m/k, r-1)\, Q(k,n) \tag{A1}$$

Now, in the discrete random walk, the electoral "particle" as a departure from equal votes for the two parties can move on a straight line in steps Δ. At each moment in time t, there is an equal probability that the point will move one step Δ to the right, or one step Δ to the left. The transition probability governing this system is

$$Q(k,n) = 1/2\delta(n,k-1) + 1/2\, \delta(n, k+1) \tag{A2}$$

where the symbol $\delta(n,k-1)$ means that the expression equals one for $n=k-1$, but zero for all other values of n (Kac & Logan, 1979). A similar interpretation holds for $\delta(n,k+1)$. The overall expression effectively says that the particle either moves to $k-1$ or to $k+1$, with probability equal to 1/2 for each of the two possibilities. Thus given the initial state m and needing to find the probability for being in state n at time r, we substitute (A2) into (A1) and find that

$$P(m/n,r) = 1/2\, P(m/n+1, r-1) + 1/2\, (P(m/n-1, r-1). \tag{A3}$$

It is now stated without proof but can be shown directly (Kac, 1947; Mandl, 1968) that in the limit of Δ and τ approaching zero, equation (A3) goes over into the differential equation,

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = K \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2} \qquad K > 0$$

where the symbol f is used to denote a probability density function and K is a constant. This is the equation for a random walk which is unbounded and has as its solution the Gaussian distribution.

Now, let there be two urns, with a total of $2R$ balls numbered consecutively distributed between them. At random, choose a number and remove the corresponding ball from the urn that it is found in and transfer it to the other. This process is repeated r times. Clearly, if there are κ balls in one urn, then upon choosing a random number the probability of transferring a ball from that urn to the other is $\kappa/2R$ and the probability of not choosing such a number is $1 - \kappa/2R$. Centering the process at 1/2 gives us an expression for an elastic force with an equilibrium probability of $2R/2$ or R for the number of balls in each urn. The transition probabilities for this process now are (Feller, 1968, p. 378):

$$Q(\kappa,n) = 1/2\,(1 + \frac{\kappa}{R})\, \delta(n,\kappa-1) + 1/2(1 - \frac{\kappa}{R})\, \delta(n,\kappa+1) \tag{A4}$$

Substituting equation (A4) into (A1) we have

$$P(m/n,r) = \frac{R+n+1}{2R}\,P(n+1,r-1) + \frac{R-n+1}{2R}\,P(n-1,r-1) \qquad \text{(A5)}$$

which upon allowing $\Delta \rightarrow 0$, $\tau \rightarrow 0$, $R \rightarrow \infty$, $\Delta^2/2\tau \rightarrow K$, $P \rightarrow f$ and $1/R\tau \rightarrow \lambda$, equation (A5) formally goes over into equation (A6) (Kac, 1947, p. 380; Mandl, 1968, p. VI),

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = \lambda\,\frac{\partial (xf)}{\partial x} + K\,\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2} \qquad \text{(A6)}$$

which is a rather well-known equation in probability theory called the second Kolmogorov equation for a Markov process or alternatively the Fokker-Planck equation (Sveshnikov, 1968, p. 264), where λ and K are constants.

Introducing an elastic restoring force, $-\omega^2 x$ and a restraining force, $-\beta\, dx/dt$, leads to equation (A7) which has as its autocorrelation function, equation (9) in the text, or

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} + u\,\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial}{\partial u}\,[(\omega^2 x + \beta u)f] - K'\,\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial u^2} = 0 \qquad \text{(A7)}$$

where $u = dx/dt$. Establishing the equilibrium relation (7) in the text between restoring and restraining forces yields equation (A8) which has equation (8) in the text as its autocorrelation function, or

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = \frac{\omega^2}{\beta}\,\frac{\partial (xf)}{\partial x} + K'\,\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2} \qquad \text{(A8)}$$

where ω^2/β is now equal to λ in equation (A6). The solutions to equations (A6), (A7) and (A8) are Gaussian distributions. Equation (A7) as an extension of (A6) is entirely equivalent to a well-known equation in stochastic theory, the Langevin equation with harmonic motion (Chandrasekhar, 1943, p. 27)

$$\frac{d^2 x}{dt^2} + \beta\,\frac{dx}{dt} + \omega^2 x = \tilde{e}(t) \qquad \text{(A9)}$$

where $\tilde{e}(t)$ is a random exogenous fluctuation force affecting the system. Each of the individual events which constitute $\tilde{e}(t)$ is assumed to be independent of the others.

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The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting

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Approval voting is being promoted as "the election reform of the 20th century" (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated. However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption. Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. More fundamentally, rather than promoting "honest" behavior, as is sometimes implied, the existence of multiple sincere strategies almost begs voters to behave strategically. I also examine sophisticated approval voting and show that in the general case it need not pick a Condorcet alternative. Ironically, there is a condition under which Condorcet winners may always be picked, but for this to occur, voters sometimes have to vote for candidates of whom they disapprove.

Approval voting—a voting system for multicandidate elections in which a voter may vote for as many candidates as he or she wishes—is being promoted as "the election reform of the 20th century" (Brams, 1980, p. 105). In fact, if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated (Brams & Fishburn, 1978). However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption.

Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. Whereas Brams speaks of approval voting as discouraging strategic or manipulative behavior (Fishburn & Brams, 1981, p. 90), I conclude exactly the opposite: "sincere" approval voting leaves so much ambiguity that voters are almost begged to think and behave strategically. In light of this argument in the section on sincere approval voting, I go on to look at "sophisticated" approval voting in the third section. If voters are sophisticated, approval voting under certain circumstances retains at least one desirable property. Ironically, however, if voters divide candidates into approved and disapproved sets, approval voting retains this property only if individuals are willing to vote for disapproved candidates.[1]

Definitions and Assumptions

DEFINITION 1. APPROVAL VOTING (AV). *A system of voting for multicandidate (≥3) elections that allows a voter to vote for as many candidates as he or she wishes.* A voter can cast no more than one vote per candidate (i.e., no cumulative voting), and the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins.

DEFINITION 2. SINCERE APPROVAL VOTING. *A voter votes sincerely "if and only if, whenever he votes for some candidate, he votes for all candidates preferred to that candidate"* (Brams, 1982, p. 10). Note that this definition includes nothing about approval as such; it does not re-

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[1] As an anonymous referee pointed out, one useful perspective is to ignore any implications of the word *approval* and simply to think of the multiple votes as one possible way of aggregating preferences. Then my results can be viewed in part as an application of the Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) theorem showing that all such voting schemes are manipulable. It is useful, however, to point out the extent of manipulability and the kinds of results (e.g., Condorcet losers winning) that can occur as a result of the manipulation. If one does lend credence to the notion of approval, then it is worth pointing out some of the consequences of that view.

quire voting only for "approved" alternatives. This definition will be discussed more fully below.

DEFINITION 3. CONDORCET CANDIDATE. *A Condorcet candidate is a candidate who is preferred by a majority in pairwise voting against all other candidates.* In pairwise voting it is assumed that a voter would always vote for the candidate ranked higher in his preference ordering.

DEFINITION 4. CONDORCET LOSER. *A Condorcet loser is a candidate who is defeated by a majority in pairwise voting against all other candidates.*

Assumption 1. Nondichotomous Preferences. At least some voters have nondichotomous preferences. Dichotomous preferences are characterized as those in which voters divide candidates into two groups, those they approve of and those they disapprove of; in addition, voters do not distinguish among the candidates in each group, that is, all the candidates of whom they approve of are equally approved and all those they disapprove of are equally disapproved. Nondichotomous preferences therefore include any other sort of preferences, such as the following, where parentheses indicate indifference among the candidates: *abc, a(bc)d, (ab)cd, (ab)(cd)e, ab(cde).* I will deal with only three alternatives and for the most part assume that preferences are linear, that is, that there is no indifference at all. However, all results hold in the presence of some indifference (as in several of the nondichotomous preferences illustrated just above), and if some but not all voters have dichotomous preferences.

Assumption 2. Approval and Disapproval Sets. Sometimes I will assume that voters can divide alternatives into approved and disapproved classes.

Note, however, that because I am dealing with nondichotomous preferences, I do not necessarily imply indifference among alternatives in a given set. For example, a voter may approve of two alternatives but still prefer one of these more than the other.

Assumption 3. Bloc Voting. I will assume that all individuals in a bloc vote identically, where a bloc is defined as voters with the same preference ordering.

This assumption is unnecessary for analyzing sincere voting. Although I use it for convenience, none of the results in the first part of the article depends on it. However, to examine sophisticated strategies, bloc voting is virtually required if strategies and outcomes are to be determinate; this is discussed more fully in the third section.

For the analysis of sophisticated voting, three other assumptions are also required.

Assumption 4. Knowledge. Voters have complete knowledge of others' preference orderings.

Assumption 5. Tied Outcomes. Two of the examples require the assumption that tied election outcomes are broken randomly.

Assumption 6. Noncooperative Game. Blocs act independently of one another.

Sincere Approval Voting

Result 1. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, there is more than one sincere strategy under AV. As a consequence, AV almost begs the voter to think and behave strategically.

Sincere voting typically implies nonstrategic or what might even be called *honest* behavior: that an individual votes "directly in accordance with his preferences" (Brams, 1975, p. 56).[2] But if one has linear preferences, this definition is problematic under AV. Suppose, for example, one has the preference ordering *abcdef.* Surely it would not be sincere to vote for *b* and not to vote for *a,* because one prefers *a* to *b*; likewise, it is not sincere to vote for *d* and not for *a, b,* and *c,* because they are all preferred to *d.* But how does one express his true preferences? Should he vote only for *a*? For *a* and *b*? For *a, b* and *c*? Or what? All of these votes satisfy the definition of sincere AV, but they are obviously not equivalent. Nor are they likely to lead to equivalent outcomes.

If a voter has a set of approved candidates, sincere AV might be more constrained. For example, if one approves of both *a* and *b* and disapproves of *c-f* (but rates *a* above *b*), then perhaps voting for both *a* and *b* and no others should be considered sincere. But this is not perfectly obvious; after all, one does prefer *a* to *b.*[3] Still, if individuals typically divided candidates into two groups—approved and disapproved—the definition of sincere voting could be altered to take this into account. But I view this assumption as highly implausible. Moreover, we would still have to look at the potential for strategic behavior, and my analysis below of sophisticated AV will suggest that the presence of approved and disapproved sets creates severe problems in the event that voters are sophisticated.

The fact that sincere AV (with nondichotomous preferences) fails to yield unique strategies is of major significance; it means that, under AV, to say voters use sincere strategies is not equivalent to saying that they make no strategic calculations.[4] In fact, the existence of multiple, equally sincere strategies suggests to me that AV would encourage strategic (albeit sincere) voting. Thus, far from promoting honest or true expressions of preferences, AV is likely to promote strategic thinking and behavior.[5] Indeed, in the closest existing analogue to AV—multiple votes and multiple winners, as in some judicial and school board elections—voters easily learn the strategic behavior called bullet voting (voting only for one's most preferred candidate).

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[2] "Sincere strategies are essentially strategies that directly reflect the true preferences of a voter, i.e., that do not report preferences 'falsely' " (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, p. 837).

[3] Notice that the definition of sincere AV does not require voting for both *a* and *b*; it requires only that *if* one votes for *b,* then one also votes for *a.* (This distinction is not always so nicely maintained. See, for example, Brams, 1982, p. 7).

One can respond to this point by trying to make multiple sincere strategies a virtue of AV. Under AV, voters are never urged to vote insincerely, whereas under plurality voting they must consider an insincere vote (e.g., second place voting). But this merely proves the point. If voters dislike insincere behavior, they will not vote strategically under plurality voting. In contrast, under AV sincere voters are still left with multiple strategies to consider.

Although it thus seems likely that AV would greatly encourage strategic behavior, it is worthwhile to derive a few results for sincere AV anyway. We will quickly see that one of the nice properties associated with AV—the selection of Condorcet candidates—is not retained under the more general circumstances of nondichotomous preferences. In fact, quite the contrary is true.

Result 2. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sincere AV need not select a Condorcet candidate.

Example 1 demonstrates this point. Let there be six voters, with the preferences indicated in Example 1. As noted, sincere voting requires only that if an individual votes for a given candidate, he votes for all candidates ranked higher in his preference ordering. Therefore, individuals might vote sincerely as indicated in Example 1. If so, *b* wins 5-4, even though *a* is a Condorcet candidate. In fact, this example demonstrates as well another result.

Result 3. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sincere AV need not select a candidate who has a majority of first place preferences.

Example 1

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Vote	Approval Vote Results
3	*abc*	*a,b*	*a* = 4
1	*acb*	*a*	*b* = 5
2	*bca*	*b*	*c* = 0

Result 4. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sincere AV may select a Condorcet loser.[6]

Example 2 demonstrates this point. Candidate *c* wins under AV even though he is less preferred than both other candidates in pairwise comparisons (*a* > *c*, 20-16; *b* > *c*, 24-12).

Example 2

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Vote	Approval Vote Results
11	*abc*	*a*	*a* = 14
3	*acb*	*a,c*	*b* = 13
6	*bac*	*b*	*c* = 19
7	*bca*	*b,c*	
9	*cba*	*c*	

Result 5. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sincere AV may select a candidate whom a majority of voters prefers least.

Note that in Example 3 the first two blocs, 17 of the 33 voters, rank *c* last; yet *c* wins.

Result 6. A Condorcet candidate may receive the fewest approval votes, so even with a runoff election among the top two candidates, the winner under sincere AV need not be a Condorcet alternative.

This result is demonstrated by the example used to illustrate Result 4 (Example 2). Candidate *b* is ranked above both others by wide margins in pair-

Example 3

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Vote	Approval Vote Results
11	*abc*	*a*	*a* = 15
6	*bac*	*b*	*b* = 9
3	*bca*	*b,c*	*c* = 16
4	*cab*	*c,a*	
9	*cba*	*c*	

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[4] Tullock (1979) made this same point a few years ago.

[5] Brams and Fishburn imply strongly that AV is more honest because it is more sincere: "A voting system that encourages sincere voting, it seems, would probably produce higher voter turnout. By allowing voters to tune their preferences more finely, *and by forcing them less often to make insincere choices for strategic reasons,* approval voting may well stimulate more voters to express themselves at the polls and enhance their attitudes towards the system" (1978, p. 838, emphasis added).

[6] Nurmi (1983, p. 188) discovered this independently.

wise comparisons ($b > a$, 22-14; $b > c$, 24-12). Yet under AV *b* comes in third and would not even get into the runoff election.

Sophisticated Approval Voting

Having argued that when preferences are nondichotomous, sincere AV creates numerous opportunities for strategic behavior and may lead to undesirable outcomes, it is important to look at strategic AV. When the choice is nonbinary, however, that is, more than two alternatives are being voted on at once—it is not immediately obvious how one ought to behave from a strategic point of view. For one thing, one almost surely has to assume bloc voting along with other assumptions about how all other voters will think and behave. Otherwise the situation is hopelessly indeterminate.[7] Yet having made these somewhat unrealistic assumptions, analysis of strategic voting leads to further disturbing conclusions about AV.

The perspective on strategic voting that I adopt here is that of Farquharson (1969). Farquharson's definition is logically compelling; it calls for a voter to consider all possible combinations of votes by others and then to see in each of these cases what differences, if any, his own vote makes. The voter then eliminates strategies that are dominated, that is, for which there is some other strategy that is always at least as good and sometimes better. Other voters are assumed to do the same. This process of reducing the available strategies (which may go on for several rounds) thus tells the voter what strategy or strategies are best in all possible circumstances. These are the sophisticated strategies. (The examples below will breathe life into this description; for complete details, see Farquharson, 1969, pp. 38-49).

Now let us see what happens under AV if voters think strategically in this way.

Result 7. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, but with voters defining sets of approved and disapproved candidates and considering voting only for the former, sophisticated AV need not select a Condorcet candidate.

Consider Example 4. In this simple case it is easy to apply Farquharson's definition. All of the relevant information is contained in a brief table in the example. Note first that by assumption the blocs with preference orderings *abc* and *cba* will always vote for *a* and *c*. The bloc with preference ordering *bac*, however, considers voting for either its first choice, *b*, or for both its first and second choice, *b* and *a* (symbolized as *ba*).[8] Likewise, the bloc with preference ordering *bca*, considers voting for *b* or for *bc*. Since two blocs each consider two strategies, there are 2 × 2 = 4 possible voting patterns with the outcomes indicated. Each of the two blocs with a choice then considers what outcome will be achieved by its various possible votes. For example, bloc *bac* is indifferent about its behavior because its vote makes no difference; if it votes *b* while the other blocs vote *a, b, c*, the outcome is *a* (voting pattern 1); if it shifts its vote to *ba* while no other bloc changes (voting pattern 3), the outcome is still *a*. The same absence of effect is apparent if one compares voting patterns 2 and 4. In contrast, bloc *bca* is always better off voting for *bc*. (The voting patterns to compare for this bloc are 1 vs. 2 and 3 vs. 4.) Thus there is only one "reduction" as shown in Example 4, and with the votes cast as shown (no matter which way bloc *bac* votes), alternative *c* wins. The Condorcet alternative, *b* ($b > a$, 19-11; $b > c$, 21-9), obtains the fewest votes.

Because Result 7 depends on some individuals restricting the strategies they consider, it is worthwhile to examine sophisticated AV without that restriction. This approach alters the situation somewhat and leads ultimately to an ironic conclusion.

Example 4

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Approved Candidates	Voting Patterns				First and Only Reduction[a]	Sophisticated Voting Results[a]
			1	2	3	4		
11	*abc*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a* = 11 or 14
3	*bac*	*b,a*	*b*	*b*	*ba*	*ba*	*b* or *ba*	*b* = 10
7	*bca*	*b,c*	*b*	*bc*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*	*c* = 16
9	*cba*	*c*	*c*	*c*	*c*	*c*	*c*	
	Outcomes		*a*	*c*	*a*	*c*		

[a]As defined by Farquharson (1969).

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[7] See Niemi and Frank (1982, p. 153). The example in that study uses the plurality procedure, but it can be very simply modified to fit AV.

[8] Voting for one's last choice is never advantageous (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, p. 836, Corollary 1).

Example 5

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Voting Patterns							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
50	*acb*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*ac*	*ac*	*ac*	*ac*
31	*bca*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*
20	*cba*	*c*	*cb*	*c*	*cb*	*c*	*cb*	*c*	*cb*
	Outcomes	*a*	*b*	*c*	*b*/*c* tie	*c*	*c*	*c*	*c*

Result 8. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sophisticated AV strategies sometimes include voting for one alternative and sometimes for more than one alternative.

This simple result—demonstrated by numerous examples, including Table 2—means that even with only three alternatives there is no one voting strategy that is optimal. Each situation has to be examined separately. Considering a number of such cases leads to the following results.

Result 9. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sophisticated AV may be indeterminate with respect to both individual strategies and outcomes. This is so even if there is a Condorcet alternative.

Witness Example 5. Neither first nor first-and-second place voting is dominated for any bloc as shown below:

First bloc: Comparing patterns 1 and 5, voting for *a* is preferred; Comparing patterns 2 and 6, voting for *a* and *c* is preferred.

Second bloc: Comparing patterns 2 and 4, voting for *b* is preferred; Comparing patterns 1 and 3, voting for *b* and *c* is preferred;

Third bloc: Comparing patterns 3 and 4, voting for *c* is preferred; Comparing patterns 1 and 2, voting for *c* and *b* is preferred.

There is a Condorcet candidate ($c > a$, 51-50; $c > b$, 70-31). Nevertheless, no strategies at all can be eliminated; any of the three alternatives may be the outcome depending on just how each bloc votes.

Result 10. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sophisticated AV may yield a determinate outcome in the presence of cyclical social preferences.

This result is easily shown in the example in Table 1.

Results 9 and 10 are noteworthy because Brams and Fishburn (1978, p. 839) observed for dichotomous preferences that (if voters use only admissible strategies) a candidate will win if and only if he is a Condorcet candidate. Neither implication is true if preferences are nondichotomous and voting is sophisticated. When sophisticated voting is indeterminate, all strategies that have not been eliminated are sophisticated (i.e., ultimately admissible). Result 9 therefore shows that a candi-

Table 1. A Situation with Linear Preferences in Which There Are Cyclical Preferences and a Determinate Outcome with Sophisticated Approval Voting

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Voting Patterns							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
4	*abc*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*ab*	*ab*	*ab*	*ab*
2	*bca*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*
3	*cab*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*
	Outcomes	*a*	*a*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*a*	*b*	*a*

Social Preference	First Reduction	Second Reduction	Third (Final) Reduction	Sophisticated Voting Results
$a > b$ 7-2	*a* or *ab*	*ab*	*ab*	$a = 7$
$b > c$ 6-3	*bc*	*bc*	*bc*	$b = 6$
$c > a$ 5-4	*c* or *ca*	*c* or *ca*	*ca*	$c = 5$
therefore *abca*				

date will not necessarily win under sophisticatd AV *if* he is a Condorcet candidate. Result 9 (for the indeterminate case) and Result 10 (for the determinate case) show that the winner of sophisticated AV is not necessarily a Condorcet winner. Thus we have:

Result 11. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, and with voters considering all possible sincere strategies, sophisticated AV need not select a Condorcet candidate.

Finally, consider what happens if voters define sets of approved and disapproved candidates but determine optimal strategies without reference to them. Then we have:

Result 12. In the absence of dichotomous preferences, sophisticated AV strategies may involve voting for less than all of the approved candidates or for one or more of the disapproved candidates.

A single example, displayed in Table 2, shows both of these cases. The five voters with preference ordering *acb* approve of both *a* and *c*, but their sophisticated strategy involves voting only for *a*. Those with preference ordering *bca* approve only *b*; yet their sophisticated strategy requires voting for both *b* and *c*!

This creates an ironic situation: if voters define some candidates as disapproved and consequently do not even consider voting for them, Result 7 tells us that sophisticated AV may select an outcome that is not the Condorcet candidate. Voters might in some circumstances retain this desirable feature, as the last example (Table 2) shows.[9] As noted, however, this can require them to vote for disapproved candidates. Thus, at the very least, these presumably desirable properties of AV—voting for all approved candidates and no others and the selection of Condorcet candidates—become unhinged.

Conclusion

A close reading of Brams's work—he is the most ardent supporter of AV—shows that he is well aware of both the advantages and disadvantages of AV. In a nontechnical introduction prepared as a teaching manual, he states that AV "is no panacea for the voter who wants to discriminate among more than two classes of candidates" (1978, p. 62). In fact, in one sense Brams goes overboard by stating that "if and only if a voter has dichotomous preferences will he have a dominant strategy" (p. 62).[10] He also notes that AV "might encourage additional candidates to run . . . and thereby weaken the two party system" (p. 63), and in a recent article (1982), he talks about the problem of strategic information in elections and presents examples that illustrate some of the same points made here (e.g., individuals vote for disapproved candidates or, in what amounts to the same thing, alter their approval sets for strategic reasons).

Despite all of these caveats, however, and despite other supporting arguments (e.g., "it would give minority candidates their proper due,"

Table 2. A Situation with Linear Preferences and Approved and Disapproved Candidates Showing that Sophisticated Strategies Require Voting for Other than All Approved Candidates

Number of Voters	Preference Ordering	Approved Candidates	Voting Patterns 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5	*acb*	*a,c*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*a*	*ac*	*ac*	*ac*	*ac*
4	*bca*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*	*b*	*b*	*bc*	*bc*
3	*cab*	*c*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*	*c*	*ca*
		Outcomes	*a*	*a*	*c*	*a*	*c*	*a/c* tie	*c*	*c*

First and Only Reduction	Sophisticated Voting Results
a	$a = 5$
bc	$b = 4$
c	$c = 7$

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[9] Gretlein and Niemi (1984) have shown that this example illustrates a general result. With three alternatives, if there are no restrictions on the strategies considered, if there is a Condorcet candidate, and if sophisticated AV is determinate, the winner will always be the Condorcet candidate.

[10] This result, which is also stated on p. 34 (Brams, 1978) as Theorem 2, is correct in the context in which it is presented, but if one knows others' preferences, there may be a dominant strategy even with nondichotomous preferences. This is shown in most of the examples in this article.

Brams, 1980), AV has begun to receive some strong endorsements, in large part I suspect—at least among academics—because of its very favorable properties when one assumes dichotomous preferences. My purpose in this article, therefore, was to confront very directly the question of what properties characterize AV when preferences are not dichotomous.[11]

The results strip away some of the gloss previously associated with AV. Strategic calculations are endemic to AV even though all of the votes considered are called sincere. Given the literature's emphasis on approval and disapproval sets —even the name, *approval*—and the fact that voting for all approved candidates and no others is optimal for dichotomous preferences, one gets the false impression that AV will eliminate strategic thinking and voting. The results here show that this is far from true, however.

Recent work by Brams (1982) actually adds to this characterization. Brams defines a "polling assumption," by which he suggests how voters might respond to information about candidate preferences. The work begins with an initial poll in which respondents tell whom they would vote for under AV. Brams then shows how following the polling assumption would cause voters to expand or contract the set of candidates for whom they would vote. But this is simply another kind of strategic voting (i.e., in addition to Farquharson's sophisticated voting). Moreover if polling were done repeatedly, this is an obvious invitation to give out deceptive information in subsequent polls—yet another kind of strategic behavior. Even if one assumes the truthful division into approved and disapproved candidates in the initial poll, one surely cannot make that assumption in later polls.[12]

Thus, perhaps the only way that supporters of AV can argue for truthful behavior is to say that the computations are so complex that voters would be unable to make any strategic calculations. But ignorance of how to analyze the situation does not make the problem disappear. One would still be faced in the voting booth with multiple strategies and no obvious way to translate one's feelings into a vote. Uncertainty about one's own behavior as well as about how other people turned their preferences into votes could, I believe, only lead to cynicism about the entire process.

If, instead, one feels that voters could understand the strategic calculations, the results in the third section show that AV has all of the same characteristics (of indecisiveness and of non-Condorcet candidates winning) as other forms of voting. Thus, however one looks at it, although AV may indeed promote sincere voting and under unusual conditions (dichotomous preferences) have other nice properties, in the general case it is neither honest, strategy proof, nor wise.

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[11] There is "comparative" work on voting systems (e.g., Merrill, 1983) that does not assume dichotomous preferences and that appears quite favorable to AV. However, such simulations cannot answer the question posed by this article. Most especially, they cannot tell us how voters would respond to the multiple sincere strategies available under approval voting.

[12] In addition, as Brams shows, continual polling and voter adjustments in response to this polling may lead to an indeterminate outcome or to the defeat of a Condorcet candidate.

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Freedom, Markets, and Voluntary Exchange

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A capitalist market system of social exchange is justified primarily because it protects individual freedom. This system, its advocates claim, achieves the complex task of production and distribution through a process of voluntary exchanges; coordination is effectively achieved without coercion. I argue that this claim is largely unwarranted. The negative concept of freedom that underlies voluntary choice (the absence of interference by others) is unable to differentiate between instances of freedom and unfreedom. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether exchanges are voluntary or coerced. A more adequate conception of free choice (as the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberate decisions and actions) suggests that a capitalist market broadly and systematically denies the possibility of voluntary agreements. This general failure to protect individuals' freedom is examined in relation to the acquisition of property, the transfer of property, and the process of production.

Market Freedom: Controversy and Confusion

For its advocates, a capitalist or free enterprise market's overriding value is clear and unequivocal: it protects and promotes individual freedom (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1944; Nozick, 1974; Rothbard, 1977). Market transactions which respect individual rights and are based on voluntary exchange achieve the complex task of producing and distributing goods and services without the imposition of centralized control. The commodities produced reflect individuals' preferences, and all exchanges represent free choice, assisted by a system of market pricing that promotes calculability in a world of scarce resources by relating preferences to costs (Buchanan, 1969). It is hardly surprising that the market concept has been applied to both individual and social choice, to political as well as economic decision making (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Lindblom, 1966, 1965). Wherever it is applied, a market is said to achieve "coordination without coercion" (Friedman, 1962, p. 15; Lindblom, 1965, p. 3). If true, this claim represents a powerful argument in support of adopting market relationships as the basis for a system of political economy.

The validity of this general view is highly dependent on the concept of freedom or free choice that is included in the notion of voluntary exchange. Yet advocates of the capitalist market as a system of exchange have devoted relatively little attention to an analysis of this central concept. A notion of freedom as the absence of interference by others has been generally accepted with little argument, and analysis centers on the specific character of market transactions, the threats to freedom posed by centralized authority, the conflict between freedom and other social values, or the role of government in protecting market relationships.

The notion that individuals' exchanges in a capitalist market are free is based on the concept of negative freedom that has been generally accepted by the Anglo-American liberal tradition. Negative freedom is understood as "freedom from," as the absence of restraints (Berlin, 1958). We are free if the actions of others do not prevent us from pursuing our goals or preferences. A primary difficulty with this view is that no substantive criteria are presented for determining what are to be considered restraints, and what are not. In an earlier age, with simpler lifestyles and a less sophisticated political economy, this weakness may not have been serious. Individuals could reasonably be assumed to be in control of their own preferences, and the threats to freedom, primarily in the form of religious or secular authority, were rather unproblematic.

This is no longer the case. Sophisticated and pervasive methods for inducing preferences, restricting options, and manipulating choices cast considerable doubt on the continuing viability of consumers' or citizens' sovereignty in economic

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and political markets (Edelman, 1964; Fromm, 1941; Galbraith, 1973; Marcuse, 1964; Wise, 1973). Contemporary merchandising of products and political candidates, the mobilization of bias for purposes of controlling or limiting choices, and the "engineering of consent" are not easily reconciled with the notion of free choice. Yet, defenders of capitalist market exchanges insist that the negative view of freedom be retained. A market, functioning within the framework of established and accepted individual rights, protects us from interference by others as we pursue our individual purposes—and protects others from interference by us.

The difficulties associated with negative freedom remain. Individuals may express preferences through their market agreements; yet these preferences and the terms of exchange may reflect a system of manipulation and coercion. If others control information, images of success and failure, or access to marketable resources, the exchanges we make through market transactions can scarcely be said to represent free choice. The need to differentiate genuine instances of free choice from those that result from factors beyond individuals' awareness and control is recognized by some analysts of market choice. Sen (1977) and Hirschman (1982, pp. 66-76) are particularly sensitive to the narrowness and weakness of free choice understood as those subjective preferences presented in the market. But an adequate alternative is not provided. Sen offers none. Hirschman loosely accepts Harry Frankfurt's notion of first- and second-order preferences, which only recreates the problem at a higher level (Frankfurt, 1971). Unless substantive criteria can be offered which reasonably distinguish free choices from behavior that is unfree, the market conception of freedom is unable to argue persuasively that individuals' exchanges are genuinely voluntary.

The unwillingness to propose such criteria appears to reflect, in part, an assessment that any effort to do so must accept even less defensible notions of freedom (Berlin, 1958; Flathman, 1982). Negative freedom may occasionally reflect manipulation, but it avoids the metaphysical difficulties associated with radical (positive) notions of alienation, self-realization, self-development, and the like (Bronfenbrenner, 1975; Dolan, 1971). And, it is believed, a system of liberal capitalism has the good sense not to force people to be free in the process of overcoming their presumed alienation.

Fortunately, philosophical analyses of freedom, although incomplete, have made substantial progress over the past few decades. Important clarification is evident regarding several issues: freedom and causal explanation (Ayer, 1954, chap. 12; Davidson, 1963; Hobart, 1948; MacIntyre, 1975; Young, 1974), the triadic character of freedom relationships (MacCallum, 1967), freedom and responsibility (MacCallum, 1964; Hart, 1948-49, 1962; Will, 1964), the exercise of freedom as a matter of degree (Oppenheim, 1960, 1961), and the relationship of freedom to broader socialization processes (Taylor, 1979, pp. 154-166; Young, 1980). Yet debate regarding freedom within the context of political and economic life is conducted in essentially the same terms (negative versus positive freedom) as presented by Isaiah Berlin nearly 25 years ago. The highly general and abstract conceptions of freedom employed in the debate over appropriate systems of political economy only suggest continued, fruitless controversy.

In an effort to overcome this impasse, I want to build upon recent theoretical analyses and propose a more viable concept of freedom. The view to be proposed respects liberals' concern that freedom is a matter of individuals pursuing their own purposes in their own way; yet it is not subject to the criticism of failing to distinguish free choices from those that are manipulated or result from factors beyond individuals' awareness or control. Given this meaning of freedom, I want to examine a central issue in the general debate between advocates and critics of a capitalist market system of exchange—namely, the extent to which exchanges within this system respect individuals' freedom. I shall argue that a capitalist market, understood as a system in which production and distribution are based on the pursuit of private interest through the acquisition and transfer of privately owned property, generally denies freedom to most participants.

The Meaning of Free Choice

Important clarification of restricted problems in the analysis of freedom has not resulted in general agreement on the meaning of freedom. We may recognize, as MacCallum noted, that discussion of freedom must consider agents, their goals, and possible obstacles to the realization of goals (MacCallum, 1967). This understanding, important as it is, does not enable us to differentiate free decisions and actions from those that are unfree. More is needed if progress is to be made in resolving specific disputes about the relative presence or absence of freedom in any given situation. Otherwise, MacCallum's proposal implies interminable disagreement about the range of the three freedom variables. Theorists with liberal sensibilities are understandably reluctant to accept any conception of freedom that incorporates substantive criteria. Such a notion, in their view, necessarily requires that freedom meet some stipulated standard (Berlin, 1958; Flathman, 1982). And, it is feared, the values reflected in any standard are those of particular individuals or groups who, if accorded political or economic power, are in the position of imposing these values on others in the name of a higher freedom.

This is not a trivial concern. Unless the debate between negative and positive freedom is to be continuously reenacted, however, it must be possible substantively to differentiate free choices from those which are unfree without identifying freedom with the preferred norms of any particular political or philosophical view. I will summarize a previous analysis of freedom which is believed to meet these requirements (Preston, 1982, 1983).

For my purpose here, the most valuable contribution of recent philosophical writing on freedom is the rather clear suggestion of what must be possible if individuals are to exercise free choice. Free decisions and actions are identified as those in which an agent's conscious deliberation has played an essential role. This basic characteristic of free choice can be seen from several approaches to the problem of defining freedom: efforts to ascribe responsibility (and, therefore, freedom) for actions (Feinberg, 1964; Hart, 1948-49; Will, 1964); concern to understand the relationship of freedom to causal explanation (Davidson, 1963; Hobart, 1948); or the relation of freedom to moral praise and blame (Beardsley, 1960; Nowell-Smith, 1948, pp. 46-47). For each of these issues, an agent's conscious deliberation is believed to be necessary before his choices may be said to be free. By itself, this is not sufficient. How are we to differentiate choices that genuinely represent an individual's deliberate (free) preferences from those (unfree) ones that result from uncontrollable desires, unconscious manipulation, or coercion? Care must be exercised in this matter for two important reasons. First, unable to enter others' consciousness, we cannot determine in any direct manner whether or not a person has deliberated. Second, if we propose a normative standard which must be met before deliberate choice is believed to occur, there is the serious risk (not unnoticed by proponents of negative freedom) of imposing our favored criteria on others in the name of a truer or more enriched freedom.

These difficulties can be avoided if we assess indirectly the presence of deliberate choice by examining whether individuals possess, before decision and action, the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberate choice regarding the particular matter under consideration. The importance of identifying factors relevant to the possibility of deliberation has been noted at a general level by MacIntyre (1957). The need to identify freedom with preexisting capacities and conditions that are relevant for deliberate choice regarding specific decisions and actions is also emphasized for purposes of assessing individual responsibility. We can only ascribe responsibility (and, therefore, freedom) for an action if it is determined that an agent possessed the necessary capacities and conditions for deliberate choice (Hart, 1948-1949).

Lengthy explanation of what is meant by capacities and conditions is not necessary; it is not even possible. The prerequisites of deliberate choice can only be determined with reference to specific activities associated with particular roles. Clearly, these are different for a judge than for a legislator, for an auto mechanic than for a gardener, for a consumer than for a worker. My concern in this article is to consider whether the exchanges of a capitalist market provide the requirements of deliberate choice for basic economic exchanges.[1] General discussion of capacities and conditions therefore can be brief.

Capacities refer to the skills, abilities, and understanding of individuals with respect to particular choices. Conditions refer to factors in an individual's choice situation which make deliberate decision and action possible. If untrained in music, I am not free to play a piano composition even if a piano and sheets of music are present. If trained, I am not free to play unless the instrument and music are provided. If I am trained, with a piano and music present, and I choose not to play (assuming the absence of other coercive factors), then it must be accepted that my choice was freely made.

This understanding of freedom overcomes the substantial weaknesses reflected in the debate between positive and negative freedom without prescribing norms that must be met if decisions and actions are to be free. As noted previously, the fundamental weakness of negative freedom as the absence of interference by others is that we have no way of determining what counts as interference. Specific accounts of interference or noninterference essentially represent the arbitrary decisions of particular theorists.[2] Not surprisingly, the negative view is unable effectively to counter critics' charges that market freedom is coerced by the subliminal influence of advertising, the alienation of labor, or the forced conformity of a consumerist, one-dimensional culture. And retreat to the inner citadel of subjective preference provides little assurance that, however general and untestable the criticisms may be, individuals are exercising free choice in the product or labor markets. The claim that exchanges in a capitalist market are free needs to demonstrate that this system effectively provides individuals with the capacities and conditions for deliberate choice in their various economic roles. I shall consider whether the logic of a capitalist market system meets this requirement in the following section.

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[1] I am only concerned here with relating this understanding of freedom to individuals' basic economic choices. It is important to emphasize that I believe individuals are also able to exercise freedom in binding collective decisions that are made jointly with others. The character of freedom in public decision and its relationship to private choices has been examined previously (Preston, 1983).

[2] It can be argued that an extensive array of social support is needed for negative freedom to be realized, as is proposed by Laski (1930) and Bay (1958). Yet, also accepting a negative view of freedom, arguments for a minimal state are presented by Hayek (1944, 1960), Friedman (1962), and Nozick (1974).

Freedom and Market Exchange

In a capitalist market, exchange occurs on the basis of individual efforts to acquire or transfer private property. Individuals' interests are met by using property to enter into exchange agreements with others. Three issues must be considered in assessing whether exchanges in a capitalist market respect individuals' freedom: freedom in the acquisition of property rights, freedom in the transfer of property, and freedom in the production process that creates the commodities to be exchanged.

Freedom and the Acquisition of Property Rights

For a capitalist market system to support freedom, the acquisition of property rights must be consistent with individuals' freedom, and transfer of acquired property must genuinely represent voluntary agreements among individuals. Defenders of the capitalist market claim that these conditions are met.

Several arguments have been offered in defense of the capitalist market conception of property rights by acquisition. Among economists, there is little concern with how property rights may have been initially acquired. They may be simply accepted as legitimate (Friedman, 1962; Rothbard, 1977), or property rights are viewed as historically established and, out of respect for the fragility and mystery of extant social institutions, best left alone (Hayek, 1960). If property rights are justified with respect to the need for social order and respect for traditional values, then it is those values, not freedom, which are assigned highest priority. Yet it may be argued that respect for traditional values is essential if there is to be a significant degree of individual freedom in society. Hayek claims that individuals in a free society must be highly respectful of tradition (Hayek, 1960). In the absence of tradition, social relations generate such a high degree of conflict that the state must assume an active, interventionist role.

The more typical defense is simply to accept property rights as given and proceed to analyze the importance of maintaining such rights, whatever their particular content, for individuals' freedom. Friedman suggests, for example, that "the existence of a well specified and generally accepted definition of property is far more important than just what the definition is" (Friedman, 1962, p. 27). Given the critical role that access to resources plays in market exchange as well as the strong relationship between present access to resources and the initial acquisition of property, it is not obvious that the freedom of all individuals is respected by uncritically assigning acquired property the status of rights.

A normative defense of the right to property by acquisition is needed which suggests how this notion generally supports individuals' freedom. Although he initially claims that rights to property are a priori entitlements, a substantial effort to provide reasons in support of the right of acquisition is made by Nozick. Claims to property are not legitimate in Nozick's view if their acquisition interferes with the freedom of others. To be legitimate, acquired property rights must allow for rectification if others' freedom has been violated. For example, one is not entitled to property acquired by means of fraud, threats, or theft (Nozick, 1974, p. 152). Unless there is evidence of coercion in the acquisition of property, however, there is a presumption that an individual is entitled to what he has acquired. This presumption is suggested for several reasons: there is no satisfactory way of settling disputes over how the property was acquired; present property holdings still respect the Lockean proviso that there be "enough and as good left in common for others" (Nozick, 1974, pp. 178-181); injustices in initial holdings wash out over time (Nozick, 1974, p. 158); and the inherent productivity of a capitalist market system expands everyone's opportunities for gaining title to newly created property (Nozick, 1974, pp. 178-182).

Nozick is surely right in claiming that past injustices, if they occurred, are typically difficult to arbitrate. On such matters, history leaves an insufficient record. A more important point regarding acquisition is the Lockean proviso that there be "enough and as good" left after initial holdings have been claimed: one person's acquisitions do not thereby restrict the freedom of others. Although Nozick dismisses the somewhat superficial rebuttal that all property has been laid claim to rather too easily, it is certainly true that this criticism (understanding property essentially as real estate) is narrow. Property assumes many other forms—skills, talents, inventions, labor, and so on. Yet property as real estate has been mostly laid claim to, and it is typically passed from one generation to the next by inheritance. Nozick explicitly accepts this on the grounds that giving to others must be respected (Nozick, 1974, pp. 167-168).

If the right to property as real estate and other fixed holdings is to be defended in terms of freedom, it must be demonstrated that access to the resources needed for free choice continues to be available. This is only possible if expanding opportunities for acquisition or if possibilities provided by transfer are able to overcome the substantial initial advantage that accrues to those who acquire property through gifts or inheritance. This Nozick has not done and, I believe, it cannot be done for a capitalist market.

Nozick's primary basis for extending the right of property to acquisition rests on the presumption of unrestricted opportunities for new property claims, given the expanding productivity of a capitalist market system (Nozick, 1974, pp. 178-182; Scanlon, 1976). But this is a matter of historical circumstance, not one of analytical necessity. Whether we shall have greater productivity in the future is uncertain. To have the possibility for voluntary exchange hinge on one's potential holdings in the future is an act of faith. The *present* and continuing concern we may have for freedom in exchange requires access to property holdings under prevailing circumstances. The operation of a capitalist market, even with expanding productivity, frequently does not function to create new property rights for those who have not acquired property through the distribution of initial holdings. If new inventions (for example, in medicine, housing, and transportation) are to create expanded property holdings, there is little reason to believe this will result in generally expanded opportunities for the acquisition of substantial property. The investments needed for research and production associated with most contemporary inventions are massive. For this reason, inventions increasingly occur within the context of present firms. Individuals working for such firms, as part of their "voluntary" employment agreement, assign the property rights to new inventions to their employers. In such instances, Nozick's claim that the Lockean requirement for freedom in acquisition is met under present circumstances is open to serious question.

Of course, one's opportunities to acquire property that has exchange value are also subject to the vagaries of chance. In a technologically advanced economy, the acquisition of marketable skills requires many years of specialized training. Fluctuations in profit-oriented demand may substantially reduce or eliminate the market value of (and, hence, freedom associated with) such skills. Presumably, individuals have the opportunity—in the long run—to retrain themselves or to hope that market demand will change in their favor. Those with a Ph.D. in African studies can become experts in public finance or hope for market-recognized political unrest in Africa; outstanding athletes in soccer or track and field can hope that the public becomes bored with football and basketball. But in the long run we are all dead, perhaps never having been presented with that situation "where preparation meets opportunity" upon which voluntary exchange rests.

There is a further complication. In a technologically and organizationally advanced society, skills must be rather highly developed if they are to have exchange value in the market. Acquisition of marketable resources depends upon the development of one's capacities—physical, intellectual, organizational, artistic—for which there is effective market demand. Reasonable health, substantial training and education, broad social and other experiences, not to mention the resources needed to acquire and maintain these, are essential if an individual is to have the essential prerequisites for making voluntary choices in the market and thereby be in a position to acquire those goods that satisfy his preferences. Does the logic of a capitalist market provide for the development of these marketable resources? Given the inequality of initial acquisitions and the market's pattern of responding to the demands of those with resources for exchange, the answer must be largely negative. And the broad failure of a capitalist market to provide individuals with free choice suggested by this analysis applies only to those who, provided with the requirements of deliberate decision and action, could effectively participate in market transactions. If we were to consider those who (for reasons of natural or historical accident) have little prospect of significant participation in market relationships, the failure of a capitalist market to provide the capacities and conditions for deliberate choice would be even more striking. As argued by Clark and Gintis (1978), a Rawlsian conception of the distributive justice required by a concern to provide basic liberties is not consistent with the logic of capitalism.

The prospect of acquiring claims to expanding property, even for those potentially able to compete, is more closely related to the degree of one's freedom in the ongoing process of exchange than Nozick allows. Indeed, he treats acquisition and transfer as two distinct and essentially unrelated activities. Yet it is the logic of transfer which primarily determines one's opportunities for acquisition, and one's prior acquisitions largely determine opportunities for making exchanges. Transfers in a capitalist market generally provide the requisites of deliberate choice in a highly restricted and biased way; that is, voluntary exchanges are primarily (and increasingly) possible only for those who already have acquired substantial property. A capitalist market therefore presents individuals with a perplexing dilemma: The right to participate in exchange is based on one's freedom to transfer his marketable resources. Substantial holdings, as private property, are necessary to develop the capacities and conditions that make it possible to acquire the marketable resources that are needed to engage in exchanges, if one does not have such resources through prior acquisition. Yet previously acquired holdings have the status of rights and any effort to redistribute them through political action is not legitimate.

Freedom and Transfer

Defenders of the capitalist market are likely to claim that this apparent paradox only exists at the abstract level of speculative theory. Real economic choices are necessarily conditioned by limited resources and the opportunity costs associated with acting to achieve particular preferences. Observe the functioning of a market, it will be insisted, and voluntary exchange will be seen. Certainly, a primary reason for proclaiming market freedom is based on the choices individuals make in the everyday exchange of goods and services. Here, it is claimed, individuals make voluntary agreements with others to maximize realization of their preferences. No third party, whether government or other individuals, determines what our preferences should be, which of our resources we will trade, or the quality, quantity, or price of the goods we select in exchange.

In the context of realistic economic choice, a pattern of incentives supportive of all persons' freedom is claimed to be built into the distributive process of capitalist market exchanges. Although the process is broadly familiar, it is important to describe the specific means through which it is achieved. Property rights provide individuals with resources that can be voluntarily exchanged with others. Whether acquired by legitimate acquisition or transfer, each individual is entitled to the use of property that he or she owns. This property (understood as all resources that an individual legitimately controls) may be kept or exchanged with others, completely at each person's discretion. All transfers must be agreed to by all individuals whose property is exchanged, and the terms of transactions must be mutually acceptable. Given the mutually dependent character of the interests of producers, workers, and consumers, an Invisible Hand operates to realize the interests of all while each is concerned only with his individual well-being (Smith, 1976, p. 477). The role of the state can therefore be restricted to protecting property rights and enforcing agreements that have been voluntarily accepted. No one can be coerced to exchange his property. All of the details associated with specific transfer agreements are matters of individual choice. As expressed by Nozick, a capitalist market respects the free choice of individuals because it operates in the following way: "From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen" (Nozick, 1974, p. 160).

Assuming the legitimacy of original acquisition, what is to count as voluntary exchange at this more immediate level, and what is not? The inadequacy of capitalist market advocates' conception of freedom has understandably led to widely divergent views on this. The line between voluntary choice and coercion is drawn in different places and reflects little more than the personal proclivities of any given writer. For example, Rothbard argues that involuntary exchange (coercion) is characterized by aggression or the threat of aggression. Agreements made with a blackmailer, for example, are voluntary because they do not involve the threat of force (Rothbard, 1962, vol. 1, p. 443, n. 9). With a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, government is viewed as the basic threat to voluntary exchange. Another possibility is to adopt Nozick's view that involuntary choices are those that result from fraud, slavery, or theft (Nozick, 1974, p. 152). Frank Knight even suggested that agreements reached through persuasion could be considered coercive (Knight, 1953).

I will not add to this confusion by attempting to propose which of these boundary lines between voluntary and involuntary exchange is correct. This difficulty occurs because the notion of freedom as the absence of interference is fundamentally flawed. So long as this concept is used, no amount of arbitrary line-drawing can resolve the problem. The view of freedom that I proposed earlier does provide a common basis for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary choices with respect to specific exchanges. A choice is voluntary (freely made) if the persons who agree to it possess, before they decide, the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberation regarding the proposed transaction.

This understanding of freedom shows the weakness of Nozick's distinction between voluntary and coercive exchanges. Nozick has proposed two primary criteria which must be met if exchanges are to be voluntary: choices take place against a background of "normal and expected" relationships with others, assuming this prevailing situation is itself viewed as legitimate; and choices leave both parties, in their own judgment, better off (Nozick, 1969). Individual decisions to exchange resources that do not meet these criteria are coerced. If freedom is understood as the relative possibility for deliberate choice rather than in the uncertain terms of noninterference, a capitalist market is clearly coercive by these criteria.

The need for exchange to occur within a context of established rules that are accepted as legitimate is emphasized by Hayek and Friedman as well as Nozick (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960, chap. 4). And a stable set of expectations *is* necessary for freedom. As suggested by Taylor, deliberate choice is only possible with reference to extant expectations, beliefs, and values; freedom is always situated (Taylor, 1979, pp. 154-166). Free choice understood as individual action without reference to a prevailing social context is unintelligible. There would be no content with respect to which deliberation could occur. Individuals exercise freedom as they come to understand present circumstances and, through critical reflection, based on newly acquired resources and skills, recognize possible alternatives for managing their affairs in the present and foreseeable future. Against the background of feudal customs, expectations, and duties, the increased opportunities to engage in commerce, alternative religious practices, or travel afforded by an emerging liberal market system represented an expansion of freedom.

Similarly, limitations that the property-based rules and operation of market capitalism present to free choice are becoming apparent; the legitimacy of the "normal and expected" conduct required by capitalism may therefore be appropriately questioned. Capitalist exchanges have become coercive because participants can recognize an alternative situation which would provide them with substantially greater freedom, a situation that the capitalist market prevents them from having (for a parallel argument, see Zimmerman, 1981). If freedom depends on the conditions and capacities for deliberate choice, a system committed to providing basic needs such as health, housing, food, and education is clearly more supportive of such freedom than capitalism.

We now realize that the exchanges of capitalism generally do not represent agreements in which both (or all) participants are better off if "better off" is viewed as gaining access to the resources needed to exercise freedom. Capitalist exchanges may occur through the good offices of an Invisible Hand that coordinates without central direction. But this does not mean that such exchanges are uncoerced because each is better off in the sense of having benefited from a free choice. The Invisible Hand only ensures that exchanges will be made, given each individual's interest in meeting his needs with the resources available to him at any given time. Within the limits set by a prevailing pattern of property distribution, we exchange goods and services with others to realize, as best we can, our interests. But those with property have no necessary interest in providing others with the resources that these others need to make free choices. Professional football teams want to utilize the services of athletes trained by universities, but the Invisible Hand does not encourage team owners to incur these substantial initial training costs. If an athlete is seriously and permanently injured, it is not in a team owner's interest to provide him with the medical care or retraining needed for the athlete to make free choices regarding an alternative career. The capitalist market's Invisible Hand ensures that we will make agreements with others, but these exchanges are characterized by substantial coercion: those with greater capital resources are in a position to coerce those with fewer resources. The exchange may be voluntary, but it is similar (legalities aside) to a "voluntary" decision to hand our wallet over to an armed thief. Given the circumstances, both we and the thief are better off by accepting his "offer," and thieves work quite well without centralized direction or control.

Nozick would disagree because threats of physical force are objectionable on moral grounds, and such threats do not represent the "normal and expected" pattern of relationships with others. Yet contrary to Nozick, neither morality nor the content of accepted relationships can be posed by unilateral intuition; if valid, they are themselves the result of the deliberations of free men. Physical force need not always be either morally objectionable or a denial of freedom. Efforts physically to restrain drug addicts from gaining access to drugs may be done for moral reasons and in the interests of freedom—to enhance addicts' ability to make deliberate choices. Nor can we decide a priori whether overt or covert manipulation and threats are normally expected in a given situation. Joggers who typically run in areas where there are frequent muggings may come to accept threats of force as normal. In response, a standard sum of money (perhaps, $20) may be carried in one's shoes as a reasonable price for safe passage. The expectations of such joggers are similar to the traditional attitudes of consumers in relation to producers: "Let the buyer beware." This rule presumably came to be viewed as "normal and expected" because the maximization of profits had come to be accepted, the rule was legally enforced, and consumers needed goods and services to live. Consumers' acceptance of producers' goods that did not perform as had been claimed was, given prevailing expectations, mutually beneficial. Owners realized profits, and consumers purchased needed goods and services.

The freedom of consumers has increased as they have questioned the prerogatives of producers in product advertising, and the expansion of consumers' freedom is dependent upon their acquiring more effective knowledge and political and economic resources to counter or restrict the productive, merchandising, and marketing authority of producers.

The historical and potentially coercive character of the Invisible Hand is also apparent in the exchanges between producers and workers. Many workers typically accept informal rules that prescribe appropriate conduct in relation to owners and managers: don't make waves; to get along, go along; keep your eyes open and your mouth shut. An important reason for the development of such attitudes would seem to be the implicit threat, reasonably inferred from past experience, of being fired or suffering other sanctions if these informal rules are violated. Given established expectations regarding the prerogatives of management and the survival interests of workers, such attitudes are mutually beneficial. Quiescent workers support management interests in control and productivity; a degree of security in receiving wages and avoiding onerous sanctions is in the interests of workers: the Invisible Hand operates to benefit all while each pursues only his particular interests. But freedom can scarcely be said to prevail.

Freedom is a matter of deliberate choice as related to our understanding of whether we are disadvantaged by a prevailing system of exchange, and whether we recognize an alternative system in which we would be better off—that is, a system that would more adequately provide the capacities and conditions necessary to make deliberate choices in our basic economic exchanges with others. The point is made by Robinson: "One reason modern life is so uncomfortable is that we have grown self-conscious about things that used to be taken for granted" (Robinson, 1962, p. 1).

Does the logic of a capitalist market system provide the requirements of free choice? Yes and no. Once individuals are generally provided with the essentials for making voluntary exchanges, such as education, information, resources for exchange, and absence of fraud or threats, a market respects the freedom of individuals to define their own purposes and exchange goods or services in support of such individually determined goals. Under these circumstances, a market system is much more likely to protect choice than centralized planning agencies with their unresponsive decision makers, established routines, and array of sanctions. The logic of a free-enterprise or capitalist market, however, provides few incentives and many counterincentives for promoting individuals' ability to make free choices. This applies to property gained by acquisition as well as to that acquired by transfer. The fundamental conflict between a capitalist market and individual freedom is that the resources that are needed to develop individuals' ability to make free choices are themselves provided on capitalist market terms. These terms, based on the inviolability of acquired property rights, systematically enhance the development of freedom for those fortunate enough to have acquired marketable resources, while providing substantially less opportunity to those without various forms of marketable property.

Exchange in Production

In a capitalist market system, decisions regarding the productive process are largely controlled by the managers of firms (Coase, 1937; Erving, 1977, p. 6; Knight, 1953). Decisions regarding what is to be produced, how the workplace is structured, plant location, investment, or marketing are all part of management's authority. The highly restricted role of workers in these production decisions has been claimed to be consistent with workers' freedom on several grounds. First, it can be argued that workers voluntarily agree to these arrangements in accepting employment with a particular firm: workers need not accept an offer of employment, and they are generally free to leave employment with a given firm and seek a better offer elsewhere (Coase, 1937; Friedman & Friedman, 1979, chap. 8). The assumptions that support freedom in this situation are those outlined previously with respect to the presumed freedom in acquisition and transfer—established property rights, individual preference, and the existence of alternatives. The weaknesses of these assumptions raise serious doubts regarding the voluntary character of workers' agreements with respect to their role in production. Free choices regarding the use of one's labor are dependent upon one's control of marketable resources. Systematically restricted in their access to such resources, workers have little choice regarding the conditions of their work; they are forced to sell their labor to (and accept the conditions imposed by) those who control capital resources (MacPherson, 1973, p. 146).

Nozick denies this and claims that at least contemporary American workers have sufficient resources, in the form of personal savings or union pension funds, to organize firms of their own if they want to do so (Nozick, 1974, p. 255). Workers' failure to invest their resources in new capital ventures can only be understood as reflecting their preference for the greater security and leisure provided by present arrangements as compared with the increased risks and opportunity costs associated with organizing and managing a firm. Again, the prerogatives of management in the workplace reflect the voluntary choices of both managers and workers.

A final justification of management's organizational control is made in terms of comparative efficiency. First, it is argued that management control more efficiently produces goods and services than a system of worker control or participation. This is defended essentially by definition. If participatory management were more efficient, it would already have been instituted because a competitive market provides the greatest benefits to the most efficient (Coase, 1937; Knight, 1953).

Additional support for this justification is provided by Nozick (1974, pp. 250-262). As individuals, the priority that we assign to a nonregimented work environment varies. Some of us may select employment that offers less income and increased control over our work; others choose occupations that provide higher pay and a more highly structured work environment. College professors, he alleges, generally have chosen the former course. In any case, it all depends on the package of costs and benefits that any individual may prefer, and a capitalist market makes it possible for us voluntarily to select employment with the combination of benefits that we want at any given time.

For my purpose here, it is not necessary either to consider these justifications of present managerial control or the extensive arguments that have contested them. The controversy is both rich and interesting, but ultimately futile. Participants in this debate base their claims on the inadequate conceptions of freedom noted in the introductory section of this article. For some, expanded workers' participation or control may be defended as a means of overcoming alienation and achieving self-realization (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1975). In response, advocates of capitalism may defend present arrangements as representing voluntary exchange, with the promise that increased productivity in an expanding capitalist market will provide the leisure and higher standard of living that remain the basic goals of most workers.

I believe the concept of freedom proposed here may fruitfully change the terms of this debate. Rather than talking past each other (in terms of alternatives and preferences, alienation and self-development), a concern for freedom would focus on the relevant capacities and conditions necessary for deliberate decision and action regarding specific choices posed by the productive process. Provide all participants with the requirements of deliberate choice regarding production decisions, with the possibility of participating to whatever degree they choose, and the question of what choices they will make regarding their role in the production process will be decided by them. It may be that workers prefer management control to participation for certain types of decisions; it is doubtful that this would be their preference for the full array of choices where management control now applies. (For example, do workers prefer management control with respect to the specific structure of work relations or plant location?) Unless we are prepared to discover the decisions workers would make after they possess the requirements of deliberate choice for particular types of production decisions, there is no basis for suggesting that the selections they make represent free choice. A reluctance to provide these requisites of free choice only lends credibility to the claim of Braverman (1974) that present structuring of the production process under market capitalism is a powerful means of class control, not simply an efficient method of production.

Conclusion

To the extent that individuals possess the necessary capacities and conditions for making specific economic or political choices, a market system of exchange promotes their freedom; it responds to the choices they make as producers, workers, consumers, or citizens. A political economy that would generally accept freedom as its basic value would assign an important, but highly restricted, role to market exchanges. Combined with a conception of individual and civil rights carefully related to their support for free choice, a market respects the notion of an area of uncontested autonomous choice that is essential for individual freedom. These requirements can only be met by defining market transactions in noncapitalist terms. Clearly, this definition suggests restrictions on inheritance, an upper limit on income from work or investment, the possibility of worker or community control of firms, and public responsibility for providing the requirements of free choice in critical areas of personal and public concern. Market processes come into play only to the extent that they are consistent with generally providing the requirements of deliberate decision and action with respect to personal as well as public choices.

The obvious objection, strongly proposed by Nozick, is that this image suggests a patterned system of distribution and, as such, requires continuous interference with individuals' voluntary choices (Nozick, 1974, pp. 168-172). This objection cannot be adequately considered here. A few comments, however, may indicate the direction of my response. Nozick (1974, pp. 150-160) and others claim that a capitalist market is neutral with respect to the distribution of social goods. This is little more than a conventional myth of "positive" economics. Any system of political economy, capitalist market or otherwise, leads to a patterned distribution of benefits and burdens. Nozick's claim to having identified neutral principles of distributive justice is not only false, it is impossible. Certainly, as Nozick fears, the patterning may result from conscious efforts to achieve a favored distribution by means of direct political action. But a pattern results just as effectively from a process that permits everyone to exchange property through open competition and bargaining, recognizing that resources, original or acquired, are unevenly distributed and that this distribution will only be exacerbated as market decisions continue to be made. Continued operation of a capitalist market only serves to heighten rather than wash out these initial advantages; this was shown by Weber (1964, especially pp. 181-202), and is often recognized by advocates of the capitalist market (Hayek, 1960; Knight, 1953; Okun, 1975).

The additional claim that individuals' voluntary choices will always threaten to overcome a predetermined pattern of distribution is valid, but trivial (Nozick, 1974, pp. 160-164). The dynamics of any system create relationships that conflict with its basic principles. For example, efforts to control markets or to achieve government support and protection results from the self-interested decisions of market participants (Galbraith, 1973; Lowi, 1969; McConnell, 1966); that is, the self-interested behavior assumed by a market, if left alone, operates to undermine market principles. Similarly, market "failure" results from the logic of market processes. Even the Friedmans recognize that the "unpatterned" logic of a capitalist market may bring about patterned results which require intervention on the basis of nonmarket principles (Friedman & Friedman, 1979, pp. 18-25). If we value free choice, the inevitable patterning that results from a system of exchange should be one designed to promote, not restrict, individuals' ability to make free choices. When a priori property rights, prevailing property claims, or traditional values are assigned priority in a capitalist market, the resulting pattern of distribution primarily serves to provide freedom for those with established capital power and privilege.

The primary commitment of a political economy of freedom would be to provide the capacities and conditions for deliberate choice and to ensure that, once these requirements exist for specific types of choices, the exchanges individuals subsequently make are accepted as being free.[3] It would seem that, if freedom is to be possible for most individuals, a system of market socialism is necessary.

Clearly, a number of theoretical and practical difficulties are posed by the concept of market socialism. These difficulties range from the problem of definition to policy matters and institutional arrangements and can only be touched upon here. As prevailing theory is revised or transformed, the initial task is to provide new and common grounds for debate. This has been my primary concern. Previous writing critical of market capitalism has typically focused on other values—especially equality or justice—and critics concerned with freedom have defined liberty in positive terms such as self-realization or self-development, terms of uncertain meaning and a propensity to result in regimes that coerce individuals for the sake of a questionable higher freedom. The view of freedom I have proposed is entirely consistent with market liberals' understanding of freedom as the ability of individuals to lead their own lives in their own way. Yet, accepting this ideal, my analysis indicates a need to reconsider the conventional claim that a capitalist market promotes such freedom. It does not.

How is analytical confusion to be avoided, however, if we understand that market exchanges are important for freedom but must assume a subordinate and restricted role in political and economic exchange? In short, what is the difference between market socialism and market capitalism? The tendency has been to define economic systems primarily in institutional terms: socialism involves government ownership of the major means of production and distribution; under capitalism, economic resources are owned as private property. I believe instead that capitalism and socialism should be defined primarily in normative terms, with the specific combination of market, authority, and preceptoral exchange processes—to borrow Lindblom's (1977) useful terms—associated with alternative normative ideals to be determined independently for specific historical and social contexts.

In its general meaning, a market system achieves exchange by individuals entering into agreements with each other on the basis of their legitimately acquired resources. Capitalism understands individuals as interest or utility maximizers as they engage in exchange. A commitment to status quo property rights provides the Archimedean point from which the pursuit of interest under conditions of scarcity, through an endless process of acquisition and transfer, is able to occur. In normative terms, freedom understood as noninterference is the ideal to be realized. The commitment to property rights as the basis of acquisition and transfer, however, undermines the professed claim to support freedom in exchange. In practice, the normative commitment of market capitalism is to the increasing power and wealth of those with substantial private property.

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[3] The important arguments that claim that the liberal conception of negative freedom restricts individuals' self-realization and leads to alienation have not been directly addressed. I can only suggest here that individuals may best achieve self-realization as they progressively acquire the requisites of deliberate choice and apply these to important problems in their personal and public lives.

I propose the alternative of market socialism with some reluctance, given the sordid history of many self-proclaimed socialist regimes. But socialist theory does recognize public responsibility for the welfare of all individuals within a society. If the welfare of individuals is understood as providing them with the capacities and conditions necessary for deliberate choice, then a political economy of market socialism would seem to be necessary for a society that has individual freedom as its primary value. The system is socialist because of a continuing public responsibility to adopt institutions and policies that provide the resources needed for citizens to make free choices. Within this framework, market relationships have an important role in exchange because they permit individuals the opportunity to pursue their own purposes and provide individuals with the incentive to respond to the interests of others.

The specific policy or institutional implications of this view are and must be uncertain. Clearly, each of the exchange processes that Lindblom presents will play an important role in any system of political economy. And their relative role would vary, depending, for example, on the importance of the need being served, the degree of scarcity, and the technical complexity of a given problem. The mix of different exchange processes under a market socialism committed to freedom would be directed by a concern to provide individuals with the resources needed to make free choices about matters of personal and public concern. Under market capitalism, exchange processes are selected that increasingly protect and promote the ability of those with substantial private property to maximize their individual preferences.

This effort to define capitalism and socialism in normative terms is admittedly preliminary. A concern for freedom requires, however, that we question the claim that freedom can only be protected by a system of market capitalism. The debate between capitalism and socialism need not be in terms of a trade-off between freedom and equality or social justice, or with respect to government as opposed to private ownership. Analysis leads to the uneasy conclusion that, whatever the relationship between capitalism and other social values, individual freedom is systematically and broadly denied by the capitalist conception of exchange. I believe that we need to accept socialism as a necessary framework within which to promote individuals' freedom and to begin the complex task of identifying the related values, institutional arrangements, and policy approaches that may provide the resources citizens need to make free choices with respect to a wide range of specific, important issues.

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The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980

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The study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants and consequences of presidential speechmaking, defined as the occurrence of a major, nationally broadcast and televised address. Major speeches delivered by Presidents Truman through Carter are examined during the period 1949-1980. Using a probit analysis, a prediction is made of the likelihood of a major speech occurring within a month, based on the effects of public attitudes, national conditions, and events. The results indicate that changes in public approval ratings and the presence of visible national events increase the likelihood that a president will deliver a speech. Conversely, worsening economic conditions (inflation and unemployment) as well as expanding military situations decrease speechmaking efforts. The findings also demonstrate that a president's popularity increases significantly with the delivery of a major address.

Standing on a railroad platform in 1924, a radio announcer asked Calvin Coolidge to make the first nationally broadcast presidential address. In an expectant voice, the announcer called upon the president to "tell this audience on a nationwide hookup, just as you are about to board this train back to Washington after a prolonged trip around the country: What message do you have for the American people?" Stepping close to the microphone, Coolidge replied, "Goodbye" and boarded the train.[1]

Presidential speeches to the nation, even relatively mundane ones, have captured considerable attention in contemporary American politics. The speeches often outline concrete actions taken by presidents. Some speeches announce major policy decisions (as with Kennedy's 1962 address on missiles in Cuba). Others disclose resignations (Nixon in 1974), pardons (Ford in 1974), and firings (Truman's dismissal of MacArthur in 1951). Still others may be more important as instances of symbolic action than as announcements of tangible action. Presidents may share their views on American society and American ideals (witness Eisenhower's cautions on the military-industrial complex in his farewell address in 1961).

Through the speeches, presidents gain immediate access to the public. In preempting regular broadcasting, they receive the all-but-automatic and undivided attention of millions of radio listeners and television viewers.[2] The forum presents presidents as sole speakers, uninterrupted by queries of newsreporters and challenged only afterward by the rebuttals of partisan foes or the interpretations of political commentators. In contrast, news conferences, interviews, impromptu remarks, or brief announcements involve other participants who may respond to, probe, or even dispute what presidents have said. In this solitary setting, presidents can appear as leaders of the nation: stirring public emotions and proposing solutions to national problems.

The public listening to the addresses may also gain an impression of immediate access to presidents. As Edelman notes, the broadcast, "presenting a live performance, creates not close contact, but a semblance of close contact. . . . The president [although] remote" is nevertheless in one's own living room (1964, p. 101). There is then a direct and seemingly intimate relationship between presidents and their audiences. Even those not actually witnessing the speeches may hear about them and note their occurrences.

Ultimately, the speeches may enable presidents to create or modify public opinion at key points during their terms. Upon listening to the speeches,

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[1] As retold in Minow et al., 1973, pp. 27-28.

[2] Major prime time addresses typically reach audiences of at least 50 million people (see Lammers, 1982, p. 165). For such speeches, presidents are rarely denied simultaneous access to all three major networks. From 1947 through 1975, only six instances exist in which a presidential request for air time was denied by one or more networks. Five instances involved Johnson during the period January 1964-September 1965; one concerned Ford in October 1975 (see Rutkus, p. 29).

citizens may evaluate more favorably presidents' performances in office or support more readily specific presidential policy proposals. Even if the public impact is only momentary, it may prove helpful in promoting a policy agenda before Congress, as constituents express to members their views about the president. The speeches may also enhance reelection efforts. Although the addresses are not likely to insure reelection, nonetheless they may serve as advantages for presidents, who, as incumbents, can run for office while in office. Overall, then, it would seem that addresses to the nation are a significant form of public presidential behavior.

Yet little is known about presidential speeches. Several studies analyze the content of formal addresses. McDiarmid (1937) observes key patterns of American symbolism in inaugural addresses from George Washington to Franklin Roosevelt. Examining State of the Union messages, Kessel (1974, 1977) finds stable areas of policy interst from 1946 through 1969 (see also Lee, 1980). Other studies of presidential communication are limited in scope to a single president over only a few years. Miller and Sigelman (1978) note variations in the content of Johnson's statements on the Vietnam war during 1967 and 1968, depending on whether he spoke before "hawk" or "dove" audiences.[3] Haight and Brody (1977) show that for three years of Nixon's first term (1969-1971), the number of presidential broadcasts (speeches and news conferences) significantly affected presidential popularity. But beyond these studies, presidency research has not outlined the circumstances under which presidents are likely to make speeches or the consequences of the speeches once made. Lacking, then, is a concerted study of presidential speechmaking—the occurrence of a major nationally broadcast and televised address to the country.

To explore presidential speechmaking, two key questions can be posed. First, what factors influence a president's decision to make a major address? Considered as a dependent variable, public presidential speechmaking may appear to be solely the result of private presidential decisions. A president and a small group of advisors determine the timing of a speech, its topic, wording, and staging. Minow et al. argue, "In almost every case, he and he alone decides. His ability to choose when and how to appear without cost before millions of viewers is completely unmatched" (1973, p. 17). Yet these seemingly private, unencumbered presidential decisions may be ultimately public in origin.

Presidents' decisions to deliver national addresses may be influenced by a context of public affairs, including public attitudes, economic conditions, military conflicts, and national and world events. Presidents' activities in office are often tied to gaining or retaining public support (for an account, see Edwards, 1983). In addition, contemporary presidents are typically expected to act upon key national events, conditions, and conflicts that arise throughout their terms. So, whether presidents make speeches or not may depend on how they seek to confront or avoid pertinent happenings within the public context.

Second, what effect do presidential speeches have on the public audience? As an independent variable, speechmaking demonstrates the extent to which the public behavior of presidents shapes public attitudes about presidents, or presidential popularity. Studies have carefully charted the impact of a range of variables on presidential popularity—time, events, wars, scandals, economic conditions, and past performance (see Hibbs, 1982; Kenski, 1977; Kernell, 1978; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1970; Shapiro & Conforto, 1980; Stimson, 1976). Yet no research has analyzed how presidents' own actions may affect their public fortunes. Recently, MacKuen (1983) has considered the relative effects of dramatic events on popularity. Some of the events considered are directly initiated by presidents, including several speeches, but these are combined with other events not so planned. Still unknown, then, is how public performances, fully orchestrated by presidents, may influence public support, and how the occurrence of presidential speeches may directly affect presidential popularity.

To answer these questions, this study examines the major speeches of seven presidents from Truman through Carter during the period 1949-1980.[4] Across these three decades, there were 159 major addresses, defined as live national radio and television speeches carried by all major networks. Presidency research is often hampered by limited longitudinal data and a lack of comparability across presidents. Yet the period under study provides a reasonably extensive time frame in which to evaluate how these presidents act as speechmakers. Moreover, during this contemporary period, the speeches examined involve a similar format: a president, as sole speaker, addressing a national audience.[5] This analysis provides an opportunity to examine empirically a specific form of public presidential behavior—speechmaking. In so doing, it may extend knowledge of presidents' public behavior generally. It may also aid in understanding the influence of the political environment on the presidency and presidents' ability to influence the American citizenry.

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[3] The statements include all remarks, regardless of whether or not they were broadcast as a national address.

[4] A list of major speeches was obtained from successive volumes of the *Public Papers of the Presidents,* which publishes the complete text of the speeches and the time each was delivered. Election years are considered in the study, but partisan speeches during those years are not included. An election year variable (coded 1 for an election year, 0 otherwise) was tested in the analyses discussed below with insignificant results. A separate analysis of only the first three years of each president's terms yielded weaker results than those reported below in all cases.

A Model of Presidential Speechmaking

Considering presidential behavior within the public context, a model of speechmaking can be proposed. The model is designed to determine whether or not presidents will deliver a major address in a given month and what factors might help in that determination. As the dependent variable, speeches can be categorized in one of two ways. Of the 159 major addresses, 38 can be treated as *obligatory* speeches: inaugural addresses and State of the Union messages that oblige presidents to speak, regardless of their desire to and regardless of what may be happening politically.[6] For instance, Lyndon Johnson, heavily involved in the Vietnam war, made only one national address in 1966, an obligatory State of the Union message. At other times speeches are not specifically mandated. Viewed in this way, there are 121 such *discretionary* speeches. Delivered during prime time broadcasting hours and preempting regular network programming, these speeches include addresses to the nation and speeches made before joint sessions of Congress, which are not State of the Union messages.[7]

By concentrating on these discretionary speeches, presidential speechmaking can be monitored on a monthly basis. There are 367 months in the period, excluding the 38 in which obligatory speeches are given. (The total period comprises 405 months.) A dummy variable for speechmaking was constructed, coded 1 for the months in which a speech occurred and 0 for those months in which no speech occurred.

Table 1 presents the total number of speeches and the number of discretionary speeches given by each of the seven presidents. Also calculated for each president are the average intervals (in months) between speeches. On the average, speeches are given every two to three months (note the mean figure of 2.5 months for all

Table 1. Major Presidential Speeches 1949-1980[a]

President	Total Speeches	Average Interval between Speeches (in months)	Discretionary Speeches[b]	Average Interval between Speeches (in months)
Truman	15	3.2	11	4.4
Eisenhower I	21	2.3	16	3.0
Eisenhower II	19	2.5	15	3.2
Kennedy	14	2.5	10	3.5
Johnson	26	2.3	19	3.2
Nixon	35	1.9	29	2.3
Ford	12	2.4	8	3.5
Carter	17	2.8	13	3.7
	159	$\bar{X} = 2.5$	121	$\bar{X} = 3.3$

[a] Defined as nationally televised and broadcast addresses to the country, carried by the major networks.
[b] Excludes inaugural addresses and State of the Union messages.

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[5] Radio listening is clearly more prevalent during the early years of the period studied. However, audience size did not increase sharply with the introduction of television in the early 1950s. Well before the availability of television, Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats averaged an audience of 60 million people. A televised broadcast by Lyndon Johnson in 1967 reached an estimated 52 million people (Minow et al., 1973, pp. 30, 46).

[6] It might be argued that the timing of State of the Union messages is at the discretion of presidents. Yet in only four of the 31 years examined were State of the Union messages not given, and with one exception the messages, when given, were delivered in January. (Eisenhower's 1953 message was given in February.) Including State of the Union messages in the analysis presented below markedly weakened the results obtained for discretionary speeches.

speeches, 3.3 months for discretionary speeches). Nixon addressed the nation slightly more often than did the other presidents; this may be accounted for by the frequency of his speeches announcing Vietnam troop withdrawals and those discussing Watergate. By contrast, Truman delivered speeches somewhat less frequently than the others. Formal broadcasts to the nation were relatively new activities at the time, which Truman apparently disliked (see Minow et al., 1973, pp. 32-34).

Yet overall, the individual records of the presidents are noticeably comparable: Speeches are given with only moderate frequency. By doing so, presidents may seek to achieve the greatest possible impact and seek to avoid problems of overexposure. Certainly, each president may adopt a unique type of style and content. Some may be more skilled at delivery than others, but presidents who may be comfortable speakers, as well as those less adept, deliver addresses in similar numbers. All presidents from Truman through Carter deliver major public addresses sparingly. (For a similar conclusion and a comparison with other types of public behavior, see Lammers, 1982.)

Thus, the model examines the circumstances under which these cautiously timed broadcasts are most likely to be made. The core of the model is formed by four types of contextual factors, noted above, which may influence presidents' decisions to speak: 1) public approval of presidents, 2) economic conditions, 3) military activity, and 4) "presidential" events. First, changes in the popularity of presidents may affect the likelihood of presidential speeches being given. A shift upward in public approval may prompt presidents to speak in an effort to maintain their improved public standing. A shift downward may also promote speechmaking as presidents seek to counter the erosion of their support. When popularity remains stable, presidents may find it unnecessary to speak. Thus, the net change in public approval between a current month and the preceding month is used as a predictor of presidential speechmaking.[8] The greater the change in approval, the more likely the speech.

As a second set of factors, ongoing economic conditions may be determinants of speechmaking. Contemporary presidents have often accepted responsibility for national economic conditions over which they may or may not have effective control. More specifically, the level of unemployment and changes in consumer prices serve as indicators of the relative health of the economy.[9] As these conditions change, presidents may adopt speechmaking strategies to accommodate the changes.

Third, the level of American military activity may influence presidential speechmaking. Presidents, as leaders of war efforts, may use public addresses to announce victories or explain defeats. As an indicator of military action, the change in the number of military personnel on active duty is used to reflect an increase (decrease) in American involvement in a foreign conflict.[10]

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[7] There is a considerable difference in the visibility of speeches delivered during prime time (7:00-11:00 P.M. EST) and of those broadcast at other times. As an example, a Nixon address carried in the afternoon reached 22.5 million people, whereas one given during prime time reached 54.4 million viewers (Minow et al., 1973, p. 56).

[8] The change in approval variable is the absolute value of the change from one month to the next. The current month approval level, distinct from approval change, was also tested as a determinant of speechmaking, with weaker results. The approval data are obtained from successive polls taken by the Gallup organization which almost monthly asks respondents, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is handling his job as president?" (Gallup, 1972, 1978, 1980). (For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this measure, see Ragsdale, 1980.) For those months for which popularity ratings are not available, ratings are interpolated from data from the immediately preceding and succeeding months. In cases where ratings from the surrounding months are not present, the month in question is excluded from the analysis. The use of interpolation is bolstered by research findings that show that popularity is relatively stable over time. (See Brody & Page, 1975; Kernell, 1978.)

[9] The unemployment variable is based on the current month's unemployment rate. Indicators of change in unemployment were tested (six-month moving averages, quarterly moving averages, changes from the preceding month), with poorer results in each case. The consumer price variable is treated as a six-month moving average, covering the change in the index over a 6-month period. Other approaches were attempted: quarterly changes, changes from the preceding month, and level at the current month. Six-month change, however, produced the strongest results. The consumer price and unemployment data are obtained from *Business Statistics 1979* issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

[10] The measure is the annual change in the percentage of the American population on active military duty. Annual figures are used as the only breakdowns available for the entire period. The data are obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States.* Figures on the number of military personnel overseas are not available for the whole period. Several other indicators of American military activity were tested with less strong results. The annual percentage of active military, rather than annual percentage change, was attempted with no significant effect on speechmaking. A dummy variable was constructed denoting the monthly presence or absence

As with economic conditions, presidential speech strategies may reflect key military escalations and deescalations.

Finally, what might be termed *presidential events* may affect speechmaking. As public leaders, presidents not only assert responsibility for economic conditions and military conflicts, but they are also directly involved in major national or world events. Typically, presidency research has emphasized the importance of international events that rally public support behind presidents (see Kernell, 1978; Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1975). Attention to these "rally around the flag" events seems to have forestalled an exploration of a broader set of events that are related to the presidency, but do not always rally support and are not necessarily international in scope (although, see MacKuen, 1983).

With this in mind, a larger group of presidential events is defined here as relatively long-lived, prominent happenings that are national or international in scope, have either negative or positive consequences for the president, and specifically involve some form of presidential action. Decision rules were constructed to identify a pool of 84 such positive and negative events.[11] During the period 1949-1980, 57 positive events and 27 negative events were noted.[12]

Intuitively it might seem that these presidential events would be occasions for almost all discretionary speeches: Eisenhower, for example, attends the Geneva summit in 1955 (the event) and addresses the nation upon his departure and upon his return. If this is the case, then events are always causes, speeches are always effects, and an analysis of presidential speechmaking becomes a rather uninteresting empirical study. Yet there are numerous instances in which events occur, but corresponding speeches do not: Johnson meets Kosygin at the 1967 Glassboro summit, but he does not speak either before going or upon coming back. And major speeches have occurred when major events have not: in a prime time address in July 1979, Carter laments a crisis of the American spirit. So events are likely to affect speechmaking, without being the sole predictor.[13]

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of military conflicts involving U.S. troops (Korea, 1950-1953; Lebanon, 1958; Bay of Pigs, 1961; Berlin, 1961; Cuba, 1962; Vietnam, 1965-1973) with slightly weaker results than those discussed below. Insignificant results were obtained with a second dummy variable, specifying only the presence or absence of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Finally, two casualty indicators were designed; these monitored six-month changes in U.S. war deaths during Korea, 1950-1953, and Vietnam, 1961-1973; the latter variable significantly affected speechmaking, whereas the former variable did not.

[11] Inclusion of an event was based on matching of material presented in weekly issues of *Facts on File* and monthly breakdowns within the *World Almanac.* An event had to be consistently mentioned for at least four consecutive weeks in the *File.* In addition, the event had to be discussed in the *Almanac*'s monthly chronology of major world occurrences. Both sources also had to note specifically the presence of presidential involvement in the event: Did the president take some action? Finally, the two sources were evaluated to establish the positive or negative impact of the event on a president's administration. The *New York Times Index* was used as a supplemental source to clarify any discrepancies between the two primary sources.

[12] Three categories of positive presidential events were delineated: First, adopting Mueller's definition of international "rally around the flag" events as "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused" (Mueller, 1970, p. 21), the category included such events as the beginning of the Korean war (June 1950) and the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962). Although Mueller considered inaugurations as rally events, they are not treated as such here. Second, other positive international events, typically less dramatic than rally events, were nonetheless visible enough and involved sufficient presidential involvement to meet the decision rules. These encompassed such events as the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1957 and the Formosa conflict of 1958. Third, at the national level, the introduction of major policy proposals by a president or the passage of major legislation actively sought by a president included Kennedy's Peace Corps initiative of March, 1961 and the passage of the Civil Rights Act (July 1964).

Four categories of negative presidential events were identified: 1) negative international events with some presidential involvement (the end of the Vietnam war in September 1974), 2) national civil disturbances or riots in which presidents have the constitutional power to intervene, including those at Little Rock in 1957 and Watts in 1965, 3) massive political protests against government action directed by a president, such as the Vietnam war protests after the Kent State shootings in 1970 and in Washington, D.C. in 1971, and 4) the failure of major legislation actively sought by a president (the rebuff of the Taft-Hartley repeal favored by Truman in 1949) or highly unpopular executive actions (Ford's pardon of Nixon in 1974). A list of all events is available from the author.

[13] Specifically, there are only moderate associations among the three variables: The bivariate correlation between positive events and speechmaking is $r = .330$; betwen negative events and speechmaking, $r = .240$; and between positive events and negative events $r = -.090$. The absence of any high degree of intercorrelation permits a clear assessment of the relative, independent effects of the two events measures on speechmaking and of the three variables on popularity. Although events and speeches sometimes coincide, the variables nevertheless represent unique occurrences which can be given distinct interpretations. The intercorrelations among the predictors as a whole are also very modest. The strongest association is between the level of unemployment and the change in military activity, $r = .349$.

Table 2. The Public Context of Presidential Speechmaking (Probit Estimates)

Dependent Variable: Occurrence of a Discretionary Speech

	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	Ratio MLE/SE
Approval change	.1159	.0219	5.296**
Positive events	1.3830	.2170	6.375**
Negative events	1.7526	.3094	5.665**
Unemployment	−.4230	.0783	−5.405**
Consumer prices	−.0074	.0030	−2.482*
Military activity	−.2090	.0615	−3.400**
Constant	.93756		

Estimated R^2 = .504
% correctly predicted = .801
N = 342

*Indicates significant at .05 level (critical value Z = 1.96).
**Indicates significant at .01 level (critical value Z = 2.57).

Predicting Presidential Speechmaking

Given the public context variables, a prediction can be made of the probability (or likelihood) of a speech occurring within a month versus the probability of a speech not occurring. Table 2 presents the results of a probit analysis.[14] The ratios between the maximum likelihood estimates and their standard errors show that each of the public context indicators significantly affects the occurrence of presidential speeches.[15]

Initially, monthly changes in public approval of presidents have a significant positive effect on the probability of a presidential speech occurring. *The greater the change in presidential popularity, the greater the likelihood of presidential speechmaking.* Presidents, then, are more likely to make discretionary speeches as their popularity rises and falls. The opposite is also implied: Presidents are less likely to make speeches when their popularity remains stable. Past research provides persuasive evidence that public evaluations of presidents are often quite stable from month to month. "Many citizens maintain their assessments of the president's performance regardless of intervening events" (Kernell, 1978, p. 513; see also Brody & Page, 1975). With this inertial effect, the impact of changes in popularity on speechmaking becomes all the more striking. Public evaluations of presidents often do not change, but when change does occur, it is likely to prompt changes in presidential behavior. Presidents' decisions to deliver major national addresses thus partly reflect changing public views of their work in office. The speeches themselves may become devices to maintain rising public support or bolster public support that has fallen.

Beyond the impact of public attitudes, the findings indicate that visible events also prompt presidents to act as speechmakers. *The probability of speechmaking strongly increases with the occurrence of both positive and negative presidential events.* Interestingly, presidents do not avoid public addresses on occasions of negative events. By informing the public of adverse situations, presidents may be able to get out in front, thereby minimizing damaging political consequences.

In contrast to the positive effects of public attitudes and presidential events, the results denote that economic conditions have significant negative effects on speechmaking. Specifically, *an increase in the national unemployment rate decreases the probability of a discretionary speech occurring.* As the unemployment situation worsens, presidents are less likely to deliver major addresses. Similarly, the relationship between consumer prices and speechmaking indicates that *as inflation increases, the likelihood of a speech being given decreases.*[16] Presidents, it seems, become less likely to make major public addresses when economic bad times face their audiences.

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[14] Probit analysis yields probability estimates that are true probabilities lying in a range from 0 (there is no probability of a speech occurring) to 1 (a speech occurs). More specifically, probit analysis fits a nonlinear function of a general S shape to the data. As a strictly linear function, ordinary least squares regression is inappropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable (see Aldrich & Cnudde, 1975; Hanushek & Jackson, 1977).

[15] Because the variables themselves are not calculated in the same units, comparisons of the maximum likelihood estimates cannot be made. Thus, the ratios between the maximum likelihood estimates and their standard errors provide appropriate interpretations of the results. Since probit estimates are based on a cumulative normal distribution function, the MLE/SE ratios can be compared to the critical values of the Z distribution.

The negative relationship between the economy and presidential speechmaking suggests a masked side to presidents' performances as speechmakers. Presidents make decisions *not* to speak, in addition to their decisions to speak. This silence of a kind may indicate that presidents are seeking to avoid a discussion of the deteriorating conditions or of their efforts to deal with the conditions. Instead, they may use other less visible, more diffused forums, such as news conferences, particularly those held in daytime rather than in prime time viewing hours. Or they may minimize public communication altogether.

Thus, unlike negative events that increase the probability of speechmaking, negative economic conditions decrease the likelihood of a speech being made. Perhaps the difference lies in greater constraints surrounding presidential actions on the economy. Despite promises of economic wizardry while campaigning and while in office, presidents ultimately have limited sway over prevailing economic circumstances. Sweeping and speedy actions are unlikely to be possible and therefore unlikely to serve as topics of dramatic presidential news. This is not to say that presidents never make speeches during bad economic times. Certainly two presidents not covered by the present study, Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, delivered several speeches during economic crises. Yet both may have had some flexibility in doing so, since the economic conditions could be presented as problems left unresolved by their predecessors. The analysis merely suggests a generalization that, more often than not, as the nation's economy deteriorates, presidents become less inclined to speak.

By contrast, more discrete negative happenings may be more easily remedied than long-term economic downturns. Ordering national guard troops to ensure calm near an Arkansas high school may reflect a more volatile situation than an increase in the consumer price index, but, ironically, it also reflects a situation more readily handled. Hence a form of presidential silence surrounding economic affairs may be strategic: Presidents are not seen and not heard for what appear to be good reasons.

As a final observation from Table 2, there is an inverse relationship betwen changes in American military activity and the likelihood of presidents making speeches. More precisely, *a decrease in military forces increases the likelihood of a speech occurring, whereas an increase in military forces promotes a decrease in speechmaking.* Thus, presidents appear to be more likely to address the nation when troops are being removed and the foreign conflict is presumably winding down. In periods of increased involvement, however, national speeches are less numerous. In part, this may reflect a pattern of the Johnson years during which marked increases in Vietnam troop levels were associated with few major addresses. Indeed, from 1965 through 1968, Johnson made only two speeches on the Vietnam war, each detailing peace initiatives rather than military escalation.[17] As a comparison, Nixon made 13 major speeches on Vietnam, 10 of which discussed troop reductions or peace measures.[18] Thus, peace more than war is likely to promote presidential speechmaking.

The results of Table 2 disclose a good deal about the public context of presidential speechmaking. As a whole, this is a political context for which presidents are often seen as having some responsibility. Yet parts of that whole may be more or less readily controlled by presidents; presidential success more or less sure. This juxtaposition between global presidential responsibility and more variable success may help clarify the intricate patterns within the context. Long-term contextual patterns, such as wars and economic problems, both of which often span administrations, are not easily reckoned with. If success occurs, it often occurs in increments not easily touted in dramatic presidential pronouncements. If success is not forthcoming, it is better left understated or not stated at all. By contrast, sharper changes in the context—visible events and shifting public support—are occurrences that presidents may be able to act upon and hence that may precipitate presidential communication. In all, the public context outlines circumstances when presidents

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[16] The consumer price measure, a six-month moving average of change, almost always reflects an increase, rather than a decrease, in the price index across the period studied; this denotes an inflationary effect.

[17] Both delivered in 1968, one announced peace talks (March 31), the other the halt of bombing (October 31). To be sure, Johnson held news conferences at which the war was discussed. Indeed, the main announcement about the escalation of the war occurred not in a speech and not in prime time, but during a news conference given at midday (July 28, 1966, 12:34 P.M. EST). This may reflect to some extent an attempt by Johnson to limit focus on the war by choosing a less vivid forum of communication.

[18] The remaining three dealt with the Cambodian invasion (April 30, 1970), the Laos incursion (April 7, 1971), and the mining of North Vietnamese harbors (May 8, 1972).

Table 3. Democratic Presidents as Speechmakers (Probit Estimates)

Dependent Variable: Occurrence of a Discretionary Speech

	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	Ratio MLE/SE
Approval change	.0597	.0305	1.958*
Positive events	1.2475	.2803	4.451**
Negative events	1.6389	.4479	3.659**
Unemployment	–.3735	.1130	–3.304**
Consumer prices	–.0073	.0036	–2.066**
Military activity	–.1620	.0841	–1.927*
Constant	.5676		

Estimated R^2 = .414
% correctly predicted = .798
N = 163

*Indicates significant at .05 level (critical value Z = 1.96).
**Indicates significant at .01 level (critical value Z = 2.57).

are likely to speak and, of equal importance, when they are not likely to speak.

Republicans and Democrats as Speechmakers

Despite George Washington's admonition against political parties, the presidency is ultimately a partisan office. Might it be that the public factors define a context distinct for Republicans and Democrats? To test this possibility, separate equations were calculated for the speechmaking of Democratic presidents and Republican presidents. A comparison of the findings displayed in Table 3 and Table 4 shows differences as well as similarities between Democratic and Republican presidents.

Exploring the differences, Republican presidents are more likely to be affected by changes in public approval than Democratic presidents. The ratios for the public approval variables show that in both cases changes in popularity increase the likelihood of a speech being made, but the increase is greater for the Republicans (compare 4.937 to 1.958). As an added difference, Republican speechmaking is slightly more affected by unemployment than is speechmaking for the Democrats. Conversely, Democratic speechmaking is somewhat more influenced by inflation than is Republican speechmaking. Considering similarities, for both Democrats and Republicans, the effects of events and military activity are roughly alike: positive and negative events increase the

Table 4. Republican Presidents as Speechmakers (Probit Estimates)

Dependent Variable: Occurrence of a Discretionary Speech

	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	Ratio MLE/SE
Approval change	.1675	.0339	4.937*
Positive events	1.8444	.4049	4.555*
Negative events	1.9660	.4845	4.057*
Unemployment	–.4600	.1127	–4.081*
Consumer prices	–.0104	.0065	–1.600
Military activity	–.1905	.1026	–1.857
Constant	1.1090		

Estimated R^2 = .596
% correctly predicted = .832
N = 179

*Indicates significant at .01 level (critical value Z = 2.57), other coefficients insignificant at .05 level (critical value Z = 1.96).

likelihood of speechmaking; military activity is inversely related to the speeches given.

Three points emerge from these comparisons. First, it appears that Republican speechmaking is somewhat more responsive to shifts in public opinion than Democratic speechmaking. As members of the minority party during this period, Republican presidents may be more dependent on public opinion to succeed in office and might therefore be more careful to time speeches in accordance with rises and declines in popularity. By contrast, Democratic presidents may act more independently of public opinion concerns while paying greater attention to national conditions and events. Without an investigation of White House decisions regarding major addresses, an explanation of the result remains tentative, but there appears to be a strategic difference in Republicans' and Democrats' approaches to speechmaking.

Second, the results provide limited confirmation of generalities that link partisans and the economy. Commonly, Democrats are associated with problems of inflation, and Republicans are tied to the difficulties of unemployment. Here, speeches of Democratic presidents are less likely to occur as inflation rises, whereas speeches of Republican presidents are not significantly affected by increases in consumer prices. However, Republican speeches are less likely to take place as unemployment worsens. The relationship is also true for Democrats, but to a more limited degree. This offers a clearer understanding of presidents' reluctance to make speeches during economic hard times observed earlier: Republicans are slightly more likely to remain silent during periods of high unemployment; Democratic presidents avoid speeches somewhat more as inflation is fueled.

Yet third, the differences noted above should not be exaggerated. The overall patterns observed in Tables 3 and 4 are not markedly dissimilar, nor do these patterns differ sharply from that noted for all presidents in Table 2. Thus, it seems that Democrats and Republicans are more alike than unlike in the ways they act as speechmakers.[19] So speechmaking may be an activity general to the office, rather than totally unique to partisans holding the office. Seemingly, a major address is a *commonplace type of public action for modern* presidents who act upon a common public ground.

The Popularity of Presidential Speechmaking

Do presidents as public speakers have an impact on the attitudes of their national audience? To explore the influence of speechmaking on public opinion, Table 5 presents results of a regression analysis testing the relative effects of speechmaking, economic conditions, military activity, national events, individual presidents,[20] and previous public approval on monthly levels of presidents' popularity from Truman through Carter.[21] In this case, all speeches, obligatory as well as discretionary, are considered. There is no reason to exclude inaugural addresses and State of the Union messages which may affect public opinion as much as, if not more, than discretionary national speeches.[22] The chief purpose of the equation is to estimate the immediate effect of speechmaking on a president's popularity for a given month. As an initial inquiry, it seems most appropriate to determine whether the speeches affect public opinion at all.[23]

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[19] In another test, dummy variables for individual presidents were added to the equation presented in Table 2. The results showed no significant effects for individual presidents.

[20] Indicators of unemployment, consumer prices, military activity, and positive and negative events remain those used in the analyses above. To measure possible idiosyncracies among the seven presidents studied, a series of dummy variables were included in the equation, using Eisenhower's second term as the excluded category.

[21] The dependent variable is the level of approval, not the change in approval used in the preceding analyses. Because most studies of presidential popularity monitor the approval level rather than approval change, the former measure is presented here to promote continuity with past research. A test of the relative effect of Republican and Democratic speechmaking on approval change also showed strong positive results. The equation is presented below with the *t*-ratios in parentheses.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Approval Change} &= -.674 + \underset{(8.237)}{3.601\ \text{REP SPEECH}} \\ &+ \underset{(3.488)}{1.702\ \text{DEM SPEECH}} + \underset{(-3.004)}{-2.131\ \text{NEG EVENTS}} \\ &+ \underset{(.852)}{.401\ \text{POS EVENTS}} + \underset{(-.114)}{-.016\ \text{UNEMP}} \\ &+ \underset{(1.156)}{.006\ \text{CPI}} + \underset{(1.125)}{.095\ \text{MILITARY}}\end{aligned}$$

[22] Discretionary speeches alone also had a significant effect on popularity.

[23] Accordingly, two refinements to the equation were considered as outside the scope of the study. First, the effect of speeches over subsequent months was not estimated. Second, modelling the overall dynamic of presidential support across a president's term, linked to performances of past presidents and, separately, the performances of presidents of the opposing party, is not a central focus of the analysis (Hibbs, 1982). The fit of

Consistent with the findings of past research, the public approval rating for the previous month is the best single predictor of popularity for the current month during the period studied, 1949-1980.[24] This confirms the noted stability of public evaluations of presidents. The table also shows the circumstances under which popularity is likely to change. The unemployment and consumer price variables post significant, negative effects on monthly approval ratings. This suggests, not surprisingly, that as the economy worsens, public support of presidents diminishes. Military activity has a similar effect on popularity. Approval declines with military expansion, but improves with military deescalation. Negative events also erode presidents' popular support, whereas positive events have no significant effect on public approval. Considering the variables for individual presidents, there are significant coefficients for Truman, Kennedy, Ford, and Carter, which denotes differences in mean popularity between these presidents and Eisenhower in his second term (the excluded category in the dummy variable scheme). Thus, as shown in other studies, public approval varies to some degree by specific presidents.

So, Table 5 confirms much that is already known from prior work examining the effect of the current political situation on presidential popularity. But apparently, presidents' actions also are a part of this situation. And the part their actions play is favorably perceived by their audience: *The occurrence of a presidential speech has a significant, positive effect, relative to the other variables, on levels of presidents' public support.* Specifically, with the occurrence of a major address, popularity increases by roughly three percentage points (note the unstandardized coefficient for speechmaking, 2.890). Indeed, careful reading of the coefficients and *t*-ratios suggests that the effect of speechmaking is notable. The magnitude of influence exceeds that of positive events, military activity, consumer prices, and unemployment and is similar to that of negative events. Presidents, then, quite apart from economic conditions, military affairs, and national events, influence their own public standing.

Considered in greater depth, Table 6 reports

Table 5. The Impact of Speechmaking on Presidents' Popularity (Regression Estimates); Dependent Variable: Level of Popularity

	β	beta	*t*-ratio
Speechmaking	2.890	.095	4.660*
Positive events	.114	.003	.138
Negative events	−2.721	−.044	−2.253*
Unemployment	−1.041	−.102	−3.310*
Consumer prices	−.092	−.187	−4.568*
Military activity	−.385	−.056	−2.417*
Prior popularity	.777	.787	25.940*
Truman	−3.292	−.074	−2.453*
Eisenhower I	.826	.039	1.406
Kennedy	3.641	.070	2.832*
Johnson	−1.466	−.038	−1.353
Nixon	−.577	−.015	−.536
Ford	5.212	.098	3.225*
Carter	5.209	.107	2.685*
Intercept	18.333		
R^2 = .881			
N = 362			

*Indicates significant at .01 level (t critical = 2.236). At the .05 level, t critical = 1.960.

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the model presented in Table 5 ($R^2 = .887$) suggests that inferences regarding speechmaking drawn from the coefficient estimates are on fairly solid ground. They should not be radically changed if more elaborate models were considered.

[24] A test was performed for serial correlation in the equation of Table 5. Because the equation contains a lagged dependent variable, the Durbin-Watson d statistic is not appropriate. Instead, a first order autocorrelation coefficient of the residuals can be computed as $r = 1 - 1/2d$, where d is the conventional Durbin-Watson statistic. Using r, a Durbin h statistic can be computed to test for autocorrelation. In the present instance, the autocorrelation coefficient $r = .23$; Durbin $h = 1.394$, which as a standard normal deviate can be compared to the normal distribution: Z critical = 1.645 at the .05 level, Z critical = 2.45 at the .01 level. Since Durbin h is less than the critical values, autocorrelation is not present (see Johnston, 1972, pp. 312-313).

Table 6. The Popularity of Democrats' and Republicans' Speechmaking (Regression Estimates); Dependent Variable: Level of Popularity

	β	beta	t-ratio
Democrats' speechmaking	2.885	.070	3.166**
Republicans' speechmaking	3.755	.104	4.455**
Positive events	.230	.006	.276
Negative events	−2.943	−.047	−2.361**
Unemployment	−.038	−.004	−.110
Consumer prices	−.098	−.198	−4.697**
Military activity	−.248	−.039	−1.486
Prior popularity	.753	.763	24.599**
Truman	−2.805	−.063	−1.964*
Eisenhower I	1.525	.071	2.508**
Kennedy	3.551	.068	2.529**
Johnson	−.104	−.003	−.086
Nixon	−.379	−.010	−.340
Ford	3.055	.057	1.805
Carter	4.556	.094	2.230**
Intercept	14.164		
$R^2 = .874$			
$N = 362$			

*Indicates significant at .05 level (t critical = 1.960).
**Indicates significant at .01 level (t critical = 2.236).

estimates of an equation that includes separate variables for Republican and Democratic speechmaking. Relative to the other variables, speeches given by Democratic presidents improve popularity by nearly 3% ($B = 2.885$). Speeches given by Republican presidents boost popularity by close to 4% ($B = 3.755$), ceteris paribus. The introduction of the two speechmaking variables apparently diminishes the effects of unemployment and military activity on popular support.[25]

The analysis offers new information about the impact of events on popularity. Although some attention has been paid to recent political scandals and unpopular wars, events with potentially disruptive effects on public support have not been systematically analyzed. The present effort indicates that such negative presidential events affect public attitudes in the expected direction, diminishing public approval with their occurrences. Of equal note, in the current model, positive events have no direct effect on popularity. It might be thought that among this total group of positive events, only rally-round-the-flag events would be sufficiently dramatic to yield an increase in presidential popularity. Yet in testing a rally-events variable in place of the positive events measure in the equation in Table 5, there was no significant effect on public approval. Based on the present results, then, it seems that the effect of events is much like negative voting: Presidents are judged more for what people do not like than for what they do like.

More important, these findings modify a common view of presidential popularity. Often, the public is seen as aware of and evaluating current national situations. Although many of the happenings are not under presidential control, the public nonetheless holds presidents responsible. Citizens are using their evaluations of national politics as low-cost information to judge, however obliquely, presidential performance. Whether or not presidents can act upon these circumstances, they become their victims and benefactors: economic bad times and good times, military defeats and victories, national crises and celebrations. So from this perspective, public evaluations of presidents appear to take place rather indirectly. Decisions and actions of presidents are less critical than visible events and conditions, only some of which result from presidential efforts. In this sense, presidential popularity is something of a misnomer, more aptly termed public contentment with prevailing national circumstances.

The results of Tables 5 and 6 temper this interpretation: Presidents are evaluated partly in terms of national conditions and events, but only partly. Presidents are able to improve their own popular standing by delivering major addresses. Well-timed and sparingly used speeches achieve positive shifts in presidents' public fortunes. Of course, this does not alleviate a more global problem for presidents that their popularity is likely to decline from the beginning to the end of their terms, but it does suggest a way that popularity, as one component of presidents' political capital, can be replenished by presidents themselves. Whereas Light (1983) notes the limited extent to which presidential capital can be recaptured as a term proceeds, speechmaking may represent one technique to counter temporarily, if not the inevitability, at least the extent of the downward slide of popular support. By considering the effect of speechmaking on public approval, presidential popularity thus appears to be more directly under presidents' control.

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[25] The diminished effects of military forces and unemployment do not appear to be the result of high intercorrelations between these and the speechmaking variables. The strongest association is between Republican speechmaking and military activity, $r = -.274$.

Conclusions

Speechmaking is a predictable form of public presidential behavior, influenced by the context of national politics within which presidents act. Changes in popular support and occurrences of both negative and positive national and international events increase the likelihood of presidents delivering major addresses. Conversely, other elements of the public context make it less likely that speeches will be given. As American military activity escalates and as inflation and unemployment worsen, the probability of a speech being given decreases. In making speeches, presidents are able to influence public opinion positively. Republican and Democratic presidents alike improve their popularity by addressing the nation.

An analysis of speechmaking provides a way of assessing the importance of social, economic, and political factors in shaping one type of presidential behavior. Often presidency research investigates internal White House politics to understand how presidential decisions are made and the activities that result. The personalities, conflicts, and consensus of the White House decision group are analyzed. Yet the present study indicates that there may be factors beyond the White House that affect the decisions made within the White House.

To be sure, there are limits to the current effort. The model of speechmaking explores only the direct effects of economic conditions, political events, military efforts, and public support. Indirect influences on speechmaking are not examined. Causal models could detail relationships among the independent variables which eventually influence speechmaking. In addition, other variables may be missing from the model. Unexplored is the extent to which news coverage of these factors may also affect presidents' public behavior. In making decisions to speak, presidents may well be sensitive to a preponderance of good or bad news.

Similar concerns could be raised regarding the analysis of presidential popularity. Variables such as the positive events measure may indirectly, rather than directly, influence presidents' public standings. Indeed, such an indirect effect could occur through speeches. Also, an indicator of media coverage is missing from the set of predictors. In assessing presidents, the public may be swayed by interpretations in news reports and analyses following the speeches made.[26]

Yet these limits also suggest possibilities for future research. The connection between the public context and the internal dynamics of presidential decision making can be explored. Within the White House setting, in what ways are factors from the public context considered? Do in fact presidents calculate the timing of speeches to coincide with happenings that may bolster their public images and to avoid instances that may harm the images? From recollections of presidential speech writers, documents pertaining to the speeches, and drafts of the speeches, information may be drawn on how White House dynamics are affected by the public context.

More complex models can consider relationships between speechmaking and public attitudes. Both the immediate and long term impact of speeches on public approval could be determined. Following MacKuen (1983), dynamic models can be proposed which assess the duration of the speech effect over time. Undoubtedly some speeches have a more longlasting influence on popularity than others. The extent of the speechmaking effect may also vary over the course of the administration; speeches made early in the term may be more effective than those delivered later on.

Additionally, a simultaneous equation model could explore the association between speeches and public opinion.[27] With the influence of changes in public approval on speechmaking observed in Table 2 and the effect of speechmaking on public approval noted in Table 5, a reciprocal public-presidential interaction might exist. There may be a dialogue of sorts between presidents and the public. Specific groups within the public can also be considered to determine how they affect and are affected by presidents' speechmaking.

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[26] For example, using an experimental design, Paletz and Vinegar (1977-1978) found that critical "instant analyses" after several of Nixon's speeches affected viewers' impressions of the president's remarks. Presidential speeches are surely intertwined with media coverage of the speeches. The positive influence of speechmaking on popularity may be dampened or heightened by reporters' assessments, either on the air or in print, of the overall success of a speech.

[27] Dynamic and simultaneous equation models are considered elsewhere (Ragsdale, 1984).

The consequences of speechmaking can be examined more fully. Beyond the impact of speeches on public opinion, it may be that speeches influence attitudes of the press or members of Congress. Specifically, how are speeches interpreted by the press either in television coverage and commentary or in newspaper accounts and editorials? Might members of Congress be infuenced, if only briefly, by presidents' addresses, particularly messages delivered before the body? Thus, profitable avenues of inquiry lie ahead in understanding presidential speeches.

Viewed more broadly, speechmaking provides insights into other forms of presidents' public behavior, including news conferences, public appearances, and trips, both within the country and abroad (see Lammers, 1982). An inquiry can consider how social, political, and economic factors affect these activities and how several types of public behavior may be interrelated. For instance, in examining news conferences and major speeches, news conferences may be a useful alternate form of public communication when major speeches are not desired. As the economy deteriorates, it may be to a president's advantage to call a news conference, rather than calling attention to the situation through a major address.

Finally, consider whether the study of presidential speechmaking is of value in understanding how key presidential decisions are made. Although speechmaking is an important form of presidents' public behavior, public behavior may be relatively less consequential than other decisions and actions. Yet the public context model does not seem limited solely to various forms of public presidential behavior. The economic conditions, political events, military efforts, and public support which affect speechmaking may well affect other, more far-reaching presidential decisions.

For instance, a modified analysis could be applied to presidents' military decisions. Here, too, the focus of most research has been to detail the internal dynamics of the White House decision group. Adapting the public context model, research could pursue whether presidents' initiatives regarding American troop deployments or withdrawals are affected by such factors as inflation, unemployment, industrial production, world economic indicators, defense contracts, public attitudes toward war, and public attitudes toward the president. Thus, applying such a model to critical presidential decisions may enrich the study of the presidency.

Speaking to the nation in 1965, Lyndon Johnson declared:

> I do not believe that the Great Society is the ordered, changeless, and sterile battalion of the ants. It is the excitement of becoming—always becoming, trying, probing, falling, resting, and trying again—but always gaining. . . . If we succeed it will not be because of what we have, but it will be because of what we are [and] what we believe.[25]

In his remarks, Johnson proposed nothing concrete; he noted no tangible accomplishments. Indeed, the content or the occasion of the speech may have been secondary to the speech as a symbolic expression of community. Major addresses may be strategically important to presidents and favorably received by the public because they represent rituals of the whole: As the president addresses the nation, the nation addresses common concerns and a shared sense of promise. Through their speeches, presidents offer the impression that they are in charge of existing political circumstances. The public is reassured that someone knows what is to be done. Ironically, the speeches are actually echoes of those same national circumstances.

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Political Education and the History of Political Thought

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Texts designed to introduce political science students to the history of political thought or to past political theories have been commonplace in the discipline, as have disputes about their pedagogical utility or justifiability, and methodological debates concerning their adequacy or legitimacy. In an effort to address these disputes and some of these debates, I construct three models of historiographical inquiry. Each model represents a particular approach, and each is defined in terms of three common features. The methodological debates are joined both indirectly and directly: indirectly by identifying clearly the major features and purposes of these approaches, and directly by consideration of such issues as the nature of a historical tradition, the legitimacy of certain interpretive strategies and presuppositions, and the viability of certain conceptions of past political theory. I conclude that each approach can make significant contributions to the education of political science students.

Texts that examine the history of political thought "from ancient to modern times" or focus on political theories "from Plato to Marx" have been widely used in courses dealing with these topics since at least the turn of the century. Typically designed only to provide an introduction to the subject matter, these studies combine original research with secondary scholarship in a variety of formats emphasizing sometimes divergent perspectives and pedagogical concerns. Despite this diversity, the authors of these texts all agree on one point: the study of Western political thought provides one of the foundations of a sound education in political science.

The central purpose of this article is to reconfirm that a familiarity with the history of political thought can contribute to political education in two main ways: it can develop in students the historical knowledge, and especially the historical sense, necessary to an adequate understanding of political study and political life, and it can help to cultivate in students the ability to think systematically, analytically, creatively, and critically about political ideas, practices, and problems.

These essentially instrumental arguments will be developed by analyzing and defending precisely those texts that have presupposed their cogency. One advantage of this somewhat indirect strategy is that it will allow me to contribute to some of the recent methodological debates about this literature,[1] even though my primary aim is to defend the study of past political thought and theory against a series of longstanding criticisms. There have always been, and there are today, at least some political scientists who question the utility, necessity, or desirability of the study of political thought and its history. One objection concerns the relationship between political philosophy and political science. According to this view, political science is (or should be) a purely scientific discipline, and neither political philosophy nor that part of it concerned with past political theories has much to offer the student or scholar. Especially prevalent during the rise of behavioralism, this argument reflects the position that political philosophy is a normative (and hence irrelevant) enterprise and that past theories are, as well, both ideological and outdated. The conclusion is that interest in the history of theory is not merely a waste of intellectual energy but a veritable obstacle to political education and to the development of modern scientific political theory.[2]

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[1] I refer to the methodological discussion and debates launched in the 1960s by Pocock (1962), Dunn (1968), and Skinner (1969). Representative discussions include Sanderson (1968), Leslie (1970), Pocock (1971, 1980), Skinner (1972, 1974), Tarlton (1973), Schochet (1974), Wiener (1974), Ashcraft (1975, 1980), Gunnell (1978, 1979), and Tarcov (1982).

[2] Advocates of both the new science movement in the 1920s, and of behavioralism in the 1950s and 1960s, adopted these and related positions. Examples of the former include Charles Merriam, George Catlin, and William Bennett Munro; of the latter, Harold Lasswell,

A second common objection is that those political scientists specializing in political philosophy or theory are (or are in constant danger of becoming) antiquarians, that the study of past thought ought to be a secondary or tertiary activity rather than a full-time occupation or obsession. According to this argument, in other words, students and scholars of political philosophy do little except study, reinterpret, and debate past ideas and theories, whereas they should be concerned with the construction and criticism of current political ideas and theories.[3]

Albeit for different reasons, these two objections are opposed to the attention paid to past theories. Both would like to see those political scientists specializing in political philosophy redirect their energies to certain present-day endeavors: in one case, to the work needed for the development of empirical theories; in the other, to the development of normative theories. By contrast, a third objection opposes, not the study of past thought per se, but a particular type of study often termed the historicist or historical kind. This kind of study is characterized by its focus on distinctively historical questions, and it is for this reason condemned as irrelevant to the student of politics. According to the argument, historicist studies are indefensible because they miss the main point, which is to utilize the study of past thought for present-day purposes.[4]

A compelling response to these objections would demonstrate that exposure to the history of political thought is virtually indispensable to the education of political science students and that continued scholarship in this area must in consequence be encouraged and applauded. I intend to provide such a response by defending the texts mentioned above and hereafter referred to as "histories." The defense can be restricted in this fashion because these histories have been specifically designed to acquaint students with past political thought or theory, have been traditionally justified on precisely the sort of instrumental grounds I am seeking, and because they presuppose and embody the collective research of scholars in the field.

An overview of these histories demonstrates considerable variety; different authors have approached and presented the subject matter in different ways for different reasons. This circumstance requires the construction of models or ideal types, each representing a fairly common approach to the writing of this sort of history. The models are defined in terms of three features: the subject matter included, called the "focus" of a history; the central questions posed in a history, called "primary objectives"; and underlying assumptions, called "presuppositions," which typically accompany given foci and objectives. Based on these criteria, I depict and defend three models. Of course, no actual history will be fully characterized by any one of the models, and any actual history will almost surely share some features present in more than one model. But because my primary interest is justificatory (rather than descriptive), the simplicity of the models presents no problem.

The Historical Model

The first model I define and defend is the historical model. Real-life approximations to it include the histories of Dunning (1902), Sabine (1961), and Sibley (1970). The focus of this model is broad, including all levels of political and social thought from the popular to the philosophical. Although interested in the exposition of political ideas and theories, the primary objective of the scholar adopting this model is to explain why political ideas and theories appear when and where they do, why they change over time, and why (or whether) they have any influence on contemporaneous and subsequent thought and behavior. These three objectives may be abbreviated as an inquiry into the historical genesis, development, and influence of political thought in the West.

The presuppositions that the historian brings to this sort of history are as follows. First he assumes that all forms of thought are embedded in historically specific "contexts" and, in particular, that political ideas and theories "are produced as a normal part of the social milieu in which politics itself has its being" (Sabine, 1961, p. v). This presupposition is made for two reasons: first, it is believed that the interpretation of past ideas and theories requires knowledge of their associated

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Robert Dahl, and, depending on how one interprets him, David Easton. Lasswell's comments are typical: In the recent past, said he, historians of political theory "were so weighed down with the burden of genteel erudition that they had little intellectual energy left with which to evolve original theory. . . . Hence empirical work in political science received a minimum of constructive aid from scholars formally responsible for political theory" (Lasswell, 1954, p. 201).

[3] This position has been especially popular since the 1950s and has been articulated by, for example, J. Roland Pennock, Alfred Cobban, Robert Dahl, David Easton, and to some extent Richard Ashcraft.

[4] Prototypes of historicist studies were said to be the works of Dunning, McIlwain, and Sabine, and were condemned in the terms described by David Easton (1953), Andrew Hacker (1954, 1961) and William Bluhm (1962). Similar views were expressed earlier by W. W. Willoughby; Leo Strauss also raised similar complaints.

contexts, because such contexts are assumed to condition, determine, or otherwise provide clues to: 1) the meanings (sense, reference, connotations) of specific terms and expressions and of the conventions governing the application or use of concepts, arguments, and methods of political thinkers; 2) the identity and characteristics of tacit assumptions and arguments made by thinkers; and 3) the intentions or goals motivating thinkers. In addition, it is supposed that knowledge of the contexts of ideas and theories can help explain their geneses. Particularly popular here have been the contentions that ideas and theories constitute responses both to perceived political problems or crises and to the influences of partisan and intellectual contemporaries or predecessors.

These beliefs demonstrate a second presupposition of the model: the idea that the composition of contexts is complex. In histories resembling the model, it has been traditionally maintained that the context of ideas and theories contains existential and ideational features. Political crises and conflicts, major political events and trends, and political institutions have been among the most emphasized features of the existential component, although general socioeconomic conditions and trends, religious institutions and movements, and many other variables have been included as well. With respect to the ideational component, popular beliefs and norms, and the intellectual climate (including scientific, philosophical, and religious theories, fashions, and beliefs) have been most emphasized.

The complexity of contexts is underscored by the additional assumption that they always contain a significant historical component. Specifically, it is assumed that many of the features constitutive of contexts are rooted in the pasts to which, in turn, thinkers are linked. Persistent or recurring controversies and conflicts, intellectual and political traditions, and inherited prejudices and practices are examples. It is partly because contexts are assumed to include a historical dimension that the question of influence arises. Given the assumption, the historian tries to explain how political ideas and theories exert an influence on subsequent thought or practice and thereby become agents of change, stabilizing elements within successive contexts, or both.

A final presupposition of the model is that contexts change over time and space. This assumption guides, indeed underpins, the historian's account of conceptual change and development. In those histories that resemble the model, the identification and description of changing contexts are typically used to help explain, in narrative fashion, why and how "the political consciousness of men has passed from early antiquity to modern times" through a series of "successive transformations" (Dunning, 1902, p. xviii), and why the "reinterpretation and readaptation" of received beliefs and theories have been one of the characteristic chores of political thinkers (Sabine, 1961, p. 145). The idea of accounting for conceptual change and development by focusing on changing contexts is also emphasized in monographs that resemble the historical model—as when, for instance, an author seeks to tell "the story" or how "the modern concept of the State came to be formed" by "considering the historical development which prompted this conceptual change" (Skinner, 1978, pp. ix, x).

The interrelated focus, objectives, and presuppositions of this model constitute a coherent historiographical approach to the writing of a history. My primary defense of histories resembling the model will be that they are particularly well suited to developing in students the historical knowledge, and especially the historical sensibility, necessary to an adequate understanding of both political study and political life. Although this is my main contention, I also argue briefly that these histories can encourage in students creative and critical thinking. These arguments are developed as I outline three specific themes or hypotheses which one would expect to emerge, and which in fact typically do emerge, from this kind of history. The first of these is the theme of diversity; the second a hypothesis asserting the interdependence of politics and political thought; the third, the emphasis placed on the historical character of the objects and methods of political study.

An obvious and certainly common defense of the "historical" history concerns the benefits provided by its emphasis on the diversity of political thought and life. Once the historian commits himself to the suppositions that all forms of political thought are to some extent context dependent and that contexts change over time, his account of the history of political thought will stress diversity. This emphasis should awaken students to the plurality of political ideas and ideals, perspectives and theories, and of forms of political life. However we might judge Sabine's history, for example, a student cannot read it and then claim that all persons and communities seek the same goods or ends; that concepts such as democracy, freedom, and justice have either only one meaning or always have the same meaning over time; that there is but one way of studying politics, organizing political and social life, or justifying political practices and principles.

An exposure to the diversity of political thought and life can thus shake up preconceptions and prejudices, liberating students from the tyranny of conventional modes of thinking. It can encourage creativity and critical thought by enlarging the sense of the possible and undermining the supposed certainty or "naturalness" of current shibboleths and reifications. In other words, a healthy sense of diversity can provide a counterbalance to intellectual smugness or ossification, a sensitivity to the fact that virtually all political and social concepts and ideals are problematic and contested and can be exploited for different purposes by political ideologues, theorists, and scientists. Moreover, although this emphasis can help students discern the provincial and modern in contemporary institutional arrangements, ideologies, and theories, an exposure to the history of Western political thought can demonstrate to students that "truly novel ideas in the domains of morals and politics are extremely rare" (Sibley, 1970, p. 7).

Although a healthy sense of the diversity of political thought and of forms of political life is encouraged by these histories, even more significant is the illumination provided by the hypothesis that political thought and political life are interdependent, reflecting and constrained by one another. The hypothesis is commonplace in such histories: According to Dunning (1902, pp. 1-2), for example, "the only path of approach to an accurate apprehension of political [thought and] philosophy is through political history"; and Sabine (1961, p. v) similarly professed that his study was written "in light of the hypothesis that theories of politics are themselves a part of politics." The elaboration and defense of this hypothesis produces a variety of claims which, I want to argue, contribute in important ways to political education.

One claim associated with the hypothesis is that political thought is always to some extent conditioned and constrained by political and social life. The existential problems addressed by thinkers, the ideas and ideals that they articulate and defend or criticize, the institutions and behaviors assumed or condemned, the alternatives propounded and possibilities foreseen—all these and more are limited, to some extent even determined, by the prevailing political arrangements, institutions, and conflicts within which thought takes shape. Similarly, developments in political thought seem often to follow developments in political and social life as, for example, relatively new ideas and ideals, and relatively novel perspectives on collective problems and possibilities, were ushered in by the emergence and spread of the Christian church and by the experience of modern industrialization.

Historical knowledge of this sort, presented in some detail in the historical history, is surely of value to the student of politics. It has in the first instance obvious intrinsic value because this historical knowledge is also political knowledge and, as such, ought to be a part of political education, but, in addition, the awareness that political thought so often reflects and is limited by political experience can alert students to the difficulty political scientists confront whenever they seek to develop transhistorical or transcultural knowledge of political phenomena. In this way, it teaches not merely humility and modesty; it underscores the absolute necessity of historical knowledge for those who would seek to generalize about politics.

A second and related claim associated with the hypothesis is that political thought is often biased by partisanship or socioeconomic position. By locating thinkers within the political and social context of which they were a part, the historian is able to illustrate how political creeds and ideals often reflect, promote, mask, or mystify political, religious, or socioeconomic interests and arrangements such as prevailing distributions of power, wealth, and privilege. Although presented in the context of the history of political thought, this sort of knowledge is obviously not limited to its historical setting. The recognition that political thought is typically connected to political interests can help students understand and better assess contemporary political rhetoric, partisan and ideological conflict, and the attachment to particular positions, creeds, and symbols by political groups and leaders. Further, the demonstration that "many bodies of ideas can plausibly be interpreted, at least in part, as rationalizations of a given *status quo*" can place the student "on guard about one's own thinking and the degree to which it can transcend the pressures of class, cultural, and national interest" (Sibley, 1970, p. 6).

It is sometimes alleged that the historical histories do a disservice to students by making it appear as if political philosophy, like more popular and partisan forms of thought, is historically conditioned, limited, and ideological. This allegation is mistaken because exaggerated. In these histories political philosophers are indeed said to produce arguments and recommendations related to identifiable interests, groups, struggles, and crises within specific societies, but there is at the same time great reluctance to conclude that political philosophy is reducible to ideology or partisan pleading. Consider, as a relevant illustration, Sabine's Hobbes. Examining Hobbes's work in the political context of the English civil wars, Sabine argues (what is now controversial) that one of Hobbes's purposes was to defend not just royal absolutism, but "the royalist party and . . . the pretensions of the Stuarts" (1961, p. 456). At the same time, however, Sabine demonstrates that Hobbes's political persuasion and alleged political interests hardly exhaust what he was about and what he produced. He does this by relating Hobbes's intentions and products to a much wider social milieu and to an intellectual environment neither exclusively English nor contemporary.

By examining Hobbes's thought in this much wider context, Sabine shows how little a partisan Hobbes really was and demonstrates that Hobbes's thought was to some extent conditioned and limited not by his immediate political environment and alleged goals, but by the much wider range of his experience and knowledge and by the rich stock of ideas, beliefs, and perspectives available to him. Hobbes's theory is thus shown to transcend its immediate environment by virtue of its breadth, depth, and ambitions; it is comparable neither to the thought of the ideologue nor to the typical thinker of the time. Sabine is drawn to this judgment precisely by examining Hobbes's thought contextually; for it is very hard to confuse Hobbes, who set out to "make his system broad enough to account, on scientific principles, for all the facts of nature, including human behavior in its individual and social aspects," with contemporaries whose purposes were exclusively partisan or whose writings were less ambitious, less abstract and systematic, and less informed by a variety of intellectual traditions (1961, p. 457).

The reporting of an ideological dimension in what are shown to be penetrating and lasting theories of politics can serve to warn students not to confuse disciplinary demands for methodological sophistication and scientific objectivity with the absence of partisanship. Systematic, reflective, sustained political inquiry and the development of genuine political understanding and insight are as much the products of political interest and concerns as of scientific method. Secondly, political philosophies are indeed shown to have lasting relevance not (simply) by abstracting them from their historical contexts but, rather, by demonstrating how a proper understanding of those contexts helps account for their relative scarcity, lasting value, and persistent influence.[5] Reverting to the example at hand, Hobbes can be shown to have produced

> a theory natural to an age which [given the rise of individualism] saw the wreck of so many of the traditional associations and institutions of economic and religious life and which saw above all the emergence of powerful states in which the making of law became the typical activity. These tendencies—the increase of legal power and the recognition of self-interest as the dominant motive in life—have been among the most pervasive in modern times. That Hobbes made them the premises of his system and followed them through with relentless logic is the true measure of his philosophical insight and of his greatness as a political thinker. (1961, p. 475)

The hypothesis of interdependence asserts that political thought arises out of, reflects, and is constrained and changed by political and social life; it also asserts the reverse. Consequently, histories that resemble the historical model provide the important—even if in some quarters controversial—service of reminding students not to discount the impact of political thought on behaviors and processes. "This assumes, of course, that men's images of the world . . . affect the way they behave (Sibley, 1970, p. 6), that political ideas and theories need to be taken into account when explaining political conduct not because these ideas and theories "are true but because they are believed" (Sabine, 1939, p. 10).

Exploration of this aspect of the hypothesis takes a variety of related forms. For example, the historian is likely to describe how ideas and ideologies have in the past motivated actors by identifying for them political problems and possible solutions, ends, and means. He will provide accounts of how ideas have generated or fueled conflict by legitimating or condemning particular leaders or groups, movements, or institutions, and by articulating and defending interests and ideals. He will try to explain how popular beliefs or systems of thought have provided criteria for defining political phenomena and frameworks within which political reality was perceived, meaningfully ordered, and acted upon. And he will describe how ideals characteristically functioned as standards against which behaviors and institutions were judged and how, sometimes, they functioned also as goals toward which political decisions and actions were directed and so became embodied in institutions, laws, or policies.

Although a familiarity with these arguments and accounts can be defended as contributing to political education on an individual basis, it is their collective purpose or impact which must be stressed. All of them help the student to understand and explore the thesis that the character, quality, and direction of political life is a function of the interplay between nature, habit, fortune, and autonomous social processes, and human thought, purpose, and struggle. Given that this thesis is central to the study of politics—it is either presupposed or examined by political scientists all the time—we should conclude that the historical history provides an important service by introducing students to it.

Finally, this history emphasizes the historical nature of the objects and methods of political inquiry; that is, political life and thought and the methods and theories used to study them are shaped by the past. I conclude my defense of this model by arguing that an exposure to this kind of historical understanding makes an especially important contribution to political education because, although at one time it was widely taught in the discipline, it is largely neglected today.[6]

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[5] For relevant comments see Sabine (1953).

Sabine (1906, p. 17) expressed this historical understanding particularly well when he observed that all things political (and indeed all things human) do not merely *have* a history; they *are* historical. We did not, for example, invent our political vocabularies ourselves; nor did we invent our political practices, institutions, beliefs, and theories; they are historical products, and understanding them even in rudimentary ways requires knowing something about their histories, about how they got here, and why they take the form they do. Thus present-day meanings of liberalism and Marxism, of freedom and justice, and of citizenship and law, contain connotations and associations that are historical in origin yet preserved in contemporary thought and dialogue. Similarly, institutions and practices embody intentions, purposes, meanings, and ideals whose development influences our current understanding and therefore our reactions to, participation in, and evaluation of those institutions and practices. So, too, for instance, the absence or presence of beliefs and practices in given societies can usually be explained only as the products of particular historical experiences and traditions, explanations that assume precisely the kind of historical understanding emphasized in the historical history.

Political theories and methods are likewise historical creatures, inventions of men and women familiar with certain historical experiences and heirs of particular intellectual traditions. For instance, consider current theories that postulate, after the fashion of modern economics, rational self-interested behavior. This postulate is popular partly because it appears reasonable, even "natural," to thinkers who live in a culture that has legitimized and reinforced calculating self-interested behavior and also because, for the same reason, it often facilitates explanation and prediction. Similarly, both the current interest in and prevailing conceptions of explanation and prediction are historical products, in this case expressions of a rationalistic culture and of an evolving conception of science dating at least to the seventeenth century.

The kind of understanding made familiar to readers of the historical histories also demonstrates why their authors use a narrative style. Because every present is shaped by its past, the history of political thought must to some extent be an unfolding story. It does not follow that these histories reify a unitary tradition of Western thought as some critics (e.g., Gunnell, 1979; Pocock, 1962) have alleged; this criticism is best directed elsewhere. Although these histories tell a story, the critics forget that its structure is complex, that it embodies discontinuities as well as continuities, and that it identifies the rise and fall of multiple traditions operating at many levels of experience. Consequently, the real weakness of these studies is that they tax the very limits of historical scholarship and for that reason need constant revision. The point here has been to argue that revisions ought to be welcomed, for they also will demonstrate that political understanding must be informed by a sense of history and by a historical sensibility.

The Traditional Model

The last two models reflect historiographies devised by scholars who, writing during the heyday of behavioralism, feared that the study of past political thought and theory was in danger of extinction, and who therefore sought to demonstrate that the study of past political theory was not an antiquarian exercise and that these theories were not uninteresting or irrelevant by virtue of their old age or alleged ethical, ideological, or unscientific character.

The result was the construction of historiographies and histories that contended that, in the history of the West, certain political theories are classics and that studying them is both relevant and significant to the education of political scientists. The primary focus of these histories is therefore on the so-called classic political theories rather than on the many levels of political thought characteristic of the historical model. In addition, a presupposition common to these histories is that there are indeed identifiable classic or great theories deserving of close attention and scrutiny.

These similarities notwithstanding, the histories to which I allude are of two relatively distinct sorts, the first of which is the traditional model. What is especially distinctive about this model is the claim that the classics constitute a great tradition of Western political theory or philosophy, and the contention that this tradition is as important an object of inquiry and understanding as the individual theories that purportedly constitute it.

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[6] The importance for political science of the kind of historical understanding I am describing here was often stressed by earlier generations of political scientists, no doubt because of the institutional and intellectual connections between political science and history characteristic of the discipline in its formative years. See as examples Smith (1886) and Burgess (1897).

The foci of histories resembling this model, then, are the classic theories and the great tradition, and their objective is the critical analysis of both the classics and the tradition, i.e., its historical development.

Examples of works adopting these foci and objectives are the histories of Strauss (1953), Wolin (1960), and Nelson (1982); in each the great tradition is understood not simply as a chronological sequence of works and authors who share certain similarities or affinities but as a relatively close-knit intellectual tradition whose participants were conscious of and deeply concerned about their predecessors, and each of whom sought to contribute to the development of political theory over time. In other words, each contributed to an evolving activity and, in the words of Wolin (1960, p. 1) and Nelson (1982, p. 2) to "a tradition of discourse."

Although not part of the model, these three histories also adopt certain substantive claims about the tradition. These claims need to be identified because they serve in these works as instrumental justifications for the focus on the historical development of the tradition. The central contention is that the tradition has in some important senses declined over time. The basis of this judgment is essentially twofold: first, it is asserted that political theory as traditionally conceived and practiced has been lost or denigrated; in addition, it is claimed that the more recent phases of the tradition have had a negative impact on contemporary thought and practice by giving rise to certain practices and beliefs that are judged deficient or harmful. The central justification for focusing on the classics is therefore that the student will come to understand (and perhaps be encouraged to emulate) a now lost or denigrated, but valuable, way of doing systematic political thinking, and the central justification for examining the historical development of the tradition is that the student will come to understand why this sorry state of affairs has come to pass.

Brief examples can help illuminate these remarks. In the case of Strauss (1953, pp. 35-36), a central position is that "political philosophers from Plato to Hegel" all wrestled with the problem of "natural right"—i.e., with the proposition that the discovery and justification of transhistorical standards of right or justice are possible. Premodern, especially Greek, political philosophers defended this proposition; modern theorists (after Aquinas) rejected it. On both philosophical and political grounds, Strauss favored the Greek position and therefore characterized the tradition of political theory as degenerative; it culminates in the rise of ethical relativism and the death of political theory as traditionally practiced. It is the demise of natural right and traditional political philosophy (or the rise of relativism and positive social science) that Strauss identified as the crux of our modern predicaments, practical as well as intellectual. His critical analysis of the classics and of the tradition was thus explicitly designed to illuminate the origins and nature of these predicaments and the superior arguments of the pre-modern political theorists.

Wolin presents a somewhat parallel case. In his view, traditional theorists sought "to identify and define [the] truly political" and to defend the dignity, distinctiveness, and importance of the political as that "order created to deal with those concerns [common to all]" (1960, pp. 289, 9). Since the seventeenth century, however, the "vision of political theory has been a disintegrating one, constantly working to destroy the idea that society ought to be considered as a whole and that its general life was best expressed through political forms" (1960, p. 430). This disintegration corresponds to, and is partly responsible for, the disintegration and denigration of political life in contemporary societies which Wolin refers to as the "decline" and "sublimation" of "the political." Accordingly, he too characterizes the tradition in terms of a decline: the decline of traditional theory and of "the political." His history is intended to explain the origins and characteristics of these modern problems and, at the same time, to disclose the "urgent task" of restoring the traditional understanding of political theory "as that form of knowledge which deals with what is general and integrative" (1960, p. 434).

Although his history presents less of a narrative, Nelson also organizes his work around a particular theme, in this case around "the shifting relationship of ethics and politics from the beginning of Western political thought to the present time" (1982, p. 1). The historical development portrayed is again one of decline, for the ancient and medieval theorists rightly conceived of politics as a moral activity, whereas modern theorists, beginning with Machiavelli, tended to sever ethics from politics. Ideologies, asserted to be a "response to the dilemmas arising out of the modern divorce of ethics and politics," complete the decline of the tradition, help to explain the loss of traditional theory, and underscore the "need" we have today "to devise political philosophies that unify ethics and politics" (1982, pp. 1-2, 332).

It is important to reiterate that the instrumental justifications underlying these histories are explicitly tied to substantive concerns about present-day politics and political thought. A central goal of these works is to indict or to question contemporary affairs, practices, or beliefs, and to identify a presumably valuable mode or activity of political thinking that has been denigrated and lost. By disclosing in a critical fashion the different visions of the great theorists, for instance, Wolin believes he is introducing students to ways of conceiving political phenomena and of constructing political theories that are genuinely unique and integrative while, at the same time, exposure to these theories throws into sharp relief the less worthy conceptions and modes of political thinking and inquiry that characterize the present day.

The central presuppositions underlying the traditional model and these histories are therefore quite obvious, and they have come in for a great deal of methodological criticism in recent years. First and foremost is the presupposition that there exists an identifiable set of classic works, of master political theorists, who engaged in substantially the same kind of activity or endeavor despite their separation in time and space. Also important are the presuppositions that these authors are members of a tightly knit historical tradition, and that this tradition has had and continues to have a substantial impact on thought and practice.

Each of these presuppositions has been criticized by a number of writers, but most prominently by Pocock (1962, 1971, 1980), Dunn (1968), and Skinner (1969), and by Gunnell (1978, 1979), who deplores more fully their supposition that the classical theorists were members of a unitary tradition is a myth. These authors also charge that the idea that the tradition has been as causally efficacious as asserted is an article of faith for which there is little evidence. Finally, the presuppositions that the masters were engaged in a common activity, or that they commonly addressed some particular issue or problem, is also rejected by most or all of these critics.

A defense of the model would therefore seem to require a defense of the presuppositions underlying it. Yet many of the criticisms levelled at those histories that resemble the model seem to me quite legitimate. The basic problem is that the classic or great works do not in fact form a unitary tradition in the manner presupposed by the model. This is not to say that the masters were not engaged in a common activity, a point to which I return; rather the masters were not self-consciously participating in a great dialogue or tradition whose contours can be presented in terms of a coherent narrative and whose meaning and import prove causally relevant to contemporary events and intellectual fashions. To discuss the putative tradition in this way is to endow it with the sorts of properties that we legitimately ascribe to, say, the nineteenth-century utilitarian tradition in Britain. And this, as Gunnell and the others argue, is a mistake: "What is presented as a historical tradition is in fact basically a retrospective analytical construction which constitutes a rationalized version of the past" (Gunnell, 1979, p. 70).

To label the tradition a myth is not, however, to undermine altogether the traditional model. As Gunnell makes clear, historians and other scholars can legitimately identify "certain similarities and differences in a range of chronologically ordered works and speak of this as a tradition with continuity and change" (1979, p. 85). Of course this presupposes that the similarities identified are not themselves invented or mythic, and here Gunnell appears to part company with the other critics mentioned, and especially with Pocock. Gunnell seems to believe that the classic works actually share certain important similarities, so that a critical focus on them can be justified on pedagogical grounds. He appears in fact to accept the very Wolin-like position that the classics creatively engage "the problem of political order and that, in terms of their content and the circumstances of their production, they bear certain family resemblances, and possess certain common motifs, which make it reasonable to construct a paradigm of political theory and the political theorist to which specific works conform in varying degrees" (1979, p. 136).

According to Pocock (1980, pp. 566-567), however, Gunnell's position merely replicates the errors of the traditional model, except of course that in Gunnell's version the classical theorists "do not constitute a [historical] tradition any more." For Pocock, rejecting the myth of the tradition is not enough; one must also reject the myth of the masters, i.e., the supposition that they can, without historical distortion, be treated as species of the same genus. In what follows I defend Gunnell, and so the traditional model *as corrected* or modified, against Pocock.

The somewhat complicated position I adopt is that the traditional model is in some ways deficient, but that certain central features of it deserve our support. With respect to deficiencies, the model errs in two fundamental ways: it ascribes to the great tradition a historical specificity and coherence that the tradition does not possess, and it ascribes to this tradition a causal impact on past and contemporary events and thought it never had. The first error can be easily rectified by following Gunnell's suggestion that the tradition be understood, and be explicitly presented to students as, an analytical construct. The second error needs simply to be admitted and no longer repeated. Although we can not and should not ignore the influence particular masters had on subsequent members of the tradition, it should be obvious that if we want to provide a historical account of past and contemporaneous practices and beliefs, we simply cannot "concentrate on the received canon of classic texts" (Skinner, 1974, p. 280). We must instead adopt something like the historiography embodied in the historical model.

At the same time, however, we need to recognize the legitimacy and pedagogical utility of the traditional history. In the first place, there is nothing wrong or untoward with using the tradition, conceived as an analytical construct, as a device through which scholars present and examine significant political or theoretical issues such as the problem of ethical relativism, the meaning, boundaries, and importance of "the political," or the relationship between politics and ethics. We can use the tradition in this way because the masters did, as a matter of historical fact, speak to these issues. They often addressed the question of moral standards, they certainly examined the nature and importance of politics, and they typically considered the relationship between politics and ethics. It is true that they did not do only these things, and it is true that they did not all think that these or any other specific issues were of equal importance or were even of central concern. But the traditional model need not deny these truths, and a fair reading of traditional histories indicates that they do not deny them either.

A second justification of the traditional history is that treating the classics as exemplars of a valuable activity and submitting them to a process of critical analysis serves to engage the student in political thinking. To repeat, the behavioral movement within political science led to a renewed emphasis on the importance of establishing the direct relevance of the study of the history of political thought. In many cases this meant shifting attention or emphasis from the *history* of political *thought* to the *study* of political *theory*. Essentially what was claimed was that the great theories must be directly relevant to political education because they were and are, after all, recognized classics. All of the justificatory arguments that followed from this premise necessarily assumed that the so-called classics deserved their title. Did they? Do they?

In a general but important sense they surely do. A classic is anything of recognized worth or excellence. As such, the term is honorific, and it is conventionally applied only to historical artifacts that have through time been influential or revered or both. The contention, then, was and is that in the history of the West certain works and authors—Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Machiavelli and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, and a few others—have been remarkably influential (as compared to lesser writers) and often revered. The historical evidence for this claim, including the fact that educated people in this century continue to read these authors, is so overwhelming that, in the general sense described, the assumption is justified.

But if we ask why these works and authors are classics—if, that is to say, we seek an explanation for their persistence and honorific status—disputes are possible, and the assignment of individual works and authors to the category can become uncertain and controversial (see, e.g., Sanderson, 1968). In the histories of the 1950s and 1960s, however, there was considerable agreement. Two qualities are most often ascribed to the classics in order to explain their lasting value and attractiveness, first that the classics raise the fundamental or the perennial questions and problems of politics, and second that they embody insightful, comprehensive theories or visions of politics.

Complete agreement on what precisely "comprehensiveness" means is absent from these histories, but there is some consensus. In general, comprehensiveness refers to three characteristics of the classics which they all meet to some extent. First, these theories embrace normative and practical as well as descriptive and explanatory concerns. Second, they often include or reflect philosophical positions and theories, such as an epistemology and metaphysic, worked out by their authors. Third, these theories consider in thoughtful and typically systematic ways a wide variety of phenomena and issues that can enhance political understanding and yet are not narrowly political—human nature and its bearing on collective existence, the place of ethics and education in political life, and the relationships between politics and culture, religion, and economics, are some standard examples.

Explaining the historical persistence and honorific status of the masters in this way supports the further claim that they, at some not-too-abstract a level, were involved in the same activity. They all constructed—more or less successfully, depending on cases and judges—comprehensive theories, and they all addressed the perennial issues of politics; indeed, these theories can be legitimately read as if they constitute responses to, or engagements with, the fundamental or timeless (and not merely timely) political problems. If this is so, histories that identify, elucidate, and discuss critically these perennial issues are eminently justifiable, eminently relevant; and this is precisely the position taken by the perennial-issues model, a model I discuss and defend below.

The traditional model also discusses the perennial issues; in fact, histories resembling this model typically organize their critical analyses of the classic theories around one of these perennial issues (e.g., around the relationship between ethics and politics) as we have seen. But the traditional history also emphasizes the comprehensiveness of the classics. The claim is that it is especially this feature and not just the confrontation with particular perennial issues which makes the classics so valuable. To recover these comprehensive theories or visions, to understand how they were put together or fashioned whole, and to assess critically the claims and perspectives they advanced are, in the traditional model, rightfully seen as contributions to political education, as invitations to modes of political thinking or theorizing in which students can participate.

Before amplifying this additional argument for the traditional model, let me make clear my opposition to Pocock's position. Pocock denies, while I wish to affirm, that the classics are exemplars of a certain broadly conceived kind of intellectual activity that issues in comprehensive theories of politics. This is not simply or largely a retrospective analytical construction; it is rather a reasonably accurate factual claim, an eminently plausible interpretation of the historical evidence, primarily of the texts in question. It helps explain why the classics have persisted as objects of interest and often of respect, and explains as well why the emphatically contextual research undertaken by historians such as Pocock has not undermined this position. Of course I cannot prove this contention here, but if we grant at least some validity to it, a good case can be made for an additional justificatory argument for the traditional histories. Very briefly I make this case by explaining what a critical analysis of the classics—conceived as comprehensive theories of politics—involves.

This instrumental defense focuses on the process of critical analysis through which the historian or scholar seeks to "understand," and to "evaluate" or "assess," the classics. Exactly what this process substantively demonstrates will of course vary from historian to historian because different historians will entertain somewhat different conceptions of what the classics are or what the masters did; they will emphasize or select different aspects or features of the theories examined, sometimes examine different writings of the same theorist, will use different standards of criticism, and will sometimes use different techniques or rules of interpretation.

Despite these differences in preconceptions, emphases, selection, standards, and techniques, I want to argue that the process of critical analylsis in all cases offers students the opportunity to participate in political thinking. This can be briefly explained by pointing out that critical analysis demands of the historian analytic, synthetic, and critical skills. Analysis and synthesis require that the historian disassemble into constitutive parts the theories examined and that he explain how the parts, such as premises, definitions, preferences, and criticisms, are interconnected to form comprehensive wholes. It is this process that helps to produce an understanding of the theories examined for both historian and student. But more important, it involves the reader, as it involves the historian, in political thinking. For example, in the effort to achieve understanding, the historian may be required to describe how a particular theorist defines and defends a particular conception of liberty or of human nature; then to explain how this conception relates to a particular argument about the desirability of or need for constitutional or absolute government; and finally to show how this argument fits and functions in the broader theory. Understanding and therefore political thinking are further enhanced by comparing the theories examined to one another, comparisons invited by conceiving each theory as instances of a common activity.

Creativity is involved in this process because the historian must illuminate, classify, and connect arguments and themes he feels are important and need attention. Perhaps the historian will invent abstract categories in order to highlight and analyze themes in theories which he feels might otherwise be missed or not fully appreciated. (Consider, for instance, Wolin's (1960) use of the categories "political space" and "time.") Or perhaps the historian will use suggestive labels in order to illuminate allegedly central arguments or themes in the works of particular theorists, as Strauss (1953, pp. 168, 193) does when he identifies Hobbes as "the creator of political hedonism" and Hobbes's theory as "the first philosophy of power." In these ways the historian introduces students to a new vocabulary and to different ways of thinking about political ideas, phenomena, and problems.

Understanding a theory also involves, and is enhanced by, critical reflection; this typically includes describing the supposed implications of concepts, propositions, or arguments found in a theory, and sometimes of the entire theory, for practice or for thought, and assessing these implications, and the theory and its parts, in terms of (for example) their supposed cogency, plausibility, novelty, justifiability, desirability, validity, truth, or falsity. Wolin's (1960, ch. 2) critique of Plato's political outlook as essentially antipolitical and Nelson's (1982, p. 43) cautious appreciation of Plato's "disturbing picture of democratic man," are examples. In these ways the historian as critic adds critical commentary as well as content to the theories examined, enlarging and enhancing the reader's comprehension of them and, at the same time, offering readers the opportunity to think critically about political concepts and arguments, relationships and possibilities.

This (second) defense of the traditional history can be summarized by saying that the critical analysis of the classics is itself an exercise in political thinking or theorizing, an exercise controlled by the textual and other historical evidence available to the historian but not reducible to that evidence. Although it is true that this benefit is accorded the historian especially, the point here is that readers will be led to share in this activity. Exposure to the classics is in this sort of history a way of teaching students how to think analytically, systematically, and critically about political ideas, perspectives, and problems.

This defense is not mine; some version of it is explicitly made, typically in introductory comments, in most of these histories in order to strengthen the justificatory claim of relevance. Although some will fault this approach to past political theory on the ground that it inevitably leads to historical inaccuracies and distortions, I have tried to argue that such a charge is not only suspect (because the classics can bear these sorts of analyses), but also misses (or dismisses) the pedagogical utility of this approach for students of politics and political theory.

The Perennial-Issues Model

When he turns to the writing of a history, the perennial-issues historian focuses on the "timeless" political problems and issues in the classic texts. He thus presupposes both that there exist certain "enduring questions of politics," and that the study of the masters is particularly well suited to the task of ferreting out those questions—because, it is said, these theorists, unlike lesser political thinkers, "concentrated their attention on general principles." This is the position of Andrew Hacker, whose history (1961, pp. 17, ix) is prototypic of the perennial-issues model. Approximations to the model include Plamenatz (1963) and Bluhm (1965).

This historian's first objective, then, is to identify for students the eternal or persistent political problems, questions, issues, or even approaches to political inquiry found in the classics. He has, however, a second objective. Recognizing that discussions of these issues by the masters is often submerged in historically specific concerns, the historian tries to demonstrate that these discussions can be made applicable to contemporary political study or political life. This second objective requires another presupposition: that the historian can legitimately update or even reinterpret the ideas or arguments of the masters in order to make their language more familiar to students and their arguments more relevant for dealing with today's world.

Because the perennial-issues historian includes in his history only the masters, his work may be confused with that of the traditional history. There are, however, differences between the two. For one thing, the perennial-issues historian is less interested in elucidating the nature of political theory conceived as a complex or comprehensive activity and more interested in using the classics to identify the "perennial problems," the timeless "ideas and assumptions," or "the universal ideas" contained or embodied in them (Bluhm, 1965, p. 13; Hacker, 1961, p. 23; Plamenatz, 1963, p. x). Additionally, he is not interested in discussing the tradition of political theory and its supposed development; on the contrary, he explicitly eschews such an interest (Bluhm, especially pp. 14-15; Hacker, ch. 1; Plamenatz, especially pp. vi, ix-x). Finally, he is not interested in using the tradition to bring into focus some fairly specific contemporary problem or predicament such as the demise of natural right or the decline of the political. Rather, he wants to demonstrate how the many perennial problems, issues, ideas, and approaches to political inquiry explicit or implicit in the classics may be brought up to date and used to elucidate better contemporary political life and inquiry.

The pursuit of these objectives in the perennial-issues histories is of course intended to guarantee their relevance, to justify instrumentally the study of past political theory. More specifically, Hacker (1961, especially pp. vii-viii) argues that his approach will illuminate for students important (because perennial) political problems and ideas and in that way help to build a bridge between the study of past theories and the contemporary study of politics. Plamenatz (1963, especially p. xi) argues that his history will help students "look carefully at the assumptions they make and the ideas they use" because it is just such assumptions and ideas that the masters articulated and examined. In addition, Bluhm (1965, ch. 1) contends that his work will help students better understand approaches to the study of, and perspectives on, contemporary politics, because contemporary approaches and perspectives resemble in significant ways the approaches and perspectives found in the classics.

Because these instrumental defenses are quite straightforward and these histories (rather like the traditional histories) have been the object of numerous methodological critiques, I shall assume that the defense of this model requires primarily a defense of the two main presuppositions underlying it. The important queries here are: Do there exist timeless political problems? Can the task of bringing meaning up to date be defended?

The claim that there exist timeless political problems presupposes that there are inherent in all forms of political life problems that transcend time. As soon as we identify such a problem, we commit ourselves to the view that there are certain ideas or concepts that are (to some degree) timeless. For example, if we say that "What is politics?" is a perennial question, we commit ourselves to the view that politics is a timeless concept. Only if we accept this premise can we say, for instance, that when Aristotle raised this question, he meant by it something akin to what we mean by it. This does not, of course, commit us to the view that the term "politics" never changes its meaning; on the contrary, we expect thinkers separated by time and space to define politics somewhat differently. Nevertheless, it does commit us to the view that the term in some respects never changes its meaning.

When radical historicists reject the contention that there exist timeless political problems or questions, they are committed to another view.[7] They suppose that a concept is individuated by its meaning, so that whenever a concept undergoes a change in meaning, it becomes a new concept (see Fain, 1970, ch. 2). They might argue, for instance, that since the Greek term for politics meant something peculiarly Greek, it cannot be supposed that the term has anything in common with ours, or that when Aristotle raised the question, "What is politics?" he was doing what we do when we raise the question.

Although I do not propose to resolve philosophical riddles concerning the nature of concepts, I wish to argue that the radical historicist view is self-defeating when applied to historical research. In particular, I want to suggest that the position of the radical historicist is, in two ways, radically ahistorical. First there can be, on the radical historicist account, no such thing as the history of "an idea"—such as the history of the idea of politics or, for that matter, a history of Western political theory—because the radical historicist would have us choose between two options: either ideas are individuated by their meaning, or ideas never change their meaning. The latter option is, of course, historically absurd; it would make history impossible. If, for example, the idea of politics never changed its meaning, there could be no history of this idea to tell.

The former option, however, produces the same result: if the idea of politics is individuated by its meaning, whenever the meaning changes the idea changes and, therefore, "there *is* no history of the idea to be written" (Skinner, 1969, p. 38). We could, on this radical historicist account, produce "a history of the various statements made with the given expression"; but this would not be a history of the idea, because ideas, unlike expressions or words, are individuated by their meaning. Writing a "history" (?) of the *expression* "politics" would, of course, be an "absurdly ambitious enterprise"; but, says the radical historicist, "it would at least be conceptually proper" (1969, p. 39).

Second, the position of the radical historicist—if taken literally—makes historical interpretation impossible. If historically distant or alien languages share nothing in common with our own, it is hard to see, as Dilthey (1962, p. 77) once suggested, how interpretation could take place: "Interpretation," he remarked, "would be impossible if expressions of life were completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between these two extremes" (see also Wiener, 1961). If there is no similarity between Aristotle's conception of politics and our own, how could we say anything about his conception; indeed, how could we discover that he had any conceptions at all? Unless the historian is prepared to assume that there are some similarities, some resemblances, between his language and that of his subjects, historical interpretation must be given up and historical understanding must be considered impossible. It is doubtful that the radical historicist means to commit himself to such a position; and this helps to explain why Skinner had ultimately to retreat from the position just described (see Skinner, 1974).

There is, however, a related position that is both more common and reasonable, that of the historicist who fears that, in making the necessary assumption that the thought of the past shares something in common with the thought of the present, the historian will exaggerate these similarities and so fall into the trap of anachronism. Failure to take seriously the historicity of human thought and life may very well produce anachronistic interpretations and erroneous descriptions of past action or purpose. This danger is surely always present; it in no way follows, however, that this is necessarily a "bad" thing. Historians who turn to the past because of present-day concerns or interests may actually produce "good" history, by which I mean bring to our attention themes or dimensions in historical subjects or texts previously neglected or overlooked —and this because of their present-minded concerns or orientation. Leslie (1970), supporting her case with some insightful examples, has argued precisely this point.

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[7] I have in mind Collingwood, Passmore, and Skinner. Collingwood rejected the view that there were timeless philosophical ideas in his *Autobiography*, as discussed by Passmore (1965, pp. 5-13). As Passmore points out, however, Collingwood also claimed that an exception to the radical historicity of thought might be political philosophy, a point on which Passmore also agrees. Skinner (1969), focusing specifically on political thought, transposes Collingwood's view on philosophy to political philosophy, although in the final analysis even Skinner is somewhat ambiguous on this point (in the 1969 article). A radical historicist position was also adopted by Lamprecht (1939).

It is also important to recognize that the alleged danger of anachronism is easily exaggerated, since exactly what constitutes an anachronistic interpretation is at least sometimes difficult to say. It may, for instance, be anachronistic to call Plato and Rousseau "totalitarians," but is it anachronistic to call attention to those features of their thought that remind us of totalitarianism? The same difficulty affects the issue of "timeless" problems or questions. Although the current problems of conservation and resource management are indeed contemporary, the problematic relationship between man and nature has been a persistent concern throughout human history. Similarly, although the question of the appropriate role of technocrats in decision making may be contemporary, the question concerning who should rule seems to be timeless; the point, of course, is that answers to the contemporary query can be approached on the basis of answers given to the timeless query (or, if one prefers, the contemporary query is a version of the timeless one).

It needs also to be pointed out that perennial-issues historians cannot usually be accused of unwittingly making anachronistic interpretations, because they often admit to doing so. When the perennial-issues historian tries to bring the language up to date and make applicable the ideas and arguments of the classics, he is often fully aware that he is doing so and that he may, in the process, be distorting to some extent historical truth (e.g., Hacker, 1961, p. 16). Only intellectual historians outside the discipline[8] seem (or in the past seemed) to miss this obvious point; those within recognize that when a perennial-issues history is written by a political scientist, the author is out to save the study of past theory from feared extinction (as evidenced in Hacker, 1954, and Bluhm, 1962).

But one question does remain: Is the (typically explicit) objective of bringing meaning up to date legitimate? The answer seems obvious. As Hirsch (1972) has pointed out, all interpretive objectives are "ontologically equal" in the straightforward sense that there simply is no one interpretive goal or strategy sanctioned by divinity, logic, necessity, or any other authoritative ground. If the interpretive objective of the perennial-issues historian is justifiable on pedagogical grounds it is, therefore, legitimate.

Consequently, the only remaining way to critique the perennial-issues model is to attack not the objectives animating it but the justification underlying it. Two such objections, related yet distinguishable, can be identified, and both have been raised by Wolin, who once argued against this sort of history that:

> What seems to have been forgotten is that one reads past theories, not because they are familiar . . . but because they are strange and therefore provocative. If [for instance] Aristotle is read as the first behavioralist, what he has to say is only of antiquarian interest and it would be far more profitable to read our contemporaries. (1969, p. 1077)

The first objection raised here is that bringing the ideas of past theorists up to date misses their real significance, which is their "strangeness." This objection cannot, on reflection, be sustained. If achieving supposedly accurate interpretations of the thought of political theorists is worthwhile for contemporary students of politics, it must be because their thought is in some sense relevant. Now by "relevance" Wolin means their ability to provoke thought—a worthy, yet nonetheless present-minded, justification. If Aristotle could not provoke thought today, he would be found, presumably, irrelevant. But if one type of relevance can justify the sort of historical approach apparently favored by Wolin, surely another type of relevance can justify the approach favored by the perennial-issues historian. If Aristotle can be unfamiliar yet provocative, he can also be made familiar because provocative.

Wolin's second objection seems more telling. This objection is that the effort to make applicable or directly relevant the discussions and arguments of the masters puts the perennial-issues historian in the odd position of saying what could be said more economically or at least more directly. If, for example, the point of studying Aristotle is to launch into a discussion of modern behavioralism, why bother with Aristotle? Or if the point of studying Machiavelli is to launch into a discussion of modern theories of elitism, why not dispense with Machiavelli and deal with Pareto and Mosca?[9] The answer is actually quite simple: the perennial-issues historian does not focus on Machiavelli only to talk about theories of elitism. Machiavelli's ideas and arguments are relevant in numerous other ways; for instance, one might also find such directly relevant or applicable ideas as the meaning of political realism and means-end-analyses; the iron law of oligarchy; the tension between ethics and politics; the significance of religious belief for political order; the doctrine of *raison d'etat*; various democratic ideas and problems; a cyclical theory of political change; perspectives on the limits of power; and political psychology.[10] For the perennial-issues historian, the thought of the "great" theorists opens an apparently unlimited storehouse of "relevant" ideas "which stimulate the mind and inspire the imagination" (Hacker, 1961, p. 19).

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[8] In particular by Skinner (1969) who presupposes what is false: that the objective of the historical study of past thinkers is always the same—namely, the attempt to achieve historically "accurate" interpretations. He thus attacks Hacker on methodological grounds several times in the course of this essay, completely ignoring Hacker's objectives.

[9] Hacker (1961) uses Aristotle and Machiavelli in these ways; but see note 10.

Conclusion

I have tried to defend three historiographical models, each representing a different approach to the study of past political ideas and theories, against the objections outlined in the first section of this article. Against the claim that historicist approaches are too past-minded to be of use or significance, I argue that histories using a historiography similar to that described by the historical model can on the contrary expose and sensitize students to a broad spectrum of important ideas. Examples include developing in students a sensitivity to the diversity of forms of political life and thought, and to the contestability of major political concepts and ideals; an awareness of the complex interrelationships between political thought and political practice; and an appreciation for the historical nature of political thought, inquiry, and practice.

Against the more general criticism that the study of past political theories is antiquarian, I have maintained that the process of historical interpretation requires creative and sustained forms of political analysis and reflection, that interpretation is not equivalent to mere description or re-description. I have also pointed out that the critical analysis of theories enables students to recover a way of thinking about collective or political existence which is unfamiliar, comprehensive, and often insightful; and that such analyses can contribute to the development of students' analytical, synthetic, and critical skills.

Finally, I argue that the perennial-issues history provides a direct, and anything but antiquarian, service to the student of politics by identifying and elucidating themes and problems explicitly considered, or implicitly contained, in certain old texts that nevertheless remain very much alive in contemporary political inquiry, thought, and practice.

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[10] These are some of the "relevant" ideas besides elitism that Hacker (1961) finds in Machiavelli.

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Partisan Orientations over the Long Haul: Results from the Three-Wave Political Socialization Panel Study

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The present study examines the dynamics of partisanship and voting behavior by utilizing national survey panel data gathered in 1965, 1973, and 1982 from two strategically situated generations—members of the high school senior class of 1965 and their parents. At the aggregate level, generational effects appeared in the persistently weaker partisan attachments of the younger generation. At the individual level, strong effects based on experience and habituation appeared in the remarkable gains occurring in the stability of partisan and other orientations among the young as they aged from their mid-20s to their mid-30s. Dynamic modeling of the relationship between partisanship and voting choice demonstrated that the younger voters had stabilized at an overall weaker level of partisanship, leading to more volatile voting behavior which, in turn, failed to provide the consistent reinforcement needed to intensify preexisting partisan leanings.

Secular movement in the net distributions of American partisan orientations has been well charted, thanks largely to an accumulation of three decades worth of survey research materials (Miller, Miller, & Schneider, 1980). Short-term individual-level dynamics of partisanship are also coming to be fairly well understood as the result of research based primarily upon the Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies panel surveys conducted in 1956, 1958, and 1960, and in 1972, 1974, and 1976, and during the course of the 1980 presidential campaign (e.g., Brody, 1977; Converse & Markus, 1979; Fiorina, 1981; Franklin & Jackson, 1983; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Markus, 1982; Markus & Converse, 1979). What have been lacking to date are individual-level data that span an appreciably long segment of an adult lifetime. Among other contributions, such information would provide a unique perspective on the interrelationships through the life course of two key components of partisan thinking: party identification and electoral choice.

At last such long-term individual level data are available, and we report here the results of a study of partisan orientations that is based on a 17-year, three-wave panel survey. That survey traces the political lives of two generational groups, one made up of individuals who entered adulthood in the late 1960s and one composed of their parents. The panel study began in the spring of 1965 as an investigation of political socialization. The original design entailed a national sample of high school seniors and their parents (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). A follow-up survey of both generations occurred in the spring of 1973 (Jennings & Niemi, 1981), and a third wave of interviews took place in the summer of 1982.

Research on the first two waves of panel data demonstrated that at the microlevel a variety of sociopolitical attitudes were consistently less stable for the filial respondents than for their middle-aged parents across the eight-year hiatus between interviews. For the most part, these results were interpreted as providing support for a political-experience model of attitude formation and change. According to this model, the political outlooks of young adults typically rest upon a fairly limited experiential base and are therefore particularly susceptible to change in response to attitudinally relevant events. Those events may be societal in nature, such as a war or an economic

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depression, and induce systematic shifts in the attitudinal makeup of an entire cohort. Classical theories of the formation of political generations emphasize this idea (Lambert, 1972; Mannheim, 1952). Or the events may be more idiosyncratic and personal in nature—a college education, geographical mobility, or marriage. Either way, the presumption is that with increasing political experience, political attitudes gradually become imbued with a richer historical precedent and are consequently less likely to change.

Particularly with respect to partisan attitudes, we found the political-experience interpretation to be an appealing one. With the passage of time, an individual's repeated use of partisan orientations to interpret and organize political information and to guide electoral decisions should reduce the likelihood of those orientations being altered by isolated events or circumstances. More specifically, the degree of stability in partisan attachments exhibited by our filial cohort should eventually approach that of their parents.

Related to the issue of life-course trends in the *stability* of partisan feelings is the possibility of similar developments in the *intensity* of those feelings. Beginning with *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, pp. 161-165), a growing body of research has suggested that under normal circumstances the intensity of partisanship increases with the amount of time for which that attitude is held (see also Converse, 1976; Shively, 1979). Analysis of the first two waves of our data evinced no such increase, however, not even for the younger cohort, for whom the hypothesized intensification should have been the more pronounced. Perhaps the expected gain was temporarily suppressed by the unique political conditions of the Vietnam War era. Or perhaps the failure of the filial cohort to develop closer psychological ties to political parties signaled an enduring change within the American electorate, as other studies suggest (Abramson, 1976).

With but two waves of data spanning eight years, there was no way to ascertain whether younger respondents would ultimately take on more distinctive partisan colorations once the political turbulence of the early 1970s had passed. Nor could one determine whether the expected convergence in attitude stability for the parental and filial cohorts would actually occur. With a third wave of data now in hand, however, what was heretofore the subject of hunch and speculation can be examined more directly. That is the subject of this report.

Study Design

The three-wave national survey of parents and their offspring was carried out by the Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies of The University of Michigan. Aside from a small proportion of mail questionnaires used to reach remotely located individuals in 1973 and 1982, all of the surveys entailed personal interviews. A chronic problem in panel studies is that of respondent mortality. Our own panels cover a 17-year period, an exceptionally long span for national surveys of more or less general populations. Despite this we have been remarkably successful in keeping the two panels intact, as Table 1 demonstrates.

These retention figures compare favorably with those of other panel studies. For example, the ultimate retention rate for the 1972-1976 (five-wave) National Election Study was 49%, and a recent 1974-1981 two-wave political study of an adult population yielded a rate of 54% (Jennings, Barnes, Farah, & Inglehart, 1983). Although the filial generation remains more intact than the parental one (column 6), an adjustment for "real" mortality narrows the gap (column 7). A further adjustment on the basis of physical disability in the parental generation reduces the difference yet again.

Of equal importance to the sheer amount of retention is the representativeness of the panel. Selective mortality, even with high retention, will produce a misleading longitudinal landscape. As demonstrated elsewhere, the parents who were reinterviewed successfully in 1973 were socially and politically indistinguishable from those who dropped out of the study (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, Appendix A). Although slight, the mortality

Table 1. Sample Sizes and Response Rates

	1 1965 *N*	2 1973 *N*	3 1982 *N*	4 1973 %	5 1982 %	6 1965-1982 %	7 Col. 6 less deceased
Parents	1562	1179	898	75	76	57	64
Offspring	1669	1348	1135	81	84	68	70

bias among the young led to a somewhat more socially advantaged, more politically involved sample in 1973. Similar comparisons were made on the three pairings produced by the complete three-wave data, namely, 1965-1973, 1973-1982, and 1965-1982. Again, scant differences emerged between panel and nonpanel parental respondents. Moreover, the small bias present for the younger panel in the 1965-1973 pairing did not appear in the 1973-1982 pairing. In fact, the 1982 offspring respondents, although fewer in number, are more representative of the original 1965 sample than is the total set of 1973 respondents.

In assessing these two generations over time, it should be kept in mind that they represent special kinds of cohorts. The filial generation comes from the high school class of 1965. That cohort aged from 17-18 to 25-26 during the first panel period and to 34-35 years of age during the second period. The parental generation is correspondingly defined by the presence of a high school senior in the family as of 1965. The mean age of the parents was 46 in 1965, 54 in 1973, and 63 in 1982. Whatever difficulties the special character of these samples creates in generalizing to the national adult population are more than compensated for by the durability and longevity of the panels and by the ability to track a young and middle-aged cohort over a long period of political history and through various stages of the life cycle. Moreover, it has been shown that the general shape and dynamics of these two cohorts, including their responses to the political environment, are similar to those of comparably situated strata in the general populace (Beck & Jennings, 1979; Converse & Markus, 1979).

Continuity and Change in Partisanship

Long seen as the linchpin of the American electoral process, identification with a political party has in recent years been noted for its increased complement of self-styled independents and has been challenged for its role as the major shaper of the vote decision. Additionally, the unidimensional nature of the traditional seven-step classification scheme has been questioned, with particular emphasis being given to the idea that people may harbor feelings about the concept of "independent" as well as about each of the major parties (Dennis, 1981; Howell, 1980; Petrocik, 1974; Valentine & Van Wingen, 1980; Weisberg, 1980). Although these revisionist thoughts and research developments may add to our understanding of the concept of party identification, it is clear that the traditional measure has much to recommend it, not least of which is its repeated use over a long stretch of time.[1] More generally, the role of party identification, although perhaps transformed or muted from earlier days, has scarcely vanished from the workings of the American electorate.

Our two panels are aptly suited for a long-term examination of party identification. The parental generation can be viewed as a cohort of firmly established and experienced veterans of electoral politics at the time of our first observations in 1965. Its aggregate response to the changing political scene over a 17-year period can be laid against that of the filial generation, fresh recruits who by and large were first eligible to vote in the 1968 presidential election.

A portrayal of the seven-way party identification measure captured at three points in time illustrates very neatly the two components of continuity and change in the American electorate (Figure 1).[2] Two points stand out. First, in the aggregate the parental generation was extraordinarily stable over time. There was some modest variation in the fractions of strong and weak partisans, but in general the three observations track each other very closely. By contrast, the younger generation, although hardly erratic in its aggregate performance, displayed considerably more net movement on the whole.

A second feature of these distributions is that the proportion of independents—pure and leaners combined—in the younger cohort was always appreciably higher than that in the older cohort. The offspring showed a large increase in self-declared independents as they were entering the electorate between 1965 and 1973, but then gave up some of that gain between 1973 and 1982. Nevertheless, there remained substantially more pure independents among the offspring than among their parents. Significantly, 34% of the parents versus only 15% of their offspring were strong partisans. In this respect the class of 1965 supports the thesis that the mid-1960s represent something of a watershed, that "socialization to independence" had become more common, and that this and subsequent cohorts may display comparatively paler partisan complexions for some time. Recalling that the younger cohort has a long future in the electorate, whereas the older one is exiting at a rapid clip, the impact of the changing composi-

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[1] For a cogent argument in support of retaining the unidimensional measure for analytical purposes, see Franklin (in press).

[2] The marginals are based on the total sample size at each time point, excluding missing data. An alternative is to use just the panel respondents. Especially in the case of parents, where loss through mortality is a factor, it seems more prudent to base estimates on the total available cases. In any event, differences between findings based on the two methods are minor.

Figure 1. Party Identification at Three Points in Time



1965	26%	24	9	10	5	13	12	(1518)	19%	24	15	13	8	13	8 (1646)
1973ᵃ	18%	27	9	10	7	17	12	(1095)	9%	25	19	15	14	12	6 (1112)
1982	20%	24	11	7	10	15	14	(864)	8%	24	16	12	15	17	7 (1089)

[a]Excludes mailback respondents.

tion of the electorate upon its partisan persuasion is apparent.

A final point to make about these aggregate distributions is that the younger cohort has gradually become less Democratic over time. In 1965 its pronounced Democratic flavor resulted in some part from the effect of the recent Johnson landslide on impressionable young minds. By 1973 the proportion of strong and weak Democrats had declined, and by 1982 it had slipped further. Meanwhile, the proportion of Republicans (including leaners) had been increasing, so much so that by 1982 it equalled that of the senior generation. In this sense the younger cohort has been relatively more sensitive to the secular forces of presidential politics, forces that have generally favored the Republicans since that cohort's entry into the electorate.

Partisanship at the Individual Level

Our prevous analysis of the 1965-1973 panels demonstrated that party identification was one of the most stable of all political orientations covered in the study (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, chap. 3). Indeed the eight-year stability for the parental generation bore a remarkable resemblance to that found in the four-year panel studies of the national electorate during the 1950s and 1970s (Converse & Markus, 1979). Although the filial generation evinced moderately high partisan continuity, it hardly matched that of their parents. At the time we chalked up this difference primarily to the lesser political (especially electoral) experience of the young and secondarily to the tumultuous events of the 1965-1973 political era. The inexperience explanation rests on the argument that party identification has, for many individuals, not reached a point of crystallization in early adulthood. Although many offspring will remain true to the partisanship of their parents and to their own early predispositions, others are engaged in a learning process that continues through late adolescence and early adulthood.

In 1982 our young adults were in their mid-thirties. If the accumulation of political experience by that time has been effective, we should observe a distinct rise in the temporal stability of the younger cohort's partisanship. By the same token, measures of attitudinal stability computed for the older cohort should exhibit little gain; that cohort has been at the business of fine tuning its party identifications for several decades. Two factors could negate these projections. First, in a period of electoral swings, split-ticket voting, and the assumed decline of party, the expected hardening of partisan arteries might be impeded. Second, this particular youth cohort, representing as it does the very heart of the Vietnam-era generation, may have been socialized instead to withstand the traditional partisan conditioning typically associated with early adulthood.

These last two possibilities notwithstanding, the results offer a strong endorsement of a learning model based on experiential history. As Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, the younger cohort scored a large gain in partisan stability during the 1973-1982 span. At the same time the older cohort registered a very modest gain. Clearly, the passage of political time acts to protect one against the lure of competing partisan calls. Although the stability of the younger generation may never quite reach that of its predecessor, the trajectory is approximately correct (see below). The importance of experience for even longer-term stability in party identification may be inferred from the fact that the (unadjusted) 1965-1982 product-moment correlation for parents is .77 compared with that of .45 for their offspring. The latter is no mean achievement over a 17-year period, but it suffers when compared with the results for a cohort first observed when already middle-aged and politically seasoned.[3]

Table 2. Turnover in Party Identification, Offspring Generation (%)[a]

	1973 Identification								
	Democratic			Independent	Republican			Total	
1965 Identification	Strong	Weak	Ind.		Ind.	Weak	Strong	%	*N*
Democratic									
Strong	22	42	20	5	7	4	1	101	166
Weak	10	46	18	9	9	8	1	101	222
Independent	8	22	29	18	13	7	4	101	143
Independent	3	12	20	31	17	14	2	99	129
Republican									
Independent	0	8	19	24	30	15	5	101	80
Weak	4	9	13	14	24	28	9	101	138
Strong	8	11	7	7	14	20	34	101	74
Total	9	26	19	14	14	12	6	100	952
tau-*b* = .40 *r* = .49									

	1982 Identification								
	Democratic			Independent	Republican			Total	
1973 Identification	Strong	Weak	Ind.		Ind.	Weak	Strong	%	*N*
Democratic									
Strong	48	37	5	2	1	4	2	99	83
Weak	10	51	19	6	6	6	2	100	237
Independent	4	27	36	11	14	7	1	100	171
Independent	2	12	21	38	20	8	0	101	128
Republican									
Independent	0	6	7	14	42	22	9	100	139
Weak	2	7	7	4	12	50	17	99	115
Strong	2	4	2	4	6	33	49	100	51
Total	8	25	17	12	15	16	7	100	924
tau-*b* = .57 *r* = .66									

[a] Based on respondents in all three waves.

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[3] As was done in the investigation of party stability using the SRC/CPS election panels (Converse & Markus, 1979), raw longitudinal correlations may be refined to filter out noise arising from measurement error and response uncertainty. When this is accomplished via the Wiley-Wiley (1970) procedure, the adjusted serial correlations for the offspring are .67 (1965-1973) and .89 (1973-1982). For the parents, the corresponding figures are .93 and .98. Parenthetically, it can well be argued that some of the response uncertainty being filtered away by procedures such as these exists in the respondent rather than in the measure; that is, the underlying attitude for an individual at a point in time is not a

Table 3. Turnover in Party Identification, Parent Generation[a]

	1973 Identification								
	Democratic			Independent	Republican			Total	
1965 Identification	Strong	Weak	Ind.		Ind.	Weak	Strong	%	*N*
Democratic									
Strong	53	35	7	1	0	4	0	100	199
Weak	16	60	6	4	5	7	2	100	195
Independent	7	31	33	17	5	5	2	100	86
Independent	0	9	18	46	12	12	2	99	81
Republican									
Independent	2	0	11	7	36	36	9	101	45
Weak	2	2	5	8	5	59	20	101	127
Strong	5	1	0	4	6	27	58	101	105
Total	18	27	10	9	6	18	12	100	838
tau-*b* = .67 *r* = .78									

	1982 Identification								
	Democratic			Independent	Republican			Total	
1973 Identification	Strong	Weak	Ind.		Ind.	Weak	Strong	%	*N*
Democratic									
Strong	64	25	7	1	0	1	1	99	149
Weak	27	51	13	3	1	3	1	99	218
Independent	16	24	35	16	6	0	2	99	80
Independent	3	15	15	36	20	6	6	101	73
Republican									
Independent	2	2	12	12	48	19	6	101	52
Weak	1	7	2	3	13	52	23	101	151
Strong	1	2	0	1	8	19	69	100	99
Total	21	23	11	7	9	14	14	99	822
tau-*b* = .70 *r* = .83									

[a]Based on respondents in all three waves.

Although the pattern of continuity correlations across time and cohorts implicates political experience as a determinant of stable partisan attitudes, we have yet to link a measure of such experience directly to partisan stability; this is accomplished in Table 4. Using reports of their own voting histories, we have classified the younger respondents according to their regularity of participation in national elections. As the second row of Table 4 indicates, there is an unmistakable relationship between the stability of party attachments, 1973-1982, and regularity of electoral participation. Moreover, it is not the case that those individuals who ultimately became the most regular voters were simply more stable partisans to begin with, as demonstrated by the lack of patterning in the 1965-1973 continuity correlations.

In sum, those filial generation respondents who did not vote exhibited no reliable increase in partisan stability. Among those who did participate, the gain in attitudinal stability was proportional to the regularity of voting. A similar pattern emerges for the parents, albeit not quite so cleanly

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single location on an ideal partisan continuum, but rather a random variable possessing both a mean and some nonzero variance. If it could be estimated, the size of that variance would be an indication of individual attitude crystallization at a single time point. Unfortunately, there is no way at present to disentangle noise in the measure from noise in the respondent, and to some extent the intrinsic separability of the two may be doubted. Our conclusion is that correlations adjusted for noise have as many advantages and disadvantages as do raw correlations. Both are useful, but both should be interpreted with care.

Table 4. Partisan Stability for Offspring Generation, by Level of Electoral Participation in Five National Elections[a]

	Number of National Elections in Which Respondent Voted, 1968-1980			
	0	1-2	3-4	5
1965-1973	.45 (57)	.58 (183)	.52 (430)	.44 (259)
1973-1982	.46 (52)	.61 (169)	.65 (426)	.75 (256)

[a]Entries are product-moment correlations; sample number is in parentheses. The five national elections were in 1968, 1970, 1972, 1976, and 1980.

because we have no record of their voting histories before 1964. Nonetheless, the 1973-1982 continuity coefficient for parental generation partisanship was .50 for those who failed to vote during the study period ($N = 29$) and .85 for those with a perfect record of participation ($N = 484$).

Serial correlations such as those mentioned above attest to *relative* attitudinal continuity; that is, they denote the degree to which the locations of respondents relative to one another along a partisan continuum remain stable over time. By their nature, such correlations do not detect systematic shifts in attitude means or variances. Relative stability is an important consideration, and if the moments of the distribution of attitudes are relatively invariant through time, serial correlations tell the whole story. In general, however, it is also useful to consider *absolute* stability. Various indicators of the latter are shown in Table 5.

The broad picture that emerges is consistent with that portrayed by the serial correlations. Whether one refers to relative or absolute stability, the partisan attachments of filial respondents were notably less constant than those of their parents between 1965 and 1973. As they aged and presumably acquired some political experience as adults, the offspring registered substantial gains in attitudinal continuity between 1973 and 1982. Parental partisan identifications, which were already quite durable in middle age (1965-1973), became if anything slighty more crystallized with the passage of time.

This section has highlighted the convergence of the two generations in terms of the longitudinal stability of partisan identification. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the passage of time has largely preserved the relatively weaker partisanship of the filial cohort. So although the temporal stability of the partisan attachments of younger respondents rivals that of their parents, the former have stabilized at an overall level of partisan commitment that is markedly below that of their elders. It was precisely this kind of patterning that Mannheim and others anticipated when they developed their theories about the formation of political generations. It is also, perhaps, a pattern that renders the

Table 5. Individual Level Movement in Party Identification, by Generation and Period (%)[a]

	Absolutely Stable[b]		Switch Parties[c]		Switch Parties[d]	
	%	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*
Offspring						
1965-1973	32	306	6	59	18	167
1973-1982	45	412	4	38	12	116
Parents						
1965-1973	52	440	4	36	8	68
1973-1982	53	433	3	28	6	49

[a]Based on respondents in all three waves.

[b]These values include individuals who remained in the same category of the seven-step partisanship measure from one wave to the next.

[c]These values exclude leaning independents who switched to favor the other party.

[d]These values include leaning independents who switched to favor the other party.

Table 6. Stability of Party Identification Compared with Other Political and Personal Orientations[a]

	Offspring		Parents	
	1965-1973	1973-1982	1965-1973	1973-1982
Party identification (7-way)	.40	.57	.67	.70
Civic tolerance	.34	.52	.38	.48
Prayers in school issue	.38	.51	.47	.52
Group evaluations[b]	.20	.35	.32	.34
Political trust	.17	.28	.26	.35
Political knowledge	.57	.64	.67	.63
Conceptual sophistication[c]	.30	.42	.39	.44
Political interest	.31	.39	.39	.44
Newspaper usage	.24	.36	.45	.47
Self-confidence	.23	.38	.35	.39
Personal trust	.27	.37	.41	.47
Opinion strength	.18	.35	.40	.37
Interpretation of Bible	.45	.59	.58	.58
Church attendance	.30	.53	.59	.63

[a] All entries are tau-*b* correlations.

[b] Mean correlations of thermometer ratings applied to labor unions, big business, whites, and blacks. This and other measures contained in the table are described in Jennings and Niemi (1981, Appendix B).

[c] Refers to recognition and understanding of liberalism and conservatism as applied to the party system.

younger cohort "ripe for realignment" (Beck, 1974).

Comparisons of Partisanship and Other Attitudes

We have argued that the sharp increment in the stability of party identification among the younger respondents grows out of a learning process marked by habituation and hardening through repeated exposure and usage. This should not be taken to imply that adults are no longer open to new messages and new learning as they enter their thirties; if our earlier anaysis of the parental generation demonstrated anything, it was that openness to political change remains an option over the later life course as well (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). Rather, it is that as the young mature, they also become more familiar and comfortable with their political selves, including their places within the party system.

According to this line of reasoning, the younger cohort should also exhibit increasing stability across a number of other political orientations. Similarly, the parental generation should show modest gains at best. These expectations are met in handsome style (first two blocks, Table 6). Without exception, the continuity gains in the younger generation exceed those in the older. So sizable is the increase for some of the measures that the filial 1973-1982 correlations surpass those of the parents in the 1965-1973 period. Still, with two exceptions the parents, too, showed slight gains in stability. Persistence tends to increase over the adult life cycle, but with decreasing acceleration.

It may be tempting to attribute the increase in the stability of party identification and other political traits to the alternative explanation of quieter times during the second panel series, which largely embraces the "silent seventies," beginning with 1974 when Ford replaced Nixon in the White House. Rejecting the maturation-habituation explanation in favor of this historical one might have some plausibility with respect to the block of preference orientations shown in the top portion of Table 6. However, it is not supported by the much smaller gains among the parents, who were experiencing exactly the same history. Also, it is difficult to see how the alternative explanation could account for the same patterning of results in the second block of measures, those dealing with political involvement and competence. Ordinarily, one would think that these attitudes would be fairly impervious to the nature of the times. Yet their stability coefficients also rose sharply within the offspring generation.

Our thesis acquires additional buttressing in light of the results presented in the third and fourth blocks of Table 6. None of the traits listed here has anything to do with politics in a specific, substantive sense, and two of them, self-confidence and opinion strength, are more properly considered personality traits. Nevertheless, the same patterns prevail as in the case of political orientations. Between the mid-twenties and the mid-thirties, moderate degrees of consolidation and constraint begin to replace the attitudinal fragmentation and disorder of the young adult years. In this respect party identification, although special for its relatively greater continuity, is but part of a more general learning process.[4]

Long-Term Voting Behavior

The five presidential elections proximate to our study period run the gamut from one landslide victory for the Democrats (1964), two sweeping victories for the Republicans (1972, 1980), and two tightly contested battles (1968, 1976). Included during this period were two serious third-party candidates, the assassination of one president and the serious wounding of another one, the resignations of a disgraced president and vice-president, the midterm succession to the presidency of two vice-presidents, the unseating of two incumbents, and the intimidation of another into not seeking reelection. This electoral turmoil has been chronicled by journalists and scholars alike. Our contribution will be to examine some of the long-term aspects of voting during this period.

The percentage who voted for the Republican candidate is the gauge for our examination of the behavior of our panel respondents cast in their roles as voters. In 1964, 1972, and 1976 the percentage base is the two-party vote. For 1968 and 1980 it includes the Wallace and Anderson votes. Because the offspring generation was not eligible to vote in 1964, we have used their recollected preferences instead of actual vote. Experiments excluding unlikely voters from this preference base yielded trivial differences in the marginals.[5]

Although neither generation purports to be a microcosm of the general electorate, the ebbs and flows of the two national parties are reflected well in the distribution of Republican support across the five elections (Figure 2). The Johnson and Nixon sweeps stand out along with the narrower victories. Thus, even though their precise values may differ somewhat from the true values for the electorate as a whole (as, for that matter, do national survey results), the two panels were clearly responding to electoral stimuli in a fashion similar to that of the general electorate.

Despite its much heralded role as a source of liberal Democratic support, the Vietnam generation—of which the class of 1965 is an archetype—scarcely departs from its elders in voting behavior. Only in 1972, with the peace issue and the new politics in full bloom, did the younger cohort weigh in as being significantly less Republican in its voting. The moment could not be sustained, though, and by 1976 the generations differed not a whit, and only marginally so in 1980. This is not to say that the younger generation is not more liberal in its political outlooks, for in many respects it surely is. When political outlooks are compressed into the forced choices of presidential politics, however, this greater liberalism has less room to express itself.

Not shown by Figure 2 is the greater propensity of the younger voters to support third-party candidates. Although the difference is small, in 1968 they voted in higher proportions for Wallace than did their parents (12% vs. 10%). In part this was a function of their less crystallized party identification and their nonexistent voting history. However, in 1980 they gave even more disproportionate support to Anderson (11% vs. 5%). More than electoral inexperience is at work here; the younger generation's continuing lower rate of party identification is one factor, and Anderson's appeal to young, college-educated professionals is another. For the long view, the speculation is that this cohort, and very probably those in its immediate wake, will likely find third-party voting easier than did previous generations. They have been exposed to third partyism at a vulnerable stage of life, and they have greater flexibility owing to their lesser commitment to party.

Although the aggregate voting profiles of the two generations tend toward convergence, the individual-level dynamics underlying these trends vary considerably. Given its greater political maturity as well as its historical origins, the older generation should be more stable in its voting habits. Two pieces of evidence support the proposition.

The first consists of the degree to which individuals voted for the same party over time. For present purposes we have allocated the respondents into four basic categories of consistency, regardless of the number of elections in which they took part. Consistent Democratic and consistent Republican voters formed two natural categories. A third category comprised electors who split their votes between the two parties, exclusive of third-party voting. A fourth category was made up of any Wallace or Anderson voters, regardless of whom else they supported in other

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[4] Here, as elsewhere throughout this report, the overall findings beg for finegrained analysis of the impact of individual life histories and macrolevel events. We intend to pursue these topics in subsequent reports.

[5] Again the percentage base is the total number of cases available at each time point, excluding missing data.

Figure 2. Republican Voting in Five Presidential Elections



	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Parents					
%	32	51	67	42	58
N	(1268)	(998)	(927)	(774)	(731)
Offspring					
%	26[a]	47	58	41	54
N	(1642)	(702)	(953)	(886)	(889)

[a] Based on reported preferences for the offspring generation.

elections. Eliminated from the base are one-time voters.

The results are shown in Table 7. The most arresting aspect of these results is the volatility within each generation. Among the parents, fewer than one-half consistently supported the same party. Taking into account any incidence of non-voting would lower that value even more. Change is even more prevalent among the young, however, owing in large part to their relative lack of faithful Republican voters. Dropping the 1964 election, which amounted to a preference poll among the young, decreases the distance between generations. Still, consistent offspring trail their parents by a margin of 56% to 47%.

A second way of gauging electoral stability is to examine the intercorrelations across pairs of elections. The presence of the Wallace and Anderson candidacies complicates the analysis. Along with most other analysts, we located Wallace as the most conservative candidate in 1968 and designated Anderson as a centrist candidate in 1980,

Table 7. Presidential Voting Combinations, 1964-1980, by Generation (%)

	All Democratic	All Republican	Democratic and Republican	Wallace or Anderson	Total	
					%	*N*
Parents	23	23	42	12	100	818
Offspring	21	12	51	16	100	1041

Table 8. Correlations of Presidential Votes, 1964-1980, by Generation[a]

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
1964		.48	.41	.52	.46
1968	.34		.53	.39	.43
1972	.21	.48		.50	.54
1976	.23	.30	.41		.58
1980	.20	.40	.40	.38	

[a]Entries are tau-*b* coefficients. Entries above the main diagonal refer to parents; those below the main diagonal refer to offspring.

falling between Carter on the left and Reagan on the right.[6] Table 8 shows the associations (tau-*b*) among the election pairings. Even disallowing the 1964 comparison, it is still apparent that the older generation's voting behavior has been the more constrained. Nor does removing third-party voting from the calculations eliminate this edge.

An interesting aspect of the data in Table 8 is that, unlike our earlier findings, there is little evidence of increasing persistence over the life cycle within either generation. Especially crippling in this regard is the 1976-1980 correlation among the younger voters. Not only is this figure far below the corresponding one for parents, it is also lower than any correlation on the parental side of the grid. Recall that the offsprings' increase in stability of partisan identification was not accompanied by a comparable increase in intensity of identification. Considering the political history of the filial generation and its persistently lower level of partisanship, it may never exhibit the voting constraint shown by its biological predecessor.

Modeling the Dynamics of Partisanship and the Vote

Thus far we have traced the aggregate partisan profiles and voting histories of the parental and filial cohorts for the period 1965 to 1982. We have also examined the individual-level continuities in party attachments and electoral choice that lay beneath those aggregate contours, touching upon the nature of the dynamic interrelationships of partisan attitudes and voting experiences. Taken together, the patterns uncovered have been consistent with a political-experience explanation of increasing attitudinal and behavioral crystallization over the life cycle. Generally speaking, by the time the filial cohort had reached its mid-thirties, the temporal continuity of their political outlooks compared favorably with that of their parents. In particular, the partisan attachments of the younger cohort became less susceptible to change as that cohort's contact with electoral politics grew. Concomitantly, the discrepancy between parental and filial cohorts in terms of overall intensity of partisanship persisted.

In the present section we explore the political-experience hypothesis more rigorously within the context of a dynamic model of the connection between party identification and electoral choice. More specifically, we search for evidence to indicate whether personal electoral experience influences one's future partisan attachments, particularly within the first few elections after reaching the age of eligibility. On the other side of the coin, we determine whether increasing political experience causes electoral decisions to become progressively more tightly constrained by standing partisan ties. The specification of the model to be evaluated reflects ideas developed earlier in this report as well as the results of other recent efforts modeling the dynamics of political attitudes and the vote by Fiorina (1981), Franklin and Jackson (1983), Jackson (1975), Markus (1979, 1982, 1983), and Markus and Converse (1979).

The Party Identification Equation

Common to the aforementioned studies is the idea that citizens' current party attachments, although ordinarily quite stable over time, are nonetheless responsive to the broader political environment, particularly the events surrounding presidential elections. This notion is reflected in equation (1):

$$ID_{it} = \alpha + \beta ID_{itz-1} + \gamma_{t-1} D_{it-1} + \delta_{t-1} R_{it-1} + u_{it} \qquad (1)$$

In equation (1), ID_{it} is the party identification of individual *i* at time *t*; and D_{it-1} and R_{it-1} are binary variables denoting whether or not *i* cast a vote at $t-1$ for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate. For our purposes, t is measured in years. After a presidential election year, individuals who cast a minor party vote or who failed to vote at all are scored zero on both D_{it-1} and R_{it-1}. Because all elections may not have equally large partisan reinforcing or destabilizing effects, depending on the idiosyncratic partisan-relevant factors surrounding a given contest, the γ_t and δ_t coefficients that represent these effects are permitted to vary from one election to the next.

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[6] For evidence supporting our placement of the candidates in 1980, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1983, pp. 24-25, 178-180).

It is worth noting that equation (1) is consistent with recent formulations of party identification as a running tally of an individual's past partisan experiences (Fiorina, 1981), as is shown below. By lagging equation (1), one obtains:

$$\begin{aligned} ID_{it-1} &= \alpha + \beta ID_{it-2} + \gamma_{t-2}D_{it-2} \\ &\quad + \delta_{t-2}R_{it-2} + u_{it-1} \qquad (2) \end{aligned}$$

Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and rearranging the result yields:

$$\begin{aligned} ID_{it} &= \alpha + \beta(\alpha + \beta ID_{it-1} + \gamma_{t-2}D_{it-2} \\ &\quad + \delta_{t-2}R_{it-2} + u_{it-1}) + \gamma_{t-1}D_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \delta_{t-1}R_{it-1} + u_{it} \\ &= \alpha(1 + \beta) + \beta^2 ID_{it-2} + \gamma_{t-1}D_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \beta\gamma_{t-2}D_{it-2} + \delta_{t-1}R_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \beta\delta_{t-2}R_{it-2} + (u_{it} + \beta u_{it-1}) \qquad (3) \end{aligned}$$

By repeatedly lagging equation (1) and back-substituting the result, one eventually obtains:[7]

$$\begin{aligned} ID_{it} &= \alpha(1-\beta^l/1-\beta) + \beta^l ID_{it-l} + \gamma_{t-1}D_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \beta\gamma_{t-2}D_{it-2} + \dots + \beta^{l-1}\gamma_{t-l}D_{it-l} \\ &\quad + \delta_{t-1}R_{it-1} + \beta\delta_{t-2}R_{it-2} + \dots \\ &\quad + \beta^{l-1}\delta_{t-l}R_{it-l} \\ &\quad + (u_{it} + \beta u_{it-1} + \dots + \beta^{l-1}u_{it-(l-1)}) \qquad (4) \end{aligned}$$

This algebraic exercise makes two important points. First, equation (4) shows that hidden behind the simple form of equation (1) is the idea that an individual's current party identification is composed partly of that individual's entire history of electoral participation (the D_i and R_i terms). Second, with the reasonable assumption that $\beta < 1$, equation (4) posits that the effect of a past vote on current partisanship diminish as the time lapse between that vote and the present increases, that is, β^{l-1} decreases as the time lag, l, increases.

Beyond the substantive matters made clearer by equation (4), that equation is also important for estimation purposes. If one had annual time series data for individuals, equation (1) could be estimated directly. We do not have such data, however. Rather, we have measures of partisanship for our parental and filial samples at three points in time and reported votes for the presidential elections between 1964 and 1980. Fortunately, these data are sufficient to estimate equation (4). Once the coefficient estimates for that equation are obtained, we may solve for the fundamental parameters of equation (1). Our analysis thus far has suggested that these fundamental parameters may vary across cohorts and life stages. To examine that possibility, equation (4) was estimated four times, using the 1965-1973 and 1973-1982 panels for each cohort.[8]

As mentioned above, from an analytical perspective the main purpose of estimating equation (4) is to serve as a basis for deriving values for the fundamental parameters of equation (1). Consequently, we report the estimation of equation (4) in an Appendix and proceed here immediately to the derived estimates of the coefficients in equation (1). Those derived estimates, displayed in Table 9, are rich with substantive implications and deserve careful examination and comment.

With regard to the impact of voting experiences on subsequent partisan attachments, we find that in seven out of eight instances the estimated vote coefficient is larger for the younger group than for their parents, on occasion substantially so. Averaging across all elections, the estimated short-run (i.e., within one year) effect of a Republican presidential vote on an older voter was to move party identification .42 of a step nearer to the Republican end of the seven-step partisan continuum than would have occurred had no vote

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[7] The fraction attached to the coefficient α in equation (4) represents the summation

$$\sum_{k=0}^{l-1} \beta^k = \frac{1-\beta^l}{1-\beta}.$$

[8] Equation (4) was estimated by two-stage least squares, with instrumental variables being provided for the lagged dependent variables. For the filial respondents, their parents' reported party identifications in 1965 helped to provide a suitable instrument. For the parent cohort, we relied on their 1965 recollections of what their parents' party identifications were when the former were children. Past votes were also used in the instrumental variables equation.

One determinant of past votes is undoubtedly past partisanship, which, coupled with the prospect that the disturbance in the ID equation is autocorrelated, leads to the conclusion that prior votes are not strictly exogenous with respect to future party identification. The amount of bias introduced by these circumstances is probably small, however, owing to the fairly long lags that are involved.

Table 9. Estimated Effects of Prior Voting and Partisanship on Current Partisanship[a]

	Parents	Offspring
1982-1973 Waves		
Constant	.11	.19
Party ID_{t-1}	.97	.95
Republican Vote_{t-1} (1980)	.58	.63
Democratic Vote_{t-1} (1980)	−.16	−.68
Republican Vote_{t-1} (1976)	.35	.56
Democratic Vote_{t-1} (1976)	−.43	−.14
1973-1965 Waves		
Constant	.12	.36
Party ID_{t-1}	.97	.90
Republican Vote_{t-1} (1972)	.19	.59
Democratic Vote_{t-1} (1972)	−.36	−.90
Republican Vote_{t-1} (1968)	.55	.57
Democratic Vote_{t-1} (1968)	−.19	−.51

[a]Entries are estimated coefficients for equation (1) as based on 2SLS estimation of equation (4) (see Appendix).

been cast. The average short-run effect of a Democratic presidential vote on older voters was somewhat less—approximately .28 of a step toward the Democratic end. For the offspring, the average short-run impact of a Republican vote was approximately .60 units in the Republican direction, and a Democratic vote altered partisanship by an equal amount in the opposite direction. Thus the short-run effect of a switched vote (from Republican to Democratic or vice versa) was equal to .70 units on the seven-step partisan continuum for the parents and was 1.20 units (approximately 70% greater) for their offspring.

The size of the autoregressive parameter β determines the "memory" of the dynamic process of developing partisan attachments; that is, it governs the rate at which the effect of a vote on partisanship decays with the passage of time. As shown in Table 9, the one-year lag autoregressive coefficient, β, is valued at .95 to .97 for the parent cohort at both times and for the filial cohort after 1973 (when its members were in their late twenties). The corresponding estimate for the 1965-1973 filial equation is .90. Although this difference in one-year lag values seems small, the consequence is fairly important across longer time spans. With β equal to .97, nearly 90% ($.97^4$) of the initial impact of a presidential vote on partisanship is retained four years later, and 78% ($.97^8$) of the effect persists after eight years. In contrast, a β of .90 implies that only two-thirds ($.90^4 = .66$) of the initial impact remains after four years and less than half ($.90^8 = .43$) after eight years.

The comparatively larger autoregressive coefficient for the parental cohort, coupled with its generally smaller vote-impact coefficients (the γ_{t-l} and δ_{t-l}), makes for an interesting contrast between the attitudinal responses of younger and older voters to election-specific stimuli. For younger voters, the short-term effect of voting on partisanship is somewhat greater than for their elders, but that effect decays relatively more rapidly. By comparison, older voters' party attachments respond a bit more moderately and slowly to electoral forces: initial impact is relatively weaker but takes longer to decay.

In either case, the magnitude of the impact of electoral choice on party identification, either in the short or long run, should not be overstated. The analysis indicates that party identification generally responds sluggishly to electoral participation—at least within the context of elections such as those encompassed by our panel data. For example, simulations using the estimated partisan dyamics equation predict that voting for the same party in four successive presidential elections would move an independent only about a single category one way or the other, to leaning Democrat or leaning Republican. These fairly modest effects confirm those found elsewhere (Markus, 1983; Markus & Converse, 1979). The sensible conclusion is that although standing partisan ties are not entirely immune to short-term factors such as elections, neither are they likely to be altered appreciably by them except under unusual circumstances, particularly those occurring in early adulthood or continuing without interruption over a fairly long period of time.

The Electoral Choice Equation

The effects of a single electoral choice on standing partisan identifications may be fairly modest

Table 10. Logit Estimation of the Likelihood of Republican Voting, by Election and Generation

	Parents		Offspring	
		SE[a]		SE
1980				
Constant	−.05	.55	−1.04	.30
Dem. vote 1976	−1.86	.54	−.64	.26
Rep. vote 1976	.38	.59	.75	.30
Party ID 1973	.49	.06	.49	.06
% correctly predicted	82		74	
1976				
Constant	−3.33	.35	−2.09	.26
Dem. vote 1972	−.88	.42	−.65	.23
Rep. vote 1972	.83	.31	.33	.20
Party ID 1973	.67	.06	.48	.05
% correctly predicted	83		72	
1972				
Constant	.20	.31	−.03	.18
Dem. vote 1968	−1.54	.29	−1.31	.20
Rep. vote 1968	.74	.32	.99	.21
Party ID 1965	.32	.06	.13	.04
% correctly predicted	80		70	
1968				
Constant	−1.59	.35	−1.04	1.53
Dem. vote 1964	−.59	.06	−.48[b]	.14
Rep. vote 1964	1.20	.32	.48	.14
Party ID 1965	.66	.44	.43	.06
% correctly predicted	80		73	

[a] Estimated standard errors.

[b] Dem. vote 1964 and Rep. vote 1964 coefficients constrained to be of equal absolute magnitude because there are no nonvoters (preference poll).

in the short run, but if past research is any guide, the opposite link—from partisanship to the vote—is substantial. In the present study, the issue is not simply whether party identification influences the vote; it assuredly does. Our aim is to exploit panel data encompassing a fairly lengthy segment of adulthood to provide unambiguous evidence about patterns of development in the partisanship-vote nexus. Having panel data that capture a youthful cohort as it emerges from adolescence and assumes adult political roles is especially useful for investigating such patterns.

The relationship between current presidential vote, on the one hand, and party identification and voting in the previous presidential election, on the other, may be represented by the following equation:

$$L(V_{it}) = \alpha + \beta_1 R_{it-4} + \beta_2 D_{it-4} + \gamma ID_{it}. \qquad (5)$$

In equation (5), V_{it} is a binary variable coded 1 for individuals voting for the Republican presidential candidate at t and 0 for those casting Democratic presidential votes. To simplify estimation and interpretation of results, nonvoters and minor party voters at t are excluded from the analysis. Because V_{it} is binary and past votes are likely to matter more for weak identifiers and independents than for strong partisans, the equation is cast in a log-linear form, with $L(V_{it})$ representing the logarithm of the odds favoring a Republican presidential vote.

Estimation of equation (5) with the data at hand is problematical because we have not observed our samples in election years. We consequently cannot include ID_{it} in our estimating equation, but must rely instead on the most proximate prior reading of that variable. For the 1980 and 1976 elections, that is the 1973 observation; for the 1972 and 1968 contests, it is the 1965 measure. For comparative purposes we have two instances where there is a three-year lag between the partisanship measure and the dependent variable (1976 and 1968) and two instances of a seven-year lag (1980 and 1972).

The logit estimates for the vote equation are presented in Table 10. Because coefficients in a log-odds model do not have an intuitively straightforward interpretation, the estimated models have also been transformed into equations

Figure 3. Predicted Probability of a Republican Vote as a Function of Past Vote and Party Identification, by Election and Generation



for the probability of a Republican vote and are displayed graphically in Figure 3.

Whether one prefers the tabular or the graphical display, the analysis suggests some convergence between the parental and filial configurations of effects. Consider the partisanship-vote link. For 1968, the coefficient estimate for the parent sample is .66, whereas for their offspring it is .43. The difference between parental and filial coefficient values is somewhat less in 1972 and 1976, and by 1980 it has disappeared altogether.[9]

As shown in Table 10, we do not find any systematic pattern of intergenerational differences in the coefficients for the effects of past vote on present one. In most instances, the parental past vote coefficients are slightly larger than the corresponding values for the filial sample. Relative to the coefficient standard errors, though, the differences are generally not significant. To the extent that there is a discernible pattern, past voting influences current electoral choice more among the parents than among their offspring, even with party identification held constant. This result, taken together with the generally stronger party ties of the older cohort, makes parental voting more predictable than that of their offspring. The circle is thus closed: the younger voters have stabilized at an overall weaker level of partisanship than that of their elders, leading to more volatile electoral behavior which, in turn, fails to provide the consistent reinforcement needed to intensify preexisting partisan leanings.

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[9] Although the impact of partisan attachments on the vote has risen with time for the younger respondents, the stability in electoral choice has *not* increased for them because of the comparatively large numbers of independents and weakly identifying partisans within their cohort.

Figure 3 *(continued)*



Conclusions

Three waves of panel data spanning 17 years and two biological generations have permitted an unparalleled view of the evolution of party identification, vote choice, and the connections between the two. Several conclusions can be drawn from our analysis and interpretation of these data.

First, the widely held view that the distribution of party identification underwent substantial and enduring change around the mid-1960s, abetted by the entry of new cohorts into the electorate, received resounding support and further clarification. The high school class of 1965 was at the cutting edge of that movement; they began their adult political lives strikingly less committed to political parties than were their parents, and they have remained less committed for nearly two decades. This result is most sensibly interpreted as a generational distinction, one that arose from the unique sociopolitical milieu surrounding the Vietnam-era cohort's entry into adulthood and one that is likely to persist, although with diminishing sharpness, with the passsage of time. This interpretation is based on the results of the present study and also those of earlier examinations of the 1965-1973 panel data (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, chap. 11; Markus, 1979). Those earlier studies implicated the war in Southeast Asia and racial issues as important influences upon the partisan outlooks of the younger respondents, but not upon those of their parents.

The panel data also shed light on the long-term individual level stability of partisan attachments. Although the firming up of party identification over the long haul has been generally assumed, the timing and magnitudes involved had remained ambiguous and debatable. Our extended time frame showed that the party ties of younger respondents became dramatically more durable as the respondents' experiential base and (by implication) familiarity with partisan objects increased. When laid alongside the already steady partisan loyalties of their parents, the filial generation's gain in stability indicates that party identification remains fairly supple into the late twenties in the usual course of events but hardens considerably soon thereafter. The rapidity of this process, in keeping with classical theories of generational formation, facilitates the persistence of whatever differences may exist in the partisan complexions of successive cohorts.

Although we devoted our attention mainly to the dynamics of partisan orientations, the patterns of attitudinal consolidation and persistence found in that domain were reproduced in other political—and even nonpolitical—domains as well. In this regard, the dual presence of initial observations of one generation in its late teens and another in midlife proved extremely fortuitous. By combining the successive observations of each generation, we could virtually construct a synthetic chart of adult attitude evolution. Based on our preliminary analysis, it appears that the period between the mid-twenties and mid-thirties witnesses a surge in the crystallization of a variety of sociopolitical attitudes, not simply partisan ones. Consequently, the kinds of attitudes and values each cohort brings into that crucial stage are likely to define its outlooks for some time thereafter.

Another insight provided by our long-haul observations of two generations concerns the stability of voting preferences. In contrast to our findings with respect to attitudinal measures, comparisons of voting histories of the two cohorts did not demonstrate a pattern of increasing stability of partisan choice over time. Instead, when compared with their parents, younger voters remained less consistent party supporters.

To explain this result required an explicit consideration of the linkages between party identification and electoral choice. As a group, members of the younger cohort have stabilized at a level of partisan loyalty notably below that of their parents. This has led to more volatile voting among younger electors which, in turn has failed to provide the kind of consistent electoral reinforcement required to enhance preexisting attachments to political parties. Our examination of partisanship-vote linkages also substantiated the idea that party identification ordinarily responds sluggishly to election-specific events, at least those events that occurred within the 17-year period under study.

A final contribution derived from our long-term perspective refers to consequences for the American electoral system. That system has been long characterized by competition between two major political parties, each one backed by a fairly stable group of supporters within the voting public. For some time it has been remarked that this traditional system is being replaced by one much more fluid in nature. Our results offer some illustrations of these two systems. The traditional one is reflected faithfully in the partisan commitments of older voters, as exemplified by our parent sample. The emerging system is embodied in the attitudes of their biological successors, for whom a sense of partisan loyalty is markedly and, it appears, enduringly less profound. As younger cohorts of electors inevitably succeed older ones, the role of political parties in mass politics may be substantially redefined.

Appendix
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Equation (4)

	Parent	Offspring
1982-1973 Waves		
Constant	.83 (.22)[a]	1.38 (.19)
Party ID 1973	.73 (.05)	.62 (.05)
Vote		
Republican, 1980	.56 (.16)	.59 (.10)
Democratic, 1980	−.16 (.16)	−.64 (.12)
Republican, 1976	.30 (.20)	.43 (.13)
Democratic, 1976	−.36 (.18)	−.11 (.11)
R^2	.73[b]	.54
N	602	994
1973-1965 Waves		
Constant	.82 (.19)	2.06 (.14)
Party ID 1965	.76 (.05)	.44 (.03)
Vote		
Republican, 1972	.19 (.15)	.59 (.10)
Democratic, 1972	−.35 (.17)	−.90 (.11)
Republican, 1968	.48 (.16)	.38 (.10)
Democratic, 1968	−.17 (.16)	−.34 (.11)
R^2	.68	.45
N	636	1025

[a] Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

[b] R^2 values are the squared correlations of observed and predicted scores.

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Equality, Efficiency, and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy, 1934-1980

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Provision of schooling in the native language is an important regime policy that reflects a government's commitment to maintaining ethnic and linguistic diversity. This study tests hypotheses related to three principles that may have guided the use of non-Russian languages in Soviet schools: equality, efficiency, and political status. A newly generated set of data on the use of non-Russian languages in Soviet primary and secondary schools permits examination of aspects of Soviet language policy about which scholars previously lacked systematic information. The analysis does not support the interpretations suggested by others; official policy has neither shifted back and forth between a centrist and a peripheralist emphasis, moved inexorably in a russificationist direction, nor been absolutely egalitarian. Instead, the policy can be most appropriately described as a bilingual education policy that at the same time has long differentiated among the non-Russian nationalities on the basis of their population size, their geographic concentration, or their political status.

As both a means of communication and a symbol of identity with the past and future of a nation or an ethnic group, language can evoke strong popular feelings. For governments of multi-ethnic countries, language policy is potentially one of the most divisive public issues. The adoption of one or more state or official languages and the suppression or neglect of other languages can have a variety of purposes, such as promotion of national unity, dominance by particular ethnic or cultural groups, or development of an efficient common medium of mass communications (Fishman, 1968). Whatever the goals or the probability of their attainment, granting or denying official status to a particular language is commonly regarded as a measure of the government's commitment to the survival of that language's bearers as a distinct ethnic group.

Perhaps more than any other aspect of language policy, provision of formal education in a child's native language reflects a government's commitment to the maintenance of distinct ethnic identities. As Knappert (1968, p. 63) has written, "The language of the school is the language of the future." Although the Soviet Union has had longer and more extensive experience with bilingual education than any other country in the world, this experience has been little studied in the West. Even the large English-language literature devoted to Soviet education, including the special literature that appeared in the immediate post-Sputnik period, has given scant attention to education in languages other than Russian. One reason Western scholars have paid so little attention to education in the non-Russian languages is the lack of systematic and comprehensive data on such education.

We have developed a new set of data on the trends in schooling in the non-Russian languages from 1934 to 1980. These data indicate whether or not non-Russian languages were used at various levels in the Soviet primary and secondary schools. The data also allow us to examine factors that can account for differences in the treatment of the non-Russian languages.

Most Western scholars have viewed Soviet education policy as supporting a single-minded course toward russification of non-Russian children. Our data suggest that this view does not accurately portray Soviet school-language policy. At the same time, Soviet official doctrine as embodied in such documents as the USSR Constitutions and the Party programs has consistently maintained

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that all languages are accorded equal rights. Our data suggest that this view, too, does not accurately describe actual school-language policy.

Although Soviet authorities have not described the actual decision rules that have guided central policy regarding native-language schooling, we have adduced from the Soviet literature three principles that might have guided the provision of native-language schooling: equality, efficiency, and political status. We test hypotheses implied by each of the principles in order to determine how well each decision rule can account empirically for the treatment of the non-Russian languages over time.

Background

Ethnic Diversity of the USSR

In 1979, the Soviet population numbered 262 million, only 52% of whom were ethnic Russians. Twenty-two ethnic groups had a population of at least one million (USSR, Ts.S.U., 1980). Approximately 90 ethnic groups, which, following Soviet practice, we refer to as nationalities, are officially designated as indigenous to the USSR.[1]

The Soviet state is federal in form, with the primary territorial divisions representing the official territories of particular nationalities, as is reflected in the territorial names. More than 50 ethnic groups are recognized as the titular nationalities of administrative-territorial units in the federal state structure. There are 15 soviet socialist republics (SSRs), also called union republics, that are the official homelands of nationalities such as the Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Armenians, and Latvians. Below the level of union republic there are 20 autonomous soviet socialist republics (ASSRs), also called autonomous republics. Autonomous republics are all located within and are administratively subordinate to the union republics. Sixteen are located within the Russian Republic (RSFSR). At the next lower level, there are eight autonomous provinces (*avtonomnye oblasti*) or AOs, six of which are in the RSFSR. There are ten autonomous districts (*avtonomnye okrugi*) or ADs, all of which are located in the RSFSR.

Almost every one of the 90 indigenous ethnic groups has its own traditional language. The languages of the Soviet nationalities are extremely diverse, coming from five main genetic language families (Indo-European, Uralic, Altaic, Caucasian, and Paleoasiatic) and numerous subgroups within those families (Comrie, 1981).

Development of Soviet Language Policy

Official Soviet policy has long balanced a concern for extending the role of the Russian language with a reluctance to stir up nationalist resentments. In addition, language is usually cited by Soviet theorists on nationality relations as the best example of what is meant by national form in the slogan describing non-Russian cultures in the USSR as "socialist in essence and national in form." Both for these reasons and as a mechanism of mobilizing support by non-Russians for the new regime, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s the Party pursued a policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) that included recruitment of local government leaders and of Party members from the non-Russian (local) populations and promotion of the local languages in schools and in government administration (Fainsod, 1963, pp. 362-363).

After the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet government embarked on a massive program to provide secular schools to the non-Russian nationalities, with their languages serving as languages of instruction. A special section of the Commissariat of Enlightenment responsible for developing schools using the non-Russian languages was established by decree of the Council of People's Commissars on October 31, 1918 (USSR, Sovnarkom, 1973, p. 145).

In the 1920s and 1930s, non-Russian (national) schools flourished in the larger- and medium-sized republics and provinces. By the middle of the 1930s, native-language schools were operating in all regions of the country, and in 1934 textbooks were printed in 104 languages (Sovetkin, 1958, p. 11).

During the 1920s, the Soviet government Latinized the existing scripts of all indigenous languages with the exception of the three major Slavic languages (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian), which continued to use Cyrillic scripts, and of Armenian and Georgian, which used their distinctive long-established non-Latin-based scripts.[2] In the mid-1920s, the government also adopted a policy of creating Latin-based scripts for the previously scriptless (*bespis'mennye*) languages of almost 30 small ethnic groups (Iakovlev, 1931).

Promoting the Latin script rather than the Cyrillic script as the "new alphabet" in the 1920s was one way in which the new communist regime sought to distinguish its nationality policy from the russificationist policy of the Tsars. Until 1936, when the Communist Party Central Committee criticized those responsible for the Latinization of alphabets for making this policy an absolute, proposals to create or to preserve Russian-based alphabets could be resisted and effectively criticized as reflecting "great Russian chauvinism" or an "old russificationist policy" (Kreindler, 1982, p. 8; Zak & Isaev, 1966, pp. 11-12).

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[1] We adopt the classification of nationalities as foreign or indigenous used in recent Soviet censuses.

[2] For a description of the development of Soviet language policy, see Comrie (1981) and Conquest (1967).

By the late 1930s a campaign was begun to teach Russian language in schools, and the alphabets of most non-Russian languages were shifted from a Latin to a Cyrillic script to facilitate this process. The Cyrillicization of scripts was justified as facilitating the learning of Russian as a second language by people whose native language was not Russian. This new emphasis on the learning of Russian was strengthened by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on March 13, 1938, "On the Obligatory Study of Russian Language in Schools in the National Republics and Provinces," which made the study of Russian mandatory in all non-Russian schools.

The next significant legislative change in the role of different languages in the Soviet schools was the Education Law of 1959, which introduced the idea of "voluntary choice" in both the language of instruction (the primary medium of instruction) and the study of other languages as subjects (Bilinsky, 1962, 1968). Although the 1959 law may appear to have eliminated the obligatory study of Russian language, in practice it apparently provided a form of democratic legitimation for reductions in the provision of native-language schooling through the exercise of "free choice" by the parents of non-Russian children. After the 1959 legislation, there were apparently widespread and substantial reductions in the use of non-Russian languages as media of instruction in schools (Silver, 1974).

Since the late 1970s, there has been a special campaign, supported by new legislation, to increase the quantity and to improve the quality of Russian language instruction among non-Russians (Feshbach, 1981; Kreindler, 1982; Solchanyk, 1982). Some Western scholars maintain that this recent effort, along with the major legislative steps taken in 1938 and 1959, demonstrates that the long-term goal of Soviet language and nationalities policy has been the elimination of the use of the non-Russian languages (e.g., Carrere d'Encausse, 1980; Conquest, 1967; Kreindler, 1982; Solchanyk, 1982).

A key problem with this line of reasoning is that it ignores the fact that Soviet nationalities policy, as expressed both in formal doctrine and in actual administrative practice, has always displayed significant tendencies that run counter to a policy of russification. For example, even the Third Party Program of 1961, which is often cited as providing doctrinal legitimation for an accelerated effort to bring about the *sliianie* (blending) of nationalities, did not use the term *sliianie* at all. Although the Program stated that ethnic distinctions will eventually disappear and a single *lingua franca* will be adopted by all nationalities, it also stated that "the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially of language distinctions, is a considerably more drawn-out process than the obliteration of class distinctions" (USSR, CPSU, 1962).

Many scholars assume, or at least give the impression, that whenever there has been an increase in the study of Russian in the non-Russian schools, there has been a commensurate decrease in the study of the group's non-Russian language. A policy of bilingualism may thereby be misinterpreted to be a policy of eliminating the non-Russian languages. Although making Russian a mandatory subject of study may have promoted not only bilingualism but also loss of the mother tongue, the actual impact of this policy cannot be understood without an understanding of the roles of both Russian and the traditional (non-Russian) languages in the school curriculum of non-Russian children.

Unfortunately, the published evidence on the status of particular non-Russian languages in the schools over time is scattered and incomplete. We have systematic, although incomplete, evidence only for 1940, 1958, and 1972. In the late 1950s, Sovetkin (1958, p. 23) provided clearcut evidence that there was a hierarchy of educational opportunities in the native language for members of different nationalities in the RSFSR. Some non-Russian nationalities had native-language schools available through complete secondary school (ten years). Others had such schools available only through a maximum of 7, 4, 2, or fewer years. According to Sovetkin, the number of years of native-language schooling available to the different nationalities was essentially established by the 1931-1932 school year. In addition, a monograph published in 1948 by the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR reported that in 1940, except for some small ethnic groups in Siberia, all non-Russian nationalities in the RSFSR had primary schools (classes 1-4) in the native language. But the "incomplete secondary school" classes (5-7) and "complete secondary school" classes (5-10) "for the most part . . . were still not indigenized" (Konstantinov & Medynskii, 1948, pp. 301, 310). In 1940, the incomplete secondary schools were nativized in only eleven languages. The "complete secondary schools" (10-year schools) were nativized in only two languages. Finally, the Minister of Education of the RSFSR published an article concerning non-Russian schooling in 1972 which presented figures that, when contrasted with those reported for 1940 and 1958, showed that the status of the languages of nationalities indigenous to the RSFSR was deteriorating (Danilov, 1972; Silver, 1974).

Although these three sources provide helpful information, published sources can provide the basis of a comprehensive account of the languages used in the RSFSR only for 1940, 1958, and 1972, and not for other years or for schools outside the RSFSR; nor do the sources provide information on the rationale for a differentiated treatment of the non-Russian languages. Nonetheless, this evidence is helpful in indicating that a very large number of non-Russian languages have been used as languages of instruction in Soviet schools and also that Soviet school-language policy has long been a highly differentiated one.

Decision Rules in the Allocation of Native-Language Schools

The actual administrative rules guiding whether or not native-language schools were to be set up and at what grade levels (and in which subjects) in the curriculum a given language might be used, have seldom been discussed publicly by Soviet officials.

In 1918 a rule was introduced by the Council of People's Commissars that called for the establishment of native-language schools for national minorities whenever there were at least 25 pupils at a given grade level who spoke that language (USSR, Sovnarkom, 1973). Although this rule may explain the liberal development of the national schools in the 1920s, the administrative rules operative in more recent years are less clear. In fact, a rarely cited portion of the March 13, 1938, decree making study of the Russian language mandatory in schools, states that:

> The native language is the basis of instruction in schools of the national republics and provinces, that exceptions from this rule occurring in some autonomous republics of the RSFSR can have only a temporary character, that the tendency to convert the Russian language from a subject of study of a language of instruction while at the same time infringing on the native language, is harmful and incorrect (cited in Sovetkin, 1958, p. 15).

Occasionally, Soviet writers on language planning use verbal formulas that have the tone of administrative decision-making rules. For example, after explaining how parents in a multinational setting might exercise their freedom of choice concerning the language of schooling for their children, Khanazarov (1963, p. 173) states:

> Here we speak not of regions of compact settlement of a single nationality in other republics. In such regions the question of language of instruction is resolved simply. Here national schools operate in which instruction is conducted in the language of a compactly settled monolingual population (*kompaktno zhivushchego odnoiazychnogo naseleniia*) or in some other language according to the parents' wishes.

Based on writings by Soviet scholars, we propose three decision rules or principles that might describe the actual policy on native-language schooling at various dates.

The Equality Principle

The dominant theme in official Soviet doctrine concerning the non-Russian languages has been that each nationality is free to use its traditional language. Article 121 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR guaranteed citizens the right to instruction in schools in their native language. Article 36 of the 1977 Constitution assures citizens "the opportunity to use the mother tongue and languages of other peoples of the USSR." Article 45 assures citizens "the opportunity for school instruction in their native language." We call this basic official doctrine the equality principle.

Strictly speaking, the equality principle has not been followed, since in official practice Russian is clearly preeminent among the languages of the USSR. Russian has been described in numerous official speeches, documents, and scholarly writings as unique among Soviet languages. Since the adoption of the Third Party Program in 1961, Russian often has been referred to as the "internationality language of discourse" (*mezhnatsional'nyi iazyk obshcheniia*) of the peoples of the USSR.

In view of the special role of Russian, instead of applying an absolute equality standard to Soviet school-language policy, we define a modified egalitarian standard along two dimensions: the greater the number of nationalities that are provided with some form of native-language instruction, the more egalitarian is school-language policy, and the greater the number of school years (the higher the class level) in which the non-Russian languages are used either as the primary medium of instruction or as a separate subject of instruction, the more egalitarian the policy.

The Efficiency Principle

A second principle that might explain use of non-Russian languages in schools is the principle of economic efficiency. The efficiency argument has two aspects. From the perspective of the child or the child's parents, it is an inefficient investment of personal resources to study in a language that has limited utility in the job market or that cannot offer a full range of cultural opportunities. From the perspective of the state, it is inefficient to expend substantial resources to develop the capacity to teach in languages that are used by only a small number of persons and thus can play only a limited role in the modern economy, in science and technology, and in disseminating the cultural achievements of the society as a whole.

Soviet scholars frequently offer arguments consistent with the efficiency principle to explain why the Russian language is the preferred *lingua franca* of Soviet nationalities and why the smaller nationalities often have limited opportunities for native-language schooling. For example, after explaining that in the early 1930s instruction was organized in the languages of many small ethnic groups, Khanazarov (1977, p. 133) writes:

> Further development of school affairs made plain to the smaller peoples, nationalities, and ethnic groups the inexpediency (*netselesoobraznost'*) and practical unwarrantedness (*neopravdannost'*) of the splintering of schools and instructional classes by language of instruction. Parents became convinced in practice of the unprofitability (*nevygodnost'*) of instructing their children in languages that are not widely used. In those languages there is an extremely small number of speakers, which greatly lowers the pay-off of the education received.

Others state that there is no contradiction between the principles of equality and efficiency. For example, Tsamerian (1973, pp. 241-242) writes:

> In our country all languages are equal under the law and develop freely. This is well known to everyone. But on the basis of this could one assert that all languages of the peoples of the USSR (including even language-dialects, which are spoken by only a few thousand or hundred people) have identical possibilities, fulfill identical functions in the development of culture in general, and of art and literature in particular? . . . Speaking of the equal rights of languages, it is impossible also to forget about the objective functional possibilities of each language.

On the basis of the Soviet literature, we propose two efficiency hypotheses. First, the larger the population size of a group, the greater the likelihood that its traditional language will be used either as the medium of instruction or as a separate subject of study in schools or both, and the higher the class level in which the language will be used. Second, native-language schooling will be more likely to be provided if a large number of group members are compactly settled than if they are not.

The Political Principle

In its broadest application, the political principle would determine opportunities for native-language schooling according to the roles assigned to the nationalities by the country's top political leaders. For example, Armstrong (1968) has constructed a model of Soviet nationalities policy that assigns specific roles to ethnic groups based on the groups' potential utility in realizing the goals of the top Communist Party leaders.

The establishment of the USSR as a federal system may be viewed as a pragmatic concession by the Bolshevik Party to the non-Russian nationalities as part of an effort to consolidate control in the non-Russian regions. The initial reasons for the organization of the USSR into a federal system were the subject of an extended scholarly debate in the USSR during the 1960s (Hodnett, 1967). However, formal recognition of a nationality's territoriality probably reflected some willingness to make concessions in the cultural sphere, especially the possibility of using the group's traditional language in schools, mass media, and governmental affairs.

We use the status of a nationality in the territorial-administrative hierarchy of the Soviet Union as an indicator of its political status. Thus, nationalities with titular areas that are union republics are assumed to have a higher political status than those whose titular areas are autonomous republics. Autonomous republic nationalities are assumed to have higher status than autonomous province nationalities, which in turn rank higher than autonomous district nationalities. All nationalities with formal status rank higher than those without any formal territorial status in the federal system.

Official recognition of nationalities is shown in other ways besides formal territorial status. For example, official disfavor was shown for those nationalities that were forcibly moved from their official homelands during World War II because of their alleged collaboration with the Nazi invaders (Conquest, 1970; Nekrich, 1978; Wimbush & Wixman, 1975). All the so-called deported nationalities lost native-language schooling from the date of their deportation in 1943-1944. After their political rehabilitation in the late 1950s, native-language schooling was restored for most of these groups. But formal territorial status does not mirror perfectly the current attitude of the Party leaders toward a particular nationality; for example, although Jews are an AO-level group, and although there were native-language schools in Yiddish, Tat, and Bukharan Jewish until the late 1930s, Soviet Jewish groups have not been provided with native-language schools since World War II.

The formal administrative-territorial status of a group is an unambiguous, official, centrally determined, and highly stable characteristic of a nationality. If formal status in the federal system can be shown to be systematically and strongly related to school-language policy, then this policy can be said, on the whole, not to be idiosyncratic or geared to the peculiarities of each separate nationality.

We therefore hypothesize that the higher the formal political status accorded a nationality in the federal structure, the more likely the nationality is to receive some native-language schooling and the higher the grade level in which that group's traditional language can be used either as the primary medium of instruction in the schools or as a separate subject of study.

Determining the Status of Non-Russian Schools

In addition to the three sources mentioned earlier, we have two other sources of systematic information about native-language schooling: curricula and bibliographies of school textbook publication.

School Curriculum Plans

For some years and regions, we have curriculum plans that list the number of hours in the school program mandated for particular subjects of study (e.g., USSR, Minpros, 1976, 1979, 1980). These reports describe the different curriculum plans for the non-Russian (national) and Russian schools, and they demonstrate the recent increase in the number of hours mandated for Russian-language study in the non-Russian schools.

In addition, these published reports show that, at least in recent years, in the non-Russian republics and provinces there have been three main types of primary and secondary general educational schools:

1) Russian schools where Russian is the primary medium of instruction and where the local languages are not studied. We call these *Russian schools Type 1.*

2) Russian schools where Russian is the primary medium of instruction, ut where the language of a non-Russian nationality is studied as a separate subject. These are officially called "russian schools where the language of a republic, autonomous province or autonomous region nationality is studied as a separate subject according to parents' wishes." (Sometimes they are also referred to as "national schools with Russian as the language of instruction.") We call these *Russian schools Type 2.*

3) Non-Russian (national) schools, where one or more non-Russian language serves as the principal medium of instruction for almost all subjects (except Russian and foreign languages), and where Russian language and literature are studied only as separate subjects. We call these *Type 3 schools.*

Western scholars often assume that there is only one kind of Russian school in the Soviet Union, in which the entire curriculum is taught in Russian and members of non-Russian nationalities study alongside Russian children.[3] These model curricula show that there is more than one kind of "Russian school" and that some native-language schooling is available in the Type 2 Russian schools.

Kashin and Chekharin (1970, p. 108) attribute the appearance of "national schools with Russian language of instruction from the first class" in the RSFSR to the 1959 Soviet education law. We think this form of school is a consequence of the provision of the 1959 law that gave parents the formal right to choose the language of instruction for their children, as well as to decide whether children in Russian-language schools would study their native language as a subject (Bilinsky, 1962).

Textbook Publication

Although the model school curricula are useful, we do not have them for all years or for all groups, and we know that the plans described in the model curricula have not been followed for some groups to whom they ostensibly apply. Therefore, we also use data on textbook publication by language to construct a consistent, systematic set of data reflecting school-language policy toward a large number of nationalities over a long period of time. The data and the methods of developing them have not been described before.

The All-Union Book Chamber (*Vsesoiuznaia knizhnaia palata*) publishes *Knizhnaia letopis' (Chronicle of Books)* weekly and *Ezhegodnik knigi SSSR (Book Annual of the USSR)* annually, which report data on virtually all books, including school textbooks, published in the Soviet Union. The All-Union Book Chamber only began to report information on books published outside the Russian Republic in 1934; before that, even for the RSFSR, the Central Book Chamber of the RSFSR did not identify books by language. Thus we depict the status of native-language schooling from 1934 through 1980; we used both *Knizhnaia letopis'* and *Ezhegodnik knigi* for information about the languages in which school textbooks were published for mathematics, natural science, language, and literature.

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[3] Kreindler (1982) notes that there are Type 2 Russian schools in the Tatar ASSR, but she does not comment on their more general existence.

We assume that the use of a given non-Russian language in math or science textbooks is a good indicator that the language is the primary medium of instruction for at least some schools, because if these subjects are taught in a given non-Russian language it is reasonable to infer that most other subjects are also taught in that language. Accordingly, for each year between 1934 and 1980 we code the highest class level for which any math or natural science textbook was published in a given language.

If only one or two subjects are taught in a group's traditional language, they are likely to include a course on the group's language or literature. We assume that publication of such textbooks indicates that at least the language was studied in some schools; therefore, we also coded the highest class level for which any language or literature textbook was published in each non-Russian language. Since the language may well have been used in other subjects as well as in language or literature, this measure indicates the minimum use of the language in schools.

In a few cases, we found that math or science textbooks in a given language were available for a higher class level than language or literature textbooks. To take this apparent anomaly into account, we used the higher of the figures for math-science or language-literature textbooks published in that language as our operational measure of the highest class level in which the language was employed in at least one subject.

We coded this information for 101 ethnic groups, 81 of which are considered officially to be indigenous to the Soviet Union (see Table A1). The technical appendix presents details concerning the coding procedures and case selection.

The Locus of Decision Making

Because our data do not reflect the proportion of children from each nationality who actually obtained schooling in their group's traditional language, we do not address the question of the distribution of children among Type 1 and Type 2 Russian schools or Type 3 national schools. Such information would be useful, and in the absence of systematic official data, this distribution might be estimated from information in *Knizhnaia letopis'* on the size of the press run, the *tirazh,* of school textbooks by subject in different languages. Although use of the *tirazh* information for this purpose is neither simple nor straightforward, we hope to use it in future research.

Data on the highest class level in which different languages are used are important in their own right. Children who find that they cannot complete secondary or even primary school without studying most, and perhaps all, subjects in a language other than their own nationality's traditional language, are likely to view their language, and perhaps their nationality, as lacking a future. The use or lack of use of the native language in school can convey a powerful message.

The class levels and subjects for which particular languages are to be used are likely to be determined by the central authorities rather than by local school officials. USSR and republic ministries of education are responsible for the preparation and allocation of educational resources, including teachers and textbooks. This is a probable legacy of the centralization of control over curricula, textbook publication, and overall educational administration during the early 1930s (Fitzpatrick, 1979).

Translating, printing, and distributing school textbooks in each subject and training individuals to teach these subjects in various languages involves major long-term financial commitments that are likely to be determined centrally. In any given year and for any given subject, class level, and language, there is usually only a single title printed. Therefore, the highest class levels for which textbooks have been published in each language probably reflect a commitment by central political authorities concerning the amount of official support to provide for each language.

At the same time, since the 1959 Soviet education law was enacted, many references have appeared in the Soviet educational literature to the importance of taking local conditions, such as parental wishes and the extent of bilingualism among the children, into account when determining the language of instruction. In many cases, however, the real choice offered to parents may not be "In what language should your child study?" but rather "What type of school should your child attend?" A leading Soviet critic of some of the policies and practices used in Soviet language planning has noted that education workers often present the choice to parents incorrectly (Avrorin, 1972, pp. 56-57):

> Instead of asking about the desired language of instruction [education workers] usually ask: "Do you want your children to know Russian?" Having received a positive response, and in the overwhelming majority of cases it naturally would be a positive one, the questioner concludes the conversation: "This means that you want your children to attend a Russian school." But in fact this conclusion, from the standpoint of elementary logic, cannot withstand any kind of criticism. It would be correct only in the situation when it was known in advance that the children already had a satisfactory command of Russian before entering school.

References to mistakes by local school administrators who pushed non-Russian children who were inadequately prepared into either the Type 1 or Type 2 Russian schools are quite common (e.g., Avrorin, 1972, p. 56; Desheriev, 1968, pp. 60-61; Kirdiashkin, 1973, pp. 77-79; Tsydypov, 1965, p. 170). For example, after describing in detail the procedures for choosing the correct language of instruction in a district, Kirdiashkin (1973, pp. 77-79) explains what happened in the Mordvinian ASSR in 1969-1971:

> The process of transition of Mordvinian primary schools to Russian language of instruction began in 1959.
>
> The Minister of Enlightenment of the RSFSR developed and distributed to the locales three curricula: the curriculum of the Russian school, the (unified) curriculum plan of the national school, and the curriculum of the 1-8th classes of Russian schools where pupils according to the parents' wishes study the language of the basic nationality.
>
> Rybkinskaia secondary school of Kobylkinskii district is Mordvinian. In the 1969-1970 school year it worked according to the curriculum of the Russian school, with children not studying the native language. Upon checking, it became apparent that the children had low achievement (*uspevaemost'*) in the Russian language. The director of the school [in explaining] the unsatisfactory knowledge of Russian among the pupils, stated: "Our school is national, children have weak command of Russian speech. We work according to the curriculum of the Russian school, but this is difficult for the children." In the 1970-1971 school year, the Rybkinskaia secondary school went over to the curriculum of the national school, but the earlier error in choice of curricula is reflected to this day in the quality of knowledge of the children.

This example illustrates the tension created by the 1959 education law between the long-term commitment to central planning of education and the simultaneous commitment to local decision making that is supposed to take local conditions into account. These tensions and problems in policy implementation are likely to occur when a centralized effort is made to shift the medium of instruction from a non-Russian language to Russian, especially when the necessary conditions for an effective shift are missing.

Trends in Native-Language Schooling

Egalitarian Hypothesis

There has been a strong egalitarian element in Soviet school-language policy; 83 of the 101 nationalities included in the data set had schooling where the group's own language was used at least as a subject of study at the level of class I or beyond during at least one year between 1934 and 1980.

Thirteen of the 18 nationalities that did not have any native-language schooling during this period were classified in the 1926 Soviet census as not having a literary language.[4] All of them have small populations and reside in either the Soviet Far North or the Caucasus. Twenty-one nationalities that officially lacked a literary language in 1926 received some native-language schooling between 1934 and 1980.

The presence of non-indigenous (foreign) nationalities in the data set presents an analytic problem because, in light of practice in most countries, it is not reasonable to expect the Soviet government to provide native-language schooling for many foreign groups. Even so, native-language schooling has been provided during some years to members of such foreign nationalities as the Poles, Uighurs, Hungarians, Czechs, Kurds, Assyrians, Chinese, and Koreans.

We concentrate in the remainder of the analysis on the nationalities that are indigenous to the USSR, because it is for these groups, more than for foreign groups, that the logic of Soviet language policy should be examined. We use the official Soviet definition of indigenous groups as used in recent census reports. (See Table A1.)

If we exclude the 20 foreign nationalities, 81 indigenous groups remain, 67 of which (83%) had schooling in which their group's traditional language was used at least as a subject through at least the first class for at least one year between 1934 and 1980. Judging by our data on publication of math or science textbooks, these same 67 nationalities also had schooling at some time in which their group's traditional language was the primary medium of instruction.

Although impressive, these figures give a superficial picture because they answer only a simple question: Between 1934 and 1980, how many nationalities ever had schooling in which their group's traditional language was used as the medium of instruction or as a subject of study at any class level? It is also important to know how the availability of native-language schooling has changed over time, and whether, on average, the class levels for which native-language schooling has been provided have followed any trend.

To answer these additional questions, we broke the 47-year time series into nine periods, for each of which (and also for the entire 1934-1980 time span) we calculated the number of indigenous nationalities that had schools in which math or science textbooks (abbreviated as M) used the group's traditional language, an indication that the group's language was the primary medium of instruction. We also calculated the number of nationalities that had schools where language or literature textbooks (abbreviated as L) used the traditional language, and those where the group's traditional language was used in either math-science or language-literature (abbreviated as H—higher of M or L).

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[4] They were Aleuts, Itel'mens, Ket, Iukagirs, Orochi, Oroki, Ul'chi, Dolgans, Tofa, Moslem Tats, Udins, Aguls, and Rutuls.

The results of these calculations, given in Table 1, show that the heyday of non-Russian schools was before World War II. During the 1934-1940 period, 64 nationalities had schools in which math-science was taught in their traditional language, and 65 had schools where instruction in language-literature was given in that language. The number of nationalities with schools where math-science (M) was taught in their traditional language has declined substantially since 1934-1940. There were approximately 50 such languages between 1946 and 1965; after that, the number dropped in each succeeding period and reached a low of 35 in the 1976-1980 period, just over half the prewar number.

The pattern of use of the non-Russian languages as subjects of study is very different. In every period since 1945, about 53 nationalities have had schools where their group's language was at least a subject of study (H), about 82% of the prewar number. However, the disappearance of schools in which the non-Russian language is the primary medium of instruction indicates that increasingly over time the Type 3 (national) schools have been replaced by Type 2 Russian schools.

We also want to know the highest class level for which native-language schooling was available. In Table 2, we examine the class levels for all groups that had native-language schooling at some time, i.e., the 67 groups from the last row of Table 1. For each period, for the 67 indigenous groups that ever had some native-language schooling, we computed an average of the highest grade in which science or math textbooks were published (M). We also computed the average of the highest grade in which either math-science or language-literature textbooks were published (H). In Tables 2-5, preschool texts are coded as .5 years to take some account of the difference between preschool native-language schooling and no native-language schooling.

Table 2 shows that of those indigenous nationalities that ever had traditional-language schooling, the average maximum class level in which the group's language was available as the primary medium of instruction (M) declined from 5.48 years in the 1934-1940 period to 3.21 in 1976-1980. A substantial drop in the average occurred during World War II, probably as a result of disruptions in the production of textbooks and in the operation of Soviet schools during those years. After World War II, the level rebounded, although it never regained the prewar level. The average has declined steadily in each period since 1951-1955.

In contrast, non-Russian languages have been

Table 1. Number of Indigenous Non-Russian Nationalities that Had Native-Language Schooling (N=81)

Type of Schooling	Number with Group's Language Used to Teach Math-Science (M)	Number with Group's Language Used to Teach Lang.-Literature (L)	Number with Group's Language Used for EITHER Math-Science or Lang.-Literature (H)
Period			
1934-1940	64	65	65
1941-1945	49	44	51
1946-1950	50	51	52
1951-1955	50	49	51
1956-1960	52	55	55
1961-1965	47	52	52
1966-1970	39	49	49
1971-1975	36	53	53
1976-1980	35	53	53
Ever 1934-1980	67	67	67

Note: In this table, a nationality is considered to have native-language schooling only if there was a textbook in the group's traditional language for the first class or higher; preschool texts alone do not qualify a group for inclusion.

Table 2. Mean Highest Grade of Native-Language Schooling among Indigenous Nationalities that Ever Had Such Schooling (N=67)[a]

Type of Schooling	(M) Group's Language Used in Math-Sci. (Mean)	(L) Group's Language Used in Lang.-Lit. (Mean)	(H) Group's Language Used in EITHER Math-Sci. or Lang.-Lit. (Mean)
Period			
1934-1940	5.48	5.38	5.94
1941-1945	4.10	4.10	4.66
1946-1950	4.74	5.14	5.50
1951-1955	4.92	5.29	5.48
1956-1960	4.57	6.18	6.21
1961-1965	4.26	6.35	6.36
1966-1970	3.63	6.22	6.23
1971-1975	3.43	6.85	6.85
1976-1980	3.21	6.93	6.93

[a] Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Tuvinians are excluded from calculations for 1934-1940 but included for other periods.

Table 3. Proportion of Variance in School-Language Policy Explained by Population, for Indigenous Nationalities by Period

	1934-1940	1941-1945	1946-1950	1951 1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980
A. Math-Science Schooling (M) (r^2)									
1926	.841	.760	.618	.615	.642	.612	.557	.530	.503
(N)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)	(77)
1959	.808	.766	.634	.623	.676	.843	.582	.560	.540
(N)	(77)	(77)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)
TER59	.692	.757	.654	.629	.762	.740	.702	.687	.666
(N)	(43)	(43)	(47)	(47)	(47)	(47)	(47)	(47)	(47)
B. Higher of Math-Science or Language-Literature Schooling (H) (r^2)									
1926	.830	.778	.602	.593	.626	.578	.613	.582	.557
1959	.801	.785	.626	.605	.677	.664	.646	.608	.607
TER59	.650	.785	.588	.548	.634	.618	.599	.508	.486

The table cells are coefficients of determination (r^2) between the population measure in either 1926 or 1959 and the given type of native-language schooling in each period: March-or-Science and Higher of Math-Science or Language-Literature.

TER59 is the natural logarithm of the number of people living in their titular area in 1959, for those groups having titular areas in 1959. Where nationalities were titular or co-titular for more than one territory (Buriats, Ossetians, and Nenets), the figures represent the total population of that nationality living in all titular areas of that group.

increasingly available at least as a subject of study (H). The average maximum class level in which the group's language was available at least as a subject of study has risen since World War II; by 1956-1960, the level exceeded that achieved in 1934-1940 (6.21 vs. 5.94), and by 1976-1980, it reached 6.93 years.

To summarize, at the same time that availability of some instruction in the non-Russian languages has increased, there has been substantial erosion in the use of the non-Russian languages as the primary medium of instruction in the schools. It would appear that the non-Russian languages are increasingly being reduced to use as a subject of study in Russian-language schools—the Type 2 Russian schools. But there is substantial intergroup variation in the extent to which this is taking place, and obviously, an equality principle cannot explain this differential treatment. We therefore turn to the evidence for the operation of the efficiency principle and the political principle.

The Efficiency Hypothesis

One indicator of the efficiency of providing native-language schooling to a given nationality is the size of its population. In addition, the more members of a nationality who live close to each other, the more efficient it is to provide schools in that group's traditional language. Although our current data do not allow us to test the effects of residential concentration in cities and rural districts, where central policies are implemented in native-language schooling, we attempt to measure the effects of geographic concentration on the availability of native-language schooling. Geographic concentration is expressed here as the number of members of each nationality who resided in that nationality's titular area (republic, province, or district) in 1959.

If the efficiency principle is the basis for deciding which nationalities were provided with native-language schooling, the larger the group's population, and the more members of the given nationality who reside in the group's titular area, the higher the class level for which traditional-language schooling in that group's traditional language will be available. Accordingly, we calculated Pearson correlation coefficients in turn between a) the natural log of the group's 1926 population size, the natural log of the group's 1959 population size, and the natural log of the number of group membes in 1959 living in the group's titular area, and b) the two basic native-language school policy measures at various dates for the indigenous nationalities.[5] We use the natural logarithm of population because the distributions of the population size variables are highly skewed.

Panel A of Table 3 shows the coefficient of determination (r^2) between the measures of 1926 and 1959 population size and the highest school class in which the group's traditional language was used to teach math-science (M). Panel B presents the analogous coefficients between population size and the extent to which the group's traditional language was used at least as a subject of study (H). In each panel, the first two rows of figures use the entire population of the nationality in the USSR in 1926 and 1959, while the third row uses the population of the nationality in 1959 living in its own titular republic, province, or district, if it had one. We show the coefficient of determination rather than the Pearson correlation coefficient in order to make Table 3 more comparable with the proportion of variance explained (R^2) in Tables 4 and 5. All of the correlation coefficients were positive, as expected.

Using either the 1926 or the 1959 population of the nationality, more than 80% of the 1934-1940 variance in each measure of native-language schooling can be accounted for by population size. The explanatory power of population size is nearly as great for the 1941-1945 period. These large proportions of explained variance indicate that during the heyday of the national schools, the provision of native-language schooling was highly consistent with an efficiency principle.

Over time, the correlation between the 1926 population variable and both native-language schooling variables remains fairly strong but gradually weakens. For the math-science schooling variable (M), the r^2 with the 1926 population measure drops from .841 in 1934-1940 to .503 in 1976-1980. For the language-literature or math-science schooling variable (H), the proportion of variance explained drops from .830 to .557.

Such an attenuation of correlation is to be expected, since the time periods for which the language policy is measured become increasingly distant from 1926. But the declining correlation does not result solely from the time lag between the population and language-policy measures, because the relation between policy and the 1959 population measure follows a similar pattern. Whether population is measured in 1926 or 1959, its correlation with school-language policy decreases in magnitude over time.

Table 3 also shows that geographic concentration is an important factor for native-language schooling; as measured by the size of the population that lived in its own titular area, geographic concentration maintained a consistently strong relation over time with the math-science measure (M), but generally weakened in its relation with the math-science or language-literature measure (H). Thus, whether or not a group is compactly settled affects differentially whether a nationality's traditional language was used as the primary medium of instruction or only as a subject of study. The statistical results are consistent with the interpretation that providing instruction in a given non-Russian language in one subject (i.e., language-literature) is relatively inexpensive, but maintaining an entire curriculum in a given non-Russian language is only reasonable when a large number of pupils from the same non-Russian nationality live close to each other.

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[5] In calculations involving 1926 population size, the four groups whose official territories were annexed by the USSR after 1926 (Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Tuvinians) are excluded. These groups are also excluded in calculations involving 1959 population size for periods before 1946. Only those groups that had official territories in 1959 are included in the calculations involving the number of group members in the group's titular area.

The Political Hypothesis

To examine the extent to which the provision of native-language schooling has varied with the territorial status of the nationality, we classify all of the indigenous nationalities according to their current status: union republic (SSR), autonomous republic (ASSR), autonomous oblast' (AO), autonomous district (*avtonomnyi okrug*—here abbreviated AD), and other indigenous nationalities (here abbreviated as IND).[6]

Figures 1 and 2 show for each period the average highest school year in which textbooks in the nationality's traditional language were published either in math-science or language-literature (H) or in math-science (M), for nationalities grouped by their formal political status. The extent to which schooling has been available follows distinctive paths related to the group's formal political status, and the status groupings always remain in the expected rank order. The highest school year in which the group's traditional language is used is always lower on average for the ASSR nationalities than for the SSR nationalities, the corresponding figures for the AO nationalities are lower on average than those of the ASSR's during each period, and the figures for AD nationalities are lower on average than those for the AO groups, but higher than those for the IND nationalities.

Figure 1 depicts the average highest class levels in which the non-Russian languages were used in school at least as a separate subject (H). It demonstrates the steady increase since World War II in the class levels in which the languages of all groupings of AO status and higher were used in schools. After lagging behind the SSR nationalities by over three class levels in the 1934-1940 period, the ASSR nationalities improved their position to such an extent that in the 1976-1980 period it nearly matched that of the SSR nationalities. The AO nationalities followed a similar upward trajectory over time, but lagged behind the ASSR nationalities. In contrast, after a decline in the status of their languages between 1934-1940 and 1941-1945, both the AD and IND groups have experienced little change.

The trends in the use of the non-Russian languages as the medium of instruction are very different from the trends in use as a separate subject. Figure 2 shows that all groupings except the SSR nationalities have experienced steady reductions over time in the highest school year in which the groups' traditional languages were used as the primary medium of instruction. This generalization is only slightly modified by observation of the brief recovery after World War II for the non-SSR groupings.

We infer that native-language education for the ASSR- and AO-level nationalities is increasingly taking place not in the national schools but instead in the Russian schools with the (non-Russian) native language as a separate subject. In contrast, for the AD- and IND-level nationalities, traditional-language schooling is disappearing completely; children in these nationalities are increasingly attending only Type 1 Russian schools.

The upward trends in Figure 1 run counter to the common supposition in the West that the non-Russian languages are disappearing from use in the educational system. The downward trends in Figure 2, however, are consistent with the Western supposition of increasing russianization of the bulk of the school curriculum for members of non-SSR nationalities. Thus, it is inappropriate to suppose that any single pattern of change applies to all Soviet ethnic groups.

The Relative Importance of Efficiency and Political Status

We now test more rigorously to what extent the formal political status of the nationalities accounts for the extent of native-language schooling over time; i.e., are the differences among political status groupings more important than the differences within political status groupings? Once this is determined, the combined and the relative effects of the efficiency and the political status factors on traditional-language schooling can be assessed.

To conduct these tests, we first calculated the multiple correlation between the measure of formal political status and the measures of school-language policy. We estimated regression equations using as the dependent variables alternately: the average for each period of the highest class levels in which textbooks were published in math-science (M), and the average for each period of the highest of language-literature or math-science (H). For independent variables, we created dichotomous variables representing the different levels of territorial status of the indigenous na-

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[6] Some groups have experienced changes in formal status. Nevertheless, the current formal status is a close approximation of group status since 1934, because the territorial status of the great majority of nationalities has not changed since the late 1930s. Territorial annexations after World War II added substantial numbers of Moldavians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, as well as members of some other groups, such as Hungarians and Finns, to the Soviet population. We do not try to take the effects of these population changes directly into account.

Figure 1. Average Highest Grade Level of Language-Literature or Math-Science Textbooks Published by Political Status



Figure 2. Average Highest Grade Level of Math-Science Textbooks Published by Political Status



Table 4. Proportion of Variance in School-Language Policy Explained by Political Status, for Indigenous Nationalities (N=77)

	1934-1940	1941-1945	1946-1950	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980
A. Math-Science (M) (R^2)									
	.711	.752	.702	.709	.792	.816	.777	.772	.796
B. Higher of Math-Science or Language-Literature (H) (R^2)									
	.741	.770	.686	.671	.850	.799	.822	.831	.818

The coefficients are R^2 values between the formal territorial-political status of the nationality and the highest class level in which math-science or language-literature or math-science textbooks were published in each period. Political status is measured by dummy-variable terms expressing the four different levels of territorial status.

tionalities: SSR, ASSR, AO, and AD.[7] The results of these calculations are presented in Table 4.

As expected, Table 4 shows that the formal political status of the nationalities is strongly related to the availability of native-language schooling. For simplicity, we do not show the coefficients for the individual independent variables, all of which are positive or not statistically significant. Also, in every case the effects of the set of dichotomous variables as a whole are statistically significant.

Political status accounts for between 67 and 85% of the variance in school-language policy. During most periods, political status is more highly related to the use of the group's traditional language as a subject of study than as the primary medium of instruction. More important for our analysis, the relation between formal political status and the provision of native-language schooling has maintained its strength over time.

Thus the variation among political status groupings is far more important than the variation within political status groupings in accounting for the differential provision of native-language schooling, and the trends depicted in Figures 1 and 2 capture the vast majority of the experience of the particular nationalities within each political status grouping.

Comparing the figures in Table 4 with those in Table 3 shows that for both aspects of school-language policy, population size has become a weaker predictor of the provision of native-language schooling over time, whereas formal political status has become a slightly stronger predictor. The relative strength of the two predictors can be compared more directly by estimating a series of multiple regression equations that include indicators of both kinds of factors simultaneously.

For each period we estimated multiple regression equations using alternately each of the school-language policy measures as dependent variables and using as independent variables both the natural log of the 1959 population and the set of dichotomous variables representing the formal political status of the groups (Table 5).

Table 5 is organized in the following manner. Panels A and B are analogous to Table 4. They show the proportion of the variance in school-language policy explained (R^2) by 1959 population alone, by the set of political status variables alone, and then by the population variable and the political status variables together. For example, in 1951-1955, for M, the population variable alone can explain 62.3% of the variance, the set of political status variables alone can explain 70.9% of the variance, and the two kinds of variables together can explain 71.8% of the variance. Panels C and D in Table 5 present the probabilities that the additional variance explained by each of the factors (after the other has already been taken into account) is owing to chance alone. We adopt the conventional criterion for determining whether a variable has a non-random effect, which is a significance level of .05 or less.

Table 5 shows for the 1934-1940 period not only that population size by itself accounts for a greater proportion of the variance in each measure of school-language policy than does political status by itself, but also that the two factors together explain only a slightly greater proportion of the variance than does population alone. Population size is also a more powerful predictor of school-language policy than is formal political status for the 1941-1945 period. Just the opposite is true for every period after World War II. In the postwar years, not only does the formal political status of the nationality by itself explain a larger proportion of the variance in the provision of schooling in the non-Russian languages than can group population size, but once political status is taken into account, population size explains only a negligible (and statistically non-significant) additional proportion of the variance.

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[7] In defining the dummy variables in the regression equation, the IND (other indigenous) nationalities were taken as the comparison group, i.e., as the intercept.

This change in the relative importance of the efficiency and political factors is shown by the *p* values in Panels C and D of Table 5. For both H and M, the *p* values for population size before 1946 are statistically significant—they are less than .05 and in fact are .000, that is, less than .0005. From 1946 through 1980, the *p* values for population size are always larger than .05, and the *p* values for the political status variables as a group are always smaller than .05.

Thus, Table 5 suggests that between 1934 and 1945, the operative decision rules for the provision of native-language schooling hinged less on the formal territorial status accorded the nationalities in the 1936 Constitution than on the practical efficiency of organizing such schooling. Additional support for this interpretation is that the extent to which a nationality had schooling in its traditional language in the 1934-1940 period is strongly related to whether the group already had a written language in 1926 ($r = .714$).

Over time, however, the policy of providing schooling in the non-Russian languages was related less to considerations of economic efficiency and more to the hierarchical organization of the Soviet federal state. Thus, differences in formal administrative-territorial status appear to be associated with real policy differences, independent of the population size of the nationalities.

This does not mean that population size had only a temporary effect on the availability of schooling in the non-Russian languages. On the contrary, in results not shown here, we found that population size is related to school-language policy in the postwar era in three ways. First, 1926 population size is positively related to the political status of nationalities, which in turn affects the availability of native-language schooling. Second, there was substantial inertia in provision of native-language schooling. To the extent that school-language policy during 1934-1940 was determined more by group population size than by group political status, population has a persistent indirect effect on later native-language schooling opportunities. Third, a nationality's population affects school-language policy even in the postwar years through the number of group members residing in the nationality's titular area.

Implications for Understanding Soviet Nationalities Policy

The best way to characterize the Soviet Union's policy toward the use of the non-Russian and Russian languages in education with a simple phrase is that it is a "bilingual education policy." Since World War II, the number of languages used as the primary medium of instruction in schools has decreased, and also there has been a

Table 5. Proportion of Variance in School-Language Policy Explained by 1959 Population and by Political Status

	Period								
	1934-1940	1941-1945	1946-1950	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980
A. Var. Expl. in Math-Sci. Schooling (M) (R^2)									
1959 Population	.808	.766	.634	.623	.676	.643	.582	.560	.540
Political Status	.711	.752	.702	.709	.792	.816	.777	.772	.796
Population & Status	.823	.813	.717	.718	.801	.819	.784	.778	.801
(N)	(77)	(77)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)	(81)
B. Var. Expl. in Highest of Math-Sci. or Lang.-Lit. Schooling (H) (R^2)									
1959 Population	.801	.785	.626	.605	.677	.664	.646	.608	.607
Political Status	.741	.770	.686	.671	.850	.799	.822	.831	.818
Population & Status	.831	.833	.699	.682	.853	.808	.825	.832	.821
C. Sig. of Additional Var. Expl. in (M) by Separate Factors (*p* value)									
1959 Population	.000	.000	.061	.129	.076	.255	.151	.162	.171
Political Status	.199	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
D. Sig. of Additional Var. Expl. in (H) by Separate Factors (*p* value)									
1959 Population	.000	.000	.086	.124	.242	.080	.231	.408	.271
Political Status	.020	.001	.001	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

substantial reduction in the highest class levels in which the non-Russian languages have been used in this capacity. But the non-Russian languages still have an important place in the curriculum.

The number of nationalities able to study their traditional language as a separate subject in at least some schools was not much smaller in 1976-1980 than in 1934-1940 and has not changed since 1941-1945. More important, the average highest class level in which the non-Russian languages are taught as subjects of study has increased since 1934-1940. If the only intention had been to eliminate the use of the non-Russian languages, there would have been no reason to increase the highest grade level at which non-Russian languages could be studied as a subject.

We describe Soviet school-language policy as one of bilingual education rather than of linguistic russification because we regard use of a language in the curriculum even as a subject of study as an important source of support for that language. In this respect we take issue with the implicit argument of many other Western scholars, who seem to regard the use of languages as the primary medium of instruction as the only meaningful support for the non-Russian languages and their use as subjects of study as inconsequential.

Our attention to use of the languages as subjects of study is grounded in part on empirical analyses that indicate that availability of the languages as subjects of study is often sufficient to retard shift to Russian as native language. If the medium of instruction was Russian but the group's traditional language was available as a separate subject, group members tended to acquire Russian as second language but to retain the group's traditional language as native language (Anderson & Silver, 1982).

The data on use of the non-Russian languages in schools are not consistent with the patterns of policy shift suggested by others. Whatever changes may have occurred in the official theoretical formulas on Soviet nationalities policy, our evidence on school-language policy supports neither the depiction of official policy as shifting back and forth between a centralist (pro-Russian) and a peripheralist (pro-non-Russian) emphasis (Lewis, 1972), nor the depiction of official policy as moving inexorably in a russificationist direction (Kreindler, 1982), nor the description of the policy as absolutely egalitarian (Isaev, 1970).

If the policy had shifted between a centralist and peripheralist emphasis, we would not have found a monotonic decrease over time in the number of nationalities whose traditional languages were used as the medium of instruction. Nor would we have found a monotonic increase in the average class levels in which the non-Russian languages served as subjects of study.

If the policy had moved inexorably toward greater russification, we would not have found nearly complete stability over time in the number of languages taught as subjects of study, and we would not have found that these languages are used at increasingly higher levels of the school curriculum. Nor would one find that in many of the union republics, such as Uzbekistan, the roles of the local languages have substantially increased over time (Fierman, 1982).

If the policy were completely egalitarian, Soviet authorities would not have extolled the virtues of the Russian language to such an extent, and there would not be the high degree of asymmetry in the emphasis given to the non-Russian and the Russian languages in the school curricula in recent years (Kreindler, 1982; Solchanyk, 1982). Although a great many non-Russian nationalities have been provided with instruction in their traditional languages, these nationalities have not been treated identically. In all periods since at least 1934, school-language policy has differentiated among the non-Russian nationalities either on the basis of their population size, their geographic concentration, or their political status.

Based on our data analyses, we identify three main periods in the evolution of Soviet policy concerning the non-Russian languages in the schools: 1917-1938, 1938-1959, and 1959-1980. The first period begins with the October Revolution and ends roughly with the 1938 decree that made Russian a mandatory subject of study in school, the second begins with the decree on Russian-language instruction and ends with the adoption of the 1959 education law, and the third period runs from the 1959 education law to the present.

Consistent with the interpretation of several Western scholars, we characterize the first period as an egalitarian period, during which an enormous effort was made to construct new alphabets, open non-Russian schools, and limit the role of the Russian language in the non-Russian areas. The model national school was one in which all subjects were taught in the native language of the non-Russian pupils.

The second period was one of differentiated bilingual education. During this period Russian became a mandatory subject of study in the non-Russian schools, but the model non-Russian school remained one in which the non-Russian language was the primary medium of instruction. It became more acceptable for non-Russians to attend Russian-language schools. As educational attainment increased and as greater numbers of non-Russians started to attend secondary schools, the earlier differentiation of native-language schooling opportunities was more or less frozen into established policy. About 50 languages of indigenous non-Russian nationalities were used as the medium of instruction.

The third period, one of highly differentiated bilingual education, dates from the 1959 education law, which nominally changed the study of the Russian language by non-Russians from an obligatory to a voluntary act and gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. In this period, the model non-Russian schools divided into two main types: the traditional national schools, where the non-Russian groups' languages served as the primary medium of instruction and where Russian was studied as a separate subject, and the national schools with Russian as the main language of instruction, but where the non-Russian groups' languages might be studied as separate subjects.

There was a sharp decline in the 1960s and 1970s in the number of languages that served as the primary medium of instruction as well as in the highest class level in which the non-Russian languages might serve in that capacity. To preserve their groups' traditional languages as the primary medium of instruction, groups had to have a large population and to be concentrated geographically. Formal status in the federal system became more closely linked to the use of the non-Russian languages as the medium of instruction.

Not only does Soviet school-language policy between 1934 and 1980 not fit the patterns described by other scholars, it does not fit any simple pattern. The differentiation in the treatment of the non-Russian nationalities and the partially countervailing trends in different aspects of school-language policy show the policy to be far more subtle than is conventionally understood. One should therefore expect any impact of this policy on language use and language loyalties also to be differentiated, both across nationalities and across generations. Moreover, the impact of Soviet school-language policy cannot easily be separated from the effects of other aspects of Soviet nationalities policy or from the effects of the enormous social and demographic changes since 1917. The effects of these other factors on the linguistic behavior and ethnic consciousness of nationalities are also likely to be differentiated and complex.

Technical Appendix

Choice of Nationalities for Analysis

To be included in the analysis, ethnic groups had to be listed both among the approximately 190 *narodnosti* (peoples) identified in the 1926 Soviet census and among the approximately 125 *natsional'nosti* (nationalities) in the 1959, 1970, or 1979 Soviet censuses, or be the titular nationality of a territorial unit during the period 1934 to 1980. The first criterion was adopted because we wanted to learn how many of the 1926 *narodnosti* that are still considered to be distinctive nationalities ever had native-language schooling. Using these criteria, 101 nationalities qualify. The qualifying nationalities are given in Table A1.

To increase the comparability of population data on the nationalities over time, in cases where 1926 census *narodnosti* (peoples) were classified in later census reports as subgroups of a larger *natsional'nost'* (nationality), we combined the reported 1926 populations of the relevant *narodnosti.*

Special Coding Procedures

For some years and for some nationalities (principally the Baltic nationalities), complete secondary schooling requires 11 years rather than the USSR norm of 10 years. Also, for many ethnic groups, especially in recent years, the only textbooks available have been designated for preschool. We have recoded 11 years as 10 years so that a score of 10 indicates complete secondary education. We also assigned preschool a value of 0.5, to take some account of the difference between no native-language schooling and preschool classes in the language.

For the Mari, Mordvinians, and Ossetians, books have been reported published in more than one dialect (or language). In each case, textbooks published in either dialect (language) are combined in the coding.

In official Soviet practice, the Kabardians and Cherkess are regarded as different nationalities, but they have the same traditional language. We have assigned identical scores to the Kabard and Cherkess languages in each year, based on the highest class level in which texts were reported published in Kabard, Cherkess, or Kabard-Cherkess. Furthermore, in the 1926 census report, no Cherkess are listed; instead, the ethnonym *Adygei* was used to refer to all who were later officially designated as Adygei or Cherkess, and books were listed as published in Cherkess or in Kabard-Cherkess during most years since 1934. We attribute 1926 census characteristics of the Adygei (such as population size) also to the Cherkess.

The Karachai and Balkars have the same traditional language. We assign the highest class level attributed to Karachai, Balkar, or Karachai-Balkar identically to both the Karachai and the Balkars.

Although there are strong differences among dialects of Finnish, Finnish has been used as the literary language of the Karelians (Comrie, 1981,

Table A1. Nationalities Included in Data on Native-Language Schooling by Official Territorial Status in 1980 and by Population Size, 1926 and 1959

Level of Official Territory	Nationality	Population 1926	Population 1959	Ever Had Native Schools 1934-1980
Union Republic	Ukrainians	31,194,976	37,252,930	Yes
	Belorussians	4,738,923	7,913,488	Yes
	Uzbeks	3,988,740	6,015,416	Yes
	Kazakhs	3,969,007	3,621,610	Yes
	Azerbaidzhanis	1,712,921	2,939,728	Yes
	Armenians	1,568,197	2,786,912	Yes
	Georgians	1,821,191	2,691,950	Yes
	Lithuanians	41,463	2,326,094	Yes
	Moldavians	278,905	2,214,139	Yes
	Latvians	151,410	1,399,539	Yes
	Tadzhiks	981,441	1,396,939	Yes
	Turkmenians	763,940	1,001,585	Yes
	Estonians	154,666	988,616	Yes
	Kirghiz	762,736	968,659	Yes
Autonomous Republic	Tatars[a]	3,311,241	4,764,504	Yes
	Chuvash	1,117,419	1,469,766	Yes
	(Peoples of Dagestan)[b]			
	Avars	197,392	270,394	Yes
	Lezgians	134,529	223,129	Yes
	Darghins	125,764	158,149	Yes
	Kumyks	94,549	134,967	Yes
	Laks	40,380	63,529	Yes
	Tabasarans	31,983	34,700	Yes
	Nogais	36,274	38,583	Yes
	Rutuls	10,495	6,732	No
	Tsakhurs	19,085	7,321	Yes
	Aguls	7,653	6,709	No
	Mordvinians	1,340,415	1,285,116	Yes
	Bashkirs	713,693	989,040	Yes
	Udmurts	514,222	624,794	Yes
	Mari	428,192	504,205	Yes
	Chechens	318,522	418,756	Yes
	Ossetians	272,272	412,592	Yes
	Komi	226,383	287,027	Yes
	Buriats	237,501	252,959	Yes
	Yakuts	240,709	233,344	Yes
	Karakalpaks	146,317	172,556	Yes
	Karelians	248,120	167,278	Yes
	Ingush	74,097	105,980	Yes
	Tuvinians	–	100,145	Yes
	Kalmyks	133,652	106,066	Yes
	Abkhazians	56,957	65,430	Yes
Autonomous Province	Jews	2,672,499	2,267,814	Yes
	Kabardinians	139,925	203,620	Yes
	Karachai	55,123	81,403	Yes
	Adygei	65,270	79,631	Yes
	Khakasy	45,608	56,584	Yes
	Altais	50,951	45,270	Yes
	Balkars	33,307	42,408	Yes
	Cherkess	65,270	30,453	Yes

TABLE A1. *(continued)*

Level of Official Territory	Nationality	Population 1926	Population 1959	Ever Had Native Schools 1934-1980
Autonomous District	Komi-Permiaks	149,488	143,901	Yes
	Evenks	39,488	24,151	Yes
	Nenets	17,566	23,007	Yes
	Khanty	22,306	19,410	Yes
	Chukchi	13,037	11,727	Yes
	Mansi	5,754	6,449	Yes
	Koriaks	7,439	6,287	Yes
	Dolgans	656	3,932	No
Other Indigenous	Crim. Tatars[c]	179,094	203,197	Yes
	Gagauz	844	123,821	Yes
	Abaza	13,825	19,591	Yes
	Vepps	32,785	16,374	Yes
	Shors	12,601	15,274	Yes
	Moslem Tats	28,705	11,463	No
	Evens	2,044	9,121	Yes
	Nanai	5,860	8,026	Yes
	Karaims	8,324	5,727	No
	Sel'kups	1,630	3,678	Yes
	Nivkhi	4,076	3,717	Yes
	Udins	2,455	3,678	No
	Ul'chi	723	2,055	No
	Saams	1,720	1,712	Yes
	Udegei	1,357	1,444	Yes
	Itel'mens	4,217	1,109	No
	Izhora	16,137	1,062	Yes
	Ket	1,428	1,019	No
	Orochi	647	782	No
	Tofa	2,829	586	No
	Negidals[d]	683	537	No
	Iukagirs	443	442	No
	Aleuts	353	421	No
Nonindigenous	Germans	1,238,549	1,619,655	Yes
	Poles	782,334	1,380,282	Yes
	Bulgarians	111,296	324,251	Yes
	Koreans	86,999	313,735	Yes
	Greeks	213,765	309,308	Yes
	Hungarians	5,476	154,738	Yes
	Gypsies	61,265	132,024	Yes
	Rumanians	4,651	106,366	No
	Uighurs	108,570	95,208	Yes
	Kurds	69,184	58,799	Yes
	Finns	134,701	92,717	Yes
	Chinese	10,247	25,781	Yes
	Czechs	27,123	24,557	Yes
	Dungans	14,600	21,928	Yes
	Assyrians	9,808	21,803	Yes
	Iranians	53,159	20,766	Yes
	Slovaks	27,123	14,674	No
	Beluchi	9,974	7,842	Yes
	Albanians	3,057	5,258	No
	Khalkha-Mongols	559	1,774	No

Notes to Table A1

[a] The 1959 population for the (Volga) Tatars is derived by subtracting the estimated number of Crimean Tatars from the reported total number of "Tatars" in the 1959 census report.

[b] The Dagestani nationalities listed here are those listed separately in the 1959 Soviet census report. Although ten nationalities are listed here as Dagestani groups, we treat only the first seven as "titular" nationalities of the Dagestan ASSR.

[c] The population totals for the Crimean Tatars are derived as follows: 1) for 1926, all persons counted as "Tatars" who lived in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Republic, 2) for 1959, all persons counted as "Tatars" who lived in Tashkent City or Tashkent Province. Each of these is only an approximation of the true number of Crimean Tatars.

[d] The Negidals are listed separately in the 1926 census report and in the 1970 and 1979 census figures, but are omitted from the 1959 census report. The population figure given here for 1959 is actually the 1970 census figure.

pp. 97-98), and in some years the entries in *K.L.* have been given as "Finnish (Karelian)." For the years before World War II (i.e., preceding the creation of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic), we assigned to both Karelians and Finns the higher of the class levels reported for either Karelian or Finnish.

For the prewar years, some textbooks were listed as published in Latgal, which is a dialect of Latvian (Comrie, 1981, p. 147). We have coded all references to Latgal or Latvian as Latvian.

When books are listed as published in the Tat language, the entry in *K.L.* is given as "Tat (Mountain Jewish)." Hence, we attribute these books to the Jewish Tats rather than to the Moslem Tats.

Smoothing of Data

We use a smoothed data series rather than the raw data. The scores that we assign to a given language in a particular year represent the highest reported figure for that language among that year and the two contiguous years. This procedure is used for the entire time series, except for 1934 and 1980, when data are only available for one contiguous year.

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Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis

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Existing rational choice treatments of collective violence have consistently discounted the role of the public goods component of the individual's decision calculus about whether or not to participate in such acts. By assuming free rider effects with respect to the public goods, these theories are unable to account for the initial inception of violence or for the later nonlooting behaviors that constitute aspects of a riot and, indeed, are preconditions for the inception of looting, the only riot behavior for which these theories can offer any explanation. Five dimensions of discrimination are defined in rational choice terms and their elimination (or reduction) is defined as the creation of a public good. I use existing theories of individual contributions to the provision of public goods to demonstrate that free rider effects need not be assumed and that the inception of a riot and later nonlooting riot behaviors can best be explained as individual contributions to the provision of the public goods represented by the elimination of the several forms of discrimination.

With the wave of urban racial violence that swept this nation 15 years ago, there emerged a corresponding wave of research into such issues as the characteristics of "riot" versus "nonriot" cities (Downes, 1968, 1970; Ford & Moore, 1970; Jibou, 1971; Lieberson & Silverman, 1965; Lieske, 1978; McElroy & Singell, 1973; Murphy & Watson, 1970; Spilerman, 1970, 1971), the socioeconomic characteristics of individual rioters (Caplan, 1970; Fogelson & Hill, 1968; Gerschwender & Singer, 1970; Lieske, 1978; Miller, Bolce, & Halligan, 1976; Sears & McConahey, 1969, 1973) and, more broadly, the causes of this wave of racial violence in particular and of urban racial violence in general (Feagin & Hahn, 1973; Gerschwender, 1968a, b; McPhail, 1971; Salert, 1976; Sears & McCohaney, 1973). However, although numerous studies were conducted, nothing approaching theoretical consensus has emerged on even these most basic questions in the etiology of urban racial violence. No doubt part of the reason for this persistent dissensus has been the plethora of social scientific paradigms that were brought to bear upon these issues. The literature abounds with studies based implicitly or explicitly on such diverse theoretical perspectives as relative deprivation theory (Davies, 1969; Miller, Bolce, & Halligan, 1976), social marginality hypotheses (Miller, Bolce, & Halligan, 1977), institutional closure explanations (Silver, 1968; Skolnik, 1969), and rational choice models (Chalmers & Shelton, 1975; Gunning, 1972). Because each of these paradigms contains its own set of assumptions and implications about what type of individual would be motivated to participate in collective racial violence, they also differ on why these riots occurred when and where they did and under what conditions we could expect similar violence to occur in the future.

Although I can by no means presume to resolve the broader problem of theoretical dissensus that characterizes this literature, I shall examine civil violence theory in one of these paradigmatic schools—that of rational choice theory—and attempt to define the theoretical puzzles that remain in this literature.[1] In rational choice theory the task of explaining civil violence is a matter of modeling the decision calculus by which a rational

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[1] My reasons for choosing this and not some other theoretical school are too complex (and perhaps irrelevant) to be elaborated fully here. Suffice it to say that rational choice theory is preferred over the paradigmatic alternatives in the civil violence literature because of the parsimony of its assumptions and conceptual structure, and the clarity with which the puzzles that are the focus of our efforts can be defined and addressed.

individual could decide to join a large group of individuals engaging in behaviors that are clearly illegal and therefore potentially costly to that individual. Invariably, in the case of a riot this decision calculus is reduced to an estimation of expected private benefits (looting times the probability of escaping apprehension) minus expected private costs (fines and imprisonment times the probability of apprehension for looting). Any public benefits (e.g., government initiatives to reduce racially based inequities) are assumed to be subject to Olson's free rider effect: No one individual's participation will determine whether or not these benefits are provided, the individual will receive these benefits whether or not he participates in their provision, and therefore he will not participate in collective action aimed at providing them unless forced to do so or promised sufficient private rewards (selective incentives) as a condition of his direct participation.

However, it can be shown that when free rider effects are assumed, there occur in this model certain theoretical anomalies that remain unattended in the existing literature. In particular, this model is unable to account for either the inception of a riot or for many of the nonlooting behaviors that occur later in a riot but before the onset of widespread looting. In this article, I shall attempt to resolve these anomalies first by defining more specifically the public goods of rioting, and second, by using the existing literature on individual contributions to the provision of public goods (e.g., Chamberlin, 1974; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970; Frohlich, Hunt, Oppenheimer, & Wagner, 1975; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Young, 1971; Hardin, 1971) to account for those as yet unexplained riot behaviors as instances of individual contributions to the provision the previously defined public goods of rioting.

Rational Choice Theories of Collective Violence

Most rational choice treatments of participation in collective violence are directly derivative of, or at least commensurable with, the models developed by Becker (1968) for crime, Tullock (1971) for revolution, and Ehrlich (1973) for illegitimate activities in general. Each of these models is concerned with the binary decision of whether or not to engage in behavior that is illegal and therefore carries the risk of injury or apprehension for criminal liability or both, with all of its attendant costs. Riot participation obviously falls within this class of behaviors. However, rioting (like revolution and unlike ordinary crime) is often seen as providing collective or public goods (e.g., greater local-government sensitivity to the demands of the minority community) in addition to whatever private benefits an individual might receive as a result of his or her direct participation in the event.[2]

However, although the public goods component is included in Tullock's (1971) theory of revolution and is at least acknowledged by Chalmers and Shelton (1975, p. 324) and Gunning (1972) in their respective theories of riot participation, all these authors have treated this component as inconsequential to the outcome of the decision calculus because public goods are assumed to be subject to free rider effects.[3] Yet the theoretical constructs do exist which would allow us to relax the free rider assumption and therefore retain the public goods component in the individual's expected utility function. Thus, the question becomes: Does the inclusion of this element add anything to a theory of collective violence, and conversely, does its omission from the decision calculus result in any theoretical deficiencies in these models? I argue that the nearly total discounting of the public goods component does limit severely the range of riot behaviors for which these models can account, as can be seen by examining the utility function that appears typically in the literature on civil violence.[4]

Given that riot behavior involves illegal activities, the rational individual faced with the choice between participation and nonparticipation will choose so as to maximize his expected utility, subject to the probability (p_i) that he will be arrested and convicted if he participates and the probability $(1-p_i)$ that he will escape apprehension.[5]

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[2] Public goods are defined throughout this article in the terms developed by Samuelson (1954) and Head (1962). They are distinguished from private goods by virtue of their jointness of supply and nonrivalness of consumption. Jointness of supply (also referred to as the nonexclusion principle) refers to the condition whereby such goods cannot be withheld from one member of a group once they are made available to others. Non-rivalness of consumption means that one person's consumption of the good does not diminish the amount available to others to consume. Public goods exhibit these two characteristics to a greater or lesser degree; there are no "pure" public goods.

[3] This argument applies to the works of Ireland (1967), Silver (1974), Salert (1976), and Roeder (1982) as well.

[4] Our "typical" utility function is adapted from Salert (1976, p. 36), and although its terms are not exactly isomorphic with those in Tullock's (1971) or Chalmers and Shelton's (1975) models, it does incorporate the same basic elements of utility, it uses the same logic and assumptions, and it implies the same behavioral outcomes as those other models.

[5] For the purposes of this article, I shall use a definition of a riot similar to that used by Gunning (1972, p. 31). A riot is a set of unlawful acts by individuals com-

His expected utility equation can be represented as follows:

$$E(U_i) = p_{pg}(R) + (1-p_i)(M_i) - (p_i)(C_i), \quad (1)$$

where $E(U_i)$ is the ith individual's expected net utility from participation; R is the public goods created by the riot (e.g., a reduction in discrimination); p_{pg} is the individual's subjective estimation of the probability that the riot will result in the provision of the public goods R; M_i is the present value of the private benefits (mainly loot) individual i expects to obtain from participation; C_i is the present value of the private costs individual i will suffer if apprehended and convicted (including the monetary value of fines and income foregone during incarceration, all discounted to present value); p_i is individual i's estimation of the probability that he will be apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to jail or fined (i.e., the probability that he will actually suffer the costs, C); and $(1-p_i)$ is individual i's subjective estimation of the probability that he will escape apprehension, conviction, and sentencing (i.e., the probability that he will avoid suffering the costs, C_i).

Typically, the logic of such a model reduces to a comparison of the expected private rewards and the expected private costs: If $(1-p_i)(M_i)$ is greater than $(p_i)(C_i)$, the individual will participate; if this condition does not hold, he will remain inactive. The public goods component (R in equation 1) is held to have no significant impact on the individual's decision because, assuming the nonexcludability of public goods, that individual will receive the benefits of R whether or not he participates in the riot.

The effect of the free rider assumption on the behavioral implications of this model is to create two rather critical theoretical anomalies. First, the model can account for an individual's participation in a riot only after extensive rioting is already in progress; it cannot explain how the riot began. If one assumes free rider effects, individuals can be induced to participate in a riot only for private benefits (i.e., looting) and only when the expected costs of participation have been diminished. In this model the costs of participation are diminished only if a riot already exists. A riot in progress reduces the effectiveness of normal law enforcement operations and therefore reduces individual i's expected costs of rioting by reducing the likelihood that he will be arrested (p_i); conversely, it increases the expected private material rewards of rioting $(1-p_i)(M_i)$ by increasing the likelihood that he or she can loot with impunity. Once this process reaches the point at which $(1-p_i)(M_i)$ exceeds $(p_i)(C_i)$, it would then be rational for the individual to participate in the riot or, more precisely, to engage in looting.

We are left with a theoretical chicken-or-egg dilemma: In order to explain the ith individual's participation in the riot, the model must presuppose that a large number of equally rational individuals have already chosen to participate. Presumably, the expected utility calculus of the initial rioters is no different from that of the later looters. Yet as it stands the model is notably silent on the behavior of the former group, as Chalmers and Shelton (1975, p. 323) are careful to acknowledge, but which nonetheless leaves the inception of the riot as yet unexplainable by the model. Thus, the model is unable to account for the conditions that make looting (the behavior it can explain) rational.

This leads us to a second theoretical anomaly, which concerns the range of specific behaviors—all considered aspects of rioting—that cannot be accounted for by the model, at least not as well as it accounts for looting. In particular, the model does not readily account for such typical riot behaviors as arson and other forms of property destruction or group attacks on law enforcement officials and firemen. Gunning (1972, p. 35) acknowleges the importance of such activities in the initiation and escalation of civil violence, but admits that their motives "are not easily handled in economics" because such behaviors do not result in immediate private rewards (M_i) for the individual, whereas they do carry the distinct possibility of private costs (C_i). Unlike looting, then, they are held to resemble lobbying activities (Gunning, 1972, p. 33) that produce distinctly public benefits. So long as one assumes the operation of free rider effects for such behaviors, the precise nature of their payoffs is unclear, the probability of the payoffs is uncertain, and the consumption of the payoffs, if they are forthcoming, is not contingent upon the individual's own participation in the riot. The inability of this model to explain these behaviors comes to appear significant when one considers the finding that most riots never escalate beyond the early stages of group violence (when these nonlooting behaviors predominate) to the later stage of more extensive violence (in

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mitted in the presence of a crowd which is sufficiently large and/or sympathetic that ordinary law enforcement procedures cannot be applied to the same extent or with the same effectiveness as they are in the absence of the hostile (to the police) crowd. The types of illegal acts included in this definition are such things as the destruction of property (arson and vandalism), theft of consumer goods (looting), acts of violence against law enforcement officials (throwing rocks, bottles, and other missiles at police, interference with the efforts of police and firemen, and sniping).

which widespread looting occurs) (Feagin & Hahn, 1973); thus, most riots remain largely unaccounted for by this model.

These anomalies are by no means trivial; they impose rather stringent limitations on the model's capacity to predict the occurrence of civil disorders and to explain individual participation in a broad range of behaviors involved in rioting. As it stands, then, the model is better able to prescribe tactics for ending violence once it has begun (i.e., raise the cost of participation) than to prescribe policies that obviate the resort to civil violence in the first place. To remedy this situation, I shall now propose a resolution of these anomalies, first by defining the public goods of rioting, and second by demonstrating that the inception of a riot and later nonlooting riot behaviors can best be explained as individual contributions to the provision of those public goods.

The Public Goods of Rioting

I shall define the public goods of rioting as an end to (or at least a reduction in) racially based forms of discrimination. According to Becker (1957, p. 14), if an individual has a "taste for discrimination," he must act as if he were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. An employer with a taste for discrimination against some group, A, and faced with a market wage rate, W, will act as if members of A were demanding a wage of $W + d$ (d being an estimate of his discrimination coefficient) when he makes his hiring decisions. Thus, an employer who discriminates will be indifferent between hiring members of A and members of not-A only if members of A will accept a wage of $W - d$ or less. Similar effects on members of A occur when they are subject to discrimination in other transactions, such as acquiring housing or obtaining credit for the purchase of consumer durables.

Such discrimination can be practiced by members of one group against another when there is some easily identifiable characteristic that distinguishes between them. Rogowski (1974, p. 71) defines such a characteristic as a stigma: any characteristic of a group that is easily identifiable by others in the society and is capable of being changed only at high costs, if at all. Race is a relatively strong stigma, because differences in skin pigmentation and other superficial physical features are easily detected and difficult, if not impossible, to alter.

Because racial discrimination is stigmatically based, its elimination would constitute a public good for blacks: the resultant benefits could not be withheld from some blacks once they were made available to others, and the consumption of this good by any one black would not necessarily diminish the availability of the good for others to consume. In short, to the extent that the elimination of discrimination exhibits jointness of supply and nonrivalness of consumption, it can be treated as a public good.

A number of studies have described in detail several specific dimensions of discrimination and have linked them theoretically and empirically to both individual riot propensity and city riot proneness (Feagin & Hahn, 1973; Kerner, 1968; Murtagh, 1983a, b; Sears & McConahey, 1973). These dimensions can be divided into two broad categories: discrimination in the public sector and in the private sector. Discrimination in the public sector includes law enforcement and judicial discrimination, educational discrimination, and discrimination with respect to the amount and quality of public services available to blacks. Discrimination in the private sector would include job discrimination, housing discrimination, and various other forms of consumer market discrimination.

After defining each of these dimensions I shall demonstrate that it is public sector discrimination that is most directly linked to both the inception of the riot and those later nonlooting riot behaviors that are as yet unaccounted for by existing rational choice theory. Public-sector discrimination has explanatory priority because the elimination of such discrimination constitutes an inclusive public good (for which the nonrivalness of consumption condition holds); Chamberlin (1974) has demonstrated that rational individuals will cooperate in the provision of normal inclusive public goods, even in the absence of selective incentives. On this basis, I argue that the elimination of public-sector discrimination, as an inclusive public good, can be used to explain the inception of a riot and later nonlooting riot behaviors. First, however, I must define more formally as public goods the several dimensions of public-sector and private-sector discrimination.

Law Enforcement and Judicial Discrimination

One of the most widely cited grievances in the Kerner Report (1968) was the inordinately harsh treatment of blacks by law enforcement and judicial officials. Indeed, in most cities that experienced riots the final precipitating event involved a confrontation between blacks and law enforcement officials. In more specific terms, blacks felt that all too often the amount of force used against black suspects was excessive and that once brought to trial, a black was more likely to be convicted than a white, more likely to be convicted of a more serious charge for the same criminal act, and more likely to receive a harsher sentence than a white for the same crime (Feagin & Hahn, 1973; Kerner Report, 1968).

To translate this class of grievances into terms that are commensurable with our rational choice approach, I shall rely upon the works of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), which depict crime in rational choice terms. A rational individual seeks an optimal allocation of his time and other resources among a number of both productive and consumptive activities, some of which may happen to be illegal. An individual's decision to commit a crime can be modeled by an expected utility function·

$$EU(X_s, t_c) = (1-p_i)U(X_b, t_c) + p_iU(X_a, t_c) \quad (2)$$

where X_s denotes the stock of a composite market good, the command over which is contingent upon the occurrence of state s; t_c is the amount of time devoted to consumption and nonmarket activity; and U is an indirect utility function that also converts X_s and t_c into consumption flows. X_b is the stock of the composite market good that the individual will have if he commits the crime and escapes apprehension (state b), which he expects to occur with a probability of $(1-p_i)$. X_a is the stock of the composite market good that the individual will have if he commits the crime and is apprehended, which he expects to occur with a probability of p_i. These two alternative states can be represented as follows:

$$X_b = W' + W_i(t_i) + W_1(t_1) \quad (3)$$

and

$$X_a = W' + W_i(t_i) - C_i(t_i) + W_1(t_1) \quad (4)$$

where W' denotes the market value of the individual's assets; W_1 is the expected rate of return (wage rate) for time (t_1) invested in legal activities; W_i is the expected rate of return (wage rate) for time (t_i) invested in illegal activities; and $C_i(t_i)$ is the discounted (pecuniary and nonpecuniary) value of the penalty for this illegitimate activity (Ehrlich, 1973, pp. 524-526).

The existence of law enforcement and judicial discrimination implies that for a given crime, the expected costs for a black would be greater than the expected costs for a white in two respects. First, the often cited use of arbitrary frisks, house and car searches, and the frequent questioning of blacks with no provocation means that the probability of apprehension (p_i in equation 2) for a black is greater than it is for a white, *ceteris paribus*. Thus, if p_i is the probability that a white person will be apprehended and punished for a given crime, then I define p'_i as the probability that a black will be apprehended and punished for the same criminal act, where $p'_i = p_i + d_1$, and d_1 is the discrimination coefficient of white law enforcement officials toward blacks. In other words, d_1 reflects the extra time and other resources law enforcement officials are willing to expend in order to apprehend, convict, and punish a black suspect as opposed to a white suspect, assuming both committed the same offense.

Second, and perhaps more important, blacks can expect to suffer greater punishments (C_i in equation 4) than whites for the same criminal act: Beside his greater probability of conviction ($p'_i > p_i$), a black is likely to be tried on a more serious charge and to receive a more severe sentence than a white, all for the same criminal act. Thus, if C_i represents the costs of punishment a white can expect to receive for a conviction for a given criminal act, then $C_i + d_2$ would be the discounted (pecuniary and nonpecuniary) value of the penalty a black could expect to suffer for a conviction stemming from the same criminal act. From this perspective, d_2 represents the extra social resources that attorneys, judges, and jurors are willing to expend in punishing a black suspect as opposed to a white suspect. The incorporation of d_1 and d_2 into the expected utility function for criminal activity (equation 2) is straightforward.[6]

What should be apparent when these terms are incorporated into equations (2) through (4) is that law enforcement discrimination reduces the net utility flows of blacks (compared to whites) in two ways: first (and more obvious), the expected utility of crime is reduced for blacks as a result of their greater probability of apprehension and their greater punishment for a given criminal act. The second and more subtle way is that discriminatory

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[6] If equation (2) is the expected utility function from crime in the absence of discrimination, then given law enforcement and judicial discrimination as defined previously, the expected utility function for a black would be:

$$EU(X_s, t_c) = (1-p'_i)U(X_b, t_c) + p'_iU(X_a', t_c) \quad (5)$$

where

$$p'_i = p_i + d_1 > p_i \quad (6)$$

and

$$X'_a = W' + W_i(t_i) - (C_i + d_2)(t_i) + W_1(t_1) < X_a \quad (7)$$

where all terms are defined as in equations (2) through (4), and d_1 is the increased probability of apprehension and conviction resulting from discrimination, and d_2 is the increased costs of punishment for a black convict resulting from discrimination.

law enforcement is inefficient law enforcement, because by definition discrimination is a suboptimal use of resources (Becker, 1957). The more frequent and severe punishment of blacks (compared to whites) for a given criminal act has the effect of crowding the level of deterrence that can be achieved for a given expenditure of social resources. In the aggregate, some offenses will go undetected to the extent that offenses by blacks are "over-detected." Similarly, some offenses will go "underpunished" to the extent that blacks are "over-punished" for the same offenses (thus literally crowding penal facilities).[7] In effect, then, blacks pay a "color tax" on the provision of crime deterrence, that tax being the resources spent indulging tastes for discrimination and, therefore, not spent on impartial law enforcement. Although blacks pay the same taxes as whites (i.e., they face the same nominal tax schedules), the amount of the public good (crime deterrence) they receive for their tax dollar is, in effect, reduced by the color tax of law enforcement discrimination. As such, these types of discrimination should represent public "bads" for blacks because they are receiving less of the public goods for the same expenditure of tax dollars. Similarly, the elimination of such discrimination would represent public goods to members of the stigmatically defined groups that are (directly or indirectly) its victims.

Educational Discrimination

As evidence of racially based disparities in educational opportunities, the Kerner Report (1968) and the Coleman Report (1966) pointed out that the typical inner-city school had a predominantly (if not exclusively) black student population; and in comparison to the newer, mostly white suburban schools, it had an older physical plant, less modern equipment, a more limited curriculum, less qualified teachers, and more crowded classrooms. To the extent that these disparities are racially determined and are the result of discrimination, their elimination would represent public goods to the stigmaticallly defined victim group.

Becker (1975) and Michaels (1972) have argued that differences in income earning ability among individuals may be analyzed in terms of returns to human capital: The more human capital an individual has invested in himself, the higher the wage rate he can command. From this perspective, educational discrimination affects utility flows for blacks through its effect on their production function for human capital and, therefore, on their lifetime income. The production function for human capital can be represented generally as follows:

$$HC = f(t_e, I, EC) \qquad (8)$$

where t_e is the amount of time spent in school; I is the amount and quality of instruction one receives (which is itself a function of the human capital embodied in one's teachers); and EC is an "educational capital" term that includes the breadth of the curriculum (the number, variety, and direct or indirect job relevance of courses offered) and the quantity and quality of the equipment and the physical plant of one's school.[8]

Two forms of educational discrimination can be represented using the terms in this production function. Both presume that student populations are highly segregated, and both have the effect of reducing the marginal productivity of time invested in education. The first of these forms occurs when teachers have a taste for discrimination against students from the stigmatically defined group. For teachers with the same ability (i.e., with equivalent amounts of human capital), one of whom has a taste for discrimination against blacks and one of whom does not, it would require a higher wage rate (higher by an amount marginally larger than that teacher's discrimination coefficient) to induce the former to teach in a predominantly black school. Therefore, for a given wage rate, W (the market wage rate for teachers with a given amount of human capital, HC) schools that serve mainly black students will face the following hiring options: (a) hire teachers with HC but who have a taste for discrimination by offering them $W + d_3$, where d_3 is the discrimination coefficient for those teachers; (b) hire teachers who have a taste for discrimination but who have an amount of human capital less than *HC* by offering them *W*, when $W - d_3$ is the highest wage they could command in the absence of discrimination; or (c) hire teachers with *HC* who have no taste for discrimination by offering them *W*.

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[7] Thus, law enforcement discrimination may result in a higher crime rate in black neighborhoods, even as blacks are suffering greater costs than whites for equivalent crimes. A possible proof of this proposition is beyond the scope of this article, and because its validity is not critical to our model of civil violence, we shall leave it as a subject for future research.

[8] There may be other elements that could be included in this equation, but these are the ones over which government has some control through its educational policymaking practices. Therefore, it is discrimination in these areas that should be relevant to riot propensity.

The costs one incurs from education consist of foregone earnings for the time one invests and taxes. We shall assume that these are the same for everyone: Everyone faces the same tax schedules, and, although time is a decision variable for the individual, the comparisons I shall make to determine the effects of discrimination will be in terms of differing returns to equivalent time investments.

Although option (c) is the most efficient expenditure of resources, Murtagh's (1983b) analysis of the effects of metropolitan segregation implies that (a) and (b) are the more likely outcomes. Because of the budget constraints imposed by a declining tax base, inner-city schools will be less able to offer teachers wages (*W*) or working conditions (*EC*) competitive with those of suburban schools. As a result, the supply of teachers available to them will be, in the aggregate, "less efficient producers of human capital": Either they embody less human capital themselves or they have tastes for discrimination that must be compensated before they will accept a job or both.[9] Furthermore, it can be shown, following Becker (1957) and Murtagh (1983b), that the more of the latter group there are in the available supply of teachers, the more the market wage rate for all teachers will be raised above what it would be in the absence of such discrimination. Thus, for a given tax expenditure, the quality of instruction available to blacks will be less than that which is available to whites; and for a given amount of time invested in schooling, t_e, the human capital returns for an inner-city black student will be less than for a suburban white student. In short, the production function for human capital is less cost effective (in terms of returns to both time and taxes) for blacks when teacher discrimination exists.

These discrimination effects are further exacerbated by discrimination with respect to the other decision variable, educational capital (*EC*). Public officials generate (through taxes) and then allocate (through budgets) public funds for investment in educational capital. To the extent that these officials manifest tastes for discrimination in their allocation decisions, they allocate less educational capital funds (*EC*) to predominantly black schools than to predominantly white schools. The effect of this form of discrimination is that the black student's time is applied to a lesser amount of educational capital (*EC*) because the black parent's tax dollar buys less educational capital. Therefore, the marginal productivity of t_e—the marginal return, in terms of human capital, on an additional unit of time invested in schooling—will be lower in the black school system than in the white school system.[10] Similarly, the marginal return of one's tax dollars is lower for blacks than for whites. To the extent that these effects are stigmatically distributed, their elimination would represent a public benefit to the stigmatic target group.

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[9] This argument does not preclude the possibility of some teachers choosing to work in inner city schools for less money and with less educational capital than they could command elsewhere. However, in the aggregate, such cases are unlikely to overcome the effects of discrimination.

[10] Thus, if equation (8) represents the production function for human capital, then when either or both forms of educational discrimination occur, the parameters of the production function for blacks and whites differ:

$$HC_w = f(I_w, EC_w, t_e) \tag{9}$$

$$HC_b = f(I_b, EC_b, t_e) \tag{10}$$

where the subscripts *b* and *w* denote the differing values of the variables for black and white school systems, respectively. My arguments presented above imply the following inequalities with respect to these parameters:

$$HC_w > HC_b \tag{11}$$

because

$$I_w = I_b + d_3 \tag{12}$$

and

$$EC_w = EC_b + d_4 \tag{13}$$

Because I want to represent the differences in human capital returns for a given time investment, I shall differentiate equations (9) and (10) with respect to t_e to obtain the marginal productivity of time increments:

$$\partial HC_w/\partial t_e = \partial f(I_w, EC_w, t_e)/\partial t_e \tag{14}$$

$$\partial HC_b/\partial t_e = \partial f(I_b, EC_b, t_e)/\partial t_e \tag{15}$$

From the prior discussion, I can infer that

$$\partial HC_w/\partial t_e > \partial HC_b/\partial t_e \tag{16}$$

and from this that

$$\partial HC_w/\partial t_e = \partial HC_b/\partial t_e + d_5 \tag{17}$$

where d_5 is the discrimination coefficient that represents the difference between black and white students with respect to the marginal productivity of their investments of time in schooling. Marginal returns to black students are less than the returns to white students by an amount d_5. The discrimination coefficient d_5, then, is the effect of discrimination by teachers and school officials on the value of education to black students. More precisely, it is the effect on the returns to black students from their investments of time in obtaining education.

Housing Discrimination

The Kerner Commission (1968, pp. 470-472) presented evidence of housing discrimination by showing that in most major cities, blacks either paid the same amount as whites for clearly inferior housing or paid more for equivalent housing. Housing discrimination in this sense may be represented in terms that are directly analogous to Becker's (1957) treatment of discrimination in job markets. If P is the market price of a house available for rent or sale by a white landlord, and if that landlord has a taste for discrimination, he will rent or sell to members of the black community only if they are willing to pay $P + d_6$, where d_6 is that landlord's discrimination coefficient. Because blacks must compensate such landlords for their taste for discrimination, they will have less of their income available for further consumption than would be the case were they not targets of stigmatically based discrimination.

Job Discrimination

Similarly, job discrimination affects blacks by lowering the income a black can expect to earn relative to what a white worker with a comparable amount of human capital could expect to earn. According to Becker (1957), when faced with a market wage rate of W, an employer with a taste for discrimination will make hiring decisions involving blacks as if the blacks were demanding a wage rate of $W + d_7$, where d_7 is the employer's discrimination coefficient. By this decision calculus, an employer with a taste for discrimination will hire a white before he hires a black if the two have equivalent job skills and are demanding the same wage rate. Correlatively, for a black to obtain a job when he is competing with whites, he will have to settle for a wage rate no higher than $W - d_7$. Underemployment and higher rates of unemployment among blacks appear to be the major effects of this type of discrimination (Kerner Report, 1968, p. 258; Sears & McConahey, 1973, p. 51).

Consumer Market Discrimination

The Kerner Commission cites evidence that blacks in central cities paid higher prices for goods at neighborhood stores, and usually the goods were of inferior quality. In addition, for consumer durables that are purchased on credit, blacks found it difficult to obtain credit at reasonable prices from conventional lending institutions, and instead they had to rely on high cost credit from firms that service "high risk" customers by charging high interest rates (Kerner Report, 1968, pp. 274-276).[11]

Consumer market discrimination can be analyzed in a manner analogous to the other forms of market discrimination. A merchant with a taste for discrimination and who sells primarily to members of the black community will charge a price equal to $P + d_8$ for his products, where P is the price he would charge if he sold exclusively to whites and d_8 is his discrimination coefficient.[12] The effect of this form of discrimination is likewise to reduce utility flows to blacks by reducing the amount of consumer goods they can purchase with a given disposable income.

The major effect of these forms of discrimination is to reduce utility flows of individual blacks and of the black community in the aggregate over what they would be in the absence of discrimination. Conversely, a major benefit created by the elimination or even reduction of such discrimination would be an increase in utility flows of individual blacks and of the black community in the aggregate. Thus, to the extent that such discrimination is stigmatically based, its reduction would represent a public good because the benefits created thereby would be available to all members of the stigmatically defined group.

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[11] Of course, such practices do not necessarily reflect racial discrimination on the part of the merchant in every instance. The difference in prices charged by firms in the ghetto is at least in part a function of the higher cost of doing business in high crime neighborhoods populated by lower-income families (even though such conditions may themselves be the result of several of the other forms of discrimination). Thus, it is difficult to distinguish overt merchant discrimination from nondiscriminatory behavior by merchants who simply happen to be doing business with high risk customers in neighborhoods that have high costs of doing business. See the Kerner Report (1968) for a further discussion of this issue.

[12] For nondurable goods this form of discrimination requires virtual market segregation (which results from neighborhood segregation). If a merchant expects virtually all of his customers to be black, his prices will be set higher (by an amount equal to his discrimination coefficient) than if he expects a predominantly white clientele. Consumer durables, on the other hand, would be more given to the use of a dual price system by a merchant with a taste for discrimination. With these goods there is often some room for negotiation on the final sale price, and the final sale price the merchant is willing to accept may vary according to whether the purchaser is black or white. Such pricing differences would be a function of the merchant's taste for discrimination, as represented by the discrimination coefficient d_9. Similarly, when the purchase is made on credit, the merchant can incorporate his taste for discrimination in the credit terms of the purchase by charging a black a higher interest rate than what he would charge a white with an equivalent financial profile.

Except where there are philanthropists, public goods are usually provided by collective action, be it of a politically conventional or an unconventional mode. Stigmatic groups are more likely to use unconventional modes of collective action—such as protest and violence—where the more conventional modes—such as electoral participation and lobbying—are perceived as being ineffective because the relevant public institutions are dominated by the majority group and are therefore unresponsive to the demands of the minority stigmatic group. In particular, when government itself engages in public-sector discrimination, then the group that is the target of such discrimination is less likely to seek redress of this grievance through the institutional channels of that government. Instead, unconventional forms of collective action—including civil violence—become relatively more attractive as means of creating the public goods of reduced discrimination, especially when such discrimination is provided publicly by the government in the first place.

Indeed, it is our contention that reduction of discrimination is the public good that motivated those aspects of riot behavior that remain unaccounted for by existing rational choice theory. Specifically, the selective incidences of property destruction that characterized riot activity immediately after the precipitating event and preceding the onset of widespread looting constitute collective action aimed at creating a public good, that good being the reduction of discrimination. By destroying property, the rioters are imposing costs on those who put into practice their taste for discrimination. The fact that property destruction was to a large extent selective and aimed at those merchants and public institutions that had a reputation for maltreatment of blacks lends support to this hypothesized relationship.[13] Merchants, landlords, and even public officials who incorporate their taste for discrimination into their transactions with blacks would now have to include an element of expected costs into their calculations: the relatively large value of the property times the small but apparently non-zero probability of it being destroyed in a riot, should one occur. Expected costs need be only marginally greater than one's discrimination coefficient in order to make refraining from discrimination rational.[14]

Individual Contributions to the Public Goods of Rioting

With the elimination of discrimination identified as the public good created by the property destruction in a riot, there still remains the problem of free rider effects with respect to the production of these public goods. All members of the black community will receive the benefits of the public goods regardless of whether or not they contribute to their production by actually participating in the collective acts of property destruction. What, then, prevents this free rider possibility from precluding the rational individual from participating in collective violence aimed at the creation of public goods?

Chamberlin (1974) has shown that, contrary to Olson's (1965, p. 44) conclusions about the free rider problem in large groups, increases in group size do not necessarily result in free rider effects when the public good in question is a normal or superior inclusive good (see Appendix 1). Indeed, for non-inferior goods, as the size of the group increases, each individual's contribution approaches zero, whereas the amount of the good available for each individual to consume continues to increase.

Following Chamberlin, then, we can say that as long as the elimination of some form of discrimination, considered as a public good, exhibits the non-rivalness of consumption property (i.e., is an inclusive public good) and is not an inferior good, then we cannot reject the possibility of victims of such discrimination cooperating in the provision of that public good, even in the absence of coercion or side payments. It can be argued that the two dimensions of public-sector discrimination do constitute inclusive public goods, whereas two dimensions of private-sector discrimination are exclusive public goods. Consumer market discrimination—the fifth dimension we defined—is a mixed case: Some forms of it are inclusive, whereas others are exclusive.

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[13] The selectivity of property destruction is discussed in the Kerner Report (1968) and in Feagin and Hahn (1973). Selectivity of property destruction is most evident in the early stages of riots (before the onset of widespread looting) and in those riots that did not proceed to the looting stage. Apparently, the earlier, targeted property destruction creates looting opportunities, but once looting has become widespread, looters do not confine their activity to those buildings damaged earlier. They begin to vandalize additional stores on the basis of their looting value and not on the basis of their reputation for discriminatory practices against blacks.

[14] According to Friedman and Savage (1968), it is against the possibility of just such a loss that the rational individual will attempt to insure himself. Individuals with moderate or high incomes buy insurance to protect themselves against the small probability of a large loss. To the extent that rioters are selective in their destruction of property (singling out those who do discriminate), the most efficient (and perhaps cheapest) way for a landlord or merchant to insure himself against such losses is simply to refrain from incorporating his taste for discrimination into his dealings with members of the minority community. Presumably, he is already sustaining some losses in real income by indulging his taste for discrimination (Becker, 1957). Alternatively, merchants who discriminate may choose to sell out to others with no taste for discrimination, in which case the outcome for blacks is the same: a reduction in market discrimination. See Murtagh (1983b) for an analysis of the metropolitan-wide impact of civil violence on markets and governments.

Specifically, a reduction in job discrimination would represent an exclusive public good in that the amount of this good available for consumption by blacks is a function of the number of jobs available in the community. And in most instances, the supply of jobs is assumed to be fixed for the short term, largely because it is a function of the supply of capital, which is itself usually assumed to be fixed in the short term. Each unit of this public good exists as the elimination of the "color tax" on one discrete job slot. Therefore, each unit can be consumed by one and only one member of the previously discriminated against group. Once a black has obtained a particular job, there is one less unit of the public good available for other blacks to consume. In this respect, the elimination of job discrimination seems rather clearly subject to crowding effects and thus would have to be considered an exclusive public good. A similar argument can be made for a reduction in housing discrimination and in the market discrimination for fixed-stock consumer goods as being exclusive public goods.[15] As such, these three public goods—reductions in discrimination with respect to (respectively) housing, jobs, and the sale of certain types of consumer goods—would be subject to free rider effects, and we would not expect blacks to cooperate in order to provide themselves only with these public goods.

It can be argued, however, that law enforcement and judicial discrimination seem to be as free from crowding effects as any inclusive good. Lowering the probability of arrest and conviction (or, more precisely, reducing the arbitrariness of arrest and conviction) for one black does not diminish the amount by which the probability of arrest and conviction for another black is lowered by the elimination of police and judicial discrimination. Similarly, the elimination of the "color tax" in the sentencing of one black is independent of the likelihood that another black will have this tax eliminated from his sentence.

Likewise, educational discrimination should be relatively free from crowding effects. The benefits one black child receives from increases in the quality of instruction and amount of educational capital available in his school does not diminish the amount of benefits a fellow student can derive from the same increases. Thus, the elimination of educational discrimination would seem to be more nearly an inclusive public good.

At first glance, it would seem that consumer market discrimination would be an exclusive public good, both because it is a market phenomenon like job and housing discrimination, and because it operates as a discrete "color tax" on units of goods that are purchased. However, for many nondurable consumer goods such as food and clothing items, their supply is not likely to be fixed in the short term. Therefore, the supply of the public good represented by elimination of the color tax on units of such goods is likewise not appreciably diminished by any one person's consumption of units of this good. As such, this form of discrimination would appear to be more nearly inclusive than other forms of market discrimination.

As for whether they are normal or superior, this is an empirical question which cannot be determined a priori because it is based on the income elasticity of demand for the good. There is, in fact, empirical evidence that would tend to support the contention that the elimination of some forms of discrimination is at least a normal if not a superior good. The single best predictor of riot frequency and intensity in a city is the size of the city's black population (Spilerman, 1970), or, more precisely, the number of blacks living in segregated neighborhoods (Murtagh, 1983b). This can be interpreted as meaning that the larger the size of the group that will benefit from the public goods of rioting, the more likely those goods are to be provided through rioting and the greater the amount of the good that will be provided. This is precisely the relationship that exists between group size and the provision of normal inclusive public goods, according to Chamberlin (1974). On this basis, at least one of the inclusive public goods of rioting would appear to be noninferior as well.

The importance of Chamberlin's analysis is that by demonstrating that rational individuals will contribute to the provision of normal inclusive public goods, we are led to the conclusion that the formulation of the public goods element in existing models of rational rioters (equation 1) is not entirely accurate. At the very least, it must be formulated in a manner that does not imply so exclusively the free rider option.

Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) have developed a model of the decision matrix that the rational individual faces when deciding whether or not—and if so, how much—to contribute to the provision of a public good (see Appendix 2).[16] Their decision matrix differs from the decision calculus in equation (1) in that they assume that rational individuals behave strategically: They estimate the likelihood that others will contribute to the public good (and if so, how much) as a first step in making their own decision as to whether or not to contribute. In the decision calculus for riot participation, the individual considers not only the effect of his contribution on the probability that the good will be provided. He must compare the increase in expected value to himself of the good's provision ($n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i$ in Table 1) with the cost of his contribution (D). As long as his estimate of the size of the donation he must make to ensure the good's provision (given his estimate of the aggregate donations of others) is less than the expected value to him of the good (the value of the good times the probability of its provision, given his and other's donations), he has an incentive to donate. Olson's free rider effect would occur only in the extreme case where the individual estimates there to be a very high probability that the contributions of others will be sufficient to provide the good without any contribution from him (i.e., in Table 1, p_0 approaches 1). The only other instance in which it would clearly be rational for the individual to contribute nothing would be the case where the individual estimates that no matter how large his donation, it is unlikely that total donations will aggregate in such a way as to be sufficient for the provision of the good. But in this case he is not being a free rider; rather, he is simply not contributing to what he estimates to be a hopeless cause. Thus, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970, pp. 112-113, 115-117) present a model of the decision calculus according to which, for the individual who behaves strategically, larger group size may result in an increased willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods. The larger the group, the smaller his estimate of the amount that he will have to contribute to ensure the good is provided. And the larger the group, the greater will be his estimate of the likelihood that his and others' donations will aggregate in such a way as to result in the provision of the good. Given this decision calculus, the greater the value of the good to the individual, the more likely he is to make what he estimates to be his optimum contribution.

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[15] The supply of both is fixed in the short term as is the supply of credit. Both are subject to "color taxes" that can be waived for members of the majority stigmatic group. The case for discrimination in other types of consumer goods is discussed later.

What is it that people contribute, by rioting, to the provision of the public goods of rioting? They contribute riot behaviors such as property destruction and attacks on police. The cost (D) to an individual of contributing to the public goods of rioting is the expected cost to him of that criminal act. This has been defined earlier as the discounted monetary equivalent of the punishment he would receive times the probability of appre-

Table 1. The Individual's Decision-matrix Regarding Possible Donations for a Lumpy Good

Range of j's Possible Donations	Amounts by Which the Total Donations of "Others" May Fall Short of the Cost of Providing the Good							
	0	1	2	. . .	i	. . .	n	$n+1$
0	n	0	0		0		0	0
1	$n-1$	$n-1$	-1		-1		-1	-1
2	$n-2$	$n-2$	$n-2$		-2		-2	-2
. . .								
D	$n-D$	$n-D$	$n-D$		$(n-D, -D)$*		$-D$	$-D$
. . .								
$n-1$	1	1	1		1		$-(n-1)$	$-(n-1)$
n	0	0	0		0		0	$-n$
	p_0	p_1	p_2		p_i		p_n	p_{n+1}

Probability j assigns to the possibilities that the contributions of others will aggregate to the specified sum.

*The value of the entry is $n-D$ if D is less than or equal to i. Otherwise it is $-D$.

Source: Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970).

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[16] The matrix presented in Appendix 2 applies to "lumpy" goods. The matrix for non-lumpy goods is slightly different but produces the same results: When one acts strategically (i.e., considers the likely behavior of others), it can be rational to contribute to the provision of public goods, even in the absence of selective incentives. See Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) for a complete discussion of the non-lumpy goods case.

hension and conviction (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). In these terms, the individual must decide whether, for a non-lumpy good, the expected increase in the amount of the public good provided by his criminal act is worth more to him than the expected costs of that act. For a lumpy good, the question is whether the increase in the expected value of the public good—its value to him times the increased probability of its provision—exceeds the expected costs of the criminal act he is considering contributing.

This conception of the public goods component of the individual's decision calculus seems especially relevant to the explanation of the riot's inception as well as the later, non-looting property destruction. Riots typically begin as crowd violence associated with a particular police action that is perceived by the crowd as being discriminatory. Crowd violence directed at the police can be seen as efforts aimed at reducing the tendency of police to discriminate against blacks. Presumably, there are individuals in the crowd who view the elimination of police discrimination as a public good which they themselves value. An individual with a high demand for that good would estimate the probability that if he took some action (for instance, throwing a bottle at the police car) the others who valued the good would, as a group, also contribute enough additional antipolice behavior (such as shouting threats at the police, throwing objects at them, and resisting police efforts to identify and apprehend the initial bottle thrower) to create the public good (here, reluctance on the part of the police to use excessive force against black suspects).

There are two important points to note about this explanation of the inception of a riot. First, for a given level of contributions D (the expected criminal costs of the act), it can be said that the greater one's demand for the good (i.e., the greater the utility one would derive from its consumption), the lower the subjective probability of its provision can be without precluding the rationality of committing the act. All that is required is that the expected benefits (the individual's utility derived from the good times the probability of its provision) exceed the expected costs. Therefore, even for lower values of the probability of the public good's provision, individuals with high demand for the good could still find it rational to make contributions of a given expected cost. This is the logic of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young's (1971) "political entrepreneurial" behavior.

The second point has to do with the effect of group size on the rationality of the acts that constitute the riot's inception. The larger the crowd that witnesses the precipitating event, the lower the probability that any one of its members will be arrested for an act of violence directed towards police. Therefore, the larger the crowd, the lower are the expected costs of "donating" a given act, and the greater the likelihood that some member(s) of the crowd will "donate" the act(s) that mark the inception of a riot. Their behavior can be explained as individual contributions to the provision of the public good represented by the elimination of police discrimination.

Similar logic allows the application of this model to the explanation of property destruction subsequent to the riot's inception (and before the onset of widespread looting). Such violence is intended to impose costs on those who discriminate and thereby to deter them from the further indulgence of their respective tastes for discrimination in their transactions with members of the black community. For a given act of property destruction, the greater one's demand for the public good involved, the lower can be the probability that destroying property will in fact deter discrimination without the rationality of that individual's committing the act (i.e., making the donation D) being precluded. Those who stand to suffer the greatest loss of utility from a given form of discrimination are the most likely to engage in destroying property of those who practice that type of discrimination.

Committing an act of property destruction undoubtedly increases the subjective probability that the associated public good will be provided. If the good in question is a lumpy good, then an additional act of property destruction (i.e., increasing one's donation) increases the likelihood that that good will be provided. And if the good in question is a non-lumpy good, an additional act of property destruction by an individual increases the amount of the public good that is made available for later consumption. Hence, so long as the increase in expected benefits (i.e., the increased amount of the good times the increased probability of its provision) exceeds the expected costs of the criminal act, the individual will commit the act of property destruction.

And as with the inception of the riot, the larger the group that is rioting, the more likely each such act of property destruction becomes because the probability of any one participant's arrest and conviction for the act is decreased and, therefore, so are each participant's expected costs for committing the act. This is nothing more than the logic used by Gunning (1972) and Chalmers and Shelton (1975) and others to account for looting behavior. We have simply shown that the same logic applies to other riot behaviors such as property destruction, which are intended to provide public goods.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to define the theoretical anomalies that remain in rational choice models of civil violence and to attempt to resolve those dilemmas by bringing to bear upon them other theoretical constructs from the rational choice paradigm. Specifically, we have shown that by assuming free rider effects with respect to the public goods of rioting, rational choice models of violence are unable to explain the inception of violence or later non-looting riot behaviors. We have argued that by incorporating into existing models the theoretical contributions of Chamberlin and Frohlich and Oppenheimer, these unexplained behaviors may be treated as individual contributions to the provision of public goods, with the elimination of stigmatically based discrimination defined as the public goods of rioting. Individuals are not motivated to participate strictly by private goods considerations. Indeed, unless one builds into the decision calculus such public goods considerations, one cannot account for the full range of behaviors that constitute an incidence of collective violence, nor for most of the riots that constitute a national wave of civil violence.

This theoretical elaboration suggests the value of drawing some distinctions among the participants in a riot. There exists a debate of sorts within the literature on racial violence over the question of who riots. On the one hand, there is the "underclass" or "social marginality" thesis which argues that the lower one's socioeconomic status, the greater is one's propensity to participate in a riot. On the other hand, there is the "new urban black" or "rising expectations" thesis which argues that the more upwardly mobile one is, the more likely one is to participate in a riot.[17] What this article implies is that both of these images of the typical rioter are, at least partially, correct. It is the latter group, motivated by the desire to eliminate racial barriers to their further mobility, that is most likely to be involved in the early stages of a riot. Once this group's more politically motivated activities have proceeded to the point of seriously crowding the coercive capacity of law enforcement agencies, then the former group will find it rational to enter the riot as looters. However, we should stress that it is the public goods oriented behaviors of the new urban blacks that are a necessary precondition for the private goods oriented activities of the "underclass" rioter.

This conclusion has some implications for the answer to the question that any theory of riot behavior should ultimately be able to address: That is, given the pattern of increasing frequency and intensity of riots from 1964 to 1968, why did these trends begin to decline after 1968? Our incorporation of public goods into the rationale of rioting does suggest some answers to this question. The willingness of people to engage in illegal activities in order to provide themselves with public goods is contingent upon their expectation that these behaviors will in fact be translated into government policies that create or redistribute public goods. With this in mind, it can be argued that the frequency and intensity of riots declined because they succeeded in providing the public goods they were intended to create. The many affirmative action programs of governments at all levels instigated from the 1960s on can be seen as efforts to reduce various forms of discrimination. As such, they constitute the enactment of the public goods of rioting.

An alternative explanation of the decline in rioting that is also derived from this model involves Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young's (1971) concept of the "political entrepreneur," whom they define as an individual who provides the organizational infrastructure, political skills, and other assets to ensure that the contributions of diverse individuals will aggregate in such a way as to ensure the provision of the public goods. With this concept in mind, we would note that the point in time at which riot frequency (and especially riot intensity) began to decline was shortly after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Although Dr. King did sincerely deplore violence as a political tactic, his behavior during this period can be seen as approximating that of the crucial political entrepreneur who translates the often inchoate concerns of rioters into concrete policy proposals aimed at alleviating those concerns. With his death there would be a concomitant decline in individuals' estimation of the probability that their riot behavior "contributions" would produce the public goods they desired. Therefore, their willingness to make those contributions would likewise decline, resulting in the eventual dissipation of the wave of violence that swept this nation during that time.

Finally, it should be noted that there is implicit in the proposed theoretical elaboration a critical test of its empirical validity. Variables measuring public-sector discrimination should be directly related to individual riot propensity, whereas the various dimensions of private sector discrimination should be only indirectly related. Murtagh (1983a) found that blacks do draw a distinction between public-sector and private-sector dimensions of discrimination and that the former are most strongly related to individual riot propensity. My preliminary analysis of Campbell and Schuman's "Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities" (1968) produced similar results: Two dimensions of perceived public-sector discrimination were more strongly related to riot propensity than any of the three dimensions of perceived private-sector discrimination; and when the public-sector variables are entered into a regression equation containing the three private-sector variables, the coefficients for the latter three variables were no longer statistically significant (i.e., non-zero). However, limitations of space and the preliminary nature of these findings preclude their presentation here. Suffice it to say that the model is testable, and that there is preliminary evidence in support of its empirical validity.

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[17] See Lupsha (1969), Feagin and Hahn (1973), Sears and McConahey (1973), and Caplan (1970), among others, for a discussion of these theories. See Miller, Bolce, and Halligan (1976), and Mason (1983) for empirical tests of certain aspects of these theories.

To conclude, I would argue that my model does increase the explanatory and predictive power of existing rational choice models of civil violence. It should allow the explanation of a broader range of specific riot behaviors and a greater proportion of the variance in riot frequency. An explanation for the decline of riot frequency in the 1970s can be derived from it. And, by referring to the public goods of rioting, it contains some clear implications as to the conditions that could increase the likelihood of riots in the 1980s. In this sense, my elaboration perhaps makes some small contribution towards better preparing us to identify and address the grievances underlying such violence. In so doing, it can perhaps allow us to avoid the escalation of a few riots into another extended period of widespread racial violence.

Figure A1.


D
B
A
O
E
E''
E'
M
I
N
C
Aggregate Contributions of All Others
Amount Contributed by the ith Individual

Source: Chamberlin (1974).

Appendix 1

Inclusive public goods are those for which the nonrivalness of consumption property holds, whereas exclusive public goods are those for which it does not hold. For an inclusive public good, then, increases in group size would not reduce the amount available for each member of the group to consume.

As for whether a public good is inferior, normal, or superior, this depends upon each individual's income elasticity of demand for the good, as reflected in the reaction curve between the amount contributed by the individual and the amount contributed by others (lines *AC*, *BC*, and *DC* in Figure A1).

In the case of an inferior good (*AC*), an extra unit provided by others induces the individual to reduce his contribution by at least one unit. Hence, if all contribute the same amount, the total amount of the good provided will decrease with increases in group size, and Olson's free rider effect occurs: Individuals are not likely to cooperate in order to provide themselves with such a good. For a normal good (*BC*), however, an extra unit provided by others induces a reduction of less than one unit in the amount provided by the individual. Hence, the total amount of the good actually increases with increases in group size, whereas the individual's contribution to its provision approaches zero. Finally, for a superior good (*DC*), an extra unit provided by others induces no reduction and perhaps even an increase in the amount provided by the individual. Here again, the total amount of the good provided increases with increases in group size. For a more thorough explication of these effects, see Chamberlin (1974).

Appendix 2

Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) have presented a model of the decision matrix that the rational individual faces when deciding whether or not—and if so how much—to contribute to the provision of a public good.

The columns of the matrix represent the possible net contributions of the other members of the inclusive group, and the values are indexed to represent the amounts by which these donations would fall short of the cost of providing the public good. Thus, column O represents the situation where the contributions of others are sufficient to provide the good without any contributions from the *j*th individual, and column 1 represents the situation where those contributions fall one unit short. The p_i's at the bottom of each column represent *j*'s subjective estimation of the probability that net contributions of others will fall *i* units short of the amount required for the provision of the good. The rows represent possible donations by *j*, and cell entries represent the net payoffs (the value to *j* of the public good minus the amount of his contribution) to *j* for donating the amount specified for that row, given the aggregate donations of the others specified for that column.

The expected value to *j* of each of the behavioral alternatives he faces can be represented as the sum of the expected values of the payoffs within each row. These can be represented as follows:

$$V_0 = nP_0 + (O) \sum_{i=1}^{n+1} P_i \qquad \text{(A1)}$$

$$V_1 = (n-1) \sum_{i=0}^{1} P_i + (-1) \sum_{i=2}^{n+1} P_i \qquad \text{(A2)}$$

$$V_D = (n-d) \sum_{i=0}^{D} P_i + (-D) \sum_{i=D+1}^{n+1} P_i \qquad \text{(A3)}$$

This last equation is the general case of the decision facing the individual. It can be rewritten as follows:

$$V_D = n \sum_{i=0}^{D} P_i - D \qquad \text{(A4)}$$

and the rational individual will donate the amount *D* that is associated with the largest expected payoff, *V*, as estimated according to the matrix. If *j* makes any donation, it must be the case that $V_D > V_O$. Therefore, *j* will contribute an amount *D* toward the provision of the public good if, and only if, the following inequality holds:

$$n \sum_{i=1}^{D} P_i > D \qquad \text{(A5)}$$

in which the left side represents the expected value of receiving the good and the right side is the cost to the individual of making a donation. What should be noted from equation (A5) is that the larger the donation the individual makes, the greater the probability that the good will be provided. Conversely, the more *j* contributes, the more the contributions of others can fall short of the cost of the good without *j*'s losing the good or, more precisely, not having it provided (Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970, p. 112).

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Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965

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A considerable amount of the international politics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations. There are, however, divergent views of this linkage. One view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power, while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal. Research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects of alliances on power relationships and has tended to focus its attention upon the occurrence of wars. This research examines the individual and joint effects of power and alliance upon the probability of 256 conflicts to escalate to reciprocated military action. The main finding is that equality of power, supplemented by alliance with a major power for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.

Despite the advent of an empirical revolution, research and theory in the study of international conflict are frequently contradictory and sometimes inchoate. This is nowhere clearer than in the body of research and theory that attempts to relate the distribution of power between and among nations to the onset of international conflict and war. In general, there are two opposing views of the relationship between power distribution and war. The first is known as balance of power theory: it argues that equal power leads to an equilibrium in which the chances of war are reduced because no nation can by itself prevail over its equals. The second view is that power equality leads to war, whereas inequality of power leads to peace because preponderant powers, through their position, are able to influence outcomes without resorting to war. In essence, these two theoretical positions make directly opposite predictions about the effects of power relationships on the outbreak of war.

The goal of this research is to explore the linkage between power relationships and the outbreak of war. Further, we will consider the role of alliances as they may interact with power relationships in the escalation of conflicts to war.

Power Relationships and War

A fundamental assertion of balance-of-power thought is that large-scale conflict between nations will be avoided when their power is approximately equal, and, conversely, will be more likely between nations that diverge in their power. This assertion is based on the assumption, frequently hidden, that in a conflict between any two nations there is a direct relationship between power and victory and, other considerations aside, the more powerful nation will prevail. Further, rational decision makers are assumed to be able to reach this same conclusion and to have reasonably accurate information on relative power relationships. Hence these decision makers will avoid initiating or escalating conflicts with nations that are equal to or more powerful than their own nation. This assumption leads to the hypothesis that it will be the stronger nation which initiates and escalates conflicts (Organski & Kugler, 1980, pp. 14-17). In essence, then, the balance-of-power view leads to the expectation of relative peace when nations are roughly equal in power, but the possibility of serious conflict when they are unequal in power. There is, however, a notable alternative point of view.

Organski (1968) argues that it is precisely when power is equal between nations that war is most likely. He reasons that in situations of conflict and unequal power, the strongest nation need not

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employ war to achieve its aim because weaker nations will not be able to resist its power. According to Organski's argument, when nations have nearly equal power, each will believe it has a chance of winning, thus making war more likely; conversely, when one nation is significantly more powerful, peace is more likely.[1] Although several empirical studies appear to sustain Organski's hypothesis (Garnham, 1976a, b; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972; Weede, 1976), a recent review of this research argues that the findings are heavily influenced by research designs that variously 1) include data not closely connected to the theory; 2) reduce the variance in the independent variables measuring power; 3) exclude cases of potential power disparity by using only conflicts between contiguous nations; or 4) analyze a restricted range of cases (Siverson & Sullivan, 1983).

Unfortunately, direct comparisons of the effects of different patterns of power distribution on war have been few (Organski & Kugler, 1980), perhaps because power relationships are correctly seen as an important component of the balance of power, whereas the balance of power is incorrectly thought to be a phenomenon of the system level alone (Waltz, 1979). Although some of the literature conceptualizes the balance of power as a purely systemic phenomenon, it is also true that numerous traditional and contemporary versions of the balance of power devote major attention to dyadic relationships (Craig & George, 1983, pp. 28-49; Wight, 1946). Moreover, as Singer (1980, p. 359) has noted, there are likely to be significant parallels between systemic properties and dyadic relationships: "Most of a system's properties rest upon and can be inferred from the relationships among its components." Thus, in many respects the system level may be seen as an aggregation of dyadic relationships. Our approach to the problem will be at the level of the dyad. This will not only permit an analysis that is free of any problems of the ecological fallacy (Sullivan & Siverson, 1981), but will also permit comparison of the balance of power to Organski's theory of "power preponderance."

Power in international politics is not only a property of the individual nation, but also of nations aggregated in alliances. In particular, alliances are thought to be especially important in adjusting power relationships in the balance of power. For example, in writing about conflict strategy in the balance-of-power system, George and Smoke (1974, pp. 16-17) note: "The usual object was to insure that one had as many great powers on one's own side as were numbered among the likely opponents. Accordingly, to be diplomatically isolated—without apparent allies—was to have one's deterrent capabilities undermined, and to isolate one's opponent was the prerequisite of going to war against him." It is the realization that a nation in isolation is in danger which is hypothesized to lead national decision makers into a search for allies to counterbalance their opponent's strength (Kaplan, 1957). In general, the effect accorded alliances in the balance of power is very similar to that of individual power; that is, when alliances are equal, relative peace will ensue, but when one alliance has greater power, war becomes possible.

A different view of alliances is developed by Organski and Kugler (1980) in their conception of the power preponderance approach. In general, they argue that alliances have little or no impact upon the onset of war. For example, in their comparison of the power-preponderance and balance-of-power theories, Organski and Kugler denigrate the role of alliances as a method of adjusting or redistributing power. They argue that "alliances are simply not a realistic method of preventing threatening changes in the distribution of world power, given the skewness of relations between the great and the lesser nations, and also among the half-dozen great powers themselves" (p. 25). Moreover, according to their view, even if alliances made a difference, they would be ineffective because "alliances cannot easily be made or unmade." They then conclude: "The assumption that underlies much of the balance of power model, namely, that the dictates of power considerations are sufficiently strong to guide the behavior of countries in making or breaking alliances, is not true" (p. 26). The results of their data analysis indicate that alliances play a relatively small role in the onset of war.[2]

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[1] Although we will refer to Organski's theory as power preponderance, it is also known as power parity and power transition. The former name has to do with Organski's hypothesis that war is likely when there is parity of power. We use the term power preponderance here because it is the logical equivalent to the balance of power; that is, although looking at exactly opposite conditions, each predicts that war is relatively unlikely. Power transition is a term that describes the general dynamic state of power relationships between two antagonists that is necessary for a war to occur (Organski & Kugler, 1980).

[2] This is the substance of their finding. What they actually report is slightly different and reflects a lack of distinction between the *onset* of war and its spread. In their analysis of the effect of changing power and alliance structure on the war participation of major powers and contenders, Organski and Kugler find that alliances explain a significant amount of the variance in war (27%), but only for the major powers and not for the contenders. In summary, they argue that the contenders

From the above review it may be seen that there is little agreement about the effects of power relationships and alliances upon the outbreak of war. In the next section we show how several new aspects of our analysis allow an assessment of how, individually and jointly, power relationships and alliances affect the escalation of international conflicts to the military activities typically associated with war.

The Approach and the Data

Our approach to analyzing the linkages between power relationships, alliance, and war differs in several important ways from those of other researchers. The most significant difference is that our dependent variable is not war alone; rather, we focus on a range of conflict measured on a three-point scale, the highest point of which corresponds to war. Our definition of conflict is similar to that of Bloomfield and Leiss (1969, pp. 13-15), who view it not as a single incident of hostile activity, but as a series of phases of violent or nonviolent behavior.

> Within each phase exist factors—conditions, perceptions, or events—that generate pressures. Some of these pressures tend toward violence and some tend away from violence. . . . Within each phase the factors interact in such a way as to *push the conflict ultimately* across a series of thresholds toward or away from violence. . . . Violence-producing factors and those tending away from violent outcomes in fact have their interaction during phases. . . . The event of transition is itself a product of forces that have been at work throughout the phases (emphasis in original deleted).

From our perspective, power relationshps and alliances constitute important factors which are hypothesized to have various effects upon whether a conflict will enter a new, more violent phase, or, alternatively will be settled without recourse to violence. Conflicts hence consist of various thresholds, the crossing of any one of which indicates a highly significant change in conflictual activity. Our research is directed toward understanding to what extent power and alliances affect the possibility that a conflict will cross a threshold, especially the threshold associated with the mutual use of organized military activity. In a very direct way, this method of observing conflict measures the extent to which conflicts escalate. Specifically, we are interested in three levels of conflict:

> 1) *Threat.* An explicit verbal statement threatening overt military action, directed at a target nation or nations.
>
> 2) *Unreciprocated military action.* Military action taken by one state against an unresponsive target state. This action may involve physical violence, but it may also include acts that are not necessarily violent, such as a naval blockade.
>
> 3) *Reciprocated military action:* Military action taken by one nation that provokes a target state to engage the initiator in military combat. This category includes qualifying international wars.

Unlike studies that use only war as a dependent variable, the use of conflict measured on a three-point index allows us to evaluate not just the outbreak of very violent conflict, but also *the relative tendencies* of conflicts to reach this severe level.

Beside allowing the observation of escalation, the use of the three-point scale of conflict for measuring the dependent variable has another subtle, but significant advantage. In a rigorous analysis of the logic of the research designs used in the study of war, Most and Starr (1982) argue persuasively against the adoption of an approach that has only war as the dependent variable. A consequence of research designs in which war is the dependent variable is that numerous researchers:

> often in effect focus on conflicts that are reported to have occurred—"successful" occurrences of the dependent war variable—and work backward. Using a design or case selection procedure that is appropriate only for probing possible necessary relationships, they proceed to examine questions of sufficiency and utilize statistical techniques that are appropriate for such queries. They fail to match the cases they consider with the questions that they ask and the methods that they employ. (p. 841).

Most and Starr conclude that "an understanding of the conditions that are sufficient for war logically entails the inclusion of both 'war' and 'peace' as the dependent variable." For an appropriate test of the balance of power, such an approach is vital. As we have noted above, the balance of power is in part a theory of why wars do not occur. If we were to explore this idea in the way most recent researchers have, it would entail correlating the wars that took place with the extent to which, for example, power was equal or unequal. It would not, however, tell us anything about the extent, if any, to which power equality mitigated against conflicts escalating into wars, which is precisely the prediction of balance-of-power theory. By using the three-point scale, we

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are "impervious to the claims of other nations" and that major powers fought "when others [i.e., the contenders] decided to fight." Thus for the initial onset of war, alliances are swept into the background.

are able to observe conflicts that did *not* become wars.

Our approach also differs from previous research on war in three other ways. First, the only nations for which data are collected are the initial two participants in a conflict; this reflects our central interest in the outbreak of conflict rather than its subsequent spread. Research that has sought to link alliances with variables such as the nation-months of war (Singer & Small, 1968) may be measuring the war-spreading effects of alliances rather than their impact upon the onset of war (Siverson & King, 1979). Our focus upon only the two initial actors will avoid this problem and permit us to assess the effects of alliances upon the onset of war. A second difference is that we identify one of the initial two participants as the initiator and the other as the target. Because power and alliances are hypothesized by the balance of power to deter nations from initiating conflicts against nations with specific power and alliance attributes, the data cannot really be tested without distinguishing between the two opponents. It should be noted, however, that the initiator of a conflict is not necessarily the aggressor, but rather the nation that made the initial overt threat. Finally, we examine only the effects of alliances that include at least one major power, because if alliances are supposed to augment a nation's power, then the effects of alliance should be most clearly evident in those cases where the incremental increase in power is the greatest. Such would be the case with a major power ally.

Although the procedures used to create our data set are discussed at length elsewhere (Siverson & Tennefoss, 1982), we believe it is useful to describe them briefly. The data set was created by locating international conflicts in numerous studies of European and international history and then categorizing these conflicts according to their level of hostility on the three-point scale discussed above. To be included in the data set, a conflict must meet two criteria: first, both participants had to be recognized as nation states, and second, at least one of the participants must have been a major power. Table 1 lists the major powers and dates of inclusion as such. This list is similar but not identical to other lists of the major powers (Singer & Small, 1972). (A list of minor powers appears in Siverson & Tennefoss, 1982.)

Table 1. Nation-states Classified as Major Powers and Time Periods of Classification, 1816-1965

Austria-Hungary	1816-1918
France	1816-1940 1945-1965
Great Britain	1816-1965
Prussia/Germany	1816-1918 1923-1945
West Germany	1955-1965
Russia	1816-1917 1922-1965
Sardinia/Italy	1860-1943
Japan	1895-1945
United States	1899-1965
China	1950-1965

Three points need to be made about the relationship between our index of conflict and the data measured by it. First, empirically the index constitutes a monotonic ordinal scale. It is monotonic in the sense we assume that every case of unreciprocated military action was previously at the threat level, and that every case of unreciprocated military action passed through the two previous levels of conflict. In some cases this passage was very brief, whereas in others it was drawn out. In those instances in which events unfolded relatively slowly, our decision to treat the situation as either one case or more than one case was governed largely by the historical descriptions in our sources. Second, as defined by Singer and Small (1972), wars are coded as reciprocated military actions rather than as a separate category of conflict. As noted above, we sought an index that had clearly visible thresholds of substantive import. To move from a threat to the actual use of military force, for example, involves a clear and unmistakable shift in the type and nature of a conflict. Similarly, when one actor uses violence, the other must make a choice about the nature of his response. Once both actors choose to use force, however, the thresholds are not so clearly delimited, and escalation proceeds not so much in terms of violations of thresholds as it does in changes in he actual severity or spread of the conflict. Although we may characterize the highest level of hostility as war, it is necessary to recognize that this category is closer to Garnham's (1976b) "lethal dyads" than to Singer's and Small's (1972) wars, even though many of the latter are included in our data.

Third, our data base contains only instances of conflictual activity; at a minimum, all cases involve threatening behavior by at least one antagonist. Therefore we cannot, nor is it our intention to, draw inferences about the conditions for the initiation of conflicts. Our interest is in exploring the effects of power and alliances on the escalation of conflict to mutual military action. We start from the assumption that a serious dispute is already taking place and then examine the influence of power relationships and alliance on the

Table 2. International Conflict by Time Periods

Conflict Level	1815-1914		1915-1965		Total
	N	%	*N*	%	
1	42	42.8	73	46.2	115
2	28	28.6	50	31.6	78
3	28	28.6	35	22.1	63
Total	98		159		256

escalation of hostilities. Threat, our lowest level of conflict, serves as the base from which we start our analysis; events must at least have reached that threshold to be studied.

We have claimed several virtues for our approach, but candor compels our recognition of at least two limitations. Had resources been available, it would have been desirable to locate all conflicts taking place between nations; that is, to have included also those involving only minor powers. As it is, the exclusion of solely minor power conflicts will impose a limit on our ability to draw inferences about the effects of power. A second problem is that our measurement of power is dichotomous, and thus our ability to explore fully the relationships between major powers is limited. For this reason alone, our analysis must be seen as tentative rather than conclusive. Nonetheless, the strength of our results should in some degree compensate for these two limitations.

Our data set contains a total of 256 conflicts. Table 2 breaks down these cases according to their conflict level and when they occurred. It may be noted that the relative proportion of cases at each level of conflict does not vary greatly across time periods.

Data Analysis

Let us begin by examining the effect of the power relationship in a dyad on the tendency for conflicts to escalate to the highest level of our scale, reciprocated military action. Table 3 gives the results of cross-tabulating the conflict data by the power of the initiator and the target. In these data several interesting patterns are immediately apparent. Generally, differences in power had a substantial effect on the level of the conflict, but in different ways. First, among major powers, where presumably power was roughly equal, 61.7% of the conflicts never moved beyond the lowest level, and only relatively few (19.8%) involved mutual military action. Second, in instances in which major powers initiated conflicts with minor powers, a much higher proportion (27%) escalated to the highest level. Both of these patterns are generally in accord with what might be expected from balance-of-power theory. However, balance-of-power theory not only asserts the conditions for conflict, but also implies who will initiate it. What is apparently not in complete accord with the ideas of the balance of power is the number and level of conflicts initiated by minor powers against major powers; minor powers initiated 49 conflicts (19.1%) with major powers, and a substantial proportion (26.5%) of these escalated to the highest level. Because the balance-of-power theory predicts that it is the stronger nation which will initiate conflicts, these data are somewhat anomalous. As we have noted, however, alliances are often seen as a method of increasing a nation's strength, and hence we need to

Table 3. Antagonists' Power Relationship and Conflict

Initiator's Power	Major				Minor	
Target's Power	Major		Minor		Major	
Conflict Level	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	50	61.7	48	38.1	17	34.7
2	15	18.5	44	34.9	19	38.7
3	16	19.8	34	27.0	13	26.5
Total	81		126		49	

$X^2 = 14.31$
$df = 4$
$p < .01$
$N = 256$

Table 4. Antagonists' Major Power Ally Status and Conflict

Did initiator have a major power ally?	Yes				No			
Did target have a major power ally?	Yes		No		Yes		No	
Conflict Level	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	49	58.3	26	35.6	18	43.9	22	37.9
2	20	23.8	21	28.5	13	31.7	24	41.4
3	15	17.8	26	35.6	10	24.4	12	20.6
Total	84		73		41		58	

$X^2 = 14.45$
$df = 6$
$p < .05$
$N = 256$

explore the possibility that the minor powers initiating conflict with major powers had major power allies. With such support, they might feel confident in their actions. We examine this possibility, but first we look at the individual effect of alliances on conflict.

Table 4 reports conflict data in terms of whether or not the initiator and target had at least one major power ally.[3] In large part, the data are strikingly consistent with balance-of-power theory. In those cases in which both nations had a major power ally, there was a pronounced tendency for the conflicts to remain at the lowest level (58.3%). Conflicts arose, but in general they were not pursued to higher levels. However, we find that the largest proportion of cases (35.6%) escalated to the highest level when the initiator had a major power ally and the target did not; in fact, these cases not only constitute the highest proportion of those escalating, they also represent the largest concentration of cases ($N=26$) at the highest level. Such a pattern in the data is, of course, completely consistent with the balance-of-power idea that alliances can be used to gain the necessary strength to initiate conflicts. When neither nation had a major power ally, we also found that relatively few conflicts escalated to reciprocated military activity, even though a rather large percentage involved only one nation engaging in military activity.[4]

A pattern inconsistent with the balance of power is apparent in those instances in which the initiator did not have a major power ally and the target did. Although the overall number of cases is relatively small, their existence and the proportion that escalated (24.4%) suggest that achieving deterrence in the balance of power is probably not just a matter of major power alliances.

We now consider the joint effects of alliances and power relationships. The three parts of Table 5 display the results of considering the conflict data with the power status and alliance status of the initiator and target. From the balance of power perspective, the relationships are, to say the least, perplexing. In conflicts between major powers, the presence of a major power ally does not make any significant difference in the level of the conflict. This finding tends to support both Organski's view that wars begin when nations are equal in power and Organski and Kugler's finding that allies do not make a substantial difference in the onset of war between major powers.

When major powers initiated conflict with minor powers, a very different pattern may readily be seen. Although allied major powers initiated no small amount of conflict with allied minor powers, only a modest number of the conflicts went to the highest level (16.7%), and the majority of conflicts (52.8%) remained at the lowest level; the pattern is similar to the major power

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[3] The alliance data are drawn from Sabrosky's (1975) revision of a large, original data set gathered by Singer and Small (1968). Initially we computed gamma and tau b between the level of hostility and the number of allies for both the target and the initiator during various time periods. The resulting statistics ranged between −.23 and .05. One was significant at the .01 level (tau b for the initiator between 1915 and 1965), but it explained only 4% of the variance.

[4] As part of our initial analysis of the data, we examined whether the type of alliance (i.e., defense, neutrality, or entente) was related to conflict level. In no case were the differences statistically significant.

Table 5. Antagonists' Alliance Status, Power Status, and Conflict

Initiator has major power ally?	Yes				No			
Target has major power ally?	Yes		No		Yes		No	
Conflict Level	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Major versus major conflict								
1	23	60.5	10	71.4	9	64.3	8	53.3
2	6	15.8	2	14.3	3	21.4	4	26.6
3	9	23.7	2	14.3	2	13.3	3	20.0
$X^2 = 2.02$ $df = 6$ $p < .80$ $N = 81$								
Major versus minor conflict								
1	19	52.8	15	26.8	2	67.0	12	38.7
2	11	30.5	17	30.4	0		16	51.6
3	6	16.7	24	42.4	1	33.3	3	9.6
$X^2 = 18.74$ $df = 6$ $p < 0.02$ $N = 126$								
Minor versus major conflict								
1	7	70.0	1	33.0	7	29.2	2	16.6
2	3	30.0	2	67.0	10	41.7	4	33.3
3	0		0		7	29.2	6	50.0
$X^2 = 11.86$ $df = 6$ $p < 0.07$ $N = 49$								

versus major power cases discussed above. However, when allied major powers initiated conflicts with nonallied minor powers, the results were clearly lethal. Fully 42.4% of these conflicts moved to the highest level, whereas only 26.8% remained at the lowest level. Equally telling is the overall lack of data in those instances in which a nonallied major power initiated conflict with an allied minor power. One may be tempted to dismiss the lack of data as merely a consequence of the fact that because major powers are alliance-prone (Job, 1976; Siverson & Duncan, 1976), there were relatively few instances in which they did not have a major power ally. However, such an explanation does not hold because an examination of the last column of data, containing conflicts in which neither the major power nor minor power had an ally, shows a significant amount of conflict. A more plausible explanation for the lack of data is the protective effect of a major power ally. For minor powers, a major power ally was evidently able to provide the augmentation of national strength necessary to achieve deterrence. In sum, the relationship between a major power initiator and a minor power target is very heavily influenced by whether or not these nations have a major power ally.

Above we promised to consider further the cases in which minor powers initiated conflicts against major powers. We suggested that the surprising high frequency with which these cases appeared could be consistent with balance of power theory if the minor powers had major powers to support them. The third section of Table 5 shows that just the opposite is true. Among these data no allied minor power initiated a conflict with a major power that eventuated at the highest level. In fact, once again there is a significant lack of data. One possible explanation for this is that major powers protected their minor power allies so well that the latter did not have the need to engage in much conflict themselves; however, data on conflicts initiated by major powers against allied minor powers seem to indicate that this is not the case (Table 5, second section). A more probable explanation would be that major powers very effectively control their minor power allies and refuse to allow them to initiate conflicts that are potentially too costly for the major power. Recent research by Weede (1983) details such control and describes the accompanying erosion of the minor powers' sovereignty as part of the heavy price of peace.

If data are relatively sparse for allied minor power initiators, they are surprisingly abundant for nonallied minor power initiators. Clearly under some circumstances minor powers lacking a major power ally are willing to initiate conflicts with major powers. We will return to this point below.

Interactions among Variables

An important problem which our analysis thus far has not directly considered is the extent to which the effects of 1) alliances with major powers, and 2) power status, jointly or independently influence the escalation of conflict. The exploration of this relationship is essential for determining to what extent alliances and power status are themselves responsible for escalating conflicts, and to what extent they interact to do the same.

A useful method of investigating this relationship is through log-linear modeling, a relatively recent development that constitutes a significant advance in the analysis of multiway contingency tables of the sort we use. Relying upon the definition of interaction based upon cross-product ratios of expected cell frequencies, log-linear modeling permits the simultaneous examination of mutual variation among qualitative variables.[5] Thus we are able to engage in the direct assessment of interaction among variables in contingency tables, and by using this technique we can determine whether the effects of alliance and power status on conflict are independent or interactive.

The data in Table 5 were analyzed using the log-linear modeling program BMD P3F (Dixon & Brown, 1979). The resulting partial and marginal associations are presented in Table 6. The results indicate four significant second order interactions conflict and the target's alliance status [*CT*], power status and the target's alliance status [*PT*],

Table 6. Partial and Marginal Associations for Selected Variables, 1815-1965

		Partials		Marginals	
Effect	*DF*	X^2	*p*	X^2	*p*
C	2	15.31	<.01		
P	2	32.98	<.01		
T	1	.13	.72		
I	1	12.37	<.01		
CP	4	11.25	.02	13.56	<.01
CT	2	4.71	.09	7.05	.03
CI	2	2.59	.27	3.39	.18
PT	2	38.46	<.01	30.58	<.01
PI	2	39.49	<.01	30.08	<.01
TI	1	12.68	<.01	3.29	.07
CPT	4	4.26	.37	3.27	.51
CPI	4	10.67	.03	11.47	.02
CTI	2	.54	.76	3.28	.19
PTI	2	4.07	.13	2.17	.34
CPTI	4	5.04	.28		

C = Conflict level
P = Power status
I = Major power alliance status of initiator
T = Major power alliance status of target

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[5] For an explanation of the method see Bishop, Feinberg, and Holland (1975), Feinberg (1977), and Knoke and Burke (1980). There are three points which need to be made about the use of log-linear analysis. First, Table 5 has several cells with no data. Such cells are troublesome for log-linear analysis. The solution we adopted was to add 0.5 to all cells (Knoke & Burke, 1980). Second, log-linear relationships are nested, and hence [*CTI*] (see Table 6 for variable identifications) includes not only a three-way relationship, but also [*CT*], [*CI*], and [*CT*]. Finally, log-linear relationships in reality have one less effect than is apparent. Thus [*CPT*], for example, contains the joint effect of *P* and *T* upon *C* (plus, of course, the nested effects of *P* and *T* individually upon *C*).

power status and the initiator's alliance status [*PI*] and the target's and initiator's alliance status [*TI*], and one significant third order interaction (conflict, power status, and the initiator's alliance status [*CPI*]), and no significant fourth order interaction. It is noteworthy that neither the second order interaction between the level of conflict and the initiator's major power alliance status ([*CI*]), nor the third order interaction, which further incorporates the target's major power alliance status ([*CTI*]), is significant. In other words, *when the log-linear models are fitted, relationships that earlier appeared to be important wash out.*

Our attempt to determine which variables and combinations of variables can best account for the distribution of cases in Table 5 will be governed by two main considerations: first, although a model could conceivably be constructed around all the significant parameters in Table 6, the demands of parsimony dictate otherwise. Instead we are required to construct that model with the fewest possible parameters. Second, in log-linear modeling there is, strictly speaking, no dependent variable, only cell probabilities affected by the variables. Because we are interested in the effects of independent variables on the escalation of conflict, our modeling should center on how power and alliance variables affect the distribution of conflict ([*C*]).

Table 7 lists the 13 models we considered. We began with a very simple model specifying that conflict [*C*] values were influenced by power status ([*P*]), the major power alliance status of the initiator ([*I*]), and the major power alliance status of the target ([*T*]). The resulting Model 1, [*CT*] [*CI*] [*CP*], however, yields a very poor fit ($X^2 = 95.3$, $df = 21$, $p < 0.001$). We then tested three other models having as a base this same four variable combination plus in each model one different second order interaction. As Table 7 indicates, the addition of [*PT*] or [*PI*] or [*TI*] to Model 1 did nothing to improve the fit of Models 2, 3, or 4, respectively. Model 5, which includes the third order interaction [*PTI*], does not fit well either, but it does produce the first observable probability value.

Model 6 introduces the third order interaction [*CPI*], which through nesting also includes both [*CP*] and [*CI*] as well as [*PI*]. The resulting model produces a very strong fit between the model's expected values and the data ($X^2 = 9.6$, $df = 10$, $p = 0.48$). Although the fit of Model 6 is quite good, there are reasons why we need to look beyond this model; quite simply, the fit is "too good." In model building of this type, one is interested in using the fewest possible variables to get the best fit between the model and the data. However, Knoke and Burke (1980) and Bishop, Feinberg, and Holland (1975, pp. 324-329) both warn of fits that are "too good."[6] Although it is not clear exactly what specifications determine whether or not a fit is "too good," Knoke and Burke suggest that models with probabilities between 0.10 and 0.35 should be the most useful; Model 6 exceeds the upper threshold. Our second reason for looking beyond Model 6 is its size and complexity. It encompasses nine individual second and third order interactions and leaves only 10 degrees of freedom. In an effort to produce a more parsimonious model, we deleted [*CT*] from Model 6. The resulting model, Model 7, has a significantly worse fit than Model 6.

Table 7. Models of the Data in Table 5

	Model	*DF*	X^2	*p*
1.	*[CT] [CI] [CP]*	21	95.3	<.001
2.	*[CT] [CI] [CP] [PT]*	19	66.7	<.001
3.	*[CT] [CI] [CP] [PI]*	19	65.7	<.001
4.	*[CT] [CI] [CP] [TI]*	20	92.4	<.001
5.	*[CT] [CI] [CP] [TPI]*	14	22.2	.07
6.	*[CT] [CPI] [PTI]*	10	9.6	.48
7.	*[CPI] [PTI]*	12	15.4	.22
8.	*[PT] [TI] [CT] [CPI]*	12	12.9	.38
9.	*[PT] [TI] [CT] [CP] [PI]*	18	26.9	.08
10.	*[TI] [CT] [CPI]*	14	51.3	<.001
11.	*[PT] [CT] [CPI]*	13	25.5	<.02
12.	*[PT] [TI] [CPI]*	14	17.6	.23
13.	*[CP] [CI] [PI] [PT] [TI] [CT]*	16	24.3	.08

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[6] There are several possible ways of getting fits that are "too good," but the one that is of greatest concern here is the inclusion of too many parameters in the model. As parameters are added to a model the fit will, in effect, automatically improve as the degrees of freedom decrease. Such a procedure will certainly produce a "good" fit, but in fact simpler models will certainly be preferable if their fit is not significantly different.

Table 8. Conflict, Power Status, and the Initiator's Alliance Status [*CPI*]

Power status of initiator	Major								Minor			
Power status of target	Major				Minor				Major			
Initiator had major power ally?	Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
Conflict Level	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	33	63.4	17	58.6	34	36.9	14	41.2	8	61.5	9	25.0
2	8	15.4	7	24.1	28	30.4	16	47.0	5	38.5	14	38.9
3	11	21.2	5	17.2	30	32.6	4	11.8	0		13	36.1
Total	52		29		92		34		13		36	

$X^2 = 29.72$
$df = 10$
$p < 0.01$

Next we deleted [*PTI*] from Model 6, producing Model 8. This model has seven interactions, including three nested second order relationships. The model offers a good (but not too good) fit between the expected values and the data ($X^2 = 12.19$; $df = 12$; $p = 0.38$). Given our interest in conflict, the main interactions of interest are [*CT*] and the third order interaction [*CPI*]. Although still complex, this model is less complex than Model 6. Although Model 8 contains an additional two degrees of freedom, the X^2 value is only 3.3 greater than in Model 6, and the difference between Models 6 and 8 is not significant at the $p = 0.10$ level. However, its fit of $p = .38$ is still marginally "too good."

We next tried four variations of Model 8, with mixed success. Model 9 removes the third order interaction [*CPI*] and fits poorly. Model 10 reintroduces [*CPI*] but drops [*PT*]; it fares even worse than Model 9. Model 11 replaces [*TI*] with [*PT*] and does slightly better, but still provides an inadequate fit. Model 12 replaces [*CT*] with [*TI*] and produces a much more reasonable fit ($X^2 = 17.6$; $df = 14$; $p = .23$), in fact better than the more complex Model 7 we passed by above. Finally, Model 13 reintroduces [*CT*] and breaks [*CPI*] into its three nested second order interactions; it, too, yields a poor fit.

We chose to accept model 12 ([*PT*], [*TI*], [*CPI*]) over Model 8 for two reasons. First, model 8 slightly exceeds the suggested upper threshold for a model that fits well. More important, model 12 is more parsimonious than model 8, incorporating as it does one fewer second order interaction. Also, although model 12 has an additional two degrees of freedom, the difference between the fit of the two models ($X^2 = 4.7$; $df = 2$; $p < .05$) is not statistically significant.

In Model 12, we are accepting a model in which the data in Table 5 may be accounted for by the interactions [*PT*], [*TI*], and [*CPI*]. Although this one set of relationships was selected, it should be noted that each of the other possible candidates for selection, that is, Models 6, 7, and 8, also contain [*CPI*]. Hence, the evidence strongly suggests that the variation in conflict may be accounted for by the interaction between power status and the initiator's alliance status.[7] The relationship encompassed in [*CPI*] can be reconstructed from Table 5, and we report it as Table 8.

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[7] It has become standard practice to divide analyses of historical conflict data into at least two distinct time periods (typically, 1815-1914 and 1915-1965) to determine the extent to which differences exist between recent historical eras. Given past research along these lines, we were tempted to divide the three parts of Table 5 into two periods, 1815-1914 and 1915-1965. Such a procedure, however, would have produced 72 cells for our 256 cases. More than half of these cells would have contained two or fewer cases, and the mode would have been one. Comparing so many low frequency cells would have been very time consuming and, ultimately, futile. Instead we decided to segregate the data into the most significant relationship demonstrated by the log-linear analysis [*CPI*] and then to control for the time period. The resulting relationships among conflict, power-status, and the major power alliance status of the initiator over the two time periods 1815-1914 and 1915-1965 showed no statistically significant differences ($p < .05$).

There are two direct implications of the [*CPI*] relationship shown in Table 8, and both lead to a slightly different view of the data in Table 5. First, the strength of the [*CPI*] relationship suggests that the target's alliance status is not necessary to account for the distribution of the cases. Put differently, the strength of [*CPI*] offers considerable support for the balance-of-power interpretation of international conflict, because it confirms that strong nations tend to initiate conflicts that escalate. More precisely, of the 63 cases of reciprocated military action, 41 (65%) were initiated by major powers with a major power ally. Nonetheless, it is also evident that the relationship is only modest in the case of conflicts between major powers; the most significant effects of the [*CPI*] relationship are to be found in conflicts initiated by allied major powers and nonallied minor powers.

Conclusion

This research has been directed at evaluating the relative ability of theories of power equality and power preponderance to account for the escalation of international conflict. In this effort we have examined not only the effects of power, but also the augmentation of power furnished by an alliance with a major power. Although the data are not in all respects clearcut, we are persuaded that the balance of power provides a better means of accounting for the escalation of conflict than do the ideas contained in Organski's theory of power preponderance. Our conclusion, however, is not without its difficulties, not the least of which is the behavior of nonallied minor powers. Before dealing with this issue, we will draw together several findings from our data analysis which we believe sustain the predictions of balance-of-power theory.

The most important evidence in favor of the balance of power is the strong tendency for conflicts to be initiated by allied major powers and for those conflicts then to escalate to reciprocated military action. As noted above, the substantial majority of conflicts at the highest level take place when allied major powers acted as the initiator. To be sure, the effect is at its weakest in conflict between major powers, but even then it is not absent. Our interpretation of the data is that for the major powers, alliances are of less significance than basic national capabilities. However, it must be noted that in conflicts between major powers these capabilities were apparently sufficiently inhibiting that the large majority of the conflicts did not escalate. Organski's theory, in which nations of relatively equal capability are the ones that are likely to go to war, finds little support in the pronounced disinclination of the major powers to escalate conflicts. What is clear from the data is the almost unequivocal support for the balance of power to be found in the behavior of major powers with a major power ally toward minor powers, particularly toward those minor powers with a major power ally. Put simply, our conclusion is that equality of national power, supplemented by major power alliances for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.

Despite this conclusion, there remain the 13 interesting cases in which a nonallied minor power initiated a conflict with a major power which escalated to reciprocal military action. Although these conflicts are not numerous enough to undermine our conclusion, they stand in sufficient contrast to the other cases and the balance of power to merit attention. Although it is clear that most relatively cohesive nations will fight if national existence is directly in question, these cases do not appear to be of that character. These conflicts were initiated by the minor power. An inspection of the cases indicates that they fall into one of three broad groups: first, several constituted attempts on the part of newly emerging nations (especially Italy) to remove or reduce the already established interests or presence of a great power. If one adopts a perceptual perspective on the evaluation of power, it is possible to argue that the emergence of nationalism in a nation may lead its population and decision makers to overestimate their power (Wright, 1965, pp. 987-1011). Such errors in power estimates might well result in conflict with stronger nations, particularly if the minor power lacked a major power ally to "correct" its perceptions. This relative inability to assess a situation correctly may have been significant in a second group of conflicts which took place over borders. A notable example of such a conflict was the second Schleswig-Holstein War. This conflict was initiated by Denmark against Prussia. The Danes were willing to initiate the conflict because they anticipated support from England, even though there was no alliance or even clear indication that such support would be forthcoming (Taylor, 1954). It proved to be a monumental misjudgment. East (1973) suggests that minor powers are prone to make such mistakes, which appear to be rash or even reckless, because they have relately poor information-processing capabilities about the world around them. Finally, there were a number of conflicts that took place at a considerable distance from the home territory of the major power. These may be related to Boulding's (1962) concept of the "loss-of-strength gradient." If it is true, as Boulding suggests, that power degrades with distance, then it might be that at the scene of the conflict, the major power was actually less able to bring its strength to bear than was the minor power. Even if power does not become reduced over distance (Wohlstetter, 1968), the minor power may perceive the major power as relatively weak. These comments are speculative; it is only clear that conflicts such as these might profitably be the subject for further research.[8]

The main finding of this research is that the balance of power offers a reasonable explanation for the escalation of conflict to reciprocated military action. Several studies have, however, rejected similar hypotheses derived from the balance of power. As noted above, a recent review of several of those studies (Siverson & Sullivan, 1983) argues that their research designs were such that a subtle but strong bias against the balance of power was present. However, another study has also rejected the balance of power in favor of a more powerful explanation. In *The War Trap* (1981), Bueno de Mesquita presents an explicit comparison of his theory of expected utility with the idea that the "strong attack the weak," a hypothesis that he states is consistent with the balance of power. His finding (p. 141) was that although there was a fairly general overall tendency for the strong to attack the weak (Q = .81 for the period 1816-1974), the results obtained from expected utility were better (Q = .94). Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita shows (pp. 141-142) that although the balance of power does slightly better (Q = .98) than expected utility (Q = .97) in the nineteenth century, the results for the balance of power in the twentieth century are, to say the least, miserable (Q = .52) when compared to expected utility (Q = .91).

Notwithstanding the strong results from the expected utility model, it must be noted that in carrying out his analysis of the "strong attack the weak" hypothesis, Bueno de Mesquita relied only upon composite national capability scores to determine who was the stronger and did not include the capability-augmenting effects of alliances in his measurements. Yet Bueno de Mesquita clearly recognizes the traditional capability augmenting effect attributed to alliances in the balance-of-power approach (pp. 5, 141, 150). Unfortunately, a full comparison of the results obtained from our analysis with those of Bueno de Mesquita is limited by at least two factors. First, the data sets, although similar in some respects, are significantly different. For instance, 1) our data do not include any conflicts between minor powers, whereas such data are used by Bueno de Mesquita; 2) our category of "reciprocal military actions" is not equivalent to his wars; and 3) *The War Trap* uses data as recent as 1974, whereas our data stop at 1965. Second, although the results in the present analysis were obtained from only two independent variables, the expected utility model required significantly more information, including a variable that measured the presumed decay of power over distance. Hence, whether or not expected utility does better than the balance of power remains a task that will at least require a simultaneous test on one data set.

Our comments on the respective merits of these two approaches, however, must be tempered by two considerations. First, there are shortcomings in our own design. In the present study, power is measured in a rather crude way. If we had at hand more precise data on national capabilities for the major powers, it could be that the findings would diverge from those presented here. We also lack data on conflicts between minor powers. The introduction of these data could also cause a revision of the findings. Second, the point of the comparison is not to suggest that Bueno de Mesquita's analysis is wrong and ours correct. At a minimum, the differences in the data sets alone preclude any such inference. What we would like to suggest is that the ideas of the balance of power may be worth further attention, and that efforts to pronounce them useless may be premature.

The findings here are highly informative. The deterrent effect of alliances, although limited to minor powers, is a significant finding not uncovered in other research (Russett, 1963; Singer & Small, 1974). The extent to which a major power controls its minor power allies is noted by Weede (1983) for the bipolar era; our data make it clear that it goes considerably beyond the post-World War II era in its generality.

Finally, and most important, it is evident that for conflicts initiated by major powers, alliances are an important explanatory factor in accounting for escalation. In a thoughtful evaluation of several books on war, Gochman (1976), after noting a number of shortcomings with their proposed explanations for war, hypothesized that "factors . . . immediate to the conflict, such as alliance associations or the relative capabilities of the antagonists, will have the greatest impact on the escalation, duration and outcome of violence" (p. 559). This research suggests that his hypothesis is accurate.

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[8] It is tempting to treat these cases as instances of irrationality and thereby to increase the support for the ideas of the balance of power. To do so, however, would be a serious error in at least two respects. First, we have no data at present on the outcomes of these conflicts, and it is possible that the minor powers did not fare too badly. There is, after all, considerable evidence that determined, well-organized nations may fare quite well in conflicts with considerably larger nations that do not have these advantages (Mack, 1975; Organski & Kugler, 1980, pp. 64-103; for a slightly different view, see Rosen, 1972). It is unfortunately true that balance-of-power theory is not well developed on the contribution of internal political development and cohesion to national power. Secondly, Bueno de Mesquita (1981, pp. 156-159) has developed an ingenuous derivation in his expected utility theory in which weak non-allied nations may rationally challenge stronger nations.

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Communications

ON ARTICLES

On Constitutionalism: A Reply to Professor Sartori
(Vol. 78, June 1984, pp. 497-499)

I am honored that Professor Sartori has responded to my note. I certainly agree that the theory of constitutionalism implies a system of protected freedom, but I am less certain that the main threat to liberty comes from government power. In 1962 Sartori launched a spirited attack on those British approaches to constitutionalism that emphasized government power, indulged in the "coquetry" of talking about parliamentary supremacy, and saw the constitution as the entire governmental "set-up" of a country. He so emphasized *garantisme* as to prepare a defense of a kind of constitutionalism that worries me deeply.

It is not helpful to attach labels, and I apologize for any implication that Professor Sartori is a Whig. His acknowledged debt to Benjamin Constant, however, undoubtedly places him in a libertarian tradition that has insisted on underplaying Cicero's version of the constitution as the entire framework of state power. Although I erred in suggesting that every mention of "constitution" follows his original usage. I do not accept that someone as influential as Cicero did not bequeath to later generations a term which, far from becoming vacant, remained available for re-employment. It was used in his sense by Livy, Apuleius, and Boethius, and they cannot simply be dismissed because they are extralegal sources. Boethius was writing on administrative arrangements for the church and may be a less valuable source for understanding secular authority (but see Ullmann, 1978, pp. 32-56, on the affinity between church administration and Roman law, and Aquinas used the term *constitutio ecclesiae* many times). Apuleius was exactly translating Plato's *politeia* when he used *constitutio* for the shape or form of a political community. I believe Sartori is wrong to equate *politeia* with *res publica* on the grounds that Plato's *Politeia* is so often called *The Republic.* Old conventions die hard, but if ever there was a mistranslation of the term for Plato's "form city" ruled by a hypothetical (non-hypothetical?) philosopher king, it was calling this arrangement "the people's affair." *Constitutio* as used by Apuleius was, I submit, a far more accurate rendition, and of course comes close to Cicero's usage as the shape or form of the state. Livy, our chief source for the developing republican constitution, simply cannot be dismissed. Sartori objects that none of these is a legal source, but it is unfortunate that our tradition of scholarship on constitutionalism has relied so much on legalism. McIlwain (1939, 1958), for example, began his discussions by proposing that constitutionalism meant government limited by *law,* but in the end had to admit that political tradition, religious loyalties, and other extralegal influences were as important as the sanction of the law.

Sartori is justified in making Cicero's *constitutio* "republican-specific." Just as his *res publica* requires justice, his *constitutio* requires a lawful disposition of powers. In the same way it had been a frame of government, a *politeia,* that for Aristotle produced the common good; in medieval times it was a "form" of government, a *forma,* that for Marsiglio, ensured the peace. Could so persistent an idea as Cicero's *constitutio,* then, be a "vacant" term when it was taken up in the English, American, and Continental movements for constitutionalism? Why *this* word, that had apparently been tainted with the absolutism of Roman and medieval imperialism? Because it meant, etymologically and historically, the *establishment,* according to defined rules, of state power. Professor Sartori has long been among my chief mentors in the use of political language. May I then, with the greatest respect, quote back to him from his 1962 article? The truth-value of definitions "lies in the fact that they tell us how to behave *as experienced people* in matters regarding which each generation starts by having no experience" (1962, p. 858). Now what experience attaches to a "vacant" term? The experience of *constitutio* that the "constitutionalists" wished to draw on was that of Cicero, and of those who went before (using *politeia*) and followed after (using *constitutio* and *forma*).

Establishing was and remains the central idea of constitution. When people form any new association nowadays, they usually wish to begin by writing a constitution to declare its purposes and to set down how its business is to be conducted. Of course members expect the business to be regulated, the office-bearers to be responsible to the membership, and procedures to be run "constitutionally." There are acknowledged difficulties in arguing by analogy from "sub-state" associations, but the same argument would have applied to the Greek colonists who, after careful comparative analysis of different types of constitution (*politeia*), prescribed the arrangements for new states.

If we do agree that such arrangements should maintain a balance between strong, flexible executive power and its control, then there is no bone of contention between Sartori and me. If, however, Sartori goes as far along the *garantiste* path as I think he does (in light of the repeated emphasis he gave it in 1962), I cannot follow him. In some of the constitutions he studied *garantisme* for the few was bought at great cost to the many.

Is all of this a quibble, a question of "mere" semantics? I think not, for (whether or not I have precisely construed Sartori's position), two divergent approaches to constitutionalism are signified in the debate. My point is that governmental power is in itself a kind of *garantisme*. It is often the only source of protection, and of moral, social, and economic well-being, for those otherwise disadvantaged in society, the only means of sustenance for those whose "natural rights" as individuals have let them down. To stand the argument on its head, *gubernaculum* must provide the *jurisdictio* for the weak against the inordinate powers of private minorities. Sartori himself has hinted that his view of constitution may be inimical to some versions of democracy—at least "a constitution limits the 'will of the people' concept of democracy just as much as it limits the will of the power holders" (1962, p. 862). Although I do not subscribe to any "will of the people" that may be interpreted as tyranny of the majority, I fear the sort of constitutionalism that perpetually thwarts the wishes of "transient" majorities (leaving aside the fact that constitutions are established at some point in a country's history by a majority that may be no less transient). We in Australia have suffered great political disruption (in the "constitutional crisis" of 1975) at the hands of a constitution that has made it very difficult for one major party, having at all times the support of nearly one half of the community, and frequently able to transform its support into a majority, to initiate change in response to its electoral mandate. Now British constitutionalism, for all its implicit tradition of *garantisme* (Sartori, 1962, p. 860), would not allow this to happen. It is not mere semantics that its *garantisme* takes the form of traditional barriers to limit the action of a theoretically unlimited parliamentary sovereignty. By tradition the British sovereign parliament would not legislate to set up a fascist regime, but it can respond to the reasonable requests of a majority of the people expressed through electoral mandate. If power-holders were hell-bent on establishing a totalitarian regime, no amount of *garantiste* constitutionalizing would stop them. Westminster-style restraints are much more subtle, much less open, less formal, than that. As Finer (1979, p. 16) has reported: "If the powerholders exercise self-restraint, the written constitution is unnecessary, and if they do not then no written constitution will check them." The trouble is that when law-abiding, constitutionalist "power-holders" are confronted with legalistic, *garantiste* constitutional restraints, they are often prevented from doing much good for the communities they represent. Is it going too far to say that their supporters, having done all the right things to build themselves into a majority, are then disfranchised by the constitution? Sartori's *garantisme* is an essential part of any theory of constitutionalism, but it too must run into restraints. The balance between power and control, I would suggest, is much better provided by the informal mechanisms of the unwritten constitution set-up than by the legalistic bunkers of many written constitutions.

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Pluralism and Class: A Rejoinder to Dahl and Lindblom

(Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 384-389)

The central conflicts between me and Professors Lindblom and Dahl involve:

1. pluralism as the dominant theory and defense of political power in the United States, and capitalism as the dominant mode of social organization in the U.S. political economy, and
2. Marxian class analysis as the leading alternative theory to pluralism, and class analysis's defense of socialism as the preferred way of organizing social relations.

Without getting mired down in debates over objectivity and value neutrality, let us recognize that pluralism has normally been developed in critical dialogue with Marxian class analysis. Pluralism, as developed by John Dewey, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and many others, represents the leading critique of and alternative to Marx's analysis of classes in capitalist societies. Like Dahl and Lindblom, pluralists writing within a Western capitalist framework have usually been struck by the multiplicity of groups in capitalist societies, the corresponding weakness of classes and class conflict, the (alleged) relationship between capitalism and democracy, and the (alleged) relationship between socialism and authoritarianism. Lindblom and Dahl, it is true, admit that socialism and what they call "polyarchal democracy" may coexist in some countries, but they are much more forcefully struck by what they see as the universal connection between capitalism and polyarchal democracy: *all* existing polyarchies, they assert, are capitalist systems. Their underlying contention regarding the tenuous fit between socialism and democracy is revealed in the lengthy exploration that is required before granting that, yes, in some cases socialist regimes may meet the tenets of polyarchal democracy. Although pluralism admits that capitalism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democracy, the relationship between socialism and democracy is considered much more problematic.

What, then, are we to make of recent revisions in pluralism that censure the United States for not living up to liberal democratic expectations, that call for structural change and greater equality in wealth and income, that seriously question much of what most pluralists have taught generations of students about power in the United States, and that, in principle at least, reject capitalism and private ownership as necessary for democracy?

In my critique of pluralism, I tried to show how Marx's treatment of such questions differs fundamentally from pluralism and from recent revisions in pluralism, and I suggested (but did not try to demonstrate fully) that, given the internal contradictions of pluralism, Marxist class analysis may offer a more integrated and coherent theory of power than the conventional view.

Professor Lindblom's response makes it clear that he and I are in substantial agreement on many key points. I agree that much of his work constitutes a major departure from pluralism rather than an effort to resuscitate it. Far from missing it, I think Lindblom's extension of Gramsci's idea of ideological hegemony to the United States ("circularity") is a nice step forward. So too is Lindblom's recognition that there is an unresolved and disturbing conflict between the general *values* of American democracy (e.g., freedom, equality) and the grand *issues* (e.g., private enterprise) that are systematically kept off the political agenda in a dominantly capitalist political economy.

I do not, however, dismiss elements of the new lines of thought in pluralism II because they do not square wholly with class analysis. Nor do I suggest that Dahl and Lindblom take class analysis as a measuring rod for correct theory. Rather, I argue that pluralism II's call to Marxist humanists fails to appreciate crucial differences between the two theories. For all of Lindblom's departures from pluralism, any serious effort to link theoretical forces with Marxist humanists must confront these contradictions, not sweep them away in a false consensus.

Consider, for example, the issue of incrementalism and structural change. I do not in fact believe, as Lindblom infers, that if pluralism II were a correct description of American society, it would also contain a formula for changing it. My point was that pluralism's commitment to and faith in incrementalism stands in logical opposition to its call for structural change. It is surely true that the failure of incrementalism to yield structural change does not invalidate pluralism's analysis of how the system works; it merely makes calls for structural change within the pluralist paradigm implausible. What I am suggesting, in short, is that pluralism cannot have it both ways. If pluralists now want to call for structural change, they have to give up their attachment to incrementalism, for incrementalism is, by definition, the way the system maintains its power relationships essentially unchanged. In my article (Manley, 1983), I state that pluralism II still defends many features of the system that perpetuate the social results the theory now deplores, and I think that statement stands.

Finally, Lindblom (1983) contends that he and Dahl broke the connection between pluralism and capitalism a long time ago. Here, and this goes to the central point of my article, we have to distinguish between pluralism as a theory of society that denies the existence and/or the central importance of class, and pluralism defined as the existence of numerous autonomous groups within a society that is dubbed pluralist democracy. For Marx, there is no contradiction between classes and groups because the latter are seen as fractions or subdivisions of classes. For pluralism, the failure of capitalist societies sharply to divide along class impeaches class analysis as social theory. The difference is crucial, because the acceptance of pluralism's view of class reduces the key element of Marx's theory to a mere nominal category. Once this is done, it is indeed possible to blur the differences between capitalism and socialism so much that the two blend into one another, as Dahl and Lindblom did as early as 1953, but this hardly resolves the argument over which theory best approximates capitalist reality: Marx, who places class at the center of social theory and sees groups as subdivisions of classes, or pluralism, which tends either to deny the reality of classes or to relegate class to a relatively empty sociological category. Dahl and Lindblom concede that such Western societies as Sweden and England can tolerate a large degree of "socialism" without losing their status as pluralist democracies, but this is far different from accepting Marx and class analysis as central to explaining power in those societies. For Marx a society cannot be capitalist and democratic; for Dahl and Lindblom the two are so closely linked that everywhere they look they find capitalism associated with polyarchal democracy. For them the question is whether socialism not capitalism is compatible with democracy. Marx's contention that the political economy of capitalism makes capitalist democracy a contradiction in terms, and pluralism's contention that the two are everywhere joined, represent insuperable obstacles to the theoretical convergence proposed by pluralism II.

Regarding Professor Dahl's comments (Dahl, 1983), I think most readers of my piece will see that I do not treat him and Lindblom as a single undifferentiated mind.

Professor Dahl takes me to task for not presenting in detail the alternative interpretation that I claim is superior to pluralism, and for failing to answer such questions as what a desirable socialist order would look like. Because neither of these objectives was included in my article, I will not comment on them here.

Two of Dahl's points do warrant comment. The first is that, by calling attention to the alleged failure of class to explain political attitudes, voting, and the like, he exposes the weakness of his call for unity with Marxist humanists. As I see it, the issue is not whether pluralism has more explanatory power at the individual or group level than class, but whether a perspective that stresses class and subclass fractions (groups) is better than a pluralist position that offers a (false) choice between them. To adopt a class perspective on voting means simply to view voting through the prism of class. It does note that class affiliation necessarily dominates the act of voting. There is nothing in this intellectual stance that requires all or most members of one class to vote alike; nor does their failure to do so demonstrate the superiority of a pluralist approach. Insisting on the superiority of pluralism over class links Dahl with the long anti-Marxist tradition of pluralism, but it also casts considerable doubt on efforts to bridge the two traditions.

Secondly, I am rather surprised by Dahl's doubts about whether a normative theory of democracy can be constructed out of class analysis. A reading of Marx shows that Marx's labor theory of value was the key to his ethical objections to capitalist social relations, that Marx saw distribution as inseparably related to the system of (capitalist) production relations, that the theory of liberal or bourgeois democracy that attended the rise of capitalism was for Marx sham democracy, and that true social democracy will exist only when society advances from capitalism's stress on unequal human abilities to socialism's stress on common human needs. All of these are debatable prpositions, but to strip Marx of democratic theory and to suggest that a Marxist theory of ethics worthy of his name has yet to be constructed ignores the fact that Marx himself proceeded from a very clear democratic and ethical theory. If it is, as Dahl suggests, an exaggeration to say that pluralism lacks a theory of value, it is only a slight exaggeration; to suggest that a theory of democracy and social ethics cannot be constructed out of class analysis is a major one.

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ON BOOK REVIEWS

Some brief clarifications are in order regarding Michael Morris's review (*American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 813-814) of our edited volume, *Security Policies of Developing Countries* (D.C. Heath, 1982). First, a typographical error listed Chile rather than Cuba as included in the case studies from Latin America. Second, although our approach is not inconsistent with what Morris characterizes as an apparent systemic approach, we attempted to build such a structure from the bottom up and, not, as Morris suggests, from the top down. Our approach was to identify key decisional categories that characterize the strategic policymaking of all states. These conceptual categories can be used to guide comparative research data gathering and analysis. Such a uniform approach frees analysis from ethnocentrism and offers the possibility of systematic study of strategic policy as a subfield of international relations.

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Editorial Note

Three years ago we began democratizing the editorial process of the *American Political Science Review* by expanding the number of scholars asked to referee articles and to review books. In particular, we have increased the number of young scholars participating in these disciplinary service roles. It is perhaps now appropriate to comment on the results of this new, broader approach.

First, and most obviously, the enlarged staff of reviewers has made it possible to reduce the turnaround time for both articles and book reviews. Additionally, and perhaps more important, we have found that young scholars are extremely professional, providing thoughtful, well-written evaluations that have been generally well received by our authors. Young scholars are generally better read in the current literature in their areas of expertise, committed less to one or another orthodoxy, and more careful in their analyses and assessments.

The area of most immediate concern as we embarked on the course of wide participation was its effect on the quality of both book reviews and referee reports on articles. There was certainly a risk that both might be of lesser quality than readers of the *Review* had come to expect. In fact, the results have been quite the opposite. We have determined that there is no correlation between the status of the reviewer and the complaints of book authors who feel that we have published unfair (usually unfavorable) reviews. In addition, of the numerous reviews evaluated by independent scholars as a result of an author complaint, there was no correlation between the status of the reviewer and the issues determined by the independent evaluators as errors or misjudgments. We add, in passing, that book reviews alone should not provide the sole basis for promotion and tenure decisions, regardless of the reviewer's status.

The evaluation of book reviews cannot be conclusive, however, as there is no way in which anonymity can be protected. With respect to articles, we are able to assess the results of our process more objectively, because all articles are refereed anonymously. Authors who have submitted articles to the *Review* are routinely asked to comment on the quality of the referee reports, copies of which are sent to the author with the editor's decision. The author of the article does not know the identity of the referees, and the same pool of scholars provides both article and book reviews.

In order to assess the connection between complaints and the status of the reviewer, we sampled these responses at two different points in time to determine whether formal status within the profession was related to what authors of articles judged to be ignorant or irresponsible evaluations. To our surprise, two-thirds of the referees deemed by authors to have written inadequate reviews were associate or full professors at institutions normally ranked among the top 20 political science departments in the nation. Approximately 85% of these complaints concerned tenure-rank faculty at major research institutions. In contrast, evaluations considered most helpful by authors of articles were to an unexpected degree by younger scholars and those from teaching, rather than research, institutions.

Such unexpected findings raise the possibility that younger scholars are more favorably disposed toward publication than older ones, so we reexamined the data to assess this factor. A very weak correlation exists between an author's evaluation of reviewers and a reviewer's evaluation of manuscripts, but no distinction between established and younger scholars emerges. Equally interesting, associate and full professors from major research institutions were slightly more likely to recommend acceptance or only minor revision than younger scholars.

It is clear that these findings will not settle the concerns of those who may feel that the editorial decision-making process should be reserved for older and wiser heads. Our experience over the past three years, however, has shown that with very few exceptions, the services provided by younger political scientists and those from other than major research institutions have added a new, welcome dimension to the process of scholarly publication in political science.

DINA A. ZINNES

Managing Editor

STEVEN THOMAS SEITZ

Book Review Editor

We are grateful to the following scholars who have served the *Review* as anonymous referees during the period from July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984.

Henry J. Abraham, Paul R. Abramson, Christopher Achen, Martha Ackelsberg, David Adamany, Charles R. Adrian, Robert Albritton, John H. Aldrich, Hayward R. Alker, Pierre Allan, James Alt, Michael F. Altfeld, J. Theodore Anagnoson, Kristi Andersen, Emmanual Q. Anise, Ronald Aqua, Peter H. Aranson, John A. Armstrong, Theodore S. Arrington, Robert J. Art, Richard Ashcraft, Richard Ashley, Burton Atkins, David N. Atkinson, Shlomo Avineri, Robert Axelrod.

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George B. Rabinowitz, Lyn Ragsdale, Amnon Rapoport, James Ray, Mark Reader, Howard L. Reiter, David Resnick, Peter Rice, Wilbur Rich, Leroy Rieselbach, William Riker, Patrick Riley, Randall B. Ripley, Michael J. Robinson, Bert A. Rockman, Philip Roeder, David Rohde, Ira Rohter, Richard Rose, Steven Rosenstone, Howard Rosenthal, Stanley Rothman, Francis E. Rourke, Rudolph Rummel, Barry S. Rundquist, Jeffold G. Rusk, Bruce Russett.

Dan Sabia, Barbara Salert, Robert H. Salisbury, Stephen Salkever, Todd Sandler, Ellis Sandoz, Andrea Sanjian, Greg Sanjian, Virginia Sapiro, Austin Sarat, Lyman T. Sargent, Giovanni Sartori, David L. Schaefer, Mark Schneider, Richard L. Schott, Lars Schoultz, Philip Schrodt, Glendon Schubert, Joel J. Schwartz, David O. Sears, Goldie A. Shabad, Stephen Shaffer, Michael J. Shapiro, Martin Shefter, Kenneth Shepsle, W. Phillips Shively, Judith Shklar, Lee Sigelman, Joel Silbey, Barbara Sinclair, J. David Singer, Roger Smith, Teresa C. Smith, V. Kerry Smith, Duncan Snidal, Paul M. Sniderman, Glenn H. Snyder, Albert Somit, Frank Sorauf, Thomas A. Spragens, John Sprague, Mark Sproule-Jones, Michael Squires, Harvey Starr, James A. Stegenga, Robert M. Stein, Peter J. Steinberger, Carleton Sterling, George J. Stigler, Peter G. Stillman, James A. Stimson, Michael S. Stohl, Richard J. Stoll, Ira R. Strauber, Gerald Strom, Tracy B. Strong, Donley T. Studlar, John Sullivan, Michael Sullivan, David Sylvan.

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Vernon Van Dyke, Sidney Verba, Thomas Volgy.

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Oran Young.

Frank Zagare, Marvin Zetterbaum, Nancy H. Zingale, Catherine Zuckert, Cliff Zukin.

Erratum

The names of several authors were inadvertently omitted from the table of contents in the June 1984 issue. The correct entries are:

Parliament and Political Support in Canada by Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg, and Marianne C. Stewart.

Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study by Lawrence LeDuc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Jon H. Pammett.

Forthcoming in March

The following articles have tentatively been scheduled for publication in the March 1985 issue:

D. Brady, "A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives"

B. Buena de Mesquita, "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model"

G. Caldeira, "The Transmission of Legal Precedents: A Study of State Supreme Courts"

H. W. Chappell, Jr., and W. R. Keech, "A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance"

P. Converse, "Power and the Monopoly of Information"

J. M. Hansen, "The Political Economy of Group Membership"

R. Inglehart, "Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Change in Mass Belief Systems in the Level of Analysis Paradox"

T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal, "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty"

V. Kerry Smith, "A Theoretical Analysis of the 'Green Lobby' "

J. Zipp, "Perceived Representativeness and Voting: An Assessment of the Impact of 'Choices' vs. 'Echoes' "

A. S. Zuckerman and D. M. West, "The Political Bases of Citizen Contacting: A Crossnational Analysis"

BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essays

Limited Nuclear War. By Ian Clark. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 266. $22.50.)

The Nuclear Future. By Michael Mandelbaum. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 131. $19.95, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control. By Bruce Russett. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983. Pp. xii + 204. $14.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Since the beginning of the postwar era, the United States has deployed a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons on the average of every 10 years. Each of these modernization programs has brought forth a flurry of studies dealing with the nature of nuclear war and how to avoid it. Strategic modernization is upon us again, and three of the books that have accompanied it are the subject of this review.

Michael Mandelbaum's *The Nuclear Future* is a primer on nuclear war and nuclear deterrence. Although there is nothing wrong in the book, there is not much in it that is new. Mandelbaum covers the usual topics such as the size of the nuclear arsenals and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons; how some weapons enhance deterrence while others undermine deterrence; and the threat of proliferation.

According to Mandelbaum's preface, *The Nuclear Future* is aimed at a general reader, so one might assume that it is intended to be an introductory text. Unfortunately, there are several books already on the market that freshmen and sophomores would probably find more entertaining and that treat the subject more completely, for example, Herbert Scoville's *MX: Prescription for Disaster* (MIT Press, 1981), *Nuclear War in the 1980s?* (Harper & Row, 1983) by Christopher Chant and Ian Hogg, or the collections of articles dealing with the subject that have been reprinted from *Scientific American* during the past few years.

A key problem with the book seems to lie in its organization. The book is quite long for the amount of material that it covers (124 pages of text divided into an introduction, three substantive chapters, and a conclusion). Most students would probably have difficulty in identifying the specific issues and arguments that are important to the current debate.

The second book is much more successful. In *Limited Nuclear War,* Ian Clark examines the question of whether or not it is desirable—or even feasible—to limit war in general. During the past two decades the trend for both of the superpowers has been to improve the ability leaders have to fight "small" nuclear wars, that is, using nuclear weapons for something other than an all-out strike against any enemy's population. For example, the Carter administration's policy that was formalized in PD-59 increased the ability of an American leader to direct nuclear strikes against specific military targets in the Soviet Union while leaving most Soviet citizens unhurt.

Most books dealing with this subject examine the technical feasibility of limited nuclear war by considering command and control difficulties or the effects of electromagnetic pulses. Clark has taken a uniquely different approach. *Limited Nuclear War* attempts to connect some of the recent controversies over limited nuclear war to some of the classical treatments of the reasons and justifications for limiting war.

The book begins on the right foot by avoiding a key mistake that has often appeared in some books in the field. According to many press reports, American targeting doctrine has shifted over the years from plans that targeted U.S. missiles and bombers against Soviet cities to plans that would direct U.S. missiles and bombers against Soviet missiles and bombers. In truth, the primary targets for U.S. strategic forces have always been Soviet military forces; the issue has been whether or not the president (or his successor) ought to have the ability to reduce collateral damage in the process of destroying these targets. The MacNamara Doctrine, the Schlesinger Doctrine, and PD-59 were all intended to improve this ability to spare civilians. The policies themselves referred to communications and guidance improvements in U.S. weapons, as well as war plans with a larger "menu" of targets to be included and excluded. Clark understands this point. As a result his discussion addresses the real question of whether nuclear war should be limited and not the artificial question of which type of target makes for the better deterrent.

Clark shows that although limiting war may be desirable, such limits may also reduce the ability of war to "resolve" conflicts. The danger of this is that unless the underlying conflict is settled, a limited war will inevitably escalate. After defining this problem, Clark reviews some of the conventions through which war has been limited in the past. His typology of schemes for limiting war includes restrictions defined according to *who* fights, *how* combatants fight, and *when* fighting is permissible.

Clark decides that limited nuclear war is infeasible because, once nuclear weapons are used, at least one combatant would be dissatisfied with the outcome and would thus escalate. Unlike other earlier types of war, Clark writes, nuclear war does not have a mechanism for both settling the conflict that started the war while also defining a clear limit above which additional fighting would be pointless.

It is here, however, that Clark may have been better off paying less attention to the classical writings on limited war and more attention to the nuts and bolts of war plans and the logic of escalation. Clark seems to limit his attention to limited *strategic* war, for example, counterforce strikes and city swapping. He does not deal much with the problems of limiting *tactical* nuclear war in which two great powers might have incentives to use nuclear weapons in a regional war but few incentives to escalate to an all-out strategic exchange.

Limited Nuclear War is actually more interesting for its treatment of limited war in general than for its treatment of nuclear warfare in particular. Clark has combed an impressive amount of literature to show the different lines along which war has been limited and how these limits developed. The authors that Clark has analyzed range from classical philosophers to modern game theorists and strategic planners.

The most ambitious book of the three is *The Prisoners of Insecurity* by Bruce Russett, which seems to have two separate objectives. Russett's primary objective is describing the current nuclear arms race and the problems that it produces. However, one suspects that an underlying purpose of the book is to integrate some of the findings floating about in academic international studies and show how they apply to some topical questions of foreign policy.

The first two chapters of the book review trends in defense spending and the arms buildup (these chapters alone would make a good introductory text). Russett then goes on to ask a series of questions that underlie the current controversy over strategic weapons such as: Does deterrence work? What is the harm of arms races? and Why do arms races occur? To answer these questions, Russett draws on findings that have been published in international studies. Russett also explains some of the formal theories that have been used to explain war, deterrence, and arms races. Not only is the book a good overview of some of the more important theoretical explanations of international conlict, it is also well-written throughout.

I do have, however, quibbles with some of the findings. For example, Russett makes the point that arms races are harmful because they are expensive. He cites studies that purport to show that the money spent on defense spending crowds out other investments that produce more profits and more jobs (pp. 50-51). However, in 1983 when the Congressional Budget Office studied this question, it found that even though defense spending may consume some investment capital, when one considers the overall ability of the U.S. economy to absorb these costs, not much harm has been done historically. According to the CBO, even the current U.S. buildup can be managed within existing excess economic capacity without displacing many jobs.

Also, even though the subject of the book is the *nuclear* arms race, Russett's analysis usually does not refer to the costs of *nuclear* programs. Almost all of the evidence refers to *total* defense burdens. Often this distinction makes a difference. For example, consider the cost of the nuclear arms race. Although the Reagan administration's final defense appropriation was $280 billion, only about 10% of this will be spent on strategic forces (nuclear weapons, being technology-intensive rather than labor-intensive, tend to be cheap). Eliminating the entire MX program, for example, would save only $1 to $5 billion per year and reduce the projected budget deficit by about 2%.

Prisoners of Insecurity is also one of the most impressive efforts to date to integrate some of the major findings in international studies. However in doing so, the book appears to identify one of the problems that the field of international studies faces.

Several years ago, an essay by Anatol Rapoport caused a stir in the international studies community by pointing out that even after two decades of theorizing and measuring, the field still had not generated many law-like statements about how the world politics works. According to Rapoport, a mature science is able to collect empirical findings so that, after a time, some general propositions are supported and others are contradicted. That is, over the long haul there ought to be some cumulation of knowledge, so that current research builds on previous research. Rapoport observed that most studies in international studies begin from square one, so that it was difficult to identify any general principles that had been derived from international studies.

Since Rapoport wrote his critique, several international relations scholars, including Russett, have attempted to meet the challenge. Often their method has been to survey the findings that have been presented in the field and to try to sort out patterns that can serve as law-like generalizations.

Yet, in doing so one can run into difficulties. For example, Russett cites a study by Michael Wallace demonstrating that conflicts that occur during arms races are more likely to escalate into war than those that occur during other periods (p. 61). There is a footnote in the back of the book admitting that the results may be somewhat controversial. However, it would also have been possible to cite an earlier study by Samuel Huntington that showed arms races have little, if any, association with the occurrence of war. Admittedly, the Huntington study did not use quantitative measures and, like the Wallace study, it has some trouble devising a convincing definition of an "arms race." Yet the Huntington study is a valid experimental design, and I suspect that the typical reader would find the Huntington results at least as convincing as the ones presented in the Wallace study. Furthermore, because the two studies differ so much in their approach, it would be difficult to design a decisive critical experiment to settle which is more accurate.

Perhaps one reason why this problem occurs in this book (as well as some other studies) is that we in the discipline may have interpreted Rapoport's imperative too simplistically. It is true that in mature, productive sciences the vast majority of studies do not begin *tabula rasa.* However, there are also few studies in these fields that try to filter truth out of a vast collection of previous investigations (the exception may be the review article, but such articles are not usually viewed as examples of seminal pieces of research).

Rather, in mature sciences cumulation seems to occur as a natural process when some investigator presents research so impressive and evidence so compelling that others in the field follow up and refine the original findings simply as a matter of course. If there has been little cumulation in international studies up to now, then it is probably because there are problems preventing it from happening, not because no one has thought of doing so. In some cases these problems stem from two researchers using such different methodologies that it is difficult to make comparisons between their findings, as in, for example, the Huntington and Wallace studies, where it is likely that scholars would argue more over the methods that were used than over the results. In other cases the problem seems to be that researchers in the fields are conceptualizing events so differently that it is difficult to make comparisons.

The Prisoners of Insecurity is worth reading, and perhaps it can be understood if Russett has stressed some findings at the expense of others, given that he was trying to make some general points to a fairly broad audience. Yet by demonstrating some of the difficulties that arise when in integrating conclusions from an existing body of research, the book may have also shown us that we may need to rethink some of our views on cumulation in international studies.

BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ

University of Minnesota

Communist Nations' Military Assistance. Edited by John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 201. $20.00.)

The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers. By Richard L. Jackson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xx + 315. $29.95.)

The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World. Edited by Walter Laqueur. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. vi + 252. $24.95.)

The international politics of third-world states, and of the Non-Aligned Movement in particular, have been the source of considerable confusion as well as controversy. In part this is due to the fact that they confound American expectations of support, or at least impartiality, in the conflict with the Soviet Union. In part it is because that conflict is not the consuming concern for the Third World that it is for the United States. Two of the books reviewed illustrate the confusion, the third helps to clear it up. All three contribute views on the controversy, at least implicitly.

Focusing on a different aspect of third-world international politics, these books approach it primarily in terms of its implications for the West within the context of Soviet-American relations. The collection edited by Copper and Papp is narrowest in scope. The donor-centered chapters, with the exception of Papp's on Soviet military aid to Eastern Europe as well as the considerably smaller reverse flow, survey military assistance and other forms of arms transfer to third-world countries and liberation movements. Each of the major chapters, Roger E. Kanet's on Soviet, Copper's on China's, and W. Raymond Duncan's on Cuban military assistance, includes a historical review as well as current aid. Because these have already received considerable attention, there is little that is new here for those following events in the Third World. The less well known Vietnamese and North Korean arms transfers are covered briefly by Douglas Pike and Nack An and Rose An.

Trond Gilberg's chapter on East European military assistance is remarkable for its aberrant approach and conclusions. Labeling Yugoslavia "Neutralist" while calling other countries "Faithful Agents" (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria), "Autonomist" (Romania), and "In-Betweens" (Poland and Hungary), he includes Yugoslavia in the description of Warsaw Pact military assistance. This indicates a fundamental misreading of Yugoslav-Soviet relations as well as of Yugoslavia's decades-long leadership role within the Non-Aligned Movement. Aside from confusing "neutrality" with "nonalignment" ("Yugoslavia continued its policy of neutrality during the 1970s. . ." [p. 74]), Gilberg contends that there is a "complementarity of needs and preferences" between Yugoslav and Soviet policies and offers three observations to support this conclusion. First, noting only in parentheses—as if regretting having to allow the point—the equally central Yugoslav policy goal of limiting Soviet influence, he states that Yugoslavia seeks to lessen Western influence in the Third World. Second, ignoring the long history of excellent relations that Yugoslavia has maintained with moderate third-world regimes, Gilberg emphasizes Yugoslavia's "strong ties with established leftist regimes that are self-proclaimed adversaries of the West" (only one, Qaddafi's, is mentioned). Finally, Gilberg claims that "Yugoslavian policies are designed to help overthrow certain existing regimes in the Third World" (p. 89). He provides no supportive data or argumentation for this assertion. In my research of Yugoslavia's foreign policy I have never encountered in any source even a hint of subversive activities, direct or otherwise, on the part of Yugoslavia.

Taken together, the nine chapters of the book present a great deal of data (and speculation when data is lacking), much of it culled from newspaper reports, on who gave or sold what to whom and when, but they offer little sustained analysis or sufficient consideration of the political context of the military assistance. For example, without attempting to substantiate them, the editors use two assertions as the peg on which to hang the book: that military assistance from other communist countries "caused" the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and that civil and other conflicts since World War II have been "decided by foreign arms assistance" (pp. xi-xii). Their conclusion, in the form of a policy prescription, is equally simplistic: Because the Soviet Union and other communist countries have increased their military aid, the Western countries, and the United States in particular, "must once again increase their weapons aid and sales." Alternatively, the communist states should be persuaded to reduce their military assistance. As a third alternative, they propose supplying China with the weapons it needs "in return for a stepping-up of its military assistance to Third World countries" (p. 178).

The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World, edited by Walter Laqueur, centers on Soviet relations with certain nonaligned countries of "the Third World heartland." It is a rather eccentric selection. Aside from two chapters on the Third World generally (by Arieh Eilan and David E. Albright) and two on Africa (by Raymond W. Copson and Herbert Block), only India, Iran, Libya, and the Horn (Ethiopia and Somalia) receive chapter-length treatment.

The contributions to the collection—"supported and reviewed" by the Department of Defense—offer a review of the history of Soviet involvement in the Third World. Paul B. Henze's well-researched chapter also illuminates some aspects of the obscure Derg politics in Ethiopia. Ellen Laipson's chapter on Libya and Muriel Atkin's on Iran are useful, well-sourced updatings of Soviet relations with each of these countries. Arieh Eilan's chapter extensively overlaps material that is covered in others, notably Robert H. Donaldson's chapter on India and those on Africa. Eilen does raise the important subject of KGB activities, but only to mention a few instances of "alleged support" by the KGB and to offer some impressionistic observations on the "Russian character" and the superior qualities of KGB agents in comparison to rank-and-file Soviet diplomats. The chapter is also marred by a selective use of data. For example, in the description of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola, there is no mention of South African or other involvement. It is difficult to assess the implications of the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola without establishing its context.

The Laqueur book is remarkable for the successful integration of its nine chapters in terms of the purpose of the volume: to assess Soviet "instrumentalities to make friends and influence people in the Third World"; to determine which factors are likely to enhance, and which to obstruct, Soviet efforts; and to consider future developments in Soviet relations with the Third World. There is a consensus among the authors on the point that Soviet efforts in the Third World have produced "mixed results," as Atkin puts it in regard to Iran. Donaldson comes to a similar assessment on India: "Moscow's considerable investment has by no means won it inordinate influence or turned India into a puppet state." He concludes that Americans need not be "alarmed at the Soviet presence in South Asia" (p. 106)—a conclusion consistent with that of the others. Although some of the authors avoid speculating about the future, those who do are not particularly persuasive. Either the predictions are so vague as not to predict anything at all or too limited; for every alternative suggested, at least one other could be proposed as equally plausible.

Laqueur, reflecting the assessments of the others, suggests that of Soviet "instrumentalities," the least important are economic aid and trade, indigenous Communist parties, and ideology. He considers as most important the "operations of the surrogates," military aid "with all its implications," and what he calls "false consciousness" on the part of certain third-world countries (p. 39). Laqueur borrows the Marxist concept to explain what he considers as the "illogical and possibly suicidal behavior" of the noncommunist countries of Asia and the Middle East bordering on the Soviet Union, namely their refusal to "look for American support against the superpower that is nearer and more dynamic, and happens to have the greater appetite." Ultimately, Laqueur comes to the "inevitable conclusion that Third World foreign policy is not guided mainly by logic or by self-interest, but that powerful emotions such as xenophobia, of the West in particular, have a greater impact" (pp. 25-26).

The polemical tone of the editor, directed both at the Soviets and the nonaligned states, is a particularly disconcerting aspect of this book. Laqueur characterizes the Non-Aligned Movement as a sort of Soviet front organization in a third-world incarnation. He confuses neutrality with nonalignment and distorts the history and character of the Movement when he states that "what started as a genuinely neutral (or neutralist) movement" has been "manipulated" by pro-Soviet elements inside the Movement, primarily Cuba, into a "reorientation" (p. 9). Moreover, to say that Cuba is "unquestioningly accepted as a nonaligned country" is to ignore the prolonged controversy among the nonaligned states over Cuba's chairmanship of the Movement (which it held from 1979 to 1983, not 1978 to 1982 as cited by Laqueur [p. 9]). This was only the most recent indication of a very persistent "questioning" of Cuba's nonaligned standing—perhaps most strongly by Yugoslavia, which Laqueur does not even mention when he lists only Cyprus and Malta as the European members of the Movement (p. 11).

Richard L. Jackson's book on the Non-Aligned Movement, *The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers,* written while he was on leave from the State Department, forms a sharp contrast to the first two. Among other things, Jackson avoids viewing the Third World as primarily an object of Soviet or American policies and attempts to explain the dynamics of the Movement in terms that take into account the interests and policy rationale of the nonaligned states, as well as those of the United States and the Soviet Union. The lucidly written volume is divided into three parts. First, Jackson reviews the origins and evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement, including a chapter on the Chairmanship of the Movement that emphasizes the sources and limitations of its influence. A chapter on the most recent nonaligned summit, the 1983 New Delhi Conference, brings the history up to date. The second part of the book focuses on the role of the nonaligned states in the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations and the impact of nonaligned politics on the structure and agenda of the United Nations. In the third part, Jackson considers Soviet and American interaction with the Non-Aligned Movement and offers well-argued policy suggestions for the United States.

The book is very sparsely documented and does not attempt a scholarly analysis of the Movement. Its value for the policymaker and for the scholar of third-world politics, and the Non-Aligned Movement in particular, is essentially threefold. First, Jackson's study, aside from the historical material, is based on his own observations at the United Nations during 1980 and 1983 and on interviews with diplomats representing nonaligned states. Consequently, there is a great deal of significant information in the book that cannot be found in the public record. Second, Jackson makes clear that American expectations of impartiality on the part of the nonaligned are misplaced. Third, he offers an insightful critique of American policies toward the nonaligned.

Jackson does not overlook the role of Cuba and other Soviet "clients" in the Non-Aligned Movement, but arguing that it is not a "sufficient explanation of U.S. difficulties with the nonaligned," he suggests that the "influence of Soviet clients within the movement has been exaggerated by some U.S. policymakers unwilling to accept non-aligned hostility" as something based on substantive differences with the United States (p. 202). Jackson goes to the heart of American misunderstanding of the nonaligned, as reflected in policy as well as, for example, in the other two books reviewed, when he observes that "Anti-Westernism is kept alive within the NAM by a post-colonial outlook and continuing stalemate on southern Africa, the Middle East, and North-South economic issues. While U.S. approaches to the non-aligned have been largely in reaction to presumed Soviet and Cuban gains, a major force within the movement has been opposition to Western policy rather than affinity for Moscow" (p. 242). Jackson also points out that U.S. policy toward the Non-Aligned Movement lacks coherence, that the United States tends to respond on an ad hoc basis to immediate issues and crises. "Faced with an impending summit of the NAM, . . . and nearly certain condemnation of the United States on issues ranging from Puerto Rico to the Middle East, the usual bureaucratic response has been a 'package' of actions intended to 'cover all bases' " (p. 225). "Lecturing" nonaligned states on such occasions over what positions to take has been counterproductive.

In effect, Jackson argues for a more coherent and pragmatic approach toward the nonaligned, one that would address their substantive interests. I recommend this book as an important contribution to the understanding of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to the continuing debate over nonalignment.

Rita Putins Peters

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State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Edited by Donald Rochchild and Victor A. Olorunsola. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. x + 356. $25.00, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism. By Anthony D. Smith. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. 171. $25.00.)

Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power. By Staffan Wiking. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983. Pp. 141. SEK 63, paper.)

These three books take stock of various events during the quarter century since the first sub-Saharan colonies gained independence from their European masters. Each moves beyond the older scholarship on nation- and state-building to reflect the lessons learned from the sub-Saharan predicament. Three themes merit particlar scrutiny. First, neither the Western European experience with state-building nor the Balkan experience with nation-building captures the peculiar problems of state- and nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, neither liberal nor Marxist scholarship of the past generation adequately understood the processes at work in sub-Saharan Africa. Third, elite/mass dynamics often peculiar to the sub-Saharan predicament affect the processes of nation- and state-building in critical ways, and thus demand more careful scholarly attention.

The Western European states emerging between the fifteenth and early twentieth centuries were favored by conditions peculiar to European history. Drawing from the work of Charles Tilly, Smith cites as preconditions a reasonably homogenous Christian culture, a peasant economy with ruling landlords rather than tribes or lineages, and a decentralized political structure. More immediate conditions included the demonstrated efficiency of the newly centralized state, the freedom of Western Europe from outside interference, and the growth of cities and a merchant class from which the state could extract taxes for its military and bureaucracy. Complementing this model of state-building in Western Europe is the nation-building of Eastern Europe, where ethnic identities were the cornerstones of statehood.

The arbitrary colonial boundaries carved upon the African subcontinent reflected a Eurocentric image of the nation-state, but conditions in sub-Saharan Africa proved radically different from those on the European continent. Colonial boundaries more often than not were insensitive to ethnic identities, colonial administrations defined the contours of subsequent state institutions, and the colonial dependencies made it impossible for the new sub-Saharan states to escape external influence. To make matters worse, indigenous economies were generally precapitalist and rooted in tribe or lineage and, except for Islam in some sections of the subcontinent, religions were comparatively heterodox.

Colonial fiat and the post-World War II international system dictated nation-state structures in sub-Saharan Africa, but European history provided little guidance for understanding the events and processes set in motion when European structures were imposed on sub-Saharan conditions. Neither liberal nor Marxist scholarship took timely and adequate account of the discrepancy between European and sub-Saharan contexts. Smith argues that neither the modernization nor the Marxist paradigms paid sufficient attention to autonomous political processes in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing instead on cultural values and economic forces. Much of *State and Nation in the Third World* reviews problems with liberal theories of modernization. Writing for the Rothchild and Olorunsola volume, *State versus Ethnic Claims,* Goran Hyden notes that Marxists sought an explanation of underdevelopment in capitalist penetration and its alienating and marginalizing effects, rather than recognize the role played by precapitalist peasant production and its attendant primordial/ethnic public realm in blocking economic development and nation-state coherence. Edmond Keller in the same volume regards the state as a potentially autonomous actor and discusses how this factor has emerged in current neo-Marxist debate.

If European experience failed to illuminate nation- and state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, and if earlier liberal and Marxist scholarship failed to take adequate notice of the historical discrepancies, what has more recent scholarship to offer? One common thread running through these three volumes is elite/mass dynamics and its impact on nation- and state-building in sub-Saharan Africa. As an autonomous force, the state in sub-Saharan Africa lacks many of the representational qualities associated with European constitutional democracies. This disjuncture between elites and masses permits differential evolution of state and nation while creating problems regarding elite/mass linkages.

Smith argues that African nationalism can and has operated at three distinct levels: the ethnic community sharing a common history and culture, the state as heir to the colonial administration and territorial boundaries, and the subcontinent as crucible for anticolonialism and racial dignity. The first two are seldom in complete accord, whereas the third emerged as a special province of the African intelligentsia. African elites have been drawn disproportionately from its Western-educated intelligentsia and, according to Smith, cultivate nationalist and Pan-African ideologies while occupying strategic structural roles that are relatively autonomous of civil society. In Smith's view, African political struggles between civilians and military, liberals and Marxists, regional and ethnic conflicts, are first and foremost conflicts within the intelligentsia.

Because the state has been given an extraordinary role in economic development, these same elites potentially can effect profound social change. Indigenous ethnic economies, conversely, continue to hamper modernization. Preferences for proletarian or mass mobilizing political parties bring elite debates to the masses while reinforcing the claims of the territorial state and granting benefits to intelligentsia within the party. Henry Bienen's essay in the Rothchild and Olorunsola volume conversely argues that political parties have been particularly sensitive to social conflict and have attempted to develop formulas for addressing communal and class cleavages. These and other interactions between existing social forms and a relatively autonomous state suggest what Smith calls the problem of "fit" between an elite with alien ideals occupying foreign structures and local cultures and communities.

Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa illustrates one such dilemma of fit. Coups in general violate rules for orderly succession of political personnel, and military coups in particular bring Western organization and ideals into African politics. Wiking reviews a number of possible explanations for military coups including foreign interests and influence, societal conditions, government-military relations, intramilitary conditions, and individual perspectives. Discrepancies between political science explanations and official justifications help to illustrate the "fitting process." Although some foreign complicity or approval may precede a military coup, officers never justify a coup with references to the interests or desires of a foreign nation. Although researchers often relate coups to performance failures, coups typically occur after a disturbance has subsided and the coup itself seldom is justified on grounds of social or political unrest. Economic failures are cited as justifications, but these are seldom the most important justification given for a military coup. Officers seldom justify coups based on problems of government/military relations, save in instances where the military previously intervened and the government subsequently strayed from the course established by the military, preferring instead to cite responsibility to nation and civilian lack of objectivity in dealing with ethnic or regional issues. Intramilitary conflicts are never used to justify a coup, and purely personal motives still require reference to some other condition that might convince others that a change of power is necessary. What follows from all this is the sharp cleavage between elite motives and mass justifications.

A final illustration of the "fit problem" derives from the Rothchild and Olorunsola volume's emphasis on state claims for control and geopolitical quests for autonomy. The policy analysis perspective advocated there asks how public policies might promote a sense of mutual interest using suboptimal or satisficing strategies instead of intractable conflict among mutually unacceptable choices. That such negotiation is thought possible reflects differences in types of state (e.g., hegemonic versus "soft") and type of demand (e.g., low intensity demands for distributive benefits versus high intensity demands for independence). Other possibly relevant factors include the development of mutually rewarding tradeoffs between patron and client, the convergence or divergence of class and ethnic cleavages, the fluidity of ethnic identities, the state's ability to disaggregate claims and strategies, the type of policy conflict, and the availability of alternative solutions (e.g., federalism). Rothchild also cites evidence of a gap between the public's latent articulations and elite selecting and shaping of demands to be channeled into the policy process. If elites and masses are on parallel courses of evolution *vis-à-vis* nation- and state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, it would seem from these books that the similitude likely emerges through an interactive process where elites shape sub-Saharan history within broad and latent boundaries of behaviors at least plausibly congruent with the more immediate and local experience of the masses, both as it was and as it changes through continued elite actions.

If contemporary comparative scholarship is today more informed by the events of sub-Saharan

Africa than in the past, there still is much work to be done; many different analytic frameworks can be found in these three volumes. Typologies abound, and some use similar words in very different ways. Emphases differ on whether factors giving rise to the problems of nation- and state-building are more or less important than available choices as these processes unfold. Using Heribert Adam's distinction in *State versus Ethnic Claims,* the arguments found in these books are neither naive efforts at social engineering nor paralyzed accounts of predetermined historical evolution. But between these extremes there is a great center which surely requires a better theoretical integration of ongoing processes and available choices. The Rothchild and Olorunsola volume concludes with David Laitin's suggestion that a theory of bargaining between state and nationality groups must be complemented with a theory of state coherence and national definition. Rigorous theoretical work linking processes and choices remains an unfulfilled promise of comparative politics.

STEVEN T. SEITZ

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American Government and Politics

Equality under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment. By Judith A. Baer. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 308. $37.50, cloth; $17.50, paper.)

Drawing on constitutional and intellectual history, Judith Baer argues that "constitutional guarantees of equality depend not on the belief that people are equally capable, but on notions of equal humanity and entitlement" (p. 184); that the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, was meant to guarantee an equality in treatment by the government—something like, in Ronald Dworkin's language, the right to be treated as an equal—*despite* inequities in talent and situation; and that the Supreme Court, which deals with equal protection challenges by scrutinizing the fit between governmental discrimination and governmental ends, ignores this history and intent. As a result, the courts have "crabbed and confined a bill of rights that was lavish and expansive in its design" (p. 253). This has led to inequities in practice. In a judicial Balkanization of the equal protection doctrine, principles which are supposed to be generally applicable are not applied to cases involving the handicapped, young, or homosexual. Baer is concise yet thorough in her discussion of the historical material and clear, although somewhat selective, in her presentation of the case law. When appropriate, she acknowledges lacunae in the historical evidence. Baer admits to being a judicial activist in the sense that she advocates a more active role for the Supreme Court in promoting equality, but her rhetoric, unlike that of most activists when writing about equality, is never pompous and only rarely strident. Of particular interest to political scientists who lean towards judicial activism are her brief rebuttal of the historical argument for a minimalist approach to the equal protection clause made by Raoul Berger in *Government by Judiciary* (Harvard University Press, 1977) and her analysis of the limits of the approach to judicial review outlined by John Hart Ely in *Democracy and Distrust* (Harvard University Press, 1980). And for students of the equal protection clause, Baer establishes quite definitely that the multi-tier approach to review now in use "is not clear; it is not rooted in history; it does not fit the constitutional language; and it permits inconsistent and troubling results" (p. 264).

After these accomplishments, Baer's own recommendations for improving the situation, which are set out in a concluding chapter, are disappointing. She draws on and extends (although with a cautionary note) the analysis in Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously* (Harvard University Press, 1978). But the approach Baer proposes, which would be less rigid and which would require courts to concern themselves more with what sorts of rights and individuals were involved than with the appropriateness of a law to the government's interests, will lead to the same sort of subjectivity and inconsistencies that she finds objectionable in the existing doctrine. It is all very well to say, for example, that courts should never permit a categorization that will stigmatize some group, and it is probably true that it is much easier to harm the powerless than the powerful. But stigma remains a psychological concept, and Baer does not recognize the counterargument—which can be based on the psychological evidence in *Brown v. Board of*

Education—that any differential access to governmental benefits inevitably stigmatizes someone. As Samuel Butler observed, any general principle yields absurd results when extended to its extreme. Other principles intervene to limit the working of Jefferson's notion of equality based on an equal endowment of natural rights. Perhaps the law, if it is not to be an ass, must approach the young or the handicapped in a different way than it approaches the black or the female. Or perhaps not. To her credit, Baer does not claim that her approach solves the existing problems; she merely says that it will lead to a better fit between law and justice than what now exists.

PAUL LERMACK

Bradley University

The Future of the Sunbelt: Managing Growth and Change. Edited by Steven C. Ballard and Thomas E. James. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xxi + 241. $25.95.)

This collection aims to expand the discussion of growth in the Sunbelt from federal spending to "other important issues, particularly federal-state relationships, state innovations in growth management capacity, and long-term needs to balance the benefits of growth with its costs and risks" (p. xvi). The title is somewhat misleading, however, because the book is primarily an overview of the current public attitudes, government organization, and growth strategies that could affect the future of the South.

Rebecca Roberts and Lisa Butler review the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the Sunbelt's ability to attract industry and residents. Thomas James complements this analysis with 1978 to 2010 population, employment, economic, and income projections for the 13 southeast and southwest states.

The third chapter addresses problems of capital mobility. Although Daniel McGovern's research is well executed, it is ill-suited to this volume: He examines plant openings and closings in Wisconsin.

Four selections examine state efforts to manage growth. Steven Ballard and Elizabeth Gunn summarize the region's air, water, hazardous waste, and land-use problems. Their analysis of public opinion, interest group membership and activity, state agency organization, and existing environmental management strategies leads them to conclude that the "capacity to manage environmental growth issues is . . . generally positive" (p. 127).

Timothy Hall links Mississippi's laggard development to the importation of half its energy, which benefits "energy producers, royalty owners, energy processors, and governments in other states" (p. 184). Mississippi's competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its neighbors can be remedied, Hall argues, if the state develops its lignite. Potential benefits include jobs, tax revenues, electric rates, and raw material for synthetic fuels and chemical feedstocks. Hall cautions the state to plan carefully to reduce the risks associated with lignite development. Strategies include a detailed technology impact assessment, an analysis of the lignite's quality and availability, a test burn and sample reclamation project, and a gasification feasibility study.

A second case study covers the Texas 2000 Project. The chapter is quite brief, however, and includes little more than a study commission's findings and recommendations regarding water, energy, agriculture, transportation, research and development, government finance, and relations with Mexico.

James L. Regens and Robert W. Rycroft examine some intergovernmental growth issues. They argue that the Reagan administration's "new federalism" effort "systematically undercuts the foundation" (p. 163) of the scientific and technological partnership needed to manage the impacts of growth in the Sunbelt. Budgetary and programmatic cutbacks for research and development, technology transfer and utilization assistance, development of state and local capacities to use science and technology, and intergovernmental agenda-setting and implementation have shifted the onus for action to the states, which may be unable to handle major environmental problems.

Local growth issues receive limited attention. A chapter on urban health care delivery is essentially a description of the Reagan budget cuts for health care. A second selection discusses Houston area residents' opinions on local problems.

Dwight Davis concludes the volume with research and policy recommendations. He suggests that the most pressing immediate problem is effective planning. His long-term agenda includes research on the "underlying causes of growth, interdependence among regions, international factors, and infrastructure and human capital factors" (p. 216).

The volume's contribution to the study of Sunbelt growth is quite limited. The editors have included little original research of interest to scholars. Nor have they aided public officials by adding selections that evaluate the effectiveness of various growth management techniques. Several of the chapters could prove helpful, however, to students and policymakers unfamiliar with the topic.

ARNOLD FLEISCHMANN

University of Georgia

The Democratic Muse: Visual Arts and the Public Interest. By Edward C. Banfield. (New York: Basic Books, 1984. Pp. xii + 244. $15.95.)

Edward Banfield has written a controversial book—at least for those of us who advocate government support for the arts. *The Democratic Muse* has a dual purpose: to determine whether increasing access to the visual arts through government subsidy is in the public interest, and to evaluate the major administrative vehicles of this support such as the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), art museums, and public school art education (pp. 3-4). Banfield argues that as a general principle, cultural subsidies are not defensible; moreover, he sees little value in programs that would broaden cultural access even if unsubsidized. Such conclusions seem likely when, at the start, Banfield asserts that public culture is not a proper national government activity and is also antithetical to "natural law liberalism" (a term introduced on page 12, but left undefined). The question of the proper role of public culture in a liberal state and pluralist society is a complicated one; it certainly requires a treatment more extensive than the seven pages that it is allotted (pp. 8-14).

Unfortunately, there is a central problem in the organization of Banfield's book: Many important issues are introduced but left unexamined, many of his concerns are only vaguely related, and these concerns are often far afield of the issue of public subsidy. Specialists will have to assess the validity of the secondary sources cited and the relevance of the many debates that are recounted. It may be observed, however, that Banfield's discussion of the educational, social, and aesthetic mission of American art museums (pp. 92-116) is both highly selective and marred by many hasty generalizations. It would be difficult to recognize the modern art museum from Banfield's description, let alone a self-conscious museum of modern art.

This is not the appropriate place to evaluate at length the aesthetic values with which Banfield deals as both critic and advocate. For example, he has an elaborate proposal for the acquisition of "high quality fakes" by museums as a solution to the high cost of original works (pp. 139-154). Banfield also proposes "the elimination of all subsidy, indirect as well as direct, private as well as public" (p. 187). Museums are to make up their revenue shortfall, which arises largely from the nature of cultural production rather than inefficiency, by imposing higher admission prices. Banfield suggests that as with the Broadway theater and Hollywood movies, a "cultural market" unimpaired by the distortions of subsidies will find "ways to give viewers what they will pay to see" (p. 188).

One may note again that the reviewer has an interest in public culture. The problem, however, is that the arguments against cultural subsidy raised in *The Democratic Muse* have been dealt with more provocatively elsewhere (for example, by Ernest van den Haag) as have questions about the NEA's goals of cultural equity (for example, by Paul Di Maggio and Michael Useem). These works are not discussed; indeed, there is little reference to the growing scholarly literature in the fields of cultural economics, social theory and the arts, and cultural policymaking. By contrast, a work like Karal Ann Marling's *Wall to Wall America: A Cultural History of Post-Office Murals in the Great Depression* (University of Minnesota Press, 1982) shows what can be learned from another look at an old subject when there is strong archival research and fresh theoretical insights.

The Democratic Muse fails to provide a sharply focused analysis of public culture or a sensitive understanding of the values that underlie the debates over government support for the arts in the United States. There is a legitimate case to be made against public cultural subsidy, but it deserves a better brief than Edward Banfield has provided in *The Democratic Muse.*

KEVIN V. MULCAHY

Louisiana State University

The Twilight of Cities: Political Conflict, Development and Decay in Five Communities. By Harvey Boulay. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Associated Faculty Press, 1983. Pp. 170. $17.00.)

In *The Twilight of Cities,* Harvey Boulay examines political conflict in five eastern Massachusetts cities: Lynn, Lowell, New Bedford, Brockton, and Lawrence. Boulay argues persuasively that these cases represent an interesting class of cities often ignored in the urban policy literature. Each is an older, middle-sized, postindustrial population center which experienced significant economic development in the nineteenth century and long-term economic decline in the twentieth. This shared history is reflected in a strong working-class culture and a deteriorating economic and physical infrastructure. Although a significant proportion of the urban population in the United States lives in such cities, scholars often prefer to study much larger metropolitan areas. As a result, much of what we think we know about urban politics may have less generality than often assumed.

Boulay adds to a growing literature that is pessimistic about the potential of local government. After reviewing a set of political controversies in each of the cities, he concludes that the most notable feature of the political process is a lack of substantive outcomes. Typically, no one wins political fights. Political drift and economic decline are evident in each city. Even the single "success" reported, the creation of an urban national park in Lowell, supports this view, because the park was largely the result of successful appeals to political authorities outside of the local political arena. Indeed, it was only very late in the decision-making process that local officials offered somewhat begrudging support to the idea of the park.

This lack of political capacity is thought to be rooted in two key features of local political culture. The first is a political style of conflict management in which political actors seek to reduce escalation of political conflict. Also critical is the environment in which conflict management occurs. Environment is defined as the level of information available to decision makers. Boulay argues that the level of information available to decision makers in each of the cities studied is very low. As a result, a conflict-management style degenerates into a broad risk-avoidance principle. Thus, decision makers tend to defer to all political groups and organizations, each of whom are seen as having unknown potential for inflicting political retribution. A sort of unit veto system emerges, with issue resolution rare, and substantive outputs limited.

This is an interesting and provocative book. In many ways it is a model of inductive analysis, because it draws tentative generalizations from the case study material. Perhaps the most interesting of these generalizations is the normative challenge the analysis raises to pluralism. Here are five cities that seem to meet the formal conditions associated with pluralism. Yet in each, the political system seems to be impotent. There is no evidence of the optimalization predicted by much of the pluralist literature. This failure of pluralism is traced to a lack of resources and information by political decision makers. In such an environment, group struggle produces stalemate rather than substantive outcomes.

There are, of course, a number of weaknesses in Boulay's analysis. Some are associated with general methodological limits of the inductive case study approach itself. Certainly, the generalizability of conclusions derived from case study material such as this is quite limited, because they may be based on unspecified or hidden bias, selective presentation of narrative analysis, or unique local situations. At a more substantive level, Boulay's discussion of economic class is disappointing. His view that the political culture of each city operates directly against the interests of the working class deserves a much more complete discussion. Indeed, the reference to class interests seems to suggest a level of analysis only hinted at by Boulay. Finally, prescriptions as to how the political process in these cities might be rejuvenated are quite simply not convincing. Even with these reservations, however, this book deserves a wide reading.

RICHARD C. HULA

University of Maryland

Empirical Theories about Courts. Edited by Keith O. Boyum and Lynn Mather. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xi + 284. $32.50.)

In the pre-behavioral era, scholars concerned with courts shared a common image of their subject, a common language, and a common data base. Appellate courts of last resort were the only forums worthy of attention; these courts' decisions and rhetoric were the data; the language was that of legal philosophers, legal historians, and the legal profession itself. The behavioral deluge washed away much of this common ground. The field of public law became more complex—and more exciting. Trial courts finally received a status commensurate with their importance. Court participants' (prosecutors, police, defense counsel) actions, defendants' characteristics, and case outcomes became relevant information. The language of sociologists, organization theorists, social psychologists, and social anthropologists began to enliven the discourse.

This volume is a product of that transformation, reflecting the ferment and diversity that currently characterize the study of courts. The volume contains eight major essays, as well as an introduction by Boyum and an epilogue by Mather. The essays are presented under three larger headings, the first of which is "Comparing Courts Across Time and Space." Lawrence Friedman's contribution to this section is a useful summary of empirical inquiries into the history of trial courts. His work addresses a number of central issues in that history: Have litigation rates increased? Are courts becoming less formalistic? Have we always had a system in which only a few cases receive all procedural niceties? Barbara Yngvesson and Lynn Mather present a framework for cross-cultural comparisons of dispute processing mechanisms, taking issue with the common distinction between modern and tribal processing styles. They argue persuasively that these mechanisms are not so much different processing styles as they are different points on continua that the authors identify. Donald Black and M. P. Baumgartner's essay offers their preliminary work on a typology in which they define the various roles that third parties may play in managing conflict.

The second major heading, "Understanding the Work That Courts Do," begins with an essay by Marc Galanter. Galanter argues that courts do more than simply resolve the disputes brought before them. By both their decisions and by their inaction, courts affect the entire process of conflict management—displacing, preventing, transforming, and mobilizing disputes in the larger society. The emphasis in Samuel Krislov's contribution is a nice counterpoint to Galanter's work. Whereas the latter emphasizes how courts structure disputes in the larger society, Krislov delineates how various scholars use court data as indicators of social processes operating in the general society. He provides an overview of case load studies, discussing how different theoretical or normative perspectives give different meanings to case loads. The recognition that scholars see case loads as resulting from a variety of processes raises the question addressed by Keith Boyum's chapter: Which factors affect an individual's belief that a claim exists and that it is worth pursuing in an official forum?

The final section of the volume, "Understanding How Courts Do Their Work," contains two essays discussing organizational approaches to analyzing trial courts. Herbert Jacob's chapter is a worthwhile distillation of selected organization theorists and a review of much of the criminal court literature that uses an organizational model. Malcolm Feeley and Mark Lazarson elaborate the simple organizational model with an argument that an "interorganizational" perspective may allow us to gain some modicum of additional insight into criminal court operation. Feeley and Lazarson use police-prosecutor interaction to illustrate the tensions that permeate relations among officials from agencies with different goals and operational needs.

The essays in the volume are uniformly good, but, given the quality of the contributing scholars, one might have expected a more impressive product. The summary essays and syntheses are worthwhile, but they are limited by the quality of the extant research in the field. Those essays that break new theoretical ground are, for the most part, in their early stages of development. Given the above, the volume gives a useful picture of current inquiries concerned with courts.

CHARLES DAVID PHILLIPS

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Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy. By John E. Chubb. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 319. $29.50.)

John E. Chubb focuses on national energy policymaking to advance our knowledge of the relationship of the interest groups and the bureaucracy involved. Different from many case studies, however, the research is solidly grounded in appropriate theory and systematically examines numerous relevant hypotheses. Possibly the most important contribution by Chubb is that he has been able to marshal data on the relationship of the interests and the bureaucracy, whereas the literature is dominated by research that examines interest group interaction with legislative actors.

Much of the data for the book was obtained in 1978 and 1979 from in-depth interviews with 73 interest group representatives who were active in the arena of energy policy during the 1970s. Those interviewed included officials of a variety of environmental and consumer groups as well as members of the traditional energy subgovernment such as the oil, gas, and electric producer association leaders. Also used in the analysis were data concerning the resources expended by these groups in Washington, and other indicators of formal interest group participation such as the number of contacts with agency personnel, filings of statements on proposed regulations, and testimony at administrative hearings.

The findings of Chubb's research present little that is different from what might be expected. However, the comprehensiveness of his research provides convincing documentation for his findings. Generally, informal contact by interest group representatives early in the process of developing program rules and regulations seems to have the greatest effect on policy development. In fact, Chubb indicates that by the time proposed policy changes are published in the *Federal Register* for comment, affected groups have little effect on the proposed policies. Too, Chubb indicates that a great deal of policy change takes place as a result of interest group contact with technical staff (GS15 and GS16 levels), and that the impact of presidential appointees within the agencies as well as legislative interest in policy initiatives seems to have minimal impact on the interest group-technical staff relationship.

Chubb's research also indicates that agency officials are not merely passive receivers of interest group demands. In fact, Chubb found many instances where agencies initiate much of the contact they have with interest groups and are as much responsible for guiding the direction of policy development as interest groups. Another important finding of Chubb's research is the ability of well-financed and well-organized groups to use these factors to advantage in their relationships with agencies. Beyond the informal opportunities that are available for the well-financed producer groups, the substantial resource advantage allows them to make presentations at hearings and to file statements when their interests are affected. The environmental and consumer groups, by virtue of their limited staff and other resources, must concentrate their efforts on issues considered by the Congress. Activity focusing on congressional consideration of policy change provides greater visibility with the group's membership which is a necessity for maintaining membership identification with the group. As a result, expert testimony from producer groups on technical issues is seldom challenged.

In sum, Chubb's in-depth research in energy policymaking is an important contribution to our knowledge of the role that interest group-bureaucracy interaction has in the formulation and development of public policy in the American political system. Those who specialize in the policy formulation, interest groups, implementation, and other related areas will find many valuable insights and much information to assist them as teachers and scholars.

THOMAS VOCINO

Auburn University at Montgomery

Before It's too Late: A Scientist's Case for Nuclear Energy. By Bernard L. Cohen. (New York: Plenum Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 292. $16.95.)
Uncertain Power: The Struggle for a National Energy Policy. Edited by Dorothy S. Zinberg. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983. Pp. xxxv + 260. $35.01, cloth; $11.91, paper.)

In radically different ways, each of these books examines the political processes associated with what the authors of both volumes view as deeply flawed policymaking in the energy arena. *Uncertain Power* is a collection of 12 articles by scholars in the fields of political science and public policy analysis, who argue convincingly that the energy crisis is not over. Proceeding from examination of characteristics of the political process in the 1970s, they seek to understand why the United States was unable to resolve its energy dilemma. The political process is broadly construed by the authors, and aspects examined are: the role of the public in energy policymaking, the role of systematic evaluation of risk in improving energy decision making, the ability of the media to cover technological issues, the functions of different levels of government as well as the electric power utilities in stimulating constructive approaches to energy policymaking, and the impact of security-related issues. The volume's most stimulating articles are a joint chapter by Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale, which sets out common conceptions of the dilemma of nuclear governance and grapples with potential solutions, and Harvey Brooks's innovative comparison of the Carter administration's attempts to design a comprehensive energy policy with the successful Sputnik campaign of earlier years. To differing extents, each of the authors attempts to analyze the implications of past patterns of policymaking for future energy decision making.

Before It's too Late is a thought-provoking analysis of the current debate concerning peacetime use of nuclear energy, delivered from the perspective of a physicist who has been convinced by scientific analyses that nuclear energy is among the safest, least costly energy sources that can power economic life. The book is a clearly worded description of the hazards and health effects that have been associated with uses of nuclear power, a discussion of the probability of their occurrence, and an analysis of the meaning of those probabilities in terms of the risks of everyday life. Although Cohen's tools are the quantitative and comparative assessment of risk, his analysis is not a standard assessment of the risks to which nuclear power exposes society. Cohen's book is of interest to students of policymaking both because it was written as part of an effort to intervene in the political process, and because it presents Cohen's provocative claim that an aspect of the American political process has run haywire in managing the issue of nuclear power, and, by analogy, in dealing with other complex technological issues.

What then are the issues learned in these two volumes, and how do they compare in the results of their search for the roots of American energy dilemmas? *Uncertain Power* locates the roots of the energy dilemma in values, culture, and politics. In the chapter "Energy Policy and Democratic Theory," Richard Sclove develops the notion that technologies have associated with them types of social and political relations, and that "in a democracy when non-instrumental values and meanings conflict, conflict resolution procedures must accord equal weight to each person's beliefs . . ." (p. 51). Zinberg, in her overview of the volume, states that the energy debate is a political battle over values.

In Cohen's view, the foregoing type of analysis substitutes cause for cure, that is, taking into account the association of energy technologies with particular values is not the solution to the energy problem, but rather the cause. For a variety of hazards ranging from leaks from high-level radioactive waste sites to reactor meltdowns, Cohen demonstrates that risks associated with the nuclear energy cycle are many orders of magnitude lower than are commonly considered, and that where significant risks are associated with nuclear power, they are always smaller than the comparable risks associated with other forms of energy.

Cohen cites evidence from recent polls that demonstrate that physical scientists overwhelmingly support his view. He attributes America's revolt against nuclear power to a failure of communication between experts and the public. In Cohen's view, this is not accidental, and he points an accusing finger at media personnel, whom he contends do not solicit the opinions and advice of experts and consistently misrepresent technological problems, primarily by committing large blocks of space and time to detailed and emotional communications of worst-case scenarios with no notice paid to the quantitative aspects of the problem, namely, the extremely low probability of occurrence.

The greatest divergence of views appears in the specific analylsis of nuclear power. Zinberg asserts that the question of social values is most pertinent in the case of nuclear power, which, in her view, is unique. But for Cohen, nuclear power and the high-level radioactive waste associated with its use are not unique at all. They involve processes and side effects that pose scientific and technological problems. In this, nuclear power is similar to other energy sources such as coal-fired electricity and solar heat, and its waste products resemble industrial byproducts like air pollutants and chemical waste products. Cohen argues that the risks associated with nuclear power can be compared logically to risks of other energy options and the multitude of nonenergy-related risks taken everyday. Finally, Cohen argues that the use of nuclear technology has no real political implications; he says "the issue here is a strictly scientific one—what is the cancer risk of one millirem of radiation?" (p. 68).

Cohen's quantitative analysis and political theorizing suggest fertile areas for future research. There is a need to test Cohen's proposition that the media fails to report both sides of technology stories and consistently represents worst-case scenarios by failure to identify their probability. If further research demonstrates Cohen's proposition to be true, the questions of why and how unwanted politicization of technical issues has occurred must be investigated.

A number of the political scientists and policy analysts who contributed to *Uncertain Power* comment that public attitudes toward technology and risk must be heavily weighted in future energy decision making. In "The Public, Experts and Governments," Zinberg argues that public anger can be transformed through political participation in energy decision making, and that taking public opinion into account in which making these decisions is a positive value (pp. 13, 14). In "The Utility Director's Dilemma," Allison and Carnesale include the conditions of "public acceptability" (p. 145) as one of three conditions that must be met by the commercial nuclear power. This perspective too stimulates thought concerning further research, because in *Uncertain Power* those analysts fail to grapple with the potential effects on American life that could result if uninformed publics exercise power in deciding issues about which there actually is ample knowledge, and in connection with which public opinion is in error. It is hoped that such an analysis could be executed.

PAULETTE A. MANDELBAUM

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Politics and the Restraint of Science. By Leonard A. Cole. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983. Pp. xii + 187. $17.95.)

This brief volume is more narrowly circumscribed and yet more broad-ranging than its title suggests. Cole's subject is the interface between science and politics, specifically the matter of political "interference" (p. 3) with scientific activity. His focus is exclusively the physical and biological sciences. Although he notes that "restraint of science by political authority may be relative or absolute," his "central concern" is only with the latter. "Relative restraints involve inhibition, but not prohibition, of certain scientific activities" (p. 6).

Despite these limitations, Cole addresses an impressive set of issues. Cole's goals are to demonstrate that scientists are not the best protectors of their own terrain; that there is "no threat of politically imposed scientific truth" in this nation (e.g., pp. 75, 77); and that politics does play a crucial role by establishing necessary constraints on the scientific enterprise in the interests of ethics and public safety.

He develops this argument by opening with an analysis of three notorious historic cases in which governments, or at least nonscientifically based systems of authority, imposed a version of the truth: Galileo in seventeenth-century Italy, Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union, and racial science under the German Nazi regime. Cole documents how limited was the resistance of the scientific establishment to each manipulative effort, and he surveys possible explanations. His conclusion here, based on a brief and largely superficial analysis, is that blame lies with the common human tendency to submit to authority; in fact, he suggests, the competitive nature of their disciplines may exacerbate this inclination among scientists. As a consequence, "the likelihood of imposed truth can best be gauged . . . from the character of political systems" (p. 52).

Cole then compares the American variant with those of the three cases. The result is largely a vindication of Western liberal democracy. This portion of Cole's volume is simultaneously provocative and frustrating. He presents an overwhelming number of plausible ideas about the linkages between political characteristics and the degree of integrity accorded the scientific enterprise. Yet with so few cases, so many variables, and so brief a discussion, his argument is more like a series of sketchy assertions than a sustained, coherent whole.

Cole's effort ranges beyond even those matters already summarized here. He examines some American cases in which attempts were made to impose a politically determined truth (antievolutionism and creationism, Jesse Helms's human life bill) and reaches largely sanguine conclusions about the demonstrated ability of the American political system, when working at its best, to resist such efforts. He surveys well-known instances of U.S. government-supported unethical experimentation to make the case that the institutional responses in the political system stimulated reforms. He covers nuclear policy and the recombinant DNA controversy (interviews with more than 100 scientists help to bolster this discussion) to support the theme that when the multiple checks of the American pluralistic system are weakened or evaded (as in the nuclear case), public safety may be imperiled. He proposes a set of procedures, including the establishment of a Science Hearings Panel, that might be initiated as part of a process of discussion and restraint when scientific activity raises matters of concern for the larger public. Among these items he intersperses the results of an opinion survey he conducted with 632 scientists.

Cole's use of these data is flawed, especially in his concluding chapter where he attempts to demonstrate that younger scientists are more likely to accept judicious constraints on scientific activity. There is no multivariate analysis, inferences are made without statistical tests of significance, and substantive discussion of the findings is cursory.

Despite these problems and others mentioned above, however, Cole has produced a stimulating volume. There are ideas aplenty—enough, by far, to provoke additional attention to some of these timely questions of science and politics.

Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr.

Auburn University

Neighborhood Politics. By Matthew A. Crenson. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 328. $22.50.)

Although the urban politics literature contains much anecdotal material about neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations, attempts to isolate the central characteristics of neighborhood-based political processes are rare. Matthew Crenson's study begins to fill that gap by focusing on the functioning of 21 "neighborhood polities" in Baltimore. Drawing on a survey conducted in 1978 and 1979 of 1,637 residents and interviews with approximately 230 neighborhood leaders, Crenson has attempted to identify the correlates of variations in political behavior that he found among residents of the different neighborhoods and to indicate the kinds of governance mechanisms that resulted from those variations.

With considerable subtlety and caution, Crenson builds upon the argument that has evolved between those (like Norton Long) who view neighborhoods at their best as "communities" whose political integration is strengthened by socioeconomic homogeneity and normative solidarity, and others (like Jane Jacobs and Richard Sennett) who find strength in social diversity. Crenson clearly prefers the latter approach, but he elaborates upon it by arguing that the *essence* of neighborhood politics is the lack of social and normative harmony. Furthermore, Crenson's evidence suggests that neighborhood polities operate largely independently of social networks. Thus, although he recognizes that individual and aggregate socioeconomic characteristics play a part in neighborhood political behaviors, Crenson's data point to the independent effects of neighborhood political "environment" in shaping both informal and formal political actions.

Crenson devotes considerable attention, alternately, to the informal and formal aspects of neighborhood political actions. Again, he argues that they constitute distinct dimensions of political participation, so that the former does not represent the foundation upon which the mobilization of organizational participation rests. Nonetheless, the more cosmopolitan residents of a neighborhood (those with greater ties outside the neighborhood) are likely to take the lead in both types of neighborhood politics. This leads to the slightly anomalous finding that neighborhood involvement is strongest among the least locally tied segments of the population. However, it also allows for the kind of political life that is anchored as much in conflict as in community.

Higher-status residents tend to predominate both in informal and formal political action and to do so both in higher-status and lower-status neighborhoods. The picture for the activation of lower-status residents is more complex. Crenson finds that low-status residents are more active informally in low-status neighborhoods than in ones where high-status residents are present in large numbers. These social differences also appear in regard to participation in formal neighborhood organizations, particularly where low-status residents find themselves in relatively high-status neighborhoods, but what also appears to be the case is that low-status residents' efforts are channeled into informal action rather than organizational politics in low-status neighborhoods.

From his rich but exceedingly complex analysis of "domestic" political patterns, Crenson moves in his last substantive chapter to an examination of what he calls "foreign entanglements." On the whole, he finds little relationship between types of informal and formal political activation on the one hand, and the styles that different neighborhoods follow in their external relations on the other.

Although the emphasis of this study is on pinning down findings from his behavioral data, Crenson introduces each chapter with an interesting vignette of neighborhood politics. These vignettes serve, at least in part, to moderate the occasionally rococo quality of the data analyses.

In his concluding chapter, Crenson briefly examines notions about neighborhoods either as interest groups or as parts of a neighborhood movement. He finds the former approach unsatisfactory given the transitory nature of neighborhood groups, and the latter does not appear to apply well in an executive-centered political order of the kind that Baltimore has developed recently.

In terms of what this study contributes to public policy, Crenson argues that his data point to the value for urban neighborhoods of having diverse populations containing a reasonable proportion of middle-class people. At the same time, he is notably careful to avoid advocating efforts that might encourage major gentrification.

It is characteristic of Crenson's emphasis on neighborhood politics that only in the concluding chapter does he provide a sense of the larger political context in which that politics is conducted. That apparent afterthought is also a commentary on how assiduously Crenson ignores the picture of urban politics that has found favor of late in so many neo-Marxist analyses of American urban politics. Although Crenson appears to accept the notion that the parameters of neighborhood politics are set by socioeconomic forces, his argument is that once neighborhoods have been created it is still important to understand how people manage their political relations with their neighbors.

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The Presidential Election and Transition 1980-1981. Edited by Paul T. David and David H. Everson. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 259. $24.95.)

How can a modest collection of lectures, printed well after the event they describe, by a small university press, hope to garner enough readers to justify its publication? Like the struggling software designer trying to cash in on the personal computer boom, the press has only two options: Do the old things better, or do something novel but broadly appealing. This book attempts, with partial success, to pursue both strategies. The 1980 presidential election has been dissected in the popular media and in scholarly journals, it has been anthologized and monographed by Congressional Quarterly and other publishers, and politicians have already culled it thoroughly for tactical lessons. All this intellectual ferment doubtless diminishes the number of novel and important questions remaining unasked—Visicalc need only be invented once—but the success of Lotus 1-2-3 shows that a new approach to an old problem can also foster creativity.

What questions about presidential elections might be illuminated by a new look at the experience of 1980? One that need not be asked again is whether the voters gave the new president a positive mandate. The essentially retrospective nature of the 1980 presidential result is now well established, and these authors—Robert D. McClure on the media, Paul T. David on the significance of the election—are wise enough to treat the question lightly. One that should be asked again inquires into the state of the national parties and the party system, and this is a good question for a late-entry text, for its answer will respond more readily to perceptive thinking than to the instant analysis of new data. In an elegant summary of his work along these lines, James Ceaser distinguishes the sources of party strength into long-term (core ideas or doctrine; the legal environment and the intra-party structure of competition; and the social, demographic, and technological context) and short-term (the salient issues of the day). He argues for assessing party strength only after abstracting from temporary fluctuations, then concentrating on long-term trends. In that light, the Republican resurgence of 1980 constitutes a minor perturbation; greater potential for party strengthening lies in the progressive decline of the last decade's impetus for party reform. Both these questions are familiar ones. But the 1980 contest also provides information about a third question that is pertinent to the 1984 campaign and of theoretical interest: What are the electoral effects of incumbency? Given the depth of our understanding of incumbency effects in congressional elections, it is surprising that so little systematic analysis compares presidential and congressional levels. It is clear that the incumbency effect in congressional contests owes most of its strength to the typical dearth of information available to voters. If we think of a continuum from information-rich to information-poor as the contextual variable determining the strength of incumbency effects as well as the potential for voters to manifest sophisticated political reasoning on a number of dimensions, then the progression from presidential to senatorial to congressional elections should map such a continuum. Although none of the authors confront the question as I have formulated it, intimations of the potential for such an approach are provided by William Crotty on the nominating process, David on the Democratic platform, and Robert D. McClure on the media's selective treatment of Carter's record.

What about political strategies and tactics? Should presidential aspirants spend early in the nomination process (as Reagan and Mondale did, Bush and Hart did not), or does haste make waste under some specifiable conditions? Herbert E. Alexander's chapter on finance and Everson's on the campaign begin to illuminate the issues here. What about reforming the presidential selection process? Are, or should, nominators be representative of their party or the country? Was Anderson's demise attributable to the structure of the contest or the unpopularity of his issues? If primaries accomplish the nominating function, should the parties give more formal attention to the procedures for producing platforms? Given the critical nature of the president's first year in office, can the nominees afford to continue devoting so much time to the probability of election and so little to the probability of transition and agenda-building? Frustratingly brief discussions by Lois Moreland, David, Laurin L. Henry, and others hint at the latent consequences implied by reform proposals.

Beyond tantalizingly incomplete discussions of broadly interesting old issues, this collection offers detailed discussions of an aspect of the 1980 elections omitted from earlier publications: the progress of the nomination and election in Illinois. These essays, by John W. Jackson III, James D. Nowlan, and Peter W. Colby and Paul M. Green, are interesting, lightly written case studies. With America's rich regional variation and the high strategic importance of state-level tactics for winning a majority of electoral votes, we need more such studies: These suffer from the absence of cross-state comparisons.

At least in conception, the book represents an attempt to penetrate the illusion that if we have national sample surveys, we must have a national electorate answering the questions. This is not yet systematic, comparative, multilevel analysis, but it gives enough hints of the causal power of diverse political contexts that it should encourage further and better attempts following the next presidential election.

M. STEPHEN WEATHERFORD

University of California, Santa Barbara

Industry in Trouble: The Federal Government and the New England Fisheries. By Margaret E. Dewar. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 252. $29.95.)

In both academic and popular circles, industrial policy has been a topic at the center of much recent discussion of public policy. Various proposals have been made to involve government in assisting the recovery of older industries and stimulating the development of new ones so that the United States can meet the challenges of a more competitive world economy. Margaret Dewar's book provides the kind of hard information essential for assessing the value of such proposals and also gives political scientists a good demonstration of the type of political-economic analysis that should become more prevalent in the discipline.

Among American industries in trouble today, the New England offshore groundfish industry—that part of the fishing industry upon which Dewar focuses—might seem an odd place to characterize as being "at the intersection of questions in politics, economics, and public policy regarding government intervention in industry affairs and the proper role of the public sector in the private economy" (p. 9). Neither a core heavy industry like steel, nor a locus of high technology like computer production, offshore groundfishing is the harvesting and processing of a renewable natural resource found in specific geographical locations. It is one of the oldest American industries, still composed mainly of small businesses with little vertical integration, many organized around family or ethnic ties. Such traits can make one think more of agriculture than of industry in the traditional sense of the term. Nevertheless, the history of offshore groundfishing since World War II provides examples of almost every major economic difficulty encountered at some time or another by mainline American industry: intense foreign competition affecting both supply and demand, new product inventions affecting the industry's structure, and technological advances affecting labor and management practices. It then provides examples of almost every major policy response by the federal government to these difficulties that has been called for by some troubled mainline industry or another: tariffs and other restrictive measures to protect the industry from foreign competition, financial assistance to soften the blow of new product developments, government-sponsored research and training to help meet new technological and labor requirements. In other words, as the book outlines the groundfish industry and its history, we are shown a microcosm of industrial policy issues in postwar America.

Dewar is meticulous and thorough in her descriptions of the fishing industry's structure, the nature of its problems, and the politics and policies involved in the federal government's efforts to assist the industry's progress. Her presentation of the facts strongly supports her three main conclusions about why government assistance to the industry was less than reasonably successful: because the causes of industry problems were not accurately assessed by either the industry or the federal government; because proposed solutions were not adequately analyzed before their implementation; and because implementation itself was beset by managerial and administrative problems. These are conclusions with sobering implications about the future of industrial policy in general, and many readers will probably wish that Dewar had taken more time than she does at the end of the book to discuss both those implications and her brief recommendations for achieving more effective government assistance. Overall, *Industry in Trouble* seems to stress the futility of public intervention in the economy, and I was left wondering whether Dewar thinks this futility to be unavoidable, or simply the result of poor judgement and planning that can be corrected.

This issue aside, the book still is worthwhile reading, especially for what it suggests about the direction that policy analysis in political science should be taking. The relationship between politics and economics is obviously of major importance in contemporary industrial society, but its full examination has not always been easy for political scientists cautious about venturing beyond the study of purely public processes. Dewar's direct and competent approach to industrial structure, processes, and history—the nonpublic phenomena critical to grasping completely the political-economic connection—should be an encouraging example of how far the discipline's skills can be stretched.

DAVID MENNINGER

University of California, Los Angeles

Conflict and Choice in Resource Management: The Case of Alaska. By John Dryzek. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 164. $17.00, paper.)

Although students of the public policy process in liberal democracies rely heavily on the assumptions and methods of economics, many are now seeking to derive insights from the discipline of philosophy. John Dryzek, like others with philosophic interests, is "extremely unhappy" with the practical policy results produced by the decentralized mechanisms of choice operative for natural resource management in the United States. These are "interactive," "fragmented," and overemphasize compromise and accommodation among competing interests while remaining insensitive both to "long-term strategic considerations" and the pursuit of clearly defined values through the exercise of central authority. Dryzek makes a plea for reconstructed policy analysis that places the social scientist in a role of "advocate and agitator on behalf of a more fundamental set of values" (p. 146) than those that result from the simple outcome of compromises struck among organized interests and various levels of government.

In a carefully executed case study of the management of Alaska's coastal and off-shore resources, with particular emphasis on oil, Dryzek examines three systems of ethics. He believes these lie at the heart of the natural resource policy problem and suggest contradictory principles of public action. The utilitarian/social welfare system, which rests on economic premises, emphasizes maximization of benefits for society as a whole and calls for the extraction of resources as dictated both by market mechanisms and by cost-benefit analysis of environmental trade-offs. The rights/justice system emphasizes a fundamental equality that dictates inviolable respect for the specific claims of individuals and groups; it permits the state of Alaska, local jurisdictions, and native communities to trump the dictates of aggregate social welfare in instances where these dictates encroach on their interests. The system of ecological ethics affords precedence to the integrity of the ecosystem and calls for "long-term strategic rationality" directed at stewardship, rather than short-term social benefits or the satisfaction of specific claims.

Based on "analytical integration" of these systems, Dryzek advocates absolute priority for ecological ethics and argues the necessity for firm value choices in a world of scarcity. Although the general argument is familiar in the public policy and natural resource literature, Dryzek advances it with uncommon originality by skillfully synthesizing the literatures of moral philosophy, welfare economics/social choice, and policy analysis.

My only criticism is that the distinction between utilitarianism/social welfare and rights/justice is too finely drawn. The contention that most current normative policy arguments collapse into these two perspectives, and that most philosophers see them as "the ones between which a fundamental choice must be made" (p. 57), is unconvincing. In policy practice, the former emphasizes revealed preference utilitarianism, an essentially free-market frame of reference, which seeks to maximize social welfare by weighing aggregate costs and benefits on the dollar standard (pp. 59-60, 120). This perspective necessarily contains a heavy implicit emphasis on rights (in particular, property rights). Therefore, Dryzek's policy "problem" does not arise from "fundamental and irreducible incompatibilities" between utilitarianism, justice, and ecology, but rather from the extent to which the prevailing distribution of individual and institutional (in particular, corporate) rights has come to dominate our liberal democratic notion of social welfare.

In my opinion, Dryzek could have rested his advocacy for more fundamental values on firmer ground by combining the first two systems into one and setting them against an alternative that moves beyond simple stewardship of the ecosystem and focuses on the willingness of individuals and groups to make sacrifices for a shared conception of the public good. Utilitarianism, as well as the philosophy of rights, is subject to strong critique by just such an alternative. And this alternative could have more clearly cast the tension between fragmented interest accommodation and the necessity for central authority.

Although the integrity of the ecosystem is important to good natural resource policy, civic virtue is even more important to good political philosophy. A reconstructed policy analysis grounded in philosophic principles must therefore agitate not only for the good of the ecosystem, but also for the good of the political community.

LEONARD CHAMPNEY

University of Scranton

Victims of the System: Crime Victims and Compensation in American Politics and Criminal Justice. By Robert Elias. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983. Pp. 352. $34.95.)

The expanded procedural safeguards provided for defendants by the Warren Court fostered the perception, especially among conservatives, that the criminal justice system was too heavily slanted in favor of criminals and against the victims. Victim compensation programs were developed to help alter this perception about the system and to provide some relief to those harmed by crime. *Victims of the System* is a well written, extensive, and extremely astute analysis of the effect of victim compensation as a method of alleviating the plight of victims.

The main body of the text concerns a comprehensive analysis of the victim compensation programs operating in Brooklyn and Newark. Elias explores the perceptions about these programs through attitudinal surveys of both victims and agency personnel. These sources were supplemented with data available through official reports, program records, and compensation board observations. The volume of data and information that is presented in this book is impressive, and each step in the analysis is documented thoroughly.

The analysis presented in *Victims of the System* demonstrates that neither the Brooklyn nor Newark programs are achieving the goals for which they were established: to grant awards, to encourage positive attitudes, and to foster cooperation on the part of victims with criminal justice agencies. Elias provides compelling reasons throughout the book for these failures, including lack of program visibility, restrictive eligibility requirements, and limited appropriations to the agencies by the legislatures.

One of the most interesting research hypotheses of the study concerns the difference in perspective observed between the Brooklyn and Newark programs. The Brooklyn program is based on a welfare model that requires a demonstration of need on the part of the claimant for eligibility, whereas the Newark program approaches eligibility as an entitlement. Elias hypothesizes that the Newark program would be more positively viewed by victims, and this was the case. It must be pointed out, however, that although the attitudinal results were more positive in the Newark program than its Brooklyn counterpart, both were viewed negatively overall by the bulk of the respondents.

Victims of the System is an appropriate title for a book about compensation programs as it points out that victims are harmed by the political process that uses them to provide a symbolic statement by creating the program, while simultaneously hampering any possible success with limited funds and eligibility requirements that eliminate most victims. This irony that the victims are again being victimized by the political process is an underlying theme in much of the book.

In the final chapter, Elias discusses the policy implications of his findings. This discussion is excellent because it links the conclusions of the study with the leading theoretical perspectives in criminal justice that suggest that the organizational needs of the system weigh heavily against both the criminal and the victim. This is very important because it avoids the common pitfall of seeing the criminal and victim as being involved in a zero-sum game.

It is impossible to adequately detail the contributions available from a fine work such as *Victims of the System.* The writing is lucid, the analysis cogent, and the documentation outstanding. In sum, this is an excellent book that should have a substantial impact.

ALBERT C. PRICE

The University of Michigan-Flint

Computers in Congress: The Politics of Information. By Stephen E. Frantzich. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982. Pp. 288. $24.00.)

In 1970, Congress barely participated in a computerized information age that had already affected several state legislatures. Little computerized information was available to Congress. Ten years later, almost all congressional offices have terminals, and scores of data bases are available for congressional use.

Frantzich has written a comprehensive account of the need for information in Congress, the recent history of efforts to increase the quantity and quality of information, the adoption and uses of the computer in Congress, and questions of access and implications. He bases his analysis upon an exhaustive survey of a growing literature and a series of interviews with congressmen and staff. He makes a number of interesting points about Congress and its use of computers.

For example, as information processing organizations, legislatures in general—and Congress in particular—are unique in their information needs. Although the computer has the potential to assist with the routines of the congressional workload, a significant portion of a legislator's job involves value conflicts and "impressionistic perceptions" that limit the usefulness of the computer in making decisions. The most ubiquitous uses for computers in Congress involve assisting with the constituent communication workload and in obtaining short "issue briefs" from the Congressional Research Service.

Frantzich places the issue of how Congress adopted the use of the computer into an organizational innovation framework. Thus, the decentralized character of Congress and the ability of individual congressmen to act as independent political entrepreneurs tends to facilitate the adoption of computers, but the very nature of Congress as an institution means that adoption is "slow, halting and fragmented" (p. 91).

The influence of the organizational structure of each house can be seen in the basic rules for computer use. In the House of Representatives, each office can use a portion of its "housekeeping" budget for computers, even to the extent of contracting with outside purveyors. Consequently, the House Information Service has aggressively marketed computerized data bases and services for individual offices. In the Senate, however, centralized computer services are provided free to all members, meaning that House members are a "much more interested and critical" clientele (p. 128). Senate services tend to lag behind those available in the House, but their correspondence services, developed specifically for the needs of large states, are more extensive.

Even more reflective of organizational structure is the fact that each house has its own computer system. The two systems are linked only to the extent of sharing computer tapes each night to avoid duplicate data entry.

Whereas the range of uses of computers in Congress is almost as vast as the range of uses outside Congress, the most extensively used services are those which fulfill the need of legislators for fast and "finished" (as opposed to "raw") information. Most useful are services which better manage the frenetic congressional workload. Much less developed at this point are systems to extend the word processing correspondence system to categorize cases by agency and problem, although a few congressmen are beginning to use systems in this area.

Clearly Congress has "quickly" (for a fragmented, decentralized organization) adopted a sophisticated technology for managing the congressional workload, assisting in reelecting incumbents, and helping provide congressmen with quick, relevant information. Less clear are the answers to some troublesome questions. Information "that might be interpreted as embarrassing" (p. 216) either has not been computerized or is not accessible by the public. Even the extent to which individual offices use the computer is not public. The Senate computer system, for example, does not make public how much mail is generated by each office.

Thus far it is clear that individual congressmen have adapted the computer to their prevailing modes of operation. Even so, there have been some system-wide effects that the computer has accelerated, if not caused. The widespread availability of tax and budget simulation information has worked with the other changes of the 1970s to decentralize power away from committee chairs and limit the influence of "experience and expertise" (p. 237). Frantzich suggests that the ultimate impact of this decentralization is more conflict on the floor of each house and less willingness to compromise. The computer has changed the role and qualifications of the staff, requiring that some staff members in each office be knowledgable about information processing. Computers have established whole new sets of ethical problems, ranging from whether partisan political information is being maintained in tax-supported mailing lists to a vast potential for invading individual privacy. Obtaining information on the legislative success of congressmen is "much more laborious than would be possible if Congress really wanted to share this information" (p. 219).

On balance, Frantzich finds that computers have had a positive impact upon Congress, but he also considers that their impact is just beginning. Overall, this is a solid, professional contribution to the literature on Congress and the literature on public-sector applications of computing. It is written in such a way that specialists in either area can read it and profit. I strongly recommend it.

J. THEODORE ANAGNOSON

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What Do Unions Do? By Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff. (New York: Basic Books, 1984. Pp. 293. $22.95.)

At a time when unions are being dealt crushing blows in the nation's workplaces and when they are in ideological and political retreat, along comes a scholarly work, bearing much evidence in the union's defense, written by two Harvard economists committed to the survival of the free enterprise system. Freeman and Medoff are confident that their heavy mining of several cross-sectional and longitudinal data bases and the sophisticated multivariate analyses they undertook can provide valid quantitative estimates of what unions do, and thus correct the largely impressionistic (and negative) view of unions that prevails currently.

The picture that emerges from a series of short but pithy chapters examining the unions' effect on wages, fringe benefits, productivity, and wage inequality is that, on balance, unions do much social good. This is not to deny that unions have bad effects through their monopoly power to raise wages above true market levels, only that these effects are small and outweighed by the good effects of the "voice/response" mechanism the unions encourage. Thus, although unions manage to obtain substantially higher wages and fringe benefits for their members over comparable nonunion workers (the wage premium in the 1970s was on the order of 20 to 30%), they do not, on balance, increase wage inequality within the whole economy. In fact, because much of the overall wage inequality is accounted for by within-plant inequality, the unions' pursuit of wage solidarity within (and across) establishments tends to reduce wage inequality by around 3%. Moreover, the threat of unionization has "sizable positive spillovers" (p. 155) for some nonunion workers in that it induces businesses to emulate the compensation package won by unions to forestall a unionization drive. Freeman and Medoff maintain that this indicates that "unionism represents the preferences of the majority of workers better than the market can," otherwise the nonunion firm could "safely ignore what unions do" (p. 151).

Further, the voice provided workers through union-won grievance and arbitration procedures reduces the probability that workers will quit their jobs when they are dissatisfied. The much lower level of quits in union firms is estimated to increase GNP (i.e., social welfare) by 0.2 to 0.3%, balancing out almost entirely the welfare loss due to union monopoly wage gains. Moreover, the lower quits reduce the costs of job training and recruitment and increase the on-the-job experience of workers, which, when coupled with a positive management response, tend to increase productivity, an obvious social benefit.

One is driven to ask why, given these generally favorable effects of unions, there has been a precipitous decline in the percentage of the work force that is unionized and in union successes in NLRB elections. It turns out that managerial opposition in the form of "tough legal campaigns," illegal actions (e.g., one in 20 workers voting for a union in elections got fired), and "positive labor relations" have increased by "leaps and bounds" and are the primary reasons for the "strangulation of private sector unionism" (pp. 230-239). Indeed, this managerial opposition is rational, because unions tend to lower profits by anywhere from 10 to 30% (although this effect occurs mainly in highly concentrated industries). Further, and despite the authors' claims, it is not at all clear that unions increase productivity. The studies they cite show a mixed picture, and their contention that restricted managerial flexibility (i.e., control) is unlikely to lower productivity substantially is not supported in many studies, which they don't cite. They are thus compelled to conclude rather lamely that whether productivity goes up or down in unionized firms depends largely on whether industrial relations are "good" or "bad" (p. 165), without describing in any detail the kinds of workplace social relations that deserve each adjective. This is not much of an inducement to management to accept unions.

Freeman and Medoff are somewhat puzzled by the contradictory impact of unions on capital on the one hand, and labor and the general good on the other. Nevertheless, they believe that the "paradox of American unionism" (p. 248) can be resolved by all sides giving up something. Union monopoly power should be reduced by increased deregulation and open competition in product markets and by unions voluntarily using their economic power more judiciously. Business opposition to unions should be curtailed by labor law reform. And finally, both sides need to work together and to "entertain innovations in their modes of dealing with one another" (p. 249).

Freeman and Medoff have produced a valuable work, full of useful and carefully arrived at empirical findings. However, their view of unionism's impact as paradoxical and their carefully balanced recommendations illustrate the naivete of their assumptions and the dangers of not fully integrating the various aspects of unionism into developments in the wider political economy.

LEON GRUNBERG

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Abortion: A Case Study in Law and Morals. By Fred M. Frohock. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 226. $29.95.)

This search for a "rational abortion practice" which would resolve the dispute between the advocates of choice and the opponents of abortion seems quixotic from the outset. Frohock seeks a theoretical basis for understanding the abortion dispute as a necessary precondition to an acceptable public policy compromise. He finds that the moral arguments stumble over basic disagreement about the definition of human. The legal resolution in *Roe* v. *Wade* is found wanting largely because viability is too ambiguous a concept to serve as a dividing line between appropriately public (a state's compelling interest in the fetus) and private (the woman's right to autonomy) decisions.

To illustrate the complexities of the interaction of morals and politics on the abortion question, Frohock quotes at length from interviews conducted with activists from both sides of the abortion controversy. Although Frohock uses the interviews to illuminate his philosophical treatment of the issue with the intense light of reality, the interludes of discussion tend to diffuse the theoretical thrust of the argument. In addition, the impact of the activists' personal views is muted by Frohock's initial insistence, to prove either his objectivity or the difficulty of the undertaking, that he disagreed with most of them most of the time.

The book is marred by carelessness about detail. "Embryo" is a term for the earliest stage of the development of an organism (in the human species, about the first eight weeks); "fetus" is correctly used for the later stages of development. To assign these terms, as Frohock does, to groups with opposing definitions of when life begins is to obfuscate, not to clarify, the language of the debate (p. 29). In *Roe* v. *Wade,* the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the outcome, but not the opinion, of the lower court, which had relied on the Ninth Amendment. The Supreme Court found protection for a woman's privacy in the liberty of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 63). Senator Dick Clark was not from Ohio, and empirical studies do not support the conclusion that he or other incumbents were defeated by single-issue abortion-related voting (p. 116).

More important, however, is the focus of the book, its policy prescription. Frohock argues that because the moral issues are unresolvable, a political compromise should be reached. He does not suggest a process that might bring this issue into the traditional bargaining mode of American policymaking. But the components that he believes should be acceptable to both sides include the availability of abortion in the first trimester and its prohibition in the second and third. Because of the difficulties associated with clear demarcation between trimesters, he recommends against the use of criminal penalties as a regulatory tool. He would, however, balance this permissiveness with the denial of public funding for abortion from general tax revenues. A tax check-off system would be acceptable, however, so that willing taxpayers could volunteer their resources for this purpose.

Several critical issues are unresolved by this recommended "social practice." Judicially established rights (here, to second-trimester abortions) cannot be simply bargained away. Although Frohock recognizes the pressing problem of teenage pregnancy and admits that "only the most organized and diligent women" could benefit from first-trimester-only rules (p. 69), he fails in the final chapter to address the problem of the pregnant child, whose abortion decision is most likely to be postponed owing to fear or ignorance.

The tax check-off device, which opens endless possibilities of private preferences for public policy (if abortion, why *not* war, weapons research, health insurance, and the rest of the policy agenda?) avoids, rather than solves, the funding issue. In a book full of discussion of fairness and social utility, the "balance" has been struck oddly indeed.

KATHLEEN L. BARBER

John Carroll University

The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic. By Charles T. Goodsell. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1983. Pp. xi + 179. $8.95, paper.)

True to its subtitle, this book is indeed a "polemic." Goodsell maintains that politicians and the press, and even academics within the field of public administration, have propagated a negative image of the American governmental bureaucracy. He writes to refute the image. Thus, this book makes no claim to balance; it is a lawyer's brief for American bureaucracy.

Goodsell begins by establishing that there is indeed a negative tone toward bureaucracy and bureaucrats that runs through American popular culture. More surprisingly, he also convincingly illustrates that an antibureaucratic tone runs throughout the writings of most academics who study public administration, and who might be expected to write with affection for "their" subject. Academic attacks come from many directions. Those using economic models emphasize the inefficiency of nonmarket organizations. Those using sociological models emphasize goal displacement. Those using psychological models emphasize the alienation of working in a bureaucracy. Although the charges differ, the conclusions do not; they are uniformly negative.

Goodsell then attempts to refute the popular and the academic criticisms of American bureaucracy, drawing upon all bits of empirical data he can find. Government bureaucracies are not all huge, he points out; most have fewer than 25 employees. Bureaucracies are not immortal; their death rate, although below private businesses, is still substantial. Bureaucrats are not all petty tyrants; most surveys of clients of bureaucracy indicate that the vast majority of clients are satisfied with the way they have been treated. Bureaucrats are not isolated or unusual people; most look very much like their private counterparts in everything from political opinions to psychological health.

Goodsell notes that the charges against bureaucracy are inconsistent and often contradictory. Bureaucracies are criticized from the Left as being too oriented to the status quo and from the Right as being liberal change agents. They are criticized for being disorganized (which suggests the need for more standardization) and for being too impersonal (which suggests the need for less standardization). Moreover, these critics often implicitly treat "bureaucracy" as a single undifferentiated entity, whereas Goodsell demonstrates the heterogeneity that characterizes bureaucratic institutions.

Goodsell also emphasizes how little empirical research is marshalled by the critics of bureaucracy. Their criticism is almost always based on anecdotes or on deductive arguments stemming from economic or sociological assumptions. In making his own case, Goodsell does try to marshall available data, and much of the data he presents is interesting and even convincing. However, its most salient characteristic is its thinness. There is little data available, and much of what does exist is fragmentary or quite old. The reader is forced to concede the urgency of Goodsell's repeated calls for more empirical research.

This is a useful book for both academics and students. It performs an important service for academics in the field by reminding them of the very negative tone that has crept, almost unnoticed, into so much of the field. Goodsell calls for more specific, empirically derived, constructive criticism and less blanket condemnation. The book performs a second valuable service for academics in gathering together so much of the existing data on the perception of bureaucracy and the performance of bureaucracy. The footnotes are a treasure chest of sources. Even the many gaps in the data serve a useful purpose as guides for further research.

But the book's more important use is probably in the classroom. True to its role as a "polemic," the book is cheerfully one-sided and cannot stand alone; it is not meant to. But read in conjunction with books that are explicitly or implicitly more negative in tone—such as E. S. Savas's *Privatizing the Public Sector* (Chatham House Publishers, 1982)—it should prove a valuable catalyst for classroom debate.

JAMES E. SWISS

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The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment. Edited by Fred I. Greenstein. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 197. $18.50, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

The demands confronting the modern presidency generated by the political system are increasingly burdensome, arduous, and debilitating. Woodrow Wilson's claim in 1908 that only a president's capacity will set the limit of his power in American politics is no longer accurate. The influence of so many variables on presidential behavior renders an assumption of effective leadership quite tenuous. The Ford and Carter presidencies testify to this new reality. Yet, leaving aside one's preferences, effective executive leadership remains a compelling necessity and public expectation in this "American century."

The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment, a collection of six essays, is an effort to expand our base of knowledge about the dynamics of effective modern presidential leadership. In the opening essay Greenstein argues that the Reagan presidency merits such advance reviews because of a distinctiveness defined by the extent and extremity of Reagan's ideological closure; his proclivity to transform faith into works, his initial success in putting programs into practice, and the tensions between principles and practice in Reagan's leadership (pp. 4-7). But what is the object (or objects) of this early assessment? At least three possibilities emerge from the collection: the substance of Reagan's economic, domestic, defense, and foreign-policy accomplishments; those factors that account for Reagan's accomplishments (and failures) during his first two years in office; and the impact of those policies on inflation, the unemployed, the needy, the Soviets, and our allies and adversaries. Regrettably, there is uneven attention given to each of these areas in the four policy-oriented essays by Hugh Heclo and Rudolph G. Penner (economic policy), Richard P. Nathan (domestic policy), Samuel P. Huntington (defense policy), and I. M. Destler (foreign policy). As they stand, such assessments enable the authors to direct our attention to the issues and behavior which may have characterized the final two years of Reagan's first term. It remains for the reader to extrapolate from these assessments and to envision what another four years of Ronald Reagan might yield.

All four policy essays offer detailed accounts of Reagan's accomplishments during the first two years in their respective areas. In addition, a good portion of the substantive evaluation focuses on the relationship between ideology and policy definition. Nathan deems it "remarkable" that the Reagan philosophy toward the poor—"that marginally poor people should be weaned from welfare programs [lest they fall victim to] 'the overall moral hazard of the welfare state' "—was enacted into law in 1981 (p. 61). Likewise, on foreign policy issues concerning the Soviets and NATO (what Destler calls "center" issues as opposed to "periphery" issues) the Reagan administration produced positions and proposals that reflected and reaffirmed conservative ideological goals (pp. 152-154). However, in economic policy Heclo and Penner argue that Reagan has the ability to accommodate changing political and economic realities because he has developed a capacity to deal with economic ideology in a strategic rather than in an ideological manner (p. 36). The appointment of George Schultz as Secretary of State, a "conservative pragmatist" according to Destler, may likewise enhance the possibilities for strategic management of foreign policy ideology.

There is also a range of explanations given for Reagan's policy accomplishments depending upon the author's level of analytic attention. At the level of individual capacity, Heclo and Penner identify Reagan's willingness to drastically limit the number of presidential priorities, to allow his immediate staff broad scope to engage in strategic planning and coalition building, and to engage in the strategic management of issues (pp. 39-40) as keys to his success. Nathan attributes changes in domestic policy to Reagan's legislative skills and to his utilization of administrative devices such as appointments, deregulation, and personnel management.

However, Nathan recognizes that "a marked turn to the right in domestic affairs" would not have been possible without concomitant changes in the larger political environment. Such changes include greater Republican representation in the House and control of the Senate, Reagan's skillful selection of principal subordinates, changes in national attitudes towards these domestic issues, and a huge tax cut that pressured Congress into cutting domestic spending (pp. 77-78). The importance of personnel management is emphasized by Destler's account of the unworkable foreign policymaking team of Allen and Haig and Reagan's ability to change it to one that was apparently more workable, that is, Clark and Shultz. The potential for effective executive leadership seems to be beyond the control of any single president—even Ronald Reagan.

Finally, Huntington suggests that the impetus for defense policymaking stems more from the imperatives of strategy-budget cycles than from the proclivities of any individual incumbent. Indeed, because of the particular juncture in the cycle at which Reagan entered office, his administration has carried forward the broad strategic policies (i.e., an "upside strategy") of the administration it had displaced (p. 89).

The assessments of policy impact are understandably scant and speculative. Flaws in the Reagan economic strategy, the effects of budget cuts on employable welfare recipients, confusion in foreign policy direction, and others are diagnosed. However, missing from such commentary is the articulation and defense of a standard (or standards) by which policies can be or should be judged. If Reagan evidences signs of effective leadership, then we should be interested in the normative premises of that leadership.

Many of the problems that the Reagan administration has faced during the last two years are foretold in these essays: increasing congressional independence, maintaining the policy initiative once the battle against inflation was won, the mounting deficit, the necessity of adopting a "downside" defense strategy to accommodate what the country is willing to pay for, and popular dissatisfaction with foreign policy. We are also forewarned of a foreign policy ideology that isolates and polarizes (Destler, p. 155); of the dangers in shortsightedness, resistance to policy rec onsideration, and policy relabeling; and of a president whose political skills may exceed his skills at policy analysis (Greenstein, pp. 169-172). On this final warning Greenstein suggests the similarity between Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.

In sum, these authors are to be commended for their policy descriptions, analytic skills, and for their willingness to apply their craft in a timely and relevant manner.

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The United States Congress. Edited by Dennis Hale. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983. Pp. xxvii + 360. $14.95, paper.)

The study of Congress and the behavior of its members has traditionally focused on the institution's constituent parts without too much concern on developing a holistic theoretical perspective of the institution. Some recent researchers, however, have recognized the analytical problems in constructing a theoretical perspective of Congress from specialized research. The methodological and theoretical crisis characteristic of the current era has been a product, to a degree, of the instability of the environment as contrasted to the stability of the time before the 1970s. Traditional empirical analyses focusing on committees, roll calls, congress people in their districts, and other aspects of the institution, have fragmented our perspective of Congress as an organization. These analyses lack a central theoretical viewpoint of the organization and were appropriate to a previously stable environment. Increasingly, researchers have begun to discuss and develop a holistic perspective of the institution and then analyze its components. The Hale collection continues the approach of focusing on components without addressing the development of a holistic institutional perspective.

The text is a collection of papers, speeches, and comments given at a symposium marking the establishment of the Thomas P. O'Neil, Jr. chair in American politics at Boston College. The collections are organized into the six major research areas of congressional studies (district behavior, fiscal and foreign policies, procedural reform, agency and congressional relationships, and election financing) and a selection on the deliberative nature of Congress. Each area includes a research paper, the comments of one or several congress people, and occasionally the remarks of a bureaucrat or congressional staff member. This format could provide a forum for beneficial exchanges between researchers and practitioners. However, the communication between these groups is characterized by superficiality and personalized remarks by most discussants.

Several factors may account for the lack of qualitative exchanges. With the exception of one or two researchers, the papers fail to present any substantially new perspectives on the congressional environment. Although the papers may not have been presented elsewhere, most do little more than synthesize existing knowledge. The paper by Morris Fiorina on constituency voting decisions is atypical in his insightful and scientific analysis of electoral decision making. Although most of the papers are not particularly novel, they are well written and should provide the discussants a wealth of material for their comments. Unfortunately, the discussants' comments do not enhance the quality of the text. Although these personalized remarks permit us to more clearly assess congressional research from an experienced political perspective, one wonders if they are representative of the opinions of most congress people. In fact, most of the legislators have long tenure in Congress. Second, as with most discussants, the papers provide an opportunity to focus on trivial aspects or serve as platforms for comments that are not directly related to the primary points in the papers.

The text encourages the reader to view Congress from a specialized analytical perspective. Because of its organization and remarks of the discussants, the reader begins to think that congressional research should focus more closely on members as individuals. If logically pursued, this research orientation would further fragment congressional research. The text may be useful to undergraduate students as a convenient way for understanding the institution and its members. It has limited utility for those engaged in congressional research.

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The Politics of Taxation: Revenue without Representation. By Susan B. Hansen. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiii + 287. $32.95.)

Susan B. Hansen explores an issue that cuts to the heart of democratic politics: the relationship of public preferences and tax policies. Her thesis is that public opinion is irrelevant to the formation of tax policy, and that this paradox (parody?) of representative government can be explained by examining the politics of taxation. Economic analyses of taxation abound, but when predictions go astray—as they often do—"economic advisers too often cite unspecified political factors as reasons and retire to academia and to formal political theory" (p. 6). To expose these political factors, Hansen draws upon a wide variety of material in the history of U.S. taxation to describe the systematic tendencies resulting in "revenue without representation."

Several independent steps support the central theme; one could wish for a more completely integrated set of chapters, but pursuing the argument through a survey may simply reflect a realistic perception of the extent of the relevant material. By considering alternate theories of taxation Hansen argues for the utility of understanding politicians, once in office, as revenue-maximizers, and the state as a major, independent, innovative actor in the process of making tax policy (chap. 2). A broad overview of the development of U.S. federal tax policy follows, first as a whole (chap. 3), then focusing on the twentieth century (chap. 4); this is not presented as a systematic history, but rather to provide empirical evidence for Hansen's view of governmental officials. The varying tax policies of individual states are also considered, featuring an analysis of the sources of tax innovation based on cross-state comparisons (chap. 5). Chapter 6, in which the issue of public opinion is addressed directly, raises "more questions than it has answered" (p. 203), but that is primarily a commentary on the quality and quantity of the data available; the real accomplishment here is the sweeping away of misconceptions, an undertaking that always exposes interesting questions. Finally, the 1978 tax revolt is used as a case study to illustrate the explanatory power of a political analysis of taxation (chap. 7).

Hansen's description clearly reveals the core of the relationship between public preference and tax policy, or the lack thereof: the absence of association between taxing and spending decisions. A political system that allows the independent formulation of revenue and expenditure policies produces two significant tendencies: (1) taxes, not easily linked to benefits, are treated as part of a coercive rather than a contributory process, with tax policy, administration, and payment removed from public scrutiny and discretion as much as possible; and (2) public officials have an incentive to increase spending programs that are popular in order to reap the electoral pluses without a clear linkage to the electoral minuses—increasing taxes. The latter phenomenon is furthered through the numerous ways public officials have discovered to increase revenues without actually enacting highly visible tax laws. The political logic of this phenomenon may be inescapable given the nature of the U.S. political system. Consider the case of Ronald Reagan. An outspoken proponent of tax cuts, he presided over the largest tax increase in the history of this country rather than cut back on his pet spending programs and shifted substantial tax burdens to future generations to achieve the appearance of a politically favorable balance between public goods provided and private goods removed.

Can anything be done about this? Hansen's conclusions are pessimistic, but the analysis suggests many unexplored possibilities, both for further research and for political reform. For example, what might be the effect of including an assessment of costs in terms of dollars paid by the average taxpayer in all spending proposals considered by Congress and the state legislatures? If the public pocketbook had to be visibly opened for a government expenditure to take place, the political calculus of taxing and spending might be altered significantly. Consideration of the institutional structure within which tax policy is formulated is the end result of Hansen's recognition that taxation is a political as well as an economic activity, and her efforts are a welcome incursion into what is relatively unexplored territory.

JAMES L. CURTIS

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Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870. By Hendrik Hartog. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 274. $27.50.)

Hartog has written a definitive study of the evolution of the legal status of cities in America. In a legal history of the municipal corporation of New York, he carefully documents how the corporation's private functions (maintenance and manipulation of its extensive property holdings—later called proprietary interests) and public functions (maintenance of public order and welfare—their governmental interests) were originally interdependent and therefore politically indistinguishable under the conveyance obligations of its Royal Charter. Both functions rested on sovereign authority delegated to the corporation, an authority that could clearly be withdrawn by successful *quo warranto* challenge by the Crown.

However, as the public role of the corporation expanded, necessitated primarily by major threats to public health and safety, it inevitably came into direct conflict with property interests created by the corporation in its proprietary role. Hartog illustrates this conflict by examining in detail the Brick Presbyterian Church case, in which the corporation's authority to pass an ordinance banning burials within corporation limits contravened explicit property use rights conveyed to churches by the corporation itself some 60 years before. Such a collision between public and private definitions of the public welfare was characteristic of the 1780 to 1820 period, and a clear societal precedent was set as the mediation of these competing values was handled by the court system rather than the legislature.

Hartog maintains that the debate reached its critical stage during the 1820 to 1840 period, an era marked by the ascendancy of republican values, the emerging dominance of state legislatures by rural interests, and a wave of judicial activism that established, albeit by fiat rather than constitutional principle, standards of municipal law. It is during this period, characterized by a privatization of public roles according to Sam B. Warner and Jon Teaford, that Hartog finds two patterns of public action that lend important perspective to our understanding of the current powers of municipal corporations.

First, the ascendancy of republican values forced municipal corporations to shift the basis of their public actions from sovereignty delegated by Royal Charter to that delegated by acts of the state legislature, a shift New York officials embraced wholly and voluntarily by the beginning of the nineteenth century. It should not be surprising therefore that the legal dictum encompassed by Dillon's Rule—that municipal corporations may legally (and with sovereign immunity) engage only in those activities explicitly authorized by state statute—was commonly accepted judicial doctrine by the 1840s and could be found in judicial interpretations as early as 1803. The willingness of the judiciary to mediate the public-private debate had its source, according to Hartog, in its growing distrust of the willingness of state and local officials to expand the public role and its desire to reimpose a sense of legislative caution on both levels by strict judicial interpretation of statutory authority.

Second, in its divestiture of its property holdings, which it had difficulty holding or manipulating legitimately in a society increasingly governed by republican values, the municipal corporation appeared to abandon its only leverage over economic development of the city. Hartog finds, however, that in the conditions it set for sale of properties (particularly waterlots), the corporation was able to orchestrate development patterns for more than 30 years in a form of development planning that would have been considered politically and philosophically suspect if handled by direct corporation intervention. City officials today would be quite envious of the kind of leverage accessible to the municipal corporation in the early nineteenth century.

Public Property and Private Power documents the evolution of the legal status of the municipal corporation during the critical period in its definition. As such, it represents a primary source of historical perspective on the debate over the proper public role of municipal corporations, a debate recently rejuvenated in Supreme Court decisions on whether cities are clothed with the sovereign immunity enjoyed by states under the U.S. Constitution.

JAMES R. ALEXANDER

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Inside the Jury. By Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod, and Nancy Pennington. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 277. $20.00.)

Since 1970, the Supreme Court has displayed a willingness to allow states to experiment with structural reforms in the administration of justice. With regard to jury trials, two of the more common policies have been the use of smaller juries and the allowance of nonunanimous verdicts. In two 1972 rulings, the Court affirmed state convictions based on 9 to 3 and 10 to 2 jury votes. In the process, the Court's majority rejected several possible objections to the nonunanimous verdict, at least implicitly ruling that it does not conflict with the proof beyond reasonable doubt standard, does not discriminate against minority jurors, and does not cut off meaningful debate and full deliberation.

Inside the Jury is an expansive and systematic attempt to evaluate the Justices' impressionistic contentions about jury decision making. In impressive fashion, the authors present a large body of findings concerning the impact of different decision rules (unanimous versus nonunanimous) on jury deliberations and verdicts. After finishing the book, it is possible to conclude that nonunanimous jury convictions are likely to be ineptly considered, unsatisfactorily debated, and unjustly rendered.

The core of the book is a study of the deliberations of 69 separate mock juries following presentation of a videotaped homicide trial (the "correct" verdict, and clearly the most legally appropriate, second-degree murder). One-third of the juries were assigned randomly to each of three different decision rule formats: 12 out of 12 (unanimous), 10 out of 12, and 8 out of 12. Jury deliberations were videotaped, each juror comment was coded on several dimensions, and all jurors responded to questionnaires to provide background and attitudinal information.

The research design is impeccable. The mock jurors were recruited from state trial court jury pools, thus providing the best possible replication of real-world juries. After a brief *voir dire* examination, the jurors went through all phases of a trial simulation based upon actual case materials, from indictment through argument and instructions. Deliberation time was unrestricted, and the juries selected their deliberation styles without prior coaching.

Several of the book's major points replicate findings of previous studies. Hung juries occurred almost exclusively in unanimous-rule juries. Nonunanimous juries hang much less often, and they reach their verdicts much more quickly. Nonunanimous juries are therefore more "efficient"; unfortunately, they are also inferior in every other sense. The 8 out of 12 and 10 out of 12 juries reached six verdicts of first-degree murder—an objectively ludicrous result. There were no first-degree murder verdicts among the unanimous juries. The unanimous-rule jurors were highly satisfied with their verdicts and deliberations and were impressed with their fellow jurors. Jurors on nonunanimous panels tended to display less satisfaction with the verdicts and to "leave . . . deliberations with a relatively low impression of their own and other jurors' persuasiveness and openmindedness" (p. 80).

Beyond these highly policy-relevant findings, there is much more in this volume. *Inside the Jury* is very well put together. A good discussion of theoretical criteria for jury performance is followed by a solid and comprehensive literature review. The chapter on research design is particularly well done, covering some advanced ground on methodology in a readable style that should be helpful to readers not possessing broad quantitative training. The findings are generally well presented both narratively and graphically.

If the book has a flaw, it is the occasional tendency to become tedious. Discussion of some of the more purely academic findings can lose the reader's interest, and the chapter that discusses a well-conceived computer simulation model of jury performance will, I fear, be much too rough sailing for many potential readers. These points aside, *Inside the Jury* is a major contribution to the field and a good model of social science research well performed and elegantly presented.

JOHN PATRICK HAGAN

West Virginia University

Work and Job Satisfaction in the Public Sector. By Anne H. Hopkins. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983. Pp. 146. $27.50.)

This work reports the results of a five-state survey of state employees regarding their perceptions of various aspects of the work environment. The purpose of this research is to advance current knowledge of job satisfaction by using both bivariate and multivariate analysis techniques, looking at the contributions of both the job environment and the job redesign models to job satisfaction, and including a unionization variable into the overall job satisfaction equation.

The job redesign model focuses on such aspects of the job as job quality, skill in the use of one's hands, the resources of co-worker help, and authority. All of these factors are related to job satisfaction, explaining just under 20% of the variance. The job environment model of job satisfaction focuses on promotions, working conditions, mobility, and nature of supervision. This model explains a higher percentage (24%) of the total job satisfaction variance. Finally, a combined model is developed that examines the interaction of both these two models, including the unionization factor. This combined model is more effective than either of the two alone. The interactive effect of job quality and promotions is the most important predictor of job satisfaction, whereas the nature of supervision is found to be of substantial importance. There appears to be a heightened awareness of the work situation among union members within the organization, but without longitudinal data it is impossible to determine whether unionization led to this increased awareness or whether increased awareness led to union membership.

The major implication of this research seems to be a plea for broadening the job redesign theories of job satisfaction. These theories recommend changing the nature of the work by adding variety and more autonomy, among other things. Although these efforts are related to increased satisfaction, other factors, particularly those related to the job environment (such as nature of supervision and fairness in the promotional system), appear to be even more important. Also, unionization appears to be a factor which influences job satisfaction indirectly by affecting perceptions of the work situation, and which should be considered in future job satisfaction studies.

The book would be of interest to researchers and practitioners in public administration who desire to know more about factors leading to job satisfaction. One strength of the book lies in the painstaking reporting of the methodological issues related to the data gathering and data analysis. Discussions range from survey research techniques and sampling techniques to data analysis considerations such as spurious correlations, multivariate analysis, interaction effects, and multicolinearity. These comments would make this work interesting reading to political science and public administration students in research methods courses.

The major weakness of this research lies in its failure to explore fully the public-sector implications of the subject matter. From the title, one would expect analysis differentiating job satisfaction in the public sector from the private sector to be equivalent. About the only thing that makes this book public-sector oriented is the fact that it samples perceptions of public-sector employees. There is little attempt to draw on public administration literature and to differentiate the abilities of public-sector managers from their private-sector counterparts to exert any controls over the nature of the job environment or the nature of the job's design. The environmental constraints on public-sector management such as direct legislative oversight, merit system rules and regulations, and other characteristics giving the public sector its unique flavor are neglected.

ROBERT H. ELLIOTT

Auburn University at Montgomery

Class Awareness in the United States. By Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. x + 236. $28.95.)

Class Awareness in the United States, by Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman, is unquestionably one of the most important comprehensive studies of class identification in the United States to appear in the last quarter century. The book challenges convincingly many conventional perceptions regarding subjective class structure in America and offers substantial original insight into a number of related areas such as the effects of capital ownership and work experiences on class identification, the differences between class identification of whites and blacks, and the relationship between class and political orientations.

The Jackmans base their work on the data from a nationwide random survey of 1,914 respondents conducted in 1975 by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The question tapping subjective social class allows respondents to choose among five classes: poor, working, middle, upper-middle, and upper. Well over 95% assign themselves readily to one of these categories, with the vast majority of these reporting to be at least somewhat strongly attached to their class. Moreover, a measure of affective class bonds shows that in general people feel "warmest" toward their own class and "coldest" toward the class furthest from theirs in the class hierarchy. Further analysis reveals that people define class membership using both objective criteria (occupation, education, and income) and cultural criteria (a person's beliefs, life style, and family origin). All this, the authors contend, suggest strongly that not only is class central to the consciousness of most Americans, but also that classes in this country form a graded hierarchy rather than a simple dichotomy such as working class and middle class, or manual and nonmanual.

The Jackmans next seek to fine-tune this basic understanding of social class and its determinants. A few of their findings are that small amounts of capital do not alter class identification, self-employment can lead people to identify with a higher class than they otherwise might have, family origin can influence class identification, and cross-class social contacts do not weaken attachments to a class. Of particular interest to political scientists will be the conclusion that class seems to structure opinions on social welfare issues only for individuals with intense class bonds, and even then the relationship is weak. Throughout the book the authors break down their analyses by race (and sometimes sex and age) where sample sizes permit.

The book is not without its limitations, although they are minor. A more thorough review of recent cross-national class research would be helpful for fitting these American results into a comparative perspective. Also, in a few instances the authors perhaps make too firm of substantive conclusions given the strength of the statistical relationships. Still, these limitations do not distract seriously from the importance of the book. *Class Awareness in the United States* is theoretically and methodologically sound, and path-breaking conceptually. As such, it is required reading for the scholar of social class, and worthwhile reading for all others.

TOM W. RICE

The University of Vermont

U.S. Energy Policy: Crisis and Complacency. By Don E. Kash and Robert W. Rycroft. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984. Pp. xviii + 334. $19.95.)

Where you stand depends upon where you sit. From the trenches in Norman, Oklahoma comes the observation that by 1980, "agreement had been reached on the participants in the energy policy community," as well as on the boundaries of the subsectors and on broad goals for a national energy policy (p. 255). In Washington in late 1979 Rep. Toby Moffett (Dem., Conn.) told the House Select Committee on Committees, which was trying to reorganize energy jurisdictions in that body, that the 83 committees and subcommittees in the House holding hearings on energy matters in 1977 and 1978 constituted "jungle warfare." The entire attempt to reshuffle the energy policy deck, which failed overwhelmingly in 1980, was based upon the Speaker's presumption that no such consensus existed.

Kash and Rycroft argue that before the OPEC embargo in 1973, energy policymaking was concentrated in five policy sectors that did not overlap: coal, oil, natural gas, electricity, and nuclear power. They present clear-cut and straightforward accounts of these separate "iron triangles" and even propose a new conceptual framework for examining subsystem politics—which looks very much like the old framework, but does not cite it. We learn much about pre-1973 policies, if not about the political forces which drove those policies. The authors' thesis is that in the post-embargo years the politics of scarcity provoked widespread instability in energy politics and the breakdown of these subsystems. It is dead on target. But how these subsystems broke down is never discussed in great detail, as Kash and Rycroft continue to focus on each in turn and not on how one impinged upon the others; and the attractiveness of the thesis is undermined by the authors' stipulation that somehow everything had fallen into place by 1980, only to be undone by the Reagan administration. This argument is "voodoo ergonomics."

Kash and Rycroft try to distinguish in chapter 2 between physical policies, on the one hand, and social policies on the other. This means that resource policy is essentially technocratic rather than sociopolitical; it leads to the conclusion (p. 107) that advocates of soft energy paths (e.g., solar, conservation, hydro and wind power) have burst into traditional energy policy sectors and thereby disrupted the entire process. Maybe such kamikaze acts were disruptive. I'm not so sure, because American society seems to have a large tolerance for permitting fringe activities without paying serious attention to them. When such groups gain influence, they must be speaking for more than a few post-hippie antinuclear activists. The Clamshell Alliance has not had nearly the impact on nuclear development that Citibank and friends have.

The best parts of the book are, not surprisingly, those that deal with technical discussions of energy technologies. Chapters 5 through 7 are quite lucid. Chapters 8 and 9 present good discussions of post-1973 legislation in the Congress, but precious little evidence on how the various subsystems began to compete with each other. From these discussions comes the conclusion in chapter 10 that the sum of all of these parts is a reasonably coherent energy policy, rather than a jerry-built set of compromises representing what Craufurd Goodwin of Brookings has called "a preference for inaction." Precisely how, particularly when energy prices were still rising, did all of these conflicts get resolved—and resolved so amicably?

Chapter 12 contains 20 policy recommendations that can be summarized in the single demand that John L. Lewis made for his mine workers' union members much earlier in this century: More. More of everything, from coal to nuclear (fast breeders only) to a larger Strategic Petroleum Reserve to solar to conservation to environmental protection to, yes, even to synthetic fuels. In a proposal they admit will please neither liberals nor conservatives, Kash and Rycroft call for more funding for synfuels, but with production left up to the major energy companies—the same Exxon, Union, and Mobil that have already abandoned federally subsidized projects. Throughout the entire book, there is no mention of environmental, boomtown, and water problems associated with synfuels' development, nor is there an assessment as to whether such fuels will ever be commercially viable without substantial governmental subsidies. Yet the authors specifically rule out government-run projects; their solutions are technocratic, as is the thrust of their entire argument.

Technocrats especially should realize that you can't put Humpty Dumpty together again. When the next shortage comes, we shall see a war of each against all precisely because the stakes are so large and the scope of the issue is so pervasive. Any commodity in short supply is more of a social policy issue than one of physical policy. It was certainly not a redundancy that the focus of the 1979 and 1980 reform effort in the House was on an Interstate and Foreign Commerce subcommittee on Energy and *Power.*

ERIC M. USLANER

University of Maryland-College Park

Interpreting Elections. By Stanley Kelley, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 267. $27.50, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

As usual, Stanley Kelley clarifies some things that have been long muddled in the discipline. This time they have to do with issue voting. Without getting into the controversies about how many Americans are issue voters, or whether issue voting is increasing, Kelley gives us a simple method for thinking about the relations between issues that are important (whether few or many) and the voter's decision.

"The rule" is: The voter reviews likes and dislikes about leading candidates and major parties in an election. Weighing each like and dislike equally, the voter supports the candidate who has the greatest net number of likes. If no candidate has such an advantage, the voter's party affiliation will prevail. If there is no candidate with a net advantage in likes, and no party identification, the voter reaches a null decision.

Kelley's data are the "what do you like/dislike about. . . ?" and the feeling thermometer responses from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center national election studies from 1952 to 1980. In applying "the rule" in those eight elections, he gets results "much better than those one obtains by basing predictions on party identification, the social and demographic characteristics of voters, or ideological affiliations, and slightly better than those one gets by basing predictions on respondents' statements of their voting intentions" (p. 15). Kelley's use is, I think, the fullest yet made of these time-series, like-and-dislike data, and suggests their employment in other intensive studies.

There are some problems with Kelley's assumption of equal weighting of all likes and dislikes, but he satisfactorily explains them away. What are not explained away are the problems resulting from two interviewing effects—Hawthorne and impression management—which inflate the responsiveness generally, the like/dislike enumerations, the self-prediction of vote intention, and probably the actual level of vote turnout of the sample, thus compromising the projectability of sample results to national populations. I do not fault Kelley; no survey researcher can explain away these generic weaknesses of the trade, nor has anyone yet come up with a satisfactory way of dealing with them.

The core of *Interpreting Elections* is the application of "the rule" to three supposed landslide elections: 1964, 1972, and 1980.

In 1964, Johnson won a whopping victory—what Kelley calls a "twice-over landslide"—according to the likes/dislikes balance of the Michigan sample. It was a landslide for Johnson and a landslide against Goldwater. By one of the statistical tests, the "loser's mobilization ratio," Goldwater would have to have gotten 111.9% of his supporters to the polls to have equaled the actual Johnson turnout and vote. Even Tammany in its best days could not have turned that trick.

The 1972 election was very different. Applying his issues and candidates likes/dislikes rule, Kelley confirms what most other analyses have hinted at: Nixon was regarded as administratively competent and stable, McGovern was not; the Vietnam war and the social issues provided a slight edge for Nixon; New Deal issues favored McGovern, but they were neither salient nor featured in the Democratic strategy. Transient issues may have excited campus radicals, some hard-hats, and the press, but the general electorate restrained its enthusiasm for both candidates; 55% of Nixon's adherents turned out, 54.8% of McGovern's. Had 88.7% of McGovern's turned out (his "loser's mobilization ratio"), he would have equaled Nixon's vote. Thus, "1972: a close landslide."

Kelley says there is no evidence from 1980 that Reagan's election reflected basic changes in the ideological or partisan patterns of the American electorate. The New Deal coalition is still in place; 1980 was an "unexpected landslide."

Embedded in Kelley's book are two absolute gems of essays. One is on the meaning of the mandate—or the nonmandate. The other, "Rule by the Worst of the Many," links mandates to sudden shifts of ill-informed voters unanchored in party or ideology. Kelley is at his best in these chapters: clearheaded, articulate, at once simple and profound.

Are there faults in this little book? Maybe. The tables in some places (especially chapters 3, 6, and 9) are overly long and detailed and go beyond the evidence needed to make Kelley's points. But statistics are the holy water of our time, and no doubt a generous sprinkling makes the exegesis legitimate.

BERNARD HENNESSY

California State University, Hayward

Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust. By Thomas J. Kerr. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 268. $25.00.)

Since World War II civil defense has been one of the traditional areas of government responsibility transformed by technology. The transformation revolves around two related phenomena: the revolutionary nature of nuclear weaponry, and the ebb and flow of politics at both domestic and international levels.

Kerr sets out to trace the history of civil defense in the United States and to offer some analytical insights into the policy processes that he characterizes as the "politics of futility." The difficulties involved in convincing Congress and an either apathetic or hostile public are elaborated in detailed historical analyses, which, Kerr concludes, depict a story of "frustration and failure."

Most of the book is taken up by legislative and bureaucratic discussion of the evolving debate over the question, How many would survive what sort of attack under what conditions? The answers change with the technological and magnitude assumptions, and to no one's surprise, the latest estimates suggest that the United States is dreadfully unprepared to deal with the consequences of full-scale thermonuclear war. In a valuable final chapter, Kerr evaluates some of the arguments people use against a serious civil defense program. These people include those who believe it to be provocative and destabilizing of the current balance of military power; those who believe that no program could work in a large-scale conflict and conclude that more weapons deployment best reduces risk of war; and finally, those who seek arms control and eventually the elimination of nuclear weapons completely.

Kerr points out that the emotionally charged responses to civil defense proposals and policies lead to a pattern of fear, denial, and episodic moments of fitful activity as occurred in the 1960s and most recently in the 1980s with the Reagan Crisis Relocation plan. These periods are then followed by negative reactions to the very idea of what things would be like after a nuclear war.

But the sustaining elements in the narrative really have to do with politics and technology. Civil defense in America has no real constituency to sustain itself in the political arena, and the refinement of weapons systems to create new and expanded zones of devastation tend to outstrip yesterday's plan. The weapons have constituents aplenty; the plans and resources for dealing with their consequences do not.

Kerr concludes this well-written description and analysis with an important insight that deserves further discussion. He notes that over the years the discussion of the subject has had a certain "abstract or even opaque quality." Although we know a great deal about the physics and engineering of nuclear weapons systems, we have spent relatively little on careful analyses of the consequences of their use.

Any thoughtful adult has given a moment or more to contemplation of the dreadful question. Self, family, neighborhood, and country all pass through the mind, and the portrait cannot fail to stimulate at least a mental shudder. The mind shunts such thought away and returns to other, more comprehensible matters. Civil defense forces the dreadful question upon us, and mainly we push it away as though thought and discussion would somehow bring us closer to this worst collective dream of the twentieth century. This book should be on library shelves, because it tells us clearly and concisely how politicians, publics, and bureaucrats have dealt—or failed to deal—with the dreadful question.

EUGENE LEWIS

University of South Florida

The Politics of Hazardous Waste Management. Edited by James P. Lester and Ann O'M Bowman. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 315. $30.00, cloth; $10.00, paper.)

Public policymaking in the area of hazardous waste management, as the authors of this volume observe, is characterized by severity, complexity, and uncertainty. Severity in that the horror stories of Love Canal and Times Beach are only the tips of an iceberg. There are thousands of other illegal and abandoned chemical dump sites degrading the environment and threatening public health. Complexity in that there are too many cooks in the kitchen, each eager to have a piece of the action with the result that the outcome is not always what ought to be a wise public policy. Uncertainty in that we lack sufficient and accurate scientific information about the level of toxic waste and the kind of chemical garbage that calls for governmental regulation. And we are not always so sure that a "new sovereign" will not change the environmental mood in the White House concerning society's desire to prevent these wastes from contaminating the environment and endangering the public health and safety.

The federal government took an important step in cleaning up abandoned chemical dump sites in the late seventies. Although it took a little more time to make up its mind, the United States Environmental Protection Agency adopted a cradle-to-grave policy through a manifest system whereby chemical wastes are regulated from the time they are generated through the time they are transported and safely disposed of or stored. The EPA also set aside a $1.6 billion Superfund to pay for cleaning up the messes created by chemical waste. Despite the size of the Superfund, it is insufficient. Thousands of chemical dump sites are waiting to be cleaned up. Adding insult to injury is the political manipulation of the Superfund by those at the top of the environmental regulatory hierarchy. Cleaning up dump sites in states where political allies live was speeded, but it was delayed in states of political adversaries. As a final blow, the Superfund was cut to its bare bones, resulting in the reduction of key career officials, especially those adept in environmental litigation. Clearly, these cutbacks severely handicapped agency efforts to get the job done. Program implementation ground almost to a halt.

Walter A. Rosenbaum's essay on public participation in hazardous waste management highlights another problem in policy implementation. If people feel strongly that their health or safety is jeopardized or their investment in their homes is threatened, they will do anything they can to prevent the construction of hazardous waste facilities. They organize into citizen groups, attend meetings, lobby politicians, and hire lawyers who will take their case to court. They also raise funds and take advantage of the referendum process to defeat proposals to site hazardous waste facilities in their own backyards. Thus, the problem of finding suitable sites for the safe disposal of toxic wastes is essentially a problem of managing local opposition.

Public interest groups feel that it will take more than a crash program to clean up chemical dump sites and to site facilities properly if the issue is to be met directly. Until the board rooms of corporate bureaucracies are opened wide enough for consumers to participate in corporate meetings, and until corporate decision-making processes are made in the open, very little can be done to protect the environment and the people from the effects of dioxin, 2,4,5-T, and PCB. Corporations must be accountable to the people who consume their products and pay for the cost in terms of diminished life chances.

Those who have contributed to this volume have done a great service in trying to help us understand that hazardous waste management is not just a problem of science and technology. If there is a common thread that runs through all the articles in the research, it is the authors' recognition of the fact that the hazardous waste management issue highlights severe stresses, strains, and tensions in the public policy process. What is overlooked is the ethical dimension of the issue, especially that of balancing the health and safety of the people against economic costs and benefits. Such an examination may be beyond the scope of this work, but it would have strengthened the case for public accountability of the corporate world.

A. B. VILLANUEVA

Western Illinois University

Congress and the Common Good. By Arthur Maass. (New York: Basic Books, 1983. Pp. 273. $18.95.)

Much of the recent political science literature on Congress has been reductionist, dealing with the motivations and behavior of its individual members. Arthur Maass, however, has written an important book that challenges much of the social science literature not just on Congress but on the American political process as well. The book's premise stems from Maass's disagreement with the assumptions of scholars such as Morris Fiorina (*Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment,* Yale University Press, 1977) and David Mayhew (*Congress: The Electoral Connection,* Yale University Press, 1974) that congressmen are primarily motivated by the self-interest axiom and are, in the final analysis, single-minded seekers of reelection. Maass rejects these "partisan mutual adjustment models" as unrealistic and insufficient for understanding Congress and, in particular, congressional-executive relations. Maass wants to offer a model of Congress that is "fundamentally different from those that dominate contemporary studies of Congress and the Presidency" (p. 3). Maass's orientation is not revolutionary in substance, but instead resurrects institutional analysis in the classic tradition of Woodrow Wilson and James MacGregor Burns.

In what Maass terms his discussion model of executive-legislative relations one finds really two models through which to examine Congress. The emphasis on "discussion" is based upon Maass's view of Congress as the institution designed to be both representative and responsive as well as his belief in the preeminence of the public interest. The public interest, according to Maass, is not some final reconciliation of narrow interests, but a broad and deliberative assessment of community interests. Maass does not propose to define this public interest in substance, but "rather to understand the process by which institutions determine these values" (p. 19). The persuasiveness of Maass's argument depends upon several assumptions. Among these is the notion that the citizenry is more credibly issue conscious than previous public opinion studies have implied. Citizens, furthermore, vote with more concern for the perceived commonweal than for private interests. Maass states that "the essence of the selective function of the electorate consists in the choice of citizens, who, in their personal capacities, are fitted to discharge the task of deliberation and discussion at the legislative stage" (p. 7). This public interest aspect of Maass's model unfortunately receives only cursory substantiation in subsequent chapters.

The second aspect of Maass's model, that of executive-legislative relations, is based upon the contention that the executive is more influential than the legislature in the legislative process. Maass holds that "congressional decisionmaking is almost always dominated by the nature of the relations between the Executive and Congress" (p. vii). Congress's role is more one of oversight and deliberation than one of legislative leadership.

Although one might disagree with Maass's assessment of the partisan mutual adjustment models, it would be difficult to find fault with his detailed descriptions of congressional organization and operation. His discussion of the relations between the House as a whole and congressional committees is especially insightful and includes a well-argued section on committee staffs. Maass's analysis of the congressional budget process is both expert and concise. The skillful use of legislative and administrative vignettes illustrates not only particular arguments, but also Maass's rich knowledge of Congress.

This work is not without shortcomings. Much of Maass's analysis is more provocative than it is systematically rigorous, falling prey to the broad scope of the book. A serious problem with this book is one of omission. Although Maass's final chapter on the flow of information between the legislative and executive branches is appropriate given the book's focus, it in no way provides concluding arguments for the study as a whole. Although Maass maintains a constant emphasis on executive-legislative relations, he loses sight of his initial public interest thesis. Despite these problems, *Congress and the Common Good* succeeds in pointing to legitimate and difficult research questions on Congress.

SUSAN L. ROBERTS

Winthrop College

Managing without Managers: Alternative Work Arrangements in Public Organizations. By Shan Martin. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 194. $24.00, cloth; $12.00, paper.)

The title of the book, *Managing without Managers,* is not necessarily indicative of its content. Martin seems well aware of the importance and necessity of managers and supervisors in public and private organizations, but raises some provocative questions and presents some thoughtful arguments in support of the idea of eliminating some of the excessive layers of management in the public service.

A considerable portion of the book is devoted to challenging the accuracy of the traditional literature in the field of management that places a heavy emphasis on the contributions of managers, but gives very little consideration to the actual role played by managers. One of Martin's basic concepts is that many of the tasks now performed by management officials could be done just as efficiently and at less cost to the public by workers in the organization below the management level.

On the basis of Martin's research on personnel practices in public agencies at the local, state, and national level, he presents some data to verify his contention that "a great deal of time and energy now absorbed in management and supervision activities can be released through the elimination of unnecessary positions and the redistribution of necessary functions to workers" (p. 15). Martin's position relevant to the issue of how many managers are necessary is explained in part by his statement that "the very real need for direction and conceptual ability from a few people in public organizations has been expanded to an imagined need" far in excess of the number necessary to do the work (p. 41).

A great deal of attention is focused on an analysis of what managers actually do in public and private organizations rather than acceptance of the traditional role of managers depicted in the literature. Some of Martin's findings and comments seem likely to create a climate of skepticism about the image of managers performing indispensable functions and to initiate an era of more thoughtful discussion of the functions that could be removed from top-level management and reassigned to employees at a lower level.

Although Martin seems to be skeptical of the accuracy of the traditional literature that tends to glamorize the role and functions of administrators, he is very much aware of the fact that there are public problems of such complexity that cannot be delegated to subordinates, and that the questions of whether a manger is needed, and the kind of administrator needed, are related directly to the nature of the problem to be dealt with and the capabilities of the subordinates.

One of Martin's surveys dealing with administrators in city, state, and federal agencies reveals that much of managers' time is spent in routine and paperwork activities rather than functions in the managerial category. Managers are aware of, and dissatisfied with, the manner in which they spend their time.

The evidence that Martin presents on what some administrators actually do in their official capacity, and the attitude of these managers about how they spend their time, tends to dilute the traditional picture of managers as persons possessed with qualities of "diligence, decisiveness, self-confidence, humaneness, intelligence, [and] toughness" (p. 30).

Martin's intent, to reduce the cost of government by eliminating unnecessary managerial positions, and to give more serious consideration to the idea of self-management, is an admirable and noble undertaking. His major theme, managing without managers, seems likely to have great public appeal. However, the forces favorable to maintaining "a cover of immutable sanctity for managers" have built their defenses in great depth and are not likely to quickly embrace Martin's basic concept.

ERNEST M. COLLINS

Ohio University, Athens

Women's Rights: The Struggle for Equality in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Nancy E. McGlen and Karen O'Conner. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiv + 413. $37.95, cloth; $13.95, paper.)

This is a comprehensive, scholarly, and sympathetic political history and analysis of the three women's movements in America: Seneca Falls forward (1848 to 1875), Suffrage (1890 to 1925), and the current movement (1966 on). The history is focused by political analylsis of three issue areas, politics, economics, and family, each examined in terms of the struggles involved and the nature of achievements. The empiricals are placed loosely within a theoretical framework derived from social movement theory, emphasizing a conceptualization of public goods or bads adapted from works by Mancur Olson, William Riker, and Peter Ordeshook.

Certainly the study is the grand composite to date on the American women's movements, which no complete feminist library should be without. Not a new analysis or breakthrough in empirical or normative theory, it consists in a twice-told tale, as the authors and any scholar of feminism must admit. But the extensive scale of the work in content and supportive resources, and the remarkable integration achieved in synthesizing a supremely diverse literature, make this work essential. There are 387 pages of text and approximately 81 pages containing 1,355 footnotes that reference sources of who's who quality in the women's studies literature for three disciplines. McGlen and O'Connor have managed to meld their writing styles in a gratifying manner. All chapters mesh, with none of the disjunctures so often encountered in joint endeavors. The chapters on ERA, although perhaps prematurely pessimistic to some, should be required background reading in any course treating women and polities. For professionals, the entire segment on women's political rights is a truly excellent synthesis of data on women's political behavior and attitudes.

A few analytical and theoretical weaknesses appear. At the analytical level, women's secondary estate across all three issues areas receives one patterned diagnosis: that is, the necessity but insufficiency of law, and the trilogy of cultural stereotypes (stressing public attitudes as the especially critical barrier to equality), lack of preparation or resources, and discrimination. This incessant circularity is unfortunate for the quality of analysis.

A theoretical difficulty is the conceptualization of public goods or bads. Either designation (good or bad) can be a matter of perception; either has variants (e.g., a pure public good or bad that all citizens must share equally and perceive uniformly, or a nonuniversal public good or bad affecting only those so choosing). The concept is employed to designate various rights or goals pursued by the women's movements, but criteria for the designations are ambiguous and seem arbitrary, which undermines analysis and the potential of the concept.

Designating public good or bads is symbolic politics, unarguably relevant in women's rights politics. If what women want is perceived as—and doomed politically by—the label "public bads," what can women do? They must, as theologian Mary Daly said in *Beyond God the Father* (Beacon Press, 1973), regain the power of naming. As McGlen and O'Connor demonstrate, women must have power to label and designate the issue and present it on their own terms. Yet the apparently most preferred strategy, advocating women's rights (e.g., marital and reproductive) as pure public goods, is also most likely to activate a countermovement of persons perceiving them as pure public bads. The less provocative strategy advocating rights of the nonuniversal public goods type (e.g., equal pay for equal work rather than for comparable work) not only compromises the primary interests of the women's movement, but also embroils its energies in short-term and perhaps myopic "victories" of the type that the 1920s achieved with protective legislation. Perhaps the pragmatic "out" is that because in the game of symbolic politics public goods or bads are a function of labeling, one must insure against proposed women's rights being perceived and designated as pure public bads. In effect, this is the authors' tack in their postmortem of ERA: an adequate resolution for practical politics, but a theoretical hiatus that needs attention.

Prognosis for the current movement is judicious. Given ERA's defeat, McGlen and O'Connor warn against a repeat of the suffrage rout, but are buoyed by the heady possibilities posed by the diffusion of the women's movement in American society. As do all feminist sympathizers, they share a basic hope for a new generation of young, increasingly educated, egalitarian-minded women touched by the existential fact and ideological force of the women's movement.

MARY R. MATTINGLY

Texas A&I University

Problems in Administrative Reform. Edited by Robert Miewald and Michael Steinman. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1984. Pp. v + 265. $27.95.)

This volume is a compilation of 15 essays that were originally presented in 1978 at a University of Nebraska symposium on the state of the art of administrative reform. The general focus here is on the reasons why there has been so much attention directed toward administrative reform when the reforms themselves appear to have had little impact on bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior.

Three essays discuss reforms at the national level: congressional oversight and the role of the General Accounting Office in evaluating agency activities; the creation and reorganization of federal agencies and the social, economic, and technical factors that generate demands for such changes; and the history of the reorganization of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare into the Education and the Health and Human Services Departments during the Carter administration. In his essay on the GAO, for example, Elmer Staats reviews congressional experience with the post-1974 budget process and offers some guidelines for the conducting of evaluations and analyses of agency performance.

Eight essays examine reform at the state and local level. These essays range from overviews of reformations of personnel systems and judicial organizations to a review of the experience with state reorganization plans to more narrowly defined inquiries into the efforts of local governments to alter budgetary practices, incorporate computers into agency management, and involve local citizens in reviewing proposals for governmental reorganization. One study reviews the experience of a county in Arizona that experimented with zero-base budgeting in the mid-1970s; another essay traces the interrelationships of public employee unions, citizen lobbies, and equal employment opportunity requirements in state personnel systems.

These essays represent a sampling of concerns rather than a comprehensive overview; they range from detailed case studies to broad overviews and do not pursue common themes or issues and are thus not easily aggregated. Much of the discussion of budgets in these articles focuses on zero-based budgeting, which has now become somewhat outdated.

The final set of three essays, plus the introductory essay of the authors, are perhaps the most interesting and useful of the volume's offerings. They address themselves to the history of administrative reform in the United States and seek to identify trends and common strands in reformist efforts. Together they provide a brief but thoughtful discussion of the tension between democracy and administration—the expectation that government be accountable to political forces as well as efficient and effective—and the competing concerns of rational and political reform—expectations that changes be comprehensive, coherent, and grounded in theory while also responding to political conditions and demands.

The authors call for a reforming of our ideas about reform, that social scientists and other students of administration be more critical of the promises of would-be reformers and that more attention be given to the plurality of interests that are likely to be affected by administrative remodeling. The primary impulse in reform has been to "solve problems, not necessarily to understand them" (p. 238), and although this pragmatism has been a common characteristic of administrative reformers, it must be combined with a more sophisticated understanding of the extent to which administrative changes have different utilities for individuals within bureaucracies and for groups that comprise the political environment in which those bureaucracies exist.

GARY BRYNER

Brigham Young University

The Politics of U.S. Labor: From the Great Depression to the New Deal. By David Milton. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982. Pp. vi + 189. $18.00, cloth; $8.00, paper.)

Why did the CIO fail to reorganize American politics along entrenched class lines, and why was it unsuccessful in institutionalizing a socialist perspective on the American scene? Why was the CIO unable to permanently fashion American unions into a broader political style, similar to their European counterparts? In reviewing documentation on the life and times of the CIO before its merger with the AFL in 1956, David Milton composes forthright, albeit pointed, responses to these questions. He presents a lively analysis of the interplay between the factions within the CIO and their relationship with the AFL, as well as juxtaposing these events with Roosevelt's strategic maneuvering of the New Deal and, later, labor policy during the national war effort. Milton's book attempts an explanation of "the triangular struggle among capital, labor and the state" by focusing upon "the actual politics" pursued by radical labor leaders and organizers. By drafting his text from so narrow a perspective, Milton necessarily limits the reader's view of the cast and character of the New Deal drama, but the virtue of his approach is the illumination of labor's battles from within, and their conviction to Roosevelt's administration specifically, and the emerging welfare state generally.

Milton argues that the rank and file movement of unskilled workers for industry wide unions in mass production dramatically effected labor syndicalists like John L. Lewis and liberals like Franklin D. Roosevelt. Contrary to current revisionist historians, Milton denies that New Deal reforms were products of elite cooptation, although ultimately, he concludes, the state confined the industrial movement within the bounds of economism through intensifying the internal tensions within the CIO. He is careful to outline the chronology of strike events immediately preceding the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 as proof of the efficacy of mass movement on the state behavior. Equally, he traces the ensuing frenzied growth of the newborn CIO.

Milton portrays Roosevelt's eventual recognition of the political value of the CIO as a counter to the growing business opposition to the New Deal. In response to the business offensive and the defeats in the 1936 congressional elections, Milton sees FDR distancing himself from labor. The 1937 economic downturn, and finally, the war's nationalism stalled the CIO's momentum. FDR played Sidney Hillman's loyalty to the state against John L. Lewis's independent syndicalism with the result, a badly divided CIO over the no strike war policy. With the Left effectively isolated within the labor movement in the postwar era, Milton contends that the state fashions "the Great Bargain": Class conflict is contained within the economist boundaries of wages and job security issues, underwritten by American prosperity. Hence, politics was separated from economics. Milton ends with a discussion of the current unravelling of the postwar consensus.

Although Milton's analysis provides a fascinating account of the state-labor-capital nexus, this book raises more questions than it answers. Is it possible that the American working class had more limited needs than the Left? Was there any other strategic option for the Left different from the economistic reforms of the New Deal? Were socialist politics on the agenda for the working class? For enough of it? Although Milton does not ignore these issues, he skirts them by weaving his narrative around "the actual politics" of labor radicals. He should pursue the broader mosaic in his subsequent writing, if only to solidify his position.

RICHARD GUARASCI

St. Lawrence University

The Contested City. By John H. Mollenkopf. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 328. $27.50, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

The Contested City examines the recent politics of American cities from the standpoint of regional economic shifts, and the evolution of federal urban policy since the 1930s. Its analytical perspective is thus in some ways congruent with contemporaneous studies such as Susan Fainstein et al.'s *Restructuring the City* (Longman, 1983) and Ira Katznelson's *City Trenches* (Pantheon, 1981), which also view local urban politics as a stage upon which particular issues and political factions develop according to a logic mixing purely local factors as well as broader economic, political, and demographic patterns. This way of looking at urban politics is of course at great variance with political science research conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s and typically concerned with questions such as the distribution and exercise of purely local political power. In fact, John Mollenkopf's theoretical starting points and the practical questions he examines owe much to the work of social scientists in allied disciplines, such as geographer David Harvey (*Social Justice and the City,* Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) and economist James O'Connor (*The Fiscal Crisis of the State,* St. Martin's Press, 1973).

Interestingly, although Mollenkopf's methodology—case examination of local redevelopment initiatives, comparative analysis of urban employment, sectoral output and associated measures, and review of particular federal legislative initiatives—is also consistent with the neo-Marxian approach of the foregoing works, his basic premise —that political factors are at the heart of the evolution of urban policy in this country—is not so congruent. In his words, "the review of federal urban programs presented here suggests that the initiative for policy expansion comes from within the political system itself" (p. 94). Mollenkopf identifies two broad trends in federal urban policy, each with particular programmatic characteristics and objectives and separable local impacts. The first is associated with the Democratic party and essentially derives from the Roosevelt administration's programmatic responses to the Great Depression. Indeed, Mollenkopf contends that "Domestic urban development programs . . . became the principal means through which the modern Democratic party was created" (p. 3). In reaction, and beginning somewhat fitfully during the Eisenhower administration, the Republicans too developed an urban agenda, but aimed at an alternative constituency. Their approach to urban policy undercut minority mobilization effected by the likes of the Community Action Program, eased the way for downtown business elites and political leaders to build "corporate downtowns," and promoted the spatial transfer of urban functions out from central cities and from the East and Midwest to the Sunbelt.

Mollenkopf examines in some detail the politics of redevelopment in Boston and San Francisco, whose particular experiences with respect to adjustment to the effects of regional economic shift, local manipulation of urban renewal, and neighborhood reaction serve to illuminate the book's broader concerns. Unfortunately for an analysis that recognizes three "types" of U.S. city (older cities with growing postindustrial sectors, older cities without growing postindustrial sectors, and Sunbelt cities), these two cities mainly shed light on the experiences of the first type. Nonetheless, Mollenkopf's analyses of pro-growth politics and neighborhood resistance in these two cities, regardless of their potential for generalization, represent insightful case studies of this pervasive local political issue.

More troubling is a latter chapter in which Mollenkopf sets out to debunk the notion that the Frostbelt/Sunbelt growth dichotomy is mainly the result of macroeconomic forces. In effect, he seeks to prove his contention that urban policy, that is, the work of national administrations, congressmen, and local officials, is at the root of the shifting fortunes of Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago versus Dallas, Phoenix, and San Diego. The problem is that the evidence Mollenkopf marshals is more ambiguous than he grants. For example, we learn that there is a secretarial wage differential between Frostbelt and Sunbelt of 7%, which Mollenkopf dismisses as inconsequential. He suggests that because per capita infrastructure investment is greater in Frostbelt than Sunbelt cities, firms must not move due to this factor. But doesn't the older, more climatically assaulted Frostbelt infrastructure require more investment? And further, investment figures tell us little regarding the relative condition of local infrastructure, or how corporate executives view its quality. To counter the claim that Frostbelt manufacturing jobs are being lost to Sunbelt cities, Mollenkopf presents figures on the relative shares of service, governmental, and manufacturing employment within individual metropolitan areas, which do suggest that services hold a larger share of local Sunbelt economies. Yet the trend data he also provides reveal significant gains in manufacturing employment (from 1960 to 1970) for several Sunbelt metropolitan areas. In short, data seem to be bent to fit an argument.

Aside from these shortcomings—which are concentrated in a single chapter—Mollenkopf makes a good case for a somewhat novel position. Unlike the vast majority of contemporary political scientists and policy analysts, Mollenkopf argues that urban programs have succeeded. However, their political origins have generated fairly perverse objectives. In the acknowledgements, Mollenkopf notes his estrangement from a "Marxian theory of politics," and *The Contested City* seems to be an effort to integrate economic variables within an analysis that also allows for the play of political forces in urban politics and policy. This is an admirably sophisticated way of looking at things, even if it makes the explanation of particular lines of causality highly ambiguous.

LARRY BENNETT

DePaul University

A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget. By Frederick C. Mosher. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. Pp. xxvi + 219. $22.50.)

Frederick Mosher's objective is to show how the two agencies in his title have responded to external influences for more than 60 years. He identifies the underlying theme of his book as the tension between the need for both agencies to maintain expertise-based credibility versus requirements that they satisfy the wishes of politicians to some degree.

Mosher devotes most of his attention to history. He begins with developments leading to passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the creation statute for both agencies. He then follows the agencies from their early concentrations on frugality through their adoptions, in response to increasing federal government size and complexity, of broader and more ambitious perspectives. Thus, in recent years instead of merely cutting budgets, the BoB/OMB has used such techniques as multiyear planning and micro economics, and rather than checking vouchers by the hundreds of thousands, the GAO performs sophisticated management and program analyses.

Although the historical sections that constitute most of the book are done with the care that scholars have come to expect from Mosher, the study as a whole cannot be counted as a success. It is pulled in two directions by the vast differences between the BoB/OMB and the GAO, with one at the center of government making authoritative decisions and the other on the periphery, by Mosher's account, using the press as its primary means of communication with its patron, the Congress. The comparisons between the two shed relatively little light on either. Most of the observations in the book are not the fruit of comparisons. What we have instead is almost two books in one with segments shifting from one agency to the other and back again through time. And what we learn about the two agencies is the sort of thing that one would expect in any administrative history, for example, how the BoB and the GAO were molded by their first director and comptroller general, respectively.

Mosher devotes surprisingly little attention to his underlying theme of politics and expertise. It emerges frequently, but not in ways that add much to our understanding of this important topic. For example, he describes, with no new insights or information, Richard Nixon's attempt to politicize the OMB. More useful would have been a treatment of how these events affected the relationships between career OMB employees and their appointed superiors. Mosher comes closer to this relationship in the GAO with a brief reference to the "repeated internal reviews that characterize much of GAO's work. The planning and selection of GAO projects require a large amount of political astuteness" (p. 181). Little more is said. The GAO project planning and report writing processes often pit analysts, especially team leaders, against a risk averse and politically sensitive GAO bureaucracy. The resulting conflict stands at the very heart of how technical knowledge and politics are connected in the federal government. Mosher's account adds little to the observations of Don K. Price in *The Scientific Estate* (Harvard University Press, 1965) and Guy Benveniste in *The Politics of Expertise* (Boyd and Fraser, 1977).

CARL GRAFTON

Auburn University at Montgomery

The Presidency and the Political System. Edited by Michael Nelson. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984. Pp. x + 522. $13.95, paper.)

Michael Nelson has assembled a good collection of mostly original articles focusing on the environment, duties, and powers of the presidency. *The Presidency and the Political System* serves both as a reader for a course on the presidency and as a repository of some stimulating thinking on the nation's foremost political office. The volume focuses on the elements of presidential power, presidential selection, the president's external constituencies, and the other government institutions (Congress, bureaucracy, and the judiciary).

None of the chapters is weak, and some are intriguing. Stephen Skowronek's clever analysis of pairs of presidents (Jackson and FDR, Polk and Kennedy, Pierce and Carter) facing challenges, respectively, of political regime construction, regime management, and regime survival raises a fascinating question of whether presidents be studied according to concepts of "political time." Paul Quirk's essay investigates the sorts of things presidents must know and do to steer between the dangers of excessive involvement in details of the job and what he calls the "minimalist presidency."

Martha Joynt Kumar and Michael Baruch Grossman review the White House's efforts to court interest groups. Although they try too hard to categorize White House personnel, their essay sheds light on a subject in need of scholarly attention. Jack Walker points out that contrary to the intention of those who wrote the rules, one of the problems with today's nomination process is that a surprise early victory by an unknown candidate may not leave time for better known candidates to reassert themselves after defeat. He also observes that incumbents under attack must either defend their records or run for reelection, thus "causing many of their decisions about appointments or policies to appear as campaign gestures" (p. 201).

In a solid chapter on public opinion, Samuel Kernell notes that because Washington is a "community governed less by leaders and more by the requirements of independent, egocentric actors, . . . presidents are going public" more and more precisely at a time when doing so is less likely to succeed (pp. 235-236). Paul Light's chapter on policymaking stresses the importance of presidential assumptions about politics, economics, and the future. He observes, albeit without much evidence, that presidents select problems to be solved on the basis of best case assumptions and return to worst case arguments to protect those solutions from change. W. Bowman Cutter brings readers back to earth by demonstrating that "on many issues it does not matter what the 'old man' thinks. No matter what priorities or objectives a president assigns himself, events will intervene" (p. 491). Robert Scigliano's chapter shows that although the judiciary has not been unduly hard on presidents, it has been increasingly assertive of late. And in a superb essay, James Fallows sympathetically explains why journalists focus on presidential politics rather than their policies.

Several of the articles, although well done, raise questions. Why, for example, would Francis Rourke select independent regulatory agencies as examples of how presidents try to control the executive bureaucracy? Michael Nelson asserts that congressmen have ceded to the presidency the power of legislative initiative, presumably because they are so busy advertising, pork-barreling, and doing casework that the time left for legislative activity is spent pandering to local interests. Both contentions (loss of initiative and excessive constituency-orientation) require more evidence than has yet been produced. Morris Fiorina, explaining that congressmen have become independent of presidents, too quickly dismisses the influence of voters' assessments of presidential performance on their 1980 votes for Congress; yet recent evidence suggests a distinct effect. He also accepts a contested argument that the cause of congressional independence is members' focus on the interests of their districts or states and, by implication, their constituency service activities.

The book is well done and contains provocative chapters. Students and their professors will like it.

JOHN R. JOHANNES

Marquette University

Mediated Political Realities. By Dan Nimmo and James Combs. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xv + 240. $25.00, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

The authors argue that people do not discover information about political happenings firsthand. Rather, their experiences are "mediated" either through mass or group communications. And because almost all political information is so mediated, people's perceptions of politics are as likely to be fantasy as reality. This argument takes Nimmo and Combs into some little explored and, for political scientists, highly unusual areas. (There are, for example, chapters on women's magazines, movies, and sports.) As they note, therefore, much of what they say is more speculative than empirically grounded. And, as is often the case with such studies, although parts of it are interesting and fertile, other sections are flawed.

To begin with the book's strengths. Nimmo and Combs make a strong case that mediated politics is often best seen as melodrama. That is, it is the nature of the mass media to present politics in the form of melodramatic tales with plot lines, actors who are heroes, villains, or fools, and all the other elements of movies or stage plays. In doing so, the picture that is painted of politics (or history) is as much fantasy as fact. Stories are made to conform to the melodramatic imperative, and in three fascinating chapters the authors outline how this process effects the way we see political crises, election campaigns, and history.

The other interesting part of the book deals with group mediation of reality. Drawing heavily on the ideas found in Irving Janis's *Victims of Groupthink* (Houghton Mifflin, 1972), the authors explore how groups of people often build their own fantastic versions of political reality. And as Nimmo and Combs argue, when the groups who develop these fantasies are either political elites or journalists (who then broadcast these fantasies as fact), the implications are deep. Furthermore, as they also show, the conspiracy theories of the extreme right and extreme left are only the logical extension of the same process that can blind more respected groups from political reality. And all of these group fantasies are likely to be the same kinds of dramatizations of politics that are found in mass-mediated politics.

On the other hand, there are some sections and arguments in the book that are more problematic. First, the chapter on movies argues that movies reflect the political fantasies of the public. And Nimmo and Combs go on to explore how the movies of each decade reflect the politics of that era. To do so they take one movie from each decade since the thirties and show how it fits with that decade's political mood. This is clearly inadequate, as they offer no evidence that the movies they pick are in any way representative of the popular movies of that era. Nimmo and Combs need, I think, to combine their content analysis of movies with some kind of look at box office appeal to make their argument more compelling.

Second, Nimmo and Combs need to speculate about some kind of systematic relationship between sports and politics. Instead, their chapter on sports simply manages to show that sports can be used to teach any political lesson that we might desire.

Third, and most important, there is the issue of the implications of such mediated realities. The authors argue that politics becomes nothing more than a series of mediated fantasies. They argue, for example, that when judging candidates:

> Perhaps . . . citizens must become critics—drama critics, rhetorical critics, speech critics. Thus prepared they can undertake the crucial task of conducting critiques of dramatic performances, fantasy themes and melodramatic rituals. Thereby they might not only demand more of candidates, campaigners, and journalists in the election melodrama but also of their own acting performances as well. (p. 69)

On the other hand, as many other studies have noted, who wins elections does seem to make some difference in terms of the policies that government pursues. And if this is the case, the importance of political fantasy is how it masks or overwhelms political reality. What we need to do then, is not judge the fantasy on its own terms, but see through it and get to the reality that it is hiding. I do not want to imply that Nimmo and Combs are not aware of the problem of the difference between fantasy and reality. But because they view political struggle as, basically, differences in political fantasies, they tend to avoid exploring this problem. Granted, it may be hard to know what "reality" is. But that does not mean we should not speculate as to what kinds of "realities" are likely to be systematically excluded from a politics of mediated fantasy.

In spite of these flaws, however, there is much of interest in this book. It is an innovative attempt to look at how our picture of the political world is formed. Much of it is speculative, and some of it is unsatisfying, but the authors do ask a number of interesting questions. *Mediated Political Realities* is clearly not, nor is it meant to be, definitive. But it is a good beginning.

ARTHUR SANDERS

Hamilton College

The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980s. Edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Mark J. Miller. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983. Pp. xi + 305. $30.00.)

This fine set of essays is a generally valuable contribution to the literature on American immigration. Papademetriou and Miller, along with seven other scholars, do not merely discuss contemporary debates on facets of U.S. immigration policy. They display a sound understanding of the historical background of these debates. The authors also draw interesting comparisons with recent experiences in other countries, especially regarding temporary-worker programs and employer sanctions in Western Europe. Both in presenting their own research and in evaluating the arguments of other scholars, the authors discuss the controversial issues of immigration policy without the hysteria and racism that often mar such discussions. The immigrants portrayed in this volume suffer from and contribute to a variety of serious problems. However, they are not viewed as racially inferior to older-stock Americans.

A major concern of several of the authors is the impact of immigrants, especially illegal aliens, on certain sectors of the American economy. The influx of foreign-born workers does not necessarily harm the economy as a whole. Indeed, Walter Fogel points out (p. 73) that, even if one counts undocumented immigrants, "the relative numbers of foreign born in the work force are currently near or at all-time lows." Still, he argues that illegal aliens tend to find only low-wage, unskilled employment with poor working conditions. According to Fogel, this situation has one or both of the following consequences: minority nonimmigrant workers are displaced, and employers have less incentive to upgrade wages and working conditions. Fogel may somewhat exaggerate the extent to which the severe unemployment problems of urban blacks and others are attributable to undocumented workers. Certainly the overall weakness of the American economy throughout much of the 1970s is a prime explanation for high unemployment in urban minority communities. Nonetheless, it does seem quite likely that a significant amount of displacement of the nonimmigrant poor has occurred in recent years. At any rate, several of the essays in this book make such a contention.

Although the contributors to *The Unavoidable Issue* generally agree on domestic policy aspects of immigration, the book includes at least one major disagreement over foreign policy. The editors conclude their chapter on "Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy" by arguing that an important way to stem illegal immigrant flows to the United States is to decrease the "push" factors of poverty and disorder in developing countries through increased foreign aid. Yet, in the very next essay, Sidney Weintraub takes a closer and more pessimistic look at such policy options. He persuasively contends that there are serious limitations to the ability of the United States to use foreign trade, investment, and aid in order substantially to change the economies of those nations which currently send most illegal aliens to America.

After reading this book, one may well question in just what sense immigration is an "unavoidable issue" in the 1980s. Are the problems created by mass immigration so severe that the American political system cannot avoid dealing with them in the 1980s? Immigration "reform" has been fairly high on the political agenda in recent years, and Congress has been considering several legislative initiatives on the subject. Yet, no clear consensus has emerged concerning what changes in U.S. policy might be best. Indeed, the very significance of the problems may serve only to stimulate enough controversy and sufficient interest group pressure to block any major changes in U.S. immigration laws in the near future. This possibility is recognized by the editors. Nonetheless, immigration may still be an "unavoidable issue" in another sense. Without fundamental reforms, the consequences of immigration will increasingly affect the American economy, society, and polity in the years ahead. It is difficult to predict how many readers of this book will be convinced of the need for any of the specific policy changes espoused by the authors. However, few readers will avoid becoming better informed about the important issues of U.S. immigration policy examined by Papademetriou, Miller, and their colleagues.

SANFORD N. GREENBERG

Austin, Texas

The Political Economy of Inflation in the United States. By Paul Peretz. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 268. $30.00, cloth; $14.00, paper.)

This work examines the way economic policy affecting inflation is made in a pluralistic democracy. It focuses on public opinion about inflation, public perception of the effects of inflation on various political and economic groups, elite attitudes toward inflation, and the ability of the pluralistic model of democracy to explain the inflation policy process. As such this book represents a synthesis of the past decade's accumulation of literature on economic voting and the political business cycle. Further, it is an effort to reconcile the individual-based public opinion approach to understanding economic policymaking with the systemic view of the political manipulation of the economy.

The overarching process model of political economy Peretz employs has three central components that form the focuses for this book: Real distributional effects of inflation (chap. 3) influence the public's perception of inflation (chap. 4), resulting in the public's political response and its demands on the policy process (chap. 5). Two additional chapters, essentially reviews of the current economic and political science literature, provide broad support for the importance of this subject. Chapter 2, "Economic Theory and Inflation," is a review of inflation since World War II and a discussion of the alternative policy tools at policymakers' disposal. Chapter 6, "Making Inflation Policy," is a very general, systems-like, review of the principal actors involved in making inflation policy. Several important substantive findings of this analysis are: The burden of inflation is rather evenly spread among occupational and income groups; the perception of inflation as a problem is not tied to one's real economic situation, for example, even long-term mortgage holders are as likely to see inflation as a problem as are renters; and political parties and other political groups are not representative of their constituents' interests concerning inflation policy. The latter is interpreted as evidence that the pluralistic model of democratic government does not accurately describe the way inflation policy is made in the United States.

Although this research is ambitious in scope, it is well-conceived at the macro level. It is plagued, however, with methodological, data limitation, and presentation problems in the examination of the three-stage process model that is the keystone of the analysis. The central chapters do not present a unified picture of citizen evaluation and reaction to inflation, and much of the data that is presented is so dated (most of the data presented are for the middle and late 1960s) and limited that generalization is questionable. The most serious pitfall of this work, however, is that this volume is a research monograph. It will most likely not receive the wide reading it deserves because it reads like a doctoral dissertation (which an earlier version was in 1978 at the University of Chicago). It suffers from the common malady of excessively referring to authors' names as shorthand symbol for their ideas. The reader, therefore, has to be well schooled in the works of several camps of democratic theorists as well as political economy to fully appreciate Peretz's argument. This limits the usefulness of this volume to those doing research in the areas of economic policy and democratic theory. As a research work, this volume is a well-conceptualized, systematic inquiry that, despite facing many methodological and data limitation problems, contributes to our understanding of economic policymaking.

DAVID J. WEBBER

West Virginia University

Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation. By Nelson W. Polsby. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 185. $18.50.)

Nelson Polsby has written a book that seeks to be at the cutting edge of the new political science subfield of "policy initiation," the study of "how it happens that new policies—political innovations—are initiated in the American political system" (pp. xi-xii). Rather than trying to write a definitive book on the subject, Polsby chooses to sketch out in an "exploratory, tentative, and speculative" way the broadest contours of this subfield, with the hope that his conclusions will be subjected to "scrutiny, correction, and expansion in many directions" (pp. 172-173). Ultimately, Polsby writes, "the study of policy initiation can be put on as firm an empirical footing as the study of policy enactment, or of administrative implementation" (p. 173).

To that end, Polsby presents here eight short case studies of policy innovations in the United States, all taken from the time period stretching from the end of World War II to the early Johnson years. His method is to compile from secondary sources a short summary of the events leading up to the initiation of a policy and to present the briefest analysis of each case study. He concludes the book with a few general and tentative conclusions as to how new policies are created.

Policy innovations, Polsby concludes, fall into two main categories. In "type A" (or "acute") innovations,

> the lapse in time between the first surfacing of an idea . . . and its enactment is short. The sources of ideas under such circumstances are people relatively close to the agencies ultimately responsible for enactment, and there is little time or effort expended on research. . . . Not all feasible or likely alternatives are canvassed. (p. 150).

In "type B" (or "incubated") initiation,

> innovation takes place slowly, frequently over many years . . . the demand for innovation is built slowly, and specific plans or proposals are typically the work of people relatively far in social, temporal, and sometimes physical distance from ultimate decision-makers. . . . These innovations pass through a stage of *incubation,* where political actors . . . take the idea up, reshape it, adapt it to their political needs, publicize it, and put it into the ongoing culture of decision-makers. (p. 153)

Whether or not this classification scheme is correct, complete, or useful will probably be debated at some length, although it seems plausible to me. The other hypotheses Polsby puts forward are either self-evident or amorphous. For example, he concludes that "A crisis can obtain attention for a 'need' and even get a policy enacted, but it cannot make the policy actually work" (p. 169). Or, discussing the causes of innovation, he writes that "an underlying cultural disposition must be present favoring the application of rational thought to problems" (p. 165).

Given the purpose of the book, the validity or meaningfulness of these conclusions is largely beside the point. It is far more interesting to consider Polsby's claim that policy innovation is or should be an independent subfield within American political science.

Like the study of enactment and implementation, policy innovation is, in Polsby's view, "a phenomenon separable from other aspects of political life, with preconditions, contours, and consequences of its own that have only begun to be mapped" (pp. 172-173). This is the crux of the argument, for only if this point is accepted does it make sense to study policy innovation independently of enactment and implementation.

Unfortunately, Polsby stops short of arguing this point systematically, and his own case studies suggest otherwise. Policies are created at every stage of the legislative and administrative processes. Sometimes, to be sure, innovation occurs before enactment and can be considered an independent event. In many other cases, however, innovations occur during the enactment process or even during the implementation process.

Certainly political scientists should be concerned about where policies come from and how innovations come about, but it is not clear that innovation should be studied independently of enactment and implementation. Ultimately, policy "innovation" or "initiation" is about how policy is created—and that is really policy*making.* Polsby's book did not convince me that the study of policy innovation should be separated from the general study of the making of policy.

WILLIAM LASSER

Clemson University

Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public Administration. Edited by Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984. Pp. xii + 320. $35.00.)

This book proposes to "celebrate the centennial of Woodrow Wilson's contribution to public administration" (p. vii). The editors deem this an appropriate time to both evaluate Wilson's contributions and to examine the past, current, and future intellectual trends and practices in American public administration.

Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman acknowledge in their Introduction that the appearance of "still another" book about public administration may seem "a bit audacious" (p. 7), but three considerations should suffice to overcome this qualm: (1) The intensification of "the so-called identity crisis in public administration" in recent years; (2) the fact that many of the postwar approaches and theories prevalent in public administration are "little more" than updated versions of the politics-administration issue; and (3) the problem of reconciling bureaucracy with democracy continues and "is very much alive" (p. 7).

To deal with these and other substantive issues, the book is divided into four sections with contributions from the following writers: "Wilson's Era: Philosophy and Times" has chapters by Robert D. Miewald, John A. Rohr, and Gerald Caiden; "Wilson and the Practice of Public Administration" contains chapters by Phillip J. Cooper, Thomas D. Lynch and Maurice H. Rahimi, David H. Rosenbloom, Larry Walker and Jeremy F. Plant, Vinton Fisher, Henry J. Steck, and Jameson W. Doig; "Wilson and the

Study of Administration" includes chapters by Paul P. Van Riper, Dwight Waldo, and Robert T. Golembiewski; and "Wilson and Public Administration's Second Century" presents chapters by William L. Morrow, Frederick C. Thayer, Gregory D. Foster, and Terry L. Cooper.

If there is anything audacious about this book, it is its vast intellectual scope. Each of the chapters focuses upon an aspect of Wilson's political-administrative thought (often the politics-administration issue) to discuss either the methodological/theoretical foundations or the particular administrative practices germane to American public administration. For example, in the latter sphere, the following topics are discussed: administrative law, public budgeting, public personnel administration, federalism, decision making, federal advisory committees, and public authority organizations. The first, second, and last sections deal with conceptual and theoretical themes. In fact, the editors claim that "the crisis in American public administration is ultimately a problem of political theory; a theory of administration is a theory of politics" (p. 8). Hence, this volume seeks to traverse considerable topical and disciplinary territory within an elongated time frame—and Wilson has provided the impetus for incisive analyses sometimes critical of his work.

All the contributors agree that Wilson did not espouse a facile separation between politics and administration in either a normative or descriptive sense; however, there is a plethora of views about what Wilson really meant, and even if it is any longer important. Concerning the former, various writers, especially Rohr and even Waldo, who calls for "a return to Wilson's essay and notes . . . in assessing and trying to address the identity crisis of self-aware public administration" (p. 230), adopt a research approach akin to a political philosopher's quest for the correct textual interpretation of Wilson's writings (i.e., essentialism). Moreover, Waldo defends the current and future reliance in administrative studies upon the politics-administration concept against Van Riper's terse observation that "as far as the dichotomy is concerned, it is time to forget Wilson," and his 1887 essay "is a limited, dated, and many ways tentative work" (p. 213). And within the interstices of Waldo's and Van Riper's splendid essays one can discern another confrontation: the disciplinary tension between political science and public administration. Yet, because it is very subtle and exceedingly civil, the possibilities for disciplinary rapprochement are not foreclosed.

Another significant theme is that an updated version of Wilsonian organicism might provide a theoretical foundation for future public administration—although disagreement exists about the usefulness of the New Public Administration. For example, in his excellent chapter, Miewald advocates the former but evinces skepticism about the New Public Administration (pp. 28-29). Foster says the New PA'ers "have gone to the extreme of sanctifying equity at the expense of efficiency" (p. 287). And Thayer claims the New Public Administration never divested itself from interest group liberalism, thereby resulting in problems that have "emerged with a vengeance" (p. 271). Morrow, on the other hand, reiterates the New PA'ers call for proactive administrators and says that Wilson's concern for "the orchestration of democratic procedures with effective policies" was "an early justification for what we now label the 'new public administration' " (p. 261).

The inclusion of articles presenting contrasting perspectives highlights this anthology's value; this book is a laudable contribution to the corpus of scholarly literature about American government. And it raises further intriguing questions such as whether there is any difference between a bureaucratic entrepreneur and a proactive administrator, and whether the emergence of a "self-aware public administration" can alleviate its identity crisis and maybe even lead to a rapprochement with political science.

PHILLIP C. WALL

Sacramento, California

Polls Apart. By John P. Robinson and Robert Meadow. (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1982. Pp. xix + 183. $14.95.)

This short work focuses upon public opinion surveys of American foreign policy issues. It examines both the accuracy of such poll data and the uses that are made, or could be made, of the data by public policymakers.

In 1976 and 1977 State Department personnel conducted foreign policy town meetings in 10 cities. Simultaneously, the Kettering Foundation supported a series of random sample telephone interviews in each city to determine the representativeness of opinions expressed at the town meetings. This book presents the results of that analysis. It also examines surveys by major polling organizations to highlight problems in polling on foreign affairs issues. The results of a seminar with 15 staff members from the Ford and Carter White House and National Security Council, the State and Defense Departments, and key congressional committees and interviews with others in similar positions are used to show how polls are used in the foreign policy arena.

Policymakers are found to make only limited use of poll data in policy formulation. Instead, they analyze and use poll results in presenting their policy decisions to the public. Executive personnel are less likely to use polls than legislative personnel; appointees use polls less than do elected personnel.

Polls are difficult for decision makers to use because of such problems as timing, oversimplification of questions, lack of multiple questions on the same issue, distinguishing between issue positions and actual behavior, question wording, and the failure to examine subgroup divisions on the issues. As a result, polls conducted in similar time frames frequently offer differing pictures of public attitudes on foreign policy.

Based on their analyses and experimental research conducted by others, Robinson and Meadow make recommendations such as the following: use filtered questions, offer specific middle alternatives, present policy options rather than simple agree/disagree formats, focus on contextual effects, use open-ended formats, do not present information to respondents, measure strengths of opinion, use more than one question to determine a policy position, and avoid biased and loaded wording.

Overall they recommend "a more natural descriptive mode of polling" (p. 135) including more reliance on in-depth interviews and more single-subject studies. Until such action is taken, Robinson and Meadow see foreign policy issue polls being of little use to policymakers.

Unfortunately, very little new information comes from this research. Most of the conclusions have been presented by others, and some of these conclusions have been known for years.

ANNE PERMALOFF

Auburn University at Montgomery

The Political Life of the American States. Edited by Alan Rosenthal and Maureen Moakley. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. 331. $29.95.)

This volume is a collection of 13 essays; the first provides the reader with a conceptual framework from which to examine the salient features of political life in the American states, and the other 12 revolve around specific case studies of 12 states. The framework developed by Rosenthal is an ingenious specification of three principal dimensions: political style, political culture, and political interaction. Political style is viewed as encompassing two principal elements, personal style which relates to the types of governmental leaders, and process style which relates to the ways in which leaders practice politics. Political culture, which borrows from the earlier works of Daniel J. Elazar, Malcoln E. Jewell, and Mancur Olson, encompasses identifications or "orientations toward the state as a political entity"; expectations or the role government should play in the day-to-day life of the state; and political interaction or the "traditional stuff of state politics" —participation, interest groups, political parties, governmental institutions, intergovernmental relations, organization, and power. Using these dimensions and elements the authors examine 12 states from the same perspective, which allows for systematic comparability. Although the 12 states included in the study are not representative of all 50, they do represent all geographic regions of the nation and cover a fairly extensive spectrum of politics in the states. The states and authors included in the study are: California, Charles G. Bell; Colorado, Thomas H. Simmons; Iowa, Samuel C. Patterson; Michigan, Peter Kobrak; Texas, Anthony Champagne and Rick Collis; Florida, Douglas St. Angelo; Georgia, Lawrence R. Hepburn; Kentucky, Marc Landy; New Jersey, Maureen Moakly; New York, Paul A. Smith; New Hampshire, Richard F. Winters; and Vermont, Frank Smallwood. The utilization of the thoughtfully developed political culture framework results in some thought-provoking results. For example, Texans were found to strongly identify with their state, but they have a negative attitude toward government in general. People in California and New York do not identify with their state to the degree that Texans do, but they generally have a positive view toward their government. The political style of Georgia and Vermont is "small-town," whereas the political style of California and New York is "big-time." California is found to be a "nation without a nation"; Colorado is "self confident," "energetic," and "independent." Iowa is "mindless," Michigan is "progressive" and fighting decline, Texas's establishment just about dwarfs everything else, Kentucky is characterized by a strong sense of "political community," and New York is found to be "big" and "professional."

The essays in this volume are almost without exception of exceptionally high quality. The work by Collis and Champagne on Texas, and St. Angelo on Florida, deserve special recognition. The volume is timely, well written, scholarly, and thought provoking. It should be of interest to a wide variety of readers, and it should be a must for those of us who are interested in state government, federalism, and intergovernmental relations.

JOHN S. ROBEY

Austin, Texas

Winners and Losers: Campaigns, Candidates and Congressional Elections. By Stuart Rothenberg. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Government and Politics of the Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, 1983. Pp. vi + 135. $4.95, paper.)

This book is a study that has a foot in two camps; it is pertinent to both academics interested in campaign strategies and their consequences and to practitioners interested in seeking winning campaign strategies.

Rothenberg selects eight 1982 Republican congressional campaigns (four successful and four not) from seven states, and examines each in terms of its campaign management, media, budget and finance, research, voter identification and turnout, social issues, external factors and candidates. Pairs of political consultants interviewed campaign managers from each race to glean information about these eight characteristics. He then analyzes the consultants' evaluations, along with published materials, to formulate some conclusions about what contributed to wins and losses.

The author acknowledges the limitations of this analysis of eight case studies; nevertheless, he offers some interesting observations. He finds, for example, that divisive primaries generally had an adverse impact on the general election, because a bitter primary campaign inflamed negative sentiments and provided fodder for the opposition. Also, early divisive primaries were less harmful than later ones.

Rothenberg also observes that an attack strategy was vital for a challenger, and an incumbent risked loss of his or her seat by ignoring a serious challenger. The consideration of the role of campaign managers shows that those who were successful tended to spend relatively little time accompanying their candidates, and also tended to direct most of their energies toward a few key components of the campaign.

Rothenberg's discussion of the impact of various media generally confirms the conclusions of existing research, for example, "free media" (i.e., news) has a greater impact than paid media. Direct mail campaigns generally have a marginal impact on turnout, but no impact on conversion. Campaigns with readily identifiable themes (embodied in "taglines") fare better than those that do not.

Levels of campaign spending bore no direct relation to winning or losing. Survey research was used in all eight Republican campaigns, but a misdiagnosis of the results in two instances had detrimental consequences. Not surprisingly, substantive campaign concerns focused on the economy and the competence and reliability of the opponent. In sum, the study concludes that successful campaigns should set a clear strategy early in the campaign, apply tactics consistent with that strategy, use research (on issues and the opponent) and targeted messages through judicious use of the media, look for signs of campaign failings before they become critical, and maximize the candidate's personal strengths.

As a practitioner's guide, this book could be useful insofar as it unifies research with pragmatic conclusions. But the book's recommendations generally parallel conventional campaign wisdom. As a scholarly work, the book is akin to a poor man's *Home Style* (Little, Brown, 1978). Unlike Richard Fenno, however, Rothenberg and his staff rely on the accounts and writings of others, rather than on first-hand observation, or even impartial observers.

Moreover, the slant of the study—to its detriment—is frankly partisan. Rothenberg's rationale (pp. 2-3) for selecting only Republican campaigns (that it would have "complicated comparisons") is unpersuasive. Indeed, the author makes implicit and explicit comparisons throughout the book between the Republican campaigns and their Democratic counterparts, and even says that focusing only on the Republican campaigns limits "our examination to only half of the equation" (p. 88). This shortcoming evidences itself, for example, in trying to assess the impact of Republican voter turnout efforts. Clearly, similar Democratic efforts in the same race must also be considered.

In sum, this study's analytically superficial approach, lack of consideration for national trends, and partisan bias make it less than useful for academics or practitioners. Even a Republican campaigner would probably like to know more about the opposition than is revealed here.

ROBERT J. SPITZER

State University of New York, Cortland

The Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left. By Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 403. $27.95.)

The Roots of Radicalism provides a much needed counterweight to many academic studies of the New Left phenomenon of the sixties and early seventies. Some scholarly analyses of this period, including Ronald Inglehart's concept of postmaterialism and Charles Reich's notion of Consciousness III, have suggested that student radicals comprised a uniquely well-adjusted, mentally healthy group. Rothman and Lichter, by contrast, take the unpopular and controversial position that the New Left was inhabited by many who exhibited a psychological syndrome termed "inverse authoritarianism" (p. 210). That is, many members of student radical movements evinced rather familiar psychological pathologies, rather than the development of new forms of political consciousness.

Briefly, Rothman and Lichter argue that many student radicals can be placed into one of two groups: "Protean" or self-expressive radicals, who for the most part are ethnic Jews; and "rigid" inverse authoritarians, who tend to come from lower-middle class Christian homes. The Jewish radicals, who provided an "initial critical mass" for the New Left (p. 83), seek radical political action because the dominant culture seems so strong. Given the social marginality of Jews in predominantly Christian societies, radical Jews seek to weaken the culture that renders them marginal. By contrast, non-Jewish radicals (or "rigid" inverse authoritarians) are attracted to radicalism because the "Establishment" seems weak and vulnerable. Rothman and Lichter connect these differing syndromes to differential child-rearing practices in Jewish and non-Jewish homes.

The Roots of Radicalism has some outstanding strengths. Providing some ideological balance to the study of the New Left is certainly a valuable contribution to the literature. Moreover, the book is an excellent example of the value of methodological eclecticism. Rothman and Lichter draw data from a national sample of college students, clinical studies of a subset of this sample, a "follow-up" survey of older radicals who were active in the early sixties, and a control study of radicals at West German universities. Methods utilized in this study include semantic differentials, Rorschach tests, and projective techniques such as Thematic Apperception Tests. The authors are quite meticulous in their data analysis, and frequently test the reliability of their findings by employing neutral coders who are unfamiliar with the purposes of the study.

The main weakness of the book is to be found in chapters 3 and 4, where the hypotheses are developed. These chapters are extremely long and somewhat hard to follow. It is difficult to attain a clear understanding of some of the concepts until they are put into operation in chapter 5. More seriously, it is rather difficult to get a sense of the audience to whom Rothman and Lichter address themselves. Readers who are already familiar with the application of psychoanalytic theory to political phenomena will probably find chapters 3 and 4 somewhat tedious. Readers who are unfamiliar with psychoanalytic jargon would probably benefit from a systematic defense of the entire approach, as opposed to the justification of a particular theory which Rothman and Lichter provide.

A methodological quibble should be noted. Except for the chapter on West German students (chap. 9), Rothman and Lichter rely quite heavily on tests of significance (usually analysis of variance) to test their hypotheses. Given the large *N* of the American survey (410 Jewish respondents, 649 non-Jews), significance testing is a somewhat weak test of the relationships the authors explore. Moreover, because most of the scores are standardized, it is difficult to intuit the magnitude of intergroup differences. Thus, although the reader is provided with evidence that a statistically significant relationship exists, there is little data presented to indicate the size of the relationship. The use of rank-order descriptive statistics, such as *tau-b* or *gamma,* would make the data presentation much more accessible to political scientists.

The Roots of Radicalism deserves the attention of those interested in the phenomenon of the New Left and of those interested in the application of psychoanalysis to political behavior. The book constitutes an interesting and provocative addition to the literature in these fields.

TED G. JELEN

Illinois Benedictine College

The Municipal Money Chase: The Politics of Local Government Finance. Edited by Alberta M. Sbragia. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. ii + 450. $25.00, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

The purpose of this book is to persuade the student that the study of politics is more interesting when it is tied to the study of money. "This book stresses the political dimensions of local finance, emphasizing the local, intergovernmental, and private-sector constraints faced by municipal officials in their attempt to provide services while balancing the budget" (p. ii). To accomplish this goal, a series of seven essays are offered that try to provide students with an understanding of how the pressures at the various levels of government and in the private sector affect the choices available to local officials. Alberta Sbragia acknowledges that the links between finance and government are complex, and the contributors to the book analyze only some issues and examples of this linkage.

The significance of this book is that it serves as a framework for further analysis of this subject area. The book notes the growing dependency relationship on the federal government for revenues and the Reagan administration's strategy of returning power to the states by using block grants. Although its goal is extensive, the book hangs together remarkably well. The contributors, who provide both substantive readings and case studies, do an insightful job.

The first chapter by Sbragia offers some gems on the changes in local government finance in the 1970s. The chapter demonstrates that the events in the previous decade set the stage for the problems of the 1980s. The tax revolt exemplified by California's Proposition 13 pressured many local governments to seek state and federal aid and develop new methods in creative finance.

It is easy to get absorbed in the literary analogies and prose of James Pfiffner's chapter on fiscal stress and the tax revolt. The political implications of budget cuts further force state and local governments to seek federal revenues in a time of expanding federal deficits and moves to balance the federal budget.

This material is followed by two rather disjointed chapters on debt financing and a case study of New York City's inability to meet its debt in 1975. The case study does, however, illustrate the relationship between the bond market and local borrowers and ties together much of what is discussed in earlier chapters by stressing that financing is fundamental to creating reforms to cope with spending limits.

The case study also sets the stage for the subsequent essays that show how state budget priorities can shape the options that local officials have in raising and managing municipal revenues. Although there is no doubt that state-mandated costs upon local governments can result in a tax shift to local communities, little is offered in this chapter to show that states will not both continue to mandate that local governments must handle costly programs and continue to refuse to pay for such programs.

The last two chapters shift to the politics of spending federal money and emphasize the Reagan administration's use of block grants, which result in the reality that the strength of a city's representative in Congress is more important than local need in deciding what level of federal aid a city will receive. Here the authors offer some speculative ideas as to the consequences of Reagan's New Federalism. This adds a valuable dimension to the book and makes worthwhile reading, but also will help date the book rapidly.

ALLEN K. SETTLE

California Polytechnic State University

Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics. By Byron E. Shafer. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983. Pp. ix + 628. $29.95.)

Byron Shafer's compelling chronicle of the Democratic party's (McGovern-Fraser) Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1968 to 1972, provides exceptionally satisfying answers to noteworthy questions relating to the why, how, and meaning of party reform. This study transcends previous considerations of the topic. Original data sources include the commission papers and interviews with virtually all significant reform participants. Emphasis is on the politics of reform: the conflicts, compromises, and choices that characterized interaction among individuals, who are considered within the context of contrasting ideologies and policy goals, group and organizational affiliations and alliances, and socioeconomic and political backgrounds. Shafer reports and interprets events within two frameworks: chronological reform stages (recommendation and implementation) and analytical themes that have become manifest within the reformed Democratic party (institutional change and circulation of elites).

This struggle for the Democratic party pitted the established, orthodox coalition of party regulars against an emerging, alternative coalition of reformers. The primary arena of conflict was the issue of new delegate selection rules for the national convention. The commission's controversial recommendations were developed in relative obscurity and accepted rather docilely by powerful opponents. Their implementation radically transformed delegate selection procedures, with drastic consequences for the nature and leadership of the party and the conduct of presidential nominating politics, and an ensuing rippling effect throughout the political system. With painstaking documentation, Shafer perceptively elucidates these momentous developments.

He locates the humble origins of reform within the 1968 McCarthy for President campaign, an endeavor disadvantaged by then-extant state party delegate selection procedures. Embracing a participatory model of party reform, these party outsiders vigorously and skillfully promoted their crusade over the next four years and secured a stunning victory. In Shafer's estimation, the related contributions of the commission leadership and staff, and two successive national party chairmen, were crucial. Chairman Fred Harris, who appointed the commission and designated its leadership, packed it in favor of members who shared his pro-reform sentiment. In turn, key staff assignments went to committed reformers, who found themselves situated to influence recommendations in general accordance with their participatory model. Later, at the outset of implementation, incoming Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien took up the cause of the reformers and lent to it his considerable credibility and prestige with party regulars. Finally, in working with state parties on compliance, the staff occasionally recreated reform through interpretations in violation of commission determinations but in keeping with its original reform dreams.

In addressing the responses of the state parties to this unprecedented assertion of national level authority by the reformers, Shafer demonstrates the significance of a distinction between volunteer and organized parties, with the former ideologically disposed to conform their rules to the participatory model, producing momentum for the reform bandwagon, and only incidentally, a historic centralizing shift in federal party relations. Other success-related factors noted include an improved climate for reform emerging out of the 1970 elections, belated national press coverage supportive of the proposed reforms, and the expansion of the alternative coalition through the mobilization of new, outside interests.

All this notwithstanding, Shafer convincingly contends that the reformers' success in achieving "the dimunition, the constriction, at times the elimination, of the regular party in the politics of presidential selection" (p. 525) must also be attributed to the acquiescence of the regulars, who were the key decision makers throughout. The major explanation for their ultimately self-defeating assent is found in their traditional brokerage, coalitional approach to party decision making, so that continual and extraordinary efforts were made to accommodate the reformers' demands to keep them within the party umbrella, in full but futile expectation of maintaining regular control.

This volume constitutes an important contribution to our comprehension of the process and progress of party reform. Step by step, we encounter critical turning points and roads not taken. At the end, we are offered a cursory, but provocative and persuasive, assessment of the aftermath of reform. Despite its intimidating length, the book is well worth reading.

HAROLD F. BASS, JR.

Ouachita Baptist University

The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress. By Mack C. Shelley II. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 201. $24.50.)

Mack Shelley's *The Permanent Majority* argues "that the conservative coalition [Republicans and southern Democrats] has become an increasingly important determinant of the outcomes of legislative decision making, as measured by roll call votes taken on the floor of the House and Senate" (p. 17). Shelley explores the structure of the conservative coalition and the factors that have influenced its role in the post-Depression Congress in a series of chapters that deal with "trends over time in the rates of appearance and success of the conservative coalition, the issue content of conservative coalition votes, the nexus between the presidency and the behavior of the conservative coalition, the relationship between the activity of the coalition and the declining salience of American legislative parties, and the importance of committees and constituencies" (p. 138).

Shelley's study "takes as a point of departure the five major issue dimensions underlying congressional roll call voting found by Aage Clausen" (p. 42) in *How Congressmen Decide* (St. Martin's Press, 1973), civil liberties, government management, international involvement, agricultural assistance, and social welfare. Shelley's analysis indicates that "the conservative coalition clearly concentrates on certain issues and largely ignores others. In both chambers, the conservative coalition devotes by far the greatest attention to the single dimension of government management issues [38% of all conservative coalition appearances in the House], pays much less and roughly equivalent attention to social welfare [21%], international involvement [23%], and civil liberties issues [12%], and virtually ignores . . . agricultural . . . assistance [1.4%]" (p. 62). The conservative coalition has also been quite successful. In the five issue areas in which it has appeared frequently, the coalition has generally won on government management (71.7%), civil liberties (79.5%), and agricultural assistance (86.2%), and has won more than half of the time on issues of international involvement (57%) and social welfare (57.8%). (All figures are for the House and can be found in Table 3-1 on page 44.)

Although Clausen's issue dimensions are employed as the theoretical basis of Shelley's analysis, his findings are substantially at odds with both the theoretical structure and the substantive interpretations offered in Clausen's earlier work. The basic theoretical assumption underlying Clausen's policy dimension approach is that congressmen "develop categories which subsume specific legislative motions, so that a common response can be made to all items of legislation included within a more general category" (Clausen, p. 8). The primary substantive incompatibility between the two works may also serve to draw Clausen's theoretical structure into question. Clausen found that "the differences between the parties on the government management dimension are so great, accounting for 80 to 90 percent of the total congressional variation in policy positions, that it may appear to be a waste of time to talk about within party differences" (Clausen, p. 173). Yet Shelley has found government management to be the issue dimension upon which the bipartisan conservative coalition appears most frequently and with considerable success (winning on 71.7% of its appearances). Clausen's policy dimension theory is called into question to the extent that congressmen respond to some questions in the government management area on the basis of partisan cues and to other questions in the same area on the basis of ideological cues. If Shelley sees the challenge that his findings pose for Clausen's model, he does not choose to press the point.

Finally, at least one alternative to Shelley's basic interpretation of the changing patterns of influence that bear on congressional policymaking seems to be available. The thesis of *The Permanent Majority* is that the decline of partisan voting in the Congress has been accompanied by a rise in ideological voting in that body, so that "it is now very rare for a North-South Democratic division not to result simultaneously in formation of the conservative coalition" (p. 133). However, the data that Shelley presents seem to contain the seeds of an alternative interpretation: that both partisan and ideological voting have declined in the face of issues to which neither partisanship nor ideology seem clearly or consistently to apply. Shelley draws attention both to "a long-term pattern of irregular decline in congressional party unity" (p. 136) and to "a noticeable, though irregular, pattern of declining [conservative] coalition success in both chambers over time" (p. 40). Clearly further study of simultaneously declining levels of partisan and ideological voting is required.

Mack Shelley has answered Clausen's call of some 10 years ago for further investigation of the role of ideology in structuring congressional voting behavior. In doing so, he has answered a number of important questions, raised others, and uncovered anomalies that future research must address.

CALVIN C. JILLSON

Louisiana State University

Domestic Policy Formation: Presidential-Congressional Partnership? By Steven A. Shull. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 218. $29.95.)

This book uses a four-stage sequential model (agenda-setting, initiation, modification, and adoption) in an attempt to explain the policymaking process. The focus is on presidents and the Congress from Eisenhower through Ford, with some attention to Carter and Reagan. The relative predictive power of functional (Theodore Lowi) and substantive policy classifications and actor and environmental factors are assessed. The research offers brief but rich histories of presidents' public policy statements and proposals and useful comparisons of administrations. It is less successful, however, in arguing that the sequential model of the policy process is of theoretical value.

Content analysis of *Public Papers of the President* provides the base for a very interesting description of presidential agenda-setting and both confirms common perceptions of presidents and provides occasional surprises. It is noted, for example, that Kennedy was the most outspoken of the group of presidents on foreign affairs and that Eisenhower, Ford, and Carter were more vocal than others on antitrust. General patterns include considerable variation across administrations, less attention to domestic policy as foreign affairs gains recent attention, Democratic presidents more rhetorical than Republicans, and increased salience of regulatory policy during the 1970s.

Initiation is examined through the use of the *Congressional Quarterly* box score of presidential initiatives, and results are broken down by party and by year in term, again with useful results. Patterns show that the number of initiatives have increased over time, that Democrats state three times as many policy proposals as Republicans, and that there are fewer initiatives during first and last years in office than in other years. A substantive classification of policy (price supports, public works, crime, antitrust, civil rights, and poverty) is found to discriminate among presidents better than Lowi's functional classification and to show that initiatives in public works, civil rights, and poverty all increased through the Johnson administration and then decreased.

The ambitious goal of "explaining the policymaking process" is not particularly aided by reliance on the four-stage sequential model or the emphasis on the president, Congress, and roll-call votes. Although presidents' agenda-setting and initiation activity is clearly of importance, neglect of bureaucracy and interest group participation paints a rather incomplete picture of the policymaking process. With modification and adoption the measures utilized are poorly linked to the conceptual stages of the sequential model. Modification is indicated by congressional action on roll-call votes on which the president has taken a position. Problems with presidential position taking aside, roll-call outcomes are at best a small fraction of all legislative modifying activity. Adoption is gauged by looking at presidential initiatives that come to a roll-call vote. Presidential initiatives that do not travel this far, as well as others' initiatives, are thus omitted from the analysis. To his credit Shull acknowledges and notes the importance of these and other limitations. However, he comes to a different conclusion than I would on their cumulative effect.

Although favoring the substantive policy classification as more "operationally useful" than Lowi's functional categorization, Shull concludes that each typology "helps explain" the policy process and "seems to have empirical as well as theoretical utility." The evidence on theoretical utility suggests otherwise. The substantive classification parallels the functional in that for each functional category (e.g., distributive) there are two substantive categories (e.g., price supports, public works) that are intended to be close matches. The problem is that policy process patterns are quite different for each of the two (supposedly) similar policy types. Whether a policy is distributive or not may be less important than whether it concerns agricultural price supports or public works. This is less a problem of fit between the two classifications (as proclaimed) than it is a problem with the theoretical claims Lowi offers with the policy classification. If quite different policy process patterns are found with two subclasses of distributive (or other functional category) policy, it suggests that the categorization simply does not perform the theoretical role for which it was offered.

James M. Rogers

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Politics and the Budget: The Struggle Between the President and the Congress. By Howard E. Shuman. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984. Pp. ix + 340. $17.95, paper.)

Several important texts have been written on the politics of the budgetary process. By far the best known work of this type is Aaron Wildavsky's classic, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Little, Brown, 1964), now in its fourth edition. Howard E. Shuman's new book follows in this tradition, focusing on the relationship between the president and Congress. The first six chapters of the book examine the budgetary process with chapters on presidential participation in the budget, congressional appropriations, and taxing authority, and fiscal and monetary policy. The second half of the book deals with the conflict between the president and Congress emerging from the constitutional crisis of the Nixon years. The text ends with a detailed examination of the Congressional Impoundment and Reform Act of 1974 and the Reagan budget revolution. Shuman's book is scholarly, comprehensive, well written, and insightful. It is the best overview available on the politics of the federal budget process.

Each chapter in this book is well documented and thorough. Shuman's use of references is balanced, including government documents, major journal articles and books such as the works by Allen Schick and Louis Fisher, and speeches. Each chapter begins with a historical overview of the chapter topic that provides a useful context with which to understand the modern budget process. I found his background chapters on fiscal and monetary policy and taxes the most comprehensive and clearly written explanations of these topics I have read. One of the most rewarding things about the book is that Shuman is willing to go into detail about a subject. Chapter 3 on the congressional appropriations process is the best example of Shuman's proclivity for detail.

The real strength of the book, however, comes from Shuman's concentration on the politics of the budget process. For example, in chapter 2, he discusses the various methods used by the executive branch to increase efficiency and economy in the budget preparation. These methods have included the use of program planning and budgeting systems and more recently zero-based budgeting. He discounts the value of these approaches through a presentation of a case study of the politics of the Bureau of Reclamation budget under Carter and Reagan which shows the impact of political considerations in budget decision making.

Also worth mentioning is Shuman's final analysis of the Budget Reform Act. He points out that it has not retrieved the power of the purse from the president, but has had the opposite effect. He states, "the president has used the institutions of the Budget Act, particularly reconciliation and the majority rule procedures, to enhance his power to initiate, control, and dominate budget procedures" (p. 305).

This is a first-rate book. I highly recommend it for undergraduate and graduate courses in budgeting and American politics and for general reading on the politics of the budgetary process.

Mark Weinberg

Ohio University

Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality. By Thomas Sowell. (New York: William Morrow, 1984. Pp. 164. $11.95.)

In a number of books, including *The Economics and Politics of Race* (William Morrow, 1983), *Ethnic America* (Basic Books, 1981), and *Markets and Minorities* (Basic Books, 1981), Thomas Sowell attacked the standard liberal view of discrimination and civil rights. In *Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality,* he continues that attack.

The main thrust is against what he describes as the "civil rights vision." That "vision" includes the proposition that statistical disparities by themselves demonstrate discrimination. Of course, everyone agrees that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. But the courts and civil rights activists never—except in polemical speeches—contended that. When one has historical evidence or a theoretical basis, then those raw statistics demonstrate discrimination.

The second proposition of the "civil rights vision" argues that the statistical disparities are attributed to either innate inferiority or discrimination. Rejecting the former, all differences are attributed to discrimination. All of us, however, note other causes such as cultural ones. Nevertheless, Sowell fails to ask either what caused the cultural differences, or what functions they play.

Finally, the "vision" urges political solutions, including those by "courts and administrative agencies as well as legislatures, and private institutional activity as well as government policy" (p. 29). Sowell contends that political activity is "neither necessary nor sufficient" (p. 32) and is likely to provoke hostility. That political activity is neither "necessary nor sufficient" to produce change in all situations is uncontested here. That political activity is sometimes unsuccessful is also uncontested here. That political activity may be helpful is asserted here. Those court suits, including *Brown* v. *Board of Education,* brought by the NAACP; the march on Selma and the subsequently passed Voting Rights Act; and thousands of other political acts testify to their effectiveness in the struggle for civil rights. In the three years after the Voting Rights Act, Mississippi black voter registration increased from 28,500 to more than 250,000. That there was a hostile and violent reaction to these political acts should upset us, but not surprise us. Before the civil rights movement, white southerners utilized violence and economic intimidation to maintain the traditional way of life. When the struggle occurred, the opponents utilized every weapon to defeat the movement. Sowell has created an overly simplified version of the "civil rights vision."

His position on equal opportunity and affirmative action laws and regulations follows from his critique of the "civil rights vision." The group quotas fail to recognize group differences in age, culture, and "the way people work" (p. 46). He uses subgroups of blacks such as West Indians to show that factors other than discrimination are influencing income. And further, he claims that black economic progress was greater before the civil rights movement, equal opportunity, and affirmative action. For example, he writes, "In other kinds of occupations, the advance of blacks was even greater during the 1940s—when there was little or no civil rights policy—than during the 1950s when the civil rights revolution was in its heyday" (p. 49). This ignores the civil rights policies of the Roosevelt administration, the demand created by the war, and civil rights activists such as A. Phillip Randolph.

This book argues against a "vision" that does not exist, ignores many historical and causal factors while criticizing others for that fault, and does not fully develop its arguments. Sowell's other books on race, and William J. Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race* (University of Chicago Press, 1978), provide better critiques of the standard liberal view.

DAVID C. COLBY

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American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies. Edited by John Zysman and Laura Tyson. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 427. $34.95.)

This collection of case studies about American manufacturing industries focuses on the inabilities of past and present U.S. policies to provide national institutional means of influencing international markets for U.S. firms. The introductory and concluding essays by Zysman and Tyson stress the need for "an active industrial and trade policy" (p. 423) to bolster the American aggregate trade position in the face of growing foreign competition. The editors explain that they select six product lines precisely because some of the firms in each have lost domestic and external markets, especially to the Japanese. They present the conclusions drawn from cases in manufacturing as generalizations for all American business. Their proposed long-run solution is to develop a national capacity to assess sectoral weaknesses and formulate policies to combat foreign government influence on international trade as a whole. Although recognizing the political clout of protectionist coalitions, Zysman and Tyson consider industry-specific policies as less preferable to even the second-best market policies. The editors see

U.S. international trade policies as inducing domestic firms to adjust to changed economic conditions, whereas protectionist policies forestall adjustment and eventually further weaken the international positions of American producers.

The seven cases consider six American product lines and government support of small business in Italy. The authors categorize semiconductors as a growth industry; automobiles and consumer electronics as transitional; and steel, textiles and apparel, and footwear as declining sectors. Four of the cases involve direct comparisons with Japanese analogs. All of the cases adopt some version of Vernon's product life-cycle framework to explain changes in competitive advantages over time.

The case studies provide a wealth of details on firm strategies, protectionist and regulatory U.S. policies, and changes in the international competitive position of American business. Michael Borrus criticizes U.S. policy for providing for the maintenance of profits for existing steel companies, but for failing to allow entry by smaller, innovative firms, with the resulting loss of international long-run competitiveness to the Japanese. In his discussion of color televisions, James E. Millstein echoes the Borrus criticism of U.S. policies, but on the grounds that the Orderly Marketing Agreements pertaining to color televisions resulted in loss of the low-cost markets and of incentives to innovate in circuitry and miniaturization. The article on semiconductor competition with the Japanese covers one quarter of the book and presents a worst case scenario of American losses in high technology growth industries. The thrust of the conclusions of the text, that the United States must develop an agency to counteract the influence of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, develops from this long fourth chapter. David Friedman's analysis of U.S.-Japanese competition in automobiles concurs and adds an interesting discussion of Japanese. In his discussion of color televisions, James E. Millstein echoes the Borrus criticism of U.S. policies, but on the grounds that the Orderly and David B. Yoffie's discussion of footwear shift the focus to competition with European Community producers in an informative way that provides the reader some comparative perspective on the "Japanese threat." Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel's eighth chapter on Italian government support for trade in goods from specialized, small-scale production presents an alternative strategy for trade growth other than mimicking the mass-marketing of Japan.

Although it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that the U.S. protectionist policies have decreased adaptation and innovation by American firms, the text's policy proposals seem maladapted to the group politics of the American system. Although borrowing Japanese policies at the level of the firm or industry may work, the national policy suggestions of this volume involve a redefinition of American interest politics that seems unlikely. The authors concentrate on trade and industrial policy without considering the inextricably linked financial policies and direct foreign investments, and without considering the growth and impact of multinational corporations on both national and international regimes. *American Industry in International Competition* is valuable for the detailed case study information and the contribution it makes to attempting to propose alternative policies to present U.S. omissions. I recommend it for research and advanced study when accompanied by texts that consider a wider definition of U.S. interactions in the international regime and a diverse array of policy proposals.

CONSTANCE H. COLE

Mount Holyoke College

Comparative and Other Area Studies

The Two Yemens. By Robin Bidwell. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xviii + 350. $26.00.)

This fine book by Robin Bidwell fills a gap in the study of modern Arab politics. For the first time we have the recent political histories of the two Yemens (or, as most Yemenis prefer to put it, the two parts of Yemen) between the covers of a single volume. Do you want to know what the British were doing to transform Aden while the revived Imamate was isolating North Yemen's traditional society from the modern world in the first half of the twentieth century? Or what was happening in the newborn Yemen Arab Republic while the nationalist struggle was being waged against the British in Aden, or after 1967, while the victorious Marxists in Aden were striving to transform radically their polity and society? This volume provides thoughtful, insightful answers to questions such as these, and it does so in a clear and graceful literary style.

The emphasis of Bidwell's chronological narrative is upon political developments in the two Yemens since 1960. Fully 60% of the space is devoted to this recent period, and more than half of this larger portion is concerned with events during the years from 1968 to 1981. As his succinct survey of Yemen's earlier history indicates, Bidwell regards Yemen as a distinct entity, and the Yemenis as a single people, the product of a common history and a unique civilization that extend back in time from the nineteenth century for more than two millennia. Historic Yemen was arbitrarily divided into two parts as a result of the nineteenth-century imperial activities of Britain in Aden and the Ottomans in North Yemen, and the two parts subsequently were forced to follow widely divergent paths into and through the first half of the twentieth century. The two independent and very different Yemeni regimes in place since 1968 and the history since then of their relations with their respective societies, each other, and the rest of the outside world is the product of a complex and contradictory mix of their shared heritage and their divergent recent histories.

Bidwell is at his interpretive and literary best in tracing and contrasting the evolution of the two parts of Yemen from the mid-nineteenth century to the late 1960s. The skillful choice and interpretation of facts, figures, and even anecdotes provide a vivid picture and an explanation of the vigorous traditionalism of the Imamate in the north and the very rapid modernization of Aden in the twentieth century; equally vivid is the picture of Britain's fatal neglect of Aden's hinterland —the Protectorate—until the mid-1950s. Aden and its hinterland receive twice as much attention as does North Yemen in the chapters covering the period from 1919 to 1968, an emphasis probably traceable to Bidwell's personal experience as a political officer in the Western Aden Protectorate in the 1950s. Given the sureness of his analysis in these chapters, this is no cause for criticism.

Unfortunately, the high level of interpretation and writing is not maintained in the two long chapters and the short postscript that cover the period from 1968 to 1981. The organization becomes more mechanical and the writing more cluttered and less thematic than in the earlier chapters. Facts are used less skillfully (a few are wrong), and the interpretation tends at times to become tentative, unclear, and unconvincing. It seems that Bidwell places undue reliance upon sketchy news sources and is not sufficiently in command of the materials required for a solid analysis of the politics of the two parts of Yemen in the 1970s. This detracts from an otherwise illuminating and perceptive political study of a people for whom Bidwell evidently has great respect and admiration.

ROBERT BURROWES

New York City

Nationalism and the State. By John Breuilly. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. x + 421. $25.00.)

Nationalism has ceased to be a European phenomenon and in the second half of this century has become a major force as an anticolonial movement. The mounting complexity it has assumed lately, and its intrusion into areas untainted by the conditions surrounding its beginnings, hardly admit of universally applicable explanations of its origin, manifestations, and symbolisms. To understand the nationalistic passion that has seized the vast majority of humanity, aroused at last from its prolonged slumber, conventional theories focusing on the European historical perspective are no longer of much help. Breuilly, lecturer in history at the University of Manchester, comments at some length on the deficiencies of the traditional approaches that variously interpret nationalism as the product of the nation, a sense of common identity generated by communication, the interests of a ruling class, a psychological need to identify with some group or cause, or a functional need to guide a society towards modernity.

Breuilly views nationalism from a new perspective. He treats it as a form of politics shaped by the modern state. Using comparative history as his method, he develops a typology in terms of the three basic objectives of nationalist movements: unification, reform, and separation. His analysis centers mainly on separation, because he believes that opposition to the existing state has played the most crucial role in the shaping of nationalism. The second classificatory principle he applies refers to the tactics of nationalism which he defines as coordination, mobilization, and legitimation. The book is divided into three parts, the first dealing with nationalist movements in non-nation-states, the second with nationalist movements in nation-states, and the third with the social and intellectual bases of nationalism.

The book is rich in penetrating insights and historical references. Each case and each generalization is thoughtfully examined in light of the historical evidence. Breuilly consciously avoids brief historical allusions to illustrate abstractly formed concepts, but lets his generalizations emerge from a detailed study of the historical context. He leaves no major gaps in the picture he draws of nationalism. Perhaps one regrettable omission is the unique although important case of Zionism, with its two-pronged development into Jewish and Israeli nationalism. The scanty documentation may strike the reader as strange at first sight in a work incorporating such a mass of historical detail. However, the book is intended as a work of synthesis rather than of original research. Moreover, the elaborate chronological table and the comprehensive bibliographical essay appended to the text provide the reader with the opportunity for further investigation.

The book is a remarkable *tour de force.* By directing attention to the great variety of groups involved in the formation of nationalism and their interaction with a wide range of environmental forces, Breuilly makes an original and important contribution to our understanding of nationalism.

PETER J. FLIESS

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Soviet Policy for the 1980s. Edited by Archie Brown and Michael Kaser. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 282. $19.50.)

With the succession of political changes in the top Soviet leadership since Brezhnev's demise in November, 1982, an edited volume on Soviet policy problems written in 1981 would seem fated to be irrelevant and dated by the time that it was reviewed. Yet, even if the essays are somewhat dated by events of the last two years (although Brown perceptively foresaw the rise of Chernenko and Gorbachëv), the nine contributors to this volume have written incisive analyses that can still be read profitably to understand Soviet policy dilemmas in 1984.

The timeliness of the contributions stems from the authors' common focus on various facets of the economic problems confounding Soviet leaders. Both Kaser and Brown note in their own chapters on economic policy and policy innovation that their fellow contributors provide uniquely complimentary angles of vision to comprehend the complicated tradeoffs and multifaceted nature of policies bearing on current long-term Soviet economic dilemmas.

Thus, John Miller's analysis of trends in Party membership and cadres identifies a growing ethnic assertiveness among non-Slavic nationalities which complicates alternatives both in Party organizational policy and in devising a union-wide economic policy not to arouse vested regional and ethnic interests. In social policy, Alastair McAuley interprets the difficult tradeoffs in maintaining past levels of social consumption benefits for all Soviet citizens, with declining economic growth, government-subsidized agriculture, and an aging population on pensions reducing available expenditures for such benefits. Ann Hegelson's overview of demographic policy isolates the labor aspect of current Soviet economic problems, as the leadership must formulate decisions to utilize workers more productively, redistribute them where needed geographically without arousing ethnic conflicts, and encourage the Slavic-Baltic female contingent of the labor force to increase their birthrates. Alec Nove analyzes the wasteful and inefficient Soviet agricultural sector, unremedied by the vast capital expenditures and reforms devoted to it since 1965, and his assessment of factors prompting recent experiments with agricultural links obviously relates to more current experiments devised in 1983 and 1984 to grant more decentralized authority to industrial managers.

In foreign economic relations, Philip Hanson not only insightfully explains the factors determining fluctuations in Soviet trade with the West, but also links Soviet policy over technology imports to the general domestic policy debate over economic reform. David Holloway's balanced overview of Soviet foreign and defense policies through 1981 foresees the hard economic choices the current leadership must weigh in expanding or moderating defense expenditures, with worsening Soviet-American relations and a questionable return in Soviet international influence from their past levels of defense spending. Even John Hazard's analysis of legal policy since 1965 relates developments to their economic significance, with the greater emphasis on legal norms affirming statutory guarantees for private-plots and expanding the authority of local governments to regulate industrial enterprises in their locales.

Few of the chapters break any new research ground. The authors have written essentially atheoretical summaries of problem areas and options, based on Western and Soviet sources and, to a great extent, the authors' own eminent past research and publications in these same policy areas. With the exception of Hazard, all have been associated with British universities or research institutes. That commonality gives the volume its distinctive virtues: cogent and solid scholarship, well-written chapters that avoid for the most part arcane terminology beyond the understanding of narrow specialists, and a somewhat identifiable British approach to Soviet politics as a needed counterpoint to more dominant American premises and perspectives in much of Western Sovietology. With balanced interpretations of Soviet policies linked to the multifaceted complexities of Soviet economic dilemmas, the volume, the second in the series since 1975 edited by Brown and Kaser, should prove an enduring source of information for students in university courses and for Western policymakers attempting to fathom the complex direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policies for the rest of this decade.

JOEL C. MOSES

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Socialism of a Different Kind: Reshaping the Left in France. By Bernard E. Brown. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 201. $29.95.)

The French Communist and Socialist parties are doctrinaire mass-parties, seeking election as a means to the enactment of their policy preferences (i.e., their respective visions of socialism). In the past, each party has had a similar electoral strategy of making strong ideological campaign appeals so as to encourage defection from the ranks of its partner's issue coalition. However, the recent centripetal pressure in French party politics has forced the Left to convey an image of unity and credibility in the electorate in order to offer an effective governmental alternatiave to Gaullism. This presupposes electoral collaboration and, more importantly, ideological convergence between the two parties.

Bernard Brown analyzes the doctrinal evolution that took place within the French Left in the seventies in response to the challenge of reconciling these two seemingly incompatible goals. His book does not deal directly with the Socialist experience in power; yet, as Brown claims, "the story of attempted synthesis of social democracy and communism, its failures, and then renewed collaboration on an altogether different basis sheds precious light on . . . the limits as well as the potential of their cooperation" (p. 5).

In the early seventies it was hoped that Socialists and Communists would achieve ideological balance through a mutual pledge to a joint government program. If elected to power, the Communists would prevent the Socialists from becoming the "managers of capitalism"—as their German or Swedish social democratic counterparts—whereas the Socialists would keep their Communist partners from reverting to Stalinism. The programmatic alliance approach proved to be a failure, however, when, confronted with a real chance of winning the 1978 legislative elections, the Communists opted to withdraw rather than facing the risk of actual enactment.

Existing explanations for the failure of the alliance of the seventies usually rely upon circumstantial considerations (electoral motivations, economic crisis). In chapter 8, Brown points to a more fundamental explanation, consistent with his implicit premise that the parties of the Left are primarily concerned with policy enactment: the Common Program was doomed from the outset because its participants never really sought to achieve a "viable synthesis" of their respective ideological traditions.

A central and most original theme in the book is that the failure to renegotiate the Common Program in 1977 and the electoral defeat of 1978 prompted the Socialist and Communist leaderships to convert to *autogestion* (workers' control), a notion retrieved from the *gauchistes* who had spearheaded the May, 1968 revolt. This was to be the ideological fuel to be used as a source of energy for the renewed alliance of the eighties. Chapters 4 and 5 argue convincingly that an authentic joint commitment to *autogestion* would go a long way toward doctrinal unity of the Left, this being in turn a necessary condition for unity of political action. The practice of *autogestion* would insure that the state is always subordinated to the people, thus preventing effectively the excess of both capitalism and Stalinism. The question remains, however, how profoundly the Left (the Communists in particular) is committed to the notion. The adoption of *autogestion* as the Communist official doctrine amounts only to the recognition in the abstract that democratic ends cannot be achieved by undemocratic means. In practice, however, French Communists have not opted for democracy, because that would amount to sacrifice of the party's Leninist structure. And then, observes Bernard Brown, "they would cease to be Communists" (p. 93).

FRANCOIS PETRY

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Government Coalitions in Western Democracies. Edited by Eric C. Browne and John Dreijmanis. (New York: Longman, 1982. Pp. x + 384. $30.00, cloth; $17.50, paper.)

Ever since the publication of William Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions* (Yale University Press, 1962), much scholarly attention has been devoted to developing theories about coalition processes, including formation, payoffs, and maintenance. Although a host of theories on coalition formation has been presented (Abram De Swaan tested 13 of them in one work, and Michael Taylor and Michael Laver 16 in another), they have generally fallen into two categories: those that focus on the size of the coalition actors as determinants of which coalition will form and of the value of coalition payoffs to participants, and those that emphasize policy agreement or ideological affinity as the basic determinants. Riker's "minimum winning coalition" falls into the first category; Robert Axelrod's notion of a "minimal connected winning coalition"—that is, a coalition with no more members than are necessary to win and with its members adjacent on an affinity or policy scale—is representative of the second type. Some theorists (Eric Browne and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, among others) have concentrated on payoffs to coalition members, and others (like Lawrence Dodd) on coalition maintenance.

Eric Browne and John Dreijmanis, the editors of *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies,* argue that the major tradition in such coalition studies has been the development of highly abstract theories that have often been unconnected with observational data and real experience. Through an international collaborative research effort, they have sought to remedy that defect by extending the theoretical work with analyses of the behavior of real actors in coalition formation and maintenance. After an introductory chapter on coalition theory by the editors, 11 authorities present descriptive and analytical chapters on post-World War II coalition experiences in as many different nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the German Federal Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Each chapter author was asked to use a common organizational framework and to consider coalition actors (which ones take part in the cabinet-making process), formation (which actors form governments, and what are the characteristics of cabinet coalitions), bargaining (what strategies and tactics are used), payoffs (what benefits do coalition participants receive), and maintenance (how to explain cabinet durability or dissolution). The authors adhere to this framework, which is broad enough to allow a variety of approaches—quantitative, probabilistic, historical, speculative—as the taste of each dictates. Not all reach clear conclusions about the applicability of the general coalition theories, but the overall result is a set of interesting and valuable discussions with a wealth of information not only about coalition behavior, but also about government and politics generally in each of the 11 states. An average of 30 pages per political system is limiting and sometimes confusing, however, even though the brevity is necessary for this kind of study. The omission from consideration of France, with all its coalition experiences under three republics, and of Norway and Sweden, also with important coalition histories, is unfortunate.

Undertaking no detailed summary or comparisons in their final chapter, Browne and Dreijmanis nonetheless conclude that the authors' descriptive chapters overwhelmingly reject the interpretation of coalition size as the major determining factor in the formation of cabinet coalitions, thus confirming many earlier studies. There is general support for the proposition that actors seek to form coalitions with other actors adjacent to them on relevant ideological or policy dimensions, that is, to form closed coalitions, although not necessarily coalitions of minimal range. This finding also confirms a number of earlier research studies. The chapters on each country raise interesting questions about definitions (of such things as political actor, coalition partnership, and "winning"), payoffs, and coalition longevity and dissolution. Arguing convincingly that an intellectual cul-de-sac has not been reached, Browne and Dreijmanis believe that coalition theories can still provide a fruitful basis for organizing, describing, and analyzing the experiences of actors in cabinet coalition situations. The continued need is to bridge the gap between theoretical developments and empirical studies to take greater account of particular contextual characteristics. This excellent volume is a helpful step in that direction, and it also points to the desirability of more extensive studies of party systems and coalition behavior in individual political systems, for which the chapters in this book, good as they are, are only condensed introductions.

KENNETH E. MILLER

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Governments under Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London, and Ottawa. By Colin Campbell. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983. $24.95.)

Colin Campbell's *Governments under Stress* is an ambitious study of the political executives and central agencies in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Campbell introduces the study with a general discussion of chief executive styles. Subsequent sections of the book address three major themes—the priority and decision-making process, the coordination of economic and fiscal policies, and the process by which resources are allocated and managed—and an examination of career bureaucrats. The first of the major themes includes separate chapters for each country, whereas the allocation and management of resources section is divided into chapters on budgets, improving effectiveness, and efficiency and personnel management. A concluding chapter summarizes how governments under stress have been managed.

The book is based on extensive interviews with senior bureaucrats in each of the three countries during the late 1970s and early 1980s and contains many interesting data and analyses related to executive leadership. The British system is described to a large extent through quotations from interviews; the American system is a combination of recall from interviews and reference to other sources; the Canadian picture is described largely through Campbell's personal knowledge of the actors and events. These three methods of presentation result, at times, in an unevenness that makes comparisons difficult.

In his introduction, Campbell presents a framework for assessing the political styles of chief executives. This framework is composed of six factors. The first three are concerned with changes in the temporal political environment: secular political trends that transcend time limits, metacycles or trends that will continue through one administration but not indefinitely, and term cycles that often correspond to legislative calendars. The three other factors are, the partisan situation of the chief executive; ex officio variables, such as available institutional resources; and the chief executives' personalities and styles.

Reflecting his emphasis on the last of these six factors, Campbell also presents a typology of leadership styles that includes brokerage politics, administrative politics, the politics of planning and priorities, and the politics of survival. Executive regimes in the three countries, over the last decade, are then examined in light of this typology. Campbell finds, for example, that the Carter administration relied on input from a number of places, with the president acting as his own chief of staff (brokerage), whereas the Thatcher government in Great Britain follows more of an administrative style, leaving details to the various ministers. In contrast, the Trudeau style in Canada is seen to have made use of all four leadership styles at different times.

Although the frameworks mentioned previously and the comprehensive data presentation are useful, there are a few weaknesses in this book that detract from its message and presentation. First, the actual comparisons between the three countries are sporadic at best. In the first two sections on the priority and decisin-making process and the coordination of fiscal policies, the use of separate chapters for each country places the focus on the particular country and detracts from any comparisons.

Second, Campbell assumes that his readers are as well versed on the structure and organization of the three bureaucracies as he is. General descriptions of the agencies' purposes and structures are missing, as is a systematic look at the relationships between agencies.

Last, Campbell occasionally follows the tangents of his discussion too far. For example, the openness and interaction between bureaucrats is useful to know, but details on the protocols of knocking on doors before entering offices in Britain's Central Policy Review Staff is not.

Governments under Stress is a book that will provide useful material for political science courses devoted to any one of the three countries. Bureaucrats in any of the three countries are also likely to find the book useful in explaining activities in their own governments. As a comparative work, however, it is not as strong as it could be.

ROBIN REENSTRA-BRYANT

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The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements. By Manuel Castells. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. xxii + 450. $29.95.)

Cities are made by people. They are transformed by complex social processes through which their citizens seek the power to live better and make their collective meanings count in the city and society. This is the central theme of Manual Castells's stimulating new book, *The City and the Grassroots.* In Castells's latest work, the crucial agents of urban transformation are the self-organized urban social movements that have been the basic form of social organization through which ordinary citizens have mobilized to resist the actions of defenders of the old order. Through their struggle to give meaning to "the city," they have produced urban change and redefined their very selves. The collective consumption conflict of Castells's earlier work is here incorporated into a new perspective that stresses deeper bases for social conflict in historical struggles over urban meaning, cultural identity, and citizen power.

Nearly two-thirds of this book is devoted to a series of lucidly written case studies of urban movements in vastly diverse contexts. A tightly structured historical section details the origins, social base, and contribution to urban change of movements as diverse as the sixteenth-century Castillian *Communidades,* the Paris Commune of 1871, and the urban revolts in the United States during the 1960s. These studies rely on the best of previously published research to support Castells's major arguments—the movements were multiclass popular rebellions rather than forms of class struggle; the politics of consumption, residence, and reproduction rather than production were at the heart of these "urban" struggles, hence, the role of women as change agents was often decisive; the movements expressed demands for better urban life quality, improved services, community solidarity, and restructured political power rather than seeking to overthrow capitalism and replace it with a proletarian hegemony.

Having thus dismissed economic determinism and class struggle as reductionist explanations of urban change, Castells turns to 10 years of his own field research in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. He draws connections, once again, among the structural roots, social base, and urban effects of grassroots protest in the French *grand ensembles,* San Francisco's gay and Latino neighborhoods, Latin American squatter settlements, and the Madrid Citizens' Movement in late Francoist Spain and beyond.

Castells labors effectively, often brilliantly, to put to rest analyses that would reduce the complexity and historical specificity of urban social conflicts to displaced forms of class struggle. His analysis is forcefully argued and well supported by the cases he has chosen. In an admirable attempt to counter the one-dimensional practice of labor movements within capitalism by focusing on the richness of urban life "beyond work," Castells tends, however, to overlook the well-established relationship between work and meaning. Surely the current changing structure of work life in advanced capitalist societies and its spatial and and social implications are another important dimension of the struggle to impose new "urban meanings" along with relationships of consumption, communication, and power. Yet this dimension of urban change is not integrated into Castells's general social theory of the city.

Despite this caveat, Castells has produced an important, powerful, and penetrating book. After a decade of criticism from both Marxist and liberal critics of the structuralism underlying his now classic *The Urban Question,* he has fundamentally altered his approach to social research. In so doing, he has entered more deeply into the rich and subtle empirical details of actual historical change to replace a basically functionalist social theory of the city with a genuinely dialectical approach that more effectively connects structural tendencies to the actions of human agents. This is a task to which he is aptly suited, as he moves with remarkable ease among Marxist and Weberian, socialist, and liberal social theories; historical scholarship; his own empirical research; and contemporary social science methodologies.

Castells is at his best when weaving the threads of all this complexity into a lucid and provocative theory of urban change. He deftly integrates the key elements of a dialectical theory in which global power and local meaning, hegemonic elites and popular cultures, civil society and the state, innovative movements and integrative parties interact to "produce the producer"—the complex social processes by which people, cities, and society change.

In this theoretical formulation the most fully developed and successful urban movements are those that are broadly based and multiclass and which, like the Madrid Citizens' Movement, manage to combine in their practice demands for collective consumption (services), cultural control over territory (community), and participatory local politics (power). Short of this combination, the demand for services is likely to evolve into clientelism; for community control into a new tribalism; and for participatory citizenship into formal cooptation. When all three are combined, the assault on established institutions can produce significant urban change.

A theory this broad in conception, however intuitively appealing and well supported by case studies, is bound to engender controversy. Hopefully, Castells's new theoretical formulation will receive the serious attention its bold conception deserves. The author's encyclopedic capacity to "do" urban social science poses a risk that his effort to connect the city to its grassroots will be unfairly neglected by less imaginative scholars. His attempt to legitimate his project to positivist social scientists in the United States by occasionally salting his case studies with formalized methodologies (e.g., factor analysis) poses a related danger. This, along with his lengthy methodological appendix, may offer myopic critics occasion to quibble with his chosen methodologies while overlooking the book's theoretical sophistication, historical depth, and practical implications.

In short, *The City and the Grassroots* is an important book that should be read by all serious urban analysts and students of local politics. If read with an open mind, it is sure to enlighten thinking about urban social and political life.

MICHAEL PETER SMITH

Tulane University

Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities. By Judith Chubb. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 292. $39.50.)

Judith Chubb's study of patronage politics in Palermo contributes to the analysis of clientelist politics and political parties. She provides a case study of politics in the Sicilian capital, while relating the details to important theoretical issues.

Chubb analyzes Palermo in order to explain why the Christian Democratic party (DC) has dominated politics, "despite a dismal record of performance" (p. 3), and why the Italian Communist party (PCI) has had so little success there. The answer emphasizes the DC's manipulation of government resources through clientelist ties to the middle classes, especially the public employees and the construction industry, as well as to the poor underemployed and unemployed. Chubb shows how the patron-client chains extend from the new neighborhoods and slums of Palermo through the agencies of municipal and regional governments to Rome and back again. In an especially powerful chapter, Chubb compares political participation in three neighborhoods, contrasting the clientelist domination of the slums of the historic center, where occasional protests give way to individualistic searches for housing, with the PCI-led protests in new areas for adequate water, electricity, and other services, and the changes in rural areas overwhelmed by urban sprawl, where voters have turned against their old patrons. Chubb examines the PCI's rise to power in Naples in order to explore the conditions under which clientelist rule is replaced. She links the particular and the general into a powerful analysis.

Chubb's findings support several hypotheses. She shows that political clienteles may be found among all social classes, not only the poor. She demonstrates that clientelist politics reflects and sustains structural characteristics of the economy and polity. It is not determined by a culture of poverty. Chubb argues persuasively that political clienteles are based on the expectation of future rewards as well as direct material benefits. Finally, Chubb shows that the material benefits exchanged by the members of clientelist factions include government contracts and licenses and the manipulation of bureaucratic regulations as well as jobs, housing, food, and money. Chubb combines the last two points to argue that clientelist rule does not necessarily produce inflations and that economic crises do not necessarily lead to the demise of clientelist parties like the DC. Indeed, her evidence implies that only shocks, like those occasioned by the cholera epidemic in Naples or massive population movements, weaken patron-client ties and expectations. Her work supports those who have argued that political clienteles are an extraordinarily persistent mode of political organization.

The study contains a number of weaknesses. Chubb does not adequately support the sharp contrast drawn between the Italian North and South. She does not analyze politics in the North and does not refer to studies of clientelist politics there and collectivist politics in the South. Nowhere does she use Gaetano Mosca's work on clientelist politics in Sicily during the Liberal era or his important and not yet surpassed general analyses of the subject. Had she followed Mosca, Chubb would have dropped the suggestion that a Socialist government in control of national, as well as local, politics is the way to end clientelist rule. Mosca demonstrates how that solution magnifies clientelism.

In addition, Chubb frequently makes claims about attitudes and beliefs but provides no survey data to back her points. The most important weakness is a confusion in level of analysis between the DC and its clientelist factions. Chubb demonstrates that the DC in Palermo is little more than an umbrella organization for its factions. If so, then the concept of the DC machine has no meaning. The same problem emerges in the analysis of the Mafia and its component families. The confusion has several consequences. It exaggerates the role of the Christian Democratic party, as such, in sustaining clientelist rule and the consequences of the end of DC domination for the demise of clientelist politics. It obscures the structural affinity between clienteles and Mafia families. The primary unit of analysis should be the political clientele not the party.

Chubb has provided a powerful demonstration of the strength of political clienteles. She shows that far from being an exotic political bond, it is found frequently, and once established, not likely to be replaced by other modes of political organization.

ALAN S. ZUCKERMAN

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U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982. By Allan D. Cooper. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xx + 222. $22.95, paper.)

Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. viii + 133. $18.95.)

In the 18 years since the United Nations General Assembly revoked the mandate given to the Union (now Republic) of South Africa over South West Africa (now Namibia), South Africa has been able to retain control of the territory in spite of United Nations resolutions, economic boycotts, guerrilla action, and the general disapproval of most of the world community. From time to time it appears that some progress has been made in forcing the withdrawal of South Africa, but each hope has led to disillusionment. Recent developments in both Mozambique and Angola have once again kindled hope for a final settlement, although this may be another case of hope springing eternal.

Whatever the outcome of current efforts, there is little doubt in the minds of most observers that Namibian independence is but a matter of time.

For this reason Robert Rotberg's *Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects* is particularly welcome. This volume grew in part from a 1981 conference organized by the World Peace Foundation of Boston on postindependence prospects for Namibia. The first chapter by Nicholas H. Z. Watts reviews the history of Namibia, outlines the basic nature of the controversy which exists, and brings the situation up to 1981.

Upon this foundation comes the four chapters that assess postindependence prospects from political (chapters by Rotberg and Stanley Uys) and economic (chapters by Wolfgang Thomas and Kate Jowell) perspectives. The picture presented by these authors for the economic future of Namibia is not very optimistic. Although Namibia's economy is stronger than that of many other central and southern African countries, the distortions that have been created by continued South African control do not present a favorable picture. Thomas, in presenting a quite comprehensive look at Namibia's economy, notes that much depends upon South African intentions, both in terms of any movement towards independence and in terms of future relations with an independent Namibia. Thomas presents three major development strategies that might be followed by a SWAPO-led government, and although he does express the hope that a "pragmatic" strategy might be followed (drawing upon the Zimbabwean experience), he indicates that the longer the negotiations draw on, the less likely that such will be the case.

Kate Jowell extends Thomas's chapter by identifying the six priorities which an independent Namibia must follow "if stability and a basically sound economic framework were to be established" (p. 93). Included are stabilization of Namibia's manpower resources, insuring continuity and development of production, and dealing with South Africa's domination of communication and transportation.

Each of the authors suggest that political and economic prospects can be enhanced by a rapid resolution of the continuing negotiations and the adoption of a pragmatic approach by a SWAPO government.

If Rotberg and his colleagues present a pragmatic assessment of Namibia's future, Allan Cooper's *U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982* goes beyond the bounds of credibility. The basic thesis of this power elite analysis is that American commercial interests control U.S. policy towards Namibia and South Africa that is designed to exploit African labor and resources. Cooper is meticulous in identifying what must be every reference to anything that might relate the United States and Namibia. For example, he has almost 500 footnotes for his 53-page discussion of U.S. commercial interests in Namibia.

But he does get carried away. He has taken elite analysis to new heights in identifying the interlocking power structures of the United States. He includes among corporate interests in Namibia virtually every company that has ever done business or sold goods, either directly or indirectly, in that territory. Thus, Quaker Oats Company is included because its products were advertised in 1956 in the *Windhoek Advertiser.* Father Theodore Hesberg, president of the University of Notre Dame, is included in a listing of scholars who are directors of "firms trading with Namibia" (in this case, Chase Manhattan).

Cooper carefully traces this interlocking directorate through its memberships in various elite social clubs (e.g., the Detroit Athletic Club; this chart alone takes 14 pages), policy planning groups (e.g., the Conference Board), and professional societies (National Association of Manufacturers). He charts the relationship of various companies that have Namibian connections with other such companies through common directors.

Evidence of hyperbole abounds. For example, the fact that the Confederate raider *Alabama* dropped anchor once in 1863 in Angra Pequena leads to the conclusion that Namibia "played a contributing role to the outcome of the War Between the States. . ." (p. 5).

There is no doubt that American business influence in Namibia is sizeable and that such influence in the United States has led to a less than enthusiastic attempt to secure compliance with the Council on Namibia's efforts to stop trading in Namibia.

Cooper documents all this and more. If you can throw a large grain of salt upon the pages, Cooper's study does present a fascinating picture of what he claims is the governing elite of America. Although the reader may not agree with him that an American "foreign policy that extends genuine friendship and cooperation to the Namibian people will require fundamental changes in American society" (p. 195), the information that Cooper presents can be quite useful.

EDWARD BAUM

Ohio University

Dissent in Eastern Europe. Edited by Jane Leftwich Curry. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. viii + 227. $27.95.)

"The usual uneven quality of contributions," a common complaint of edited volumes, can happily be omitted here. All the contributions for

Dissent in Eastern Europe are of even quality—and evenly good.

Robert Sharlet's analytical overview of the "dialectic of dissent and repression" opens the volume and displays a keen sensitivity toward the great variety of dissidence in the 1970s in the many countries surveyed. He rightly insists that the "quest for human rights has become a systemic variable with long-term implications" (p. 10). Andrzej Korbonski's article on Poland notes that the roots of Solidarity reach deep into the past. Happily he avoids an excessively jargonized explanation of Solidarity's growth. Instead, he points his finger directly at the corruption and stupidity of Polish authorities—and justifiably so. In Jane Curry's selection, the proposition that Polish workers would have proven more successful had they paid more heed to the "restraint" of dissident intellectuals requires more evidence. Still, her competent and comprehensive treatment deserves a close reading.

Vladimir Kusin presents an excellent analysis showing how effectively repression, if skillfully administered, can render a large-scale movement like the Czech Spring impotent virtually overnight. Yet we must wonder to what degree the post-1968 purge by Husak "can be compared to the Chinese cultural revolution under Mao" (p. 50). Emil Freund offers a highly competent treatment of dissent in Romania. One doubts, however, that "intellectuals form the most articulate and, therefore, most dangerous element in Romanian dissent" (p. 64). Does Ceausescu really fear pamphleteering intellectuals as much as the spectre of Solidarity-type workers marching through the streets? I would imagine instead that proletarian dissidence seriously challenges the very legitimacy of all the "workers' states." In contrast, Vlad Georgescu presents an illuminating discussion of the alienation of Romanian intellectuals from the workers and the latter's ability to develop their own political agendas independently.

Like many of the other authors, George Schopflin also gives credit to the skills of Eastern European regimes where it is due. His description of the role of Kadar's political manipulations in reducing Hungarian dissent should be required reading for students of that country. Michael Sodaro presents a clear and informative treatment of East German intellectual dissidents, with an emphasis, again, on their alienation from the population. Given the explosiveness of the nationalities problem in Yugoslavia, Sharon Zukin's treatment of the Kosovo disturbances seems unduly thin. However, her analysis of the psychological development of the modal Yugoslavian dissident reveals an excellent grasp of protest theory and merits close attention by students of political dissent.

A summary article by Jan de Weydenthal makes a number of useful generalizations. Another by Antonin Liehm posits that East Europeans have made a "new social contract" with political authorities, trading political liberties for economic satisfactions. Yet future economic problems may predict an unravelling of this silent agreement.

Only a few shortcomings pervade the volume. Already the rapid development of the movement of East German peaceniks has made its characterization as "small" (p. 83) somewhat outdated. Given Germany's recent militaristic past, the movement deserves a good deal more research in the future. Further, the authors tend to ignore the transnational ties among Soviet and East European dissenters, which to some degree have served as a stimulus to dissent. Finally, the authors simply disregard the peasantry, perhaps undeservedly. Curry and Andrzej Korbonsky, for example, omit Rural Solidarity from their analysis of Polish dissent.

On the other hand, all the authors put their respective countries in a larger regional context, which renders the volume useful to comparative specialists. Likewise, they all highlight the many important international influences on East European dissent (a Polish Pope, the West European peace movement, detente and the Helsinki Accords, and several others). Vratislav Pechota, for instance, rightly notes that the "speed of the socialist convoy is determined by its slowest ship" —the USSR (p. 206). Finally, the authors display a healthy *Fingerspitzengefuhl* for the grass roots realities of Eastern Europe, which provides a humanity, immediacy, and texture to their otherwise abstract analysis.

DAVID KOWALEWSKI

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Press Control around the World. Edited by Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xvi + 283. $29.95.)

This volume is about an inherently interesting, important, and timely subject. The editors' aim is to provide a systematic examination and comparison of censorship questions in relation to diverse political systems and economic structures for media ownership. Given the scarcity of material about the specific mechanisms and processes of censorship in different contexts, this is a helpful addition to our knowledge on the subject.

The Introduction and Conclusion do not violate the conventional norm that these parts of an edited volume consist of an overview on the subject. Curry's concluding chapter is less general than most such chapters, because she makes some attempt to identify qualitative differences among media policies of different types of polities. In order to do this, she makes the sensible decision to discuss media management practices involving direction, control, and restraint rather than the less useful blanket word, censorship. Authoritarian and communist systems are likely to use all three forms of media management by issuing explicit directives to media professionals, by controlling content in the production process, and by emphasizing individual self-restraint among professionals. Democratic systems, Curry notes, "do not, under normal circumstances, engage in either direction or control against the will of the media. . . . The emphasis is on restraint and suggestion by appeals (largely indirectly made) to common values and symbols" (p. 257). Although this statement seems to acknowledge a qualitative difference between nondemocratic and democratic politics, much of the remainder of Curry's discussion blurs this difference. At one point she states that in regard to the media control process "in systems with ideologies and political realities ranging from the most democratic to the most repressive, the differences are more quantitative than qualitative" (p. 256). Yet I do not read the contributions in the book that way. The overall thrust emphasizes that the existence of genuine opposition expressing alternatives to official government preferences, conditions that mark democratic process, signifies something qualitatively different about the media politics of a country, even when the real restraints imposed by private ownership and social consensus are taken into account.

The case studies on media management are grouped as "Controls Over the 'Free Press': Western Democracies"; "Controlling the Communist Press"; "Press Controls in the Developing World"; and "External Controls of Domestic Media." There are outstanding contributions in most sections, for example, C. R. Eisendrath's chapter tracing the extensive web of subsidies and aids to the private press in France, Lilita Dzirkals's chapter detailing the coordinate functions of various media control agencies in the Soviet Union, and Joan Dassin's fascinating account of the psychotechnical system of media control used in Brazil. At the same time, some chapters simply fail to make a case, such as Philip Schlesinger's argument that the British television news were committing an antidemocratic act by cooperating with the government during the days leading up to the 1980 SAS storming of the Iranian Embassy in London to recapture it from the Arabistan guerrillas holding 26 people hostage.

What the contributions demonstrate collectively is the widespread difference of opinion about which practices or events constitute examples of media control. The major significance of the case studies in this book is that they provide some explicit factual grounds for further study of a subject whose past discussion has been replete with shibboleths and slogans.

MILDA K. HEDBLOM

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Democracy in Trade Unions: Studies in Membership Participation and Control. By Mary Dickenson. (New York: University of Queensland Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 243. $32.50.)

The world of work has become increasingly integrated into the realm of governmental activity, because it is no longer the case that the employer and employees determine the rules and regulations that are to govern their relationship. The inequities of that relationship, which were espoused by Karl Marx at an early moment in the Industrial Revolution, were set in concrete by the formation of trade unions in a variety of shapes and forms, but all sharing a recognition of a unity of worker interest. It is within this larger history of trade unions, especially as they are understood in capitalist democracies, that Mary Dickenson's book, *Democracy in Trade Unions,* is to be situated. Specifically, Dickenson is concerned with how trade unions in Australia operate, and how, in particular, they realize certain democratic and participatory objectives in their internal operations. In addition to revealing how governmental policies assist this democratization process, the book examines, through a set of detailed case studies of the Port Kembla branch of the Federated Ironworkers' Association and the Australian Capital Territory branch of the Administrative and Clerical Officers' Association (the Commonwealth Public Service), how the presence of political choice in union elections helps to realize democratic objectives.

Australian trade unions are constituted legally under a formalized system of conciliation and arbitration which, among other things, plays a regulatory role in union operations and has as a specific intent the guaranteeing of democratic internal affairs. Originally intended to prevent strikes, the Conciliation and Arbitration Acts have had the secondary consequence of regulating union practices, including the activities of radical factions within the union.

Aware of the larger theoretical issues, Dickenson submerges her study against the backdrop of some larger issues: What purpose is served by this democratization of trade union practices and the availability of choices on union slates? What consequences, intended or not, follow from requiring that certain procedural practices be followed? Do apparent choices lead to unions choosing more moderate leaders, as non-Labour governments in Australia have assumed to be the case? The reader can appreciate Dickenson's recognition that procedures have both manifest and latent consequences, and, although most of the text is an empirical description of how two very different unions functtion, the import is a reading of how politics dictates procedures and how erroneous it is to think of procedures as objectively valid.

At the same time, Dickenson wants the reader to appreciate the constraints and demands that formal structures do impose on union activities, and how ideology may take second place to the daily management of union afairs. She chronicles, with copious detail, how rhetoric gives way to day-to-day demands, and how pragmatism and the objective of electoral power replace ideology in the management and operation of union affairs.

For the reader interested in trade union practices, as well as for the student of Australian history who wishes to assess how the specifics of history (the battles between the communists and their adversaries) affected trade union policies, Dickenson's book will be a welcome addition to the field; certainly it is a fine introduction to this literature, if not as groundbreaking and extensive as several of the writers quoted in the bibliography (G. E. Caiden, Robin Gollan, Helen Hughes, and D. W. Rawson). The book might also interest the political sociologist who will appreciate Dickenson's efforts to link her discussion with larger themes: Robert Michels on elites, Max Weber on traditional belief systems, Steven Lukes on power, and Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson on personality and ideology. One wishes that a more intensive analysis would have been undertaken in this particular direction.

SONDRA FARGANIS

Vassar College

Governing Peoples and Territories. Edited by Daniel J. Elazar. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982. Pp. vii + 350. $25.00.)

This book, which is based on a conference held in 1979 in Jerusalem, deals with "autonomy arrangements, solutions for the problem of governing peoples and territories and, specifically, the utility of such arrangements in the case of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs" (p. 1). It includes 16 essays (three of which are the editor's), as well as the transcripts of discussion sessions that involve additional participants.

Although the focus is on Israeli-occupied territories, the volume also includes some studies of supposedly parallel instances of multiethnicity and irredentism in which autonomy arrangements have been applied, as in Italy and the Balkans. These are all excellent studies, but little effort is made to compare such situations with the one in the Middle East. Furthermore, situations such as that in South Africa which arguably provide better analogies are shied away from, aside from Myron Weiner's brief warning of the similarity between Israeli and South African politics "likely to be seen by outsiders" (p. 139).

Insofar as the volume focuses on the Israel-Palestine question, capable scholarship tends to suffer from the intrusion of partisanship. This is particularly true of Elazar and several other contributors, who present positions similar to that of Israel's Likud government, that is, rejecting both withdrawal from the occupied territories and the kind of incorporation of the territories' populations into the polity that would undo its Jewish character in favor of limited autonomy under Israeli control.

Elazar's abtruse conceptual framework stresses the need to move away from "building reified, politically sovereign states which force the peoples in their respective territories into the procrustean or sodomian jurisdiction of a single central government" (p. 1) in favor of "a new model which views the polity as a matrix of overlapping interlocking units, powers and relationships" which "is related to a . . . federalist understanding of politics" (p. 3). He fails to point out that such arrangements are abhorrent to the population of the territories to which he is referring and could be imposed only by virtue of Israel's superior force, that this would not represent decentralization of control over the existing territory of a state but rather would involve the acquisition of areas under a military occupation whose permanence the international community rejects, and that this would be a colonial rather than a federal type of arrangement in which one segment of the population of an enlarged Israel would be relegated to a limited say in its substate affairs without representation in the central government.

However, other views are represented in this volume. Nathan Glazer expresses uneasiness generally about political divisions based on ethnicity and hopes for "the emergence in time of interests that transcend Arabness and Jewishness" (p. 56). Emile A. Nakhleh presents his findings about the views of Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories. A chapter by Dan Horowitz forcefully presents the case for a full withdrawal by Israel along with security guarantees, whereas strong criticisms of Israeli proposals are articulated in several short statements during discussion sessions. As a case in point, Leonard Binder declares "The autonomy project . . . for anyone with a democratic moral sense . . . [to be] an embarrassment" and calls the "appeal to scientism, to center-periphery theories" and the like "a statistical effort to sidetrack . . . the democratic theory of politics. . ." (p. 319). Pointing to the lack of symmetry in autonomy proposals, Gabriel Ben Dor notes that a truly federal solution would mean sharing control over Tel Aviv and Haifa as well as Nablus. Such voices provide redeeming features to the book's treatment of the Palestine issue.

GLENN E. PERRY

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The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia. By Oskar Gruenwald. (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 438. $24.50.)

With Yugoslavia pioneering in so many realms such as national communism, an independent road to socialism, decollectivization, decentralized and participatory workers' self-management, market socialism, and nonalignment, Gruenwald suggests that Yugoslavia is one of the most fascinating social experiments in the world. Few can disagree.

In his interdisciplinary study which combines philosophy, politics, economics, and history, Gruenwald endeavors to show that the Yugoslavs have also begun a major reformulation of Marxism. The Yugoslavs have shifted away from an excessive and doctrinaire preoccupation with deterministic and collectivist concepts and have, via the young Marx, rediscovered the importance of the individual and the concept of alienation. Gruenwald suggests that the Yugoslavs have thus begun the process of creating an open-ended and more democratic Marxism; nevertheless, he warns that Yugoslavs have not yet traveled the full path to democratization. Accordingly, he characterizes contemporary Yugoslavia as an uneasy blend of democracy and totalitarianism (i.e., workers' self-management and Leninist one-party rule). To a great degree, two forces embody these tendencies—the avant-garde Marxist humanists or Marxist-existentialists of the Praxis Group and the party officialdom, respectively. A key portion of Gruenwald's study deals with the ensuing tensions between these forces. On this theme and throughout the book, the documentation is extensive, citing Eastern and Western scholars equally and revealing a solid command of the literature in several languages. Unfortunately, at times the text bogs down in excessive peripheral detail, unnecessary repetition, or summaries of too many similar writers.

Although Yugoslavia exhibits numerous social problems such as high unemployment, inflation, regional disparities, insipient separatist movements, and continued growth of excessive state power and bureaucracy, Gruenwald's pessimism about the Yugoslav system seems unnecessarily accentuated by his own ideological motive of seeking a "definitive refutation" of Marxism Leninism (pp. ix, 303). For example, he praises the neoconservative writings of Friedman and Hayek and postulates that socialism in principle is incompatible with freedom (pp. 263, 288, 300). Such a statement reflects a considerable naivete about the meaning of, and the richness in, the forms of socialism that have appeared in the Western world. For example, British Fabians and Commonwealth Labour parties have shown that socialism and liberty can coincide. Gruenwald's polemical perspective also weakens his earlier thesis of the need to transcend "alienated" and outmoded concepts such as capitalism and communism and to strive for a new synthesis (pp. 17, 249). Gruenwald himself seems to be enamored with the ideology of neoconservatism, particularly in the concluding chapter of his book. Can he expect others to be any less attracted to their ideologies?

Part of the difficulty with Gruenwald's analysis rests in his somewhat one-sided view of ideology. In his view, ideologies produce only negative consequences. Consequently, he fails to see that most of mankind seems to need an ideology to give meaning to life and some semblance of order to social relations. Ideologies, in short, can be forces of construction, and not only of destruction. Although the longing for the end of ideology and a quest for convergence between East and West are perhaps understandable sentiments, it seems utopian to expect that ideologies have outlived their usefulness. As long as social stratification occurs, it seems likely that some ideologies will arise that defend the affluent and the status quo, and other ideologies will emerge to express the alienation and discontent of the have-nots and the demand for social change.

Despite these criticisms of *The Yugoslav Search for Man,* it is a book that raises key philosophical and political questions about how to build a new, better model of social relations. Gruenwald does not seem to have the answers, but at least he is asking the important questions. That is more than many political scientists can say.

Alan Whitehorn

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The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy, and Development. Edited by Paget Henry and Carl Stone. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983. Pp. xx + 348. $30.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Analysts of the Caribbean are confronted not only with traditional issues such as the one related to size and development, but also with a vast array of questions that make the region a veritable microcosm of the difficult choices facing third-world nations in the mid-eighties, central to which is the difficult task of nation-building in an area where more than four centuries of colonialism, slavery, and racism have left their indelible mark.

Henry and Stone have assembled a good collection of essays that deal with such choices, primarily in the English-speaking territories. Focused on national development and framed loosely around its relationship with decolonization (conceptualized as a process rather than as an event), with the contemporary world order as well as with democratic institutions, the 16 chapters provide a well-researched and comprehensive survey of Caribbean politics up to the late seventies.

The best essays are those from the editors themselves. In a brilliant chapter, Carl Stone analyzes the nature of the Caribbean state with particular reference to Jamaica, underlining "its imperialist class origins and over-development relative to the domestic or local class forces" (p. 41) and explaining how "patron clientelism and service institutions oriented toward meeting the needs of the poor and the oppressed . . . became the central legitimizing basis for the state" (p. 49). In another essay on democracy and socialism in Manley's Jamaica, Stone gives an excellent account of the political dynamics that led to the ultimate failure of the effort to bring democratic socialism to the island.

In turn, Paget Henry, in his chapter on decolonization and cultural underdevelopment, sets forth a rich and insightful analysis of the dialectics between the social and political underpinnings of the emergence of nationalism in the West Indies and its manifestations in the cultural sphere and a clearheaded assessment of the current cultural identity predicament of the West Indian (p. 114): "He is free, but is still unable to be himself without appearing to be like his colonizer." Equally insightful, albeit painted with a broader brush, is Henry's analysis of decolonization and authoritarianism in Antigua. He uses Michel's iron law of oligarchy to explain the emergence of the island's trade union-based political parties, which, over time, have lost all contact with their working-class origins and have become fully identified with foreign and local business interests. Antigua's case is a particularly interesting one; in many ways the emergence of its party system mirrors the pattern of other territories, and its Prime Minister, Vere Bird, is a prototype of a certain class of West Indian leader that has emerged in the region in the past 20 years.

Other informed and illuminating chapters are those by Luis Maira on the Caribbean policy of Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela and by Vaughan Lewis on Caribbean state systems and the contemporary world order. George Danns's chapter on militarization in Guyana, though, is confused. Whereas in the first three-fourths of the chapter he carefully documents the ways in which Burnham and the ruling PNC have increasingly militarized Guyanese society to consolidate power in their own hands and that of the black minority (and to keep the East Indian majority in the political wilderness), he closes with an open endorsement of authoritarianism in Guyana. His efforts to generalize from the Guyanese experience to the rest of the region fly in the face of much of what the political experience of the Commonwealth Caribbean tells us.

The editors should be commended for reaching beyond the English-speaking Caribbean to include chapters on other territories. Unfortunately, they are either very weak (as Ruben Berrios Martinez's unconvincing comparative chapter on Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic), or do not fit very well into the volume's overall framework (as Rita Manitzas's sharp analysis of Cuban foreign policy). There is also some overlap between the various chapters (with two chapters on Jamaica, Guyana, and Anntigua) and some glaring omissions (e.g., no discussion at all of Barbados, which has scored some impressive successes in its development efforts, nor of the Grenadian revolution). It also seems odd to have a full section of the book devoted to the Caribbean's insertion into the contemporary world order and not include a chapter on relations with the country that has by far the most determining influence on Caribbean developments, the United States. But there is little doubt that this is a book that belongs on the shelf of every person with an interest in Caribbean politics.

Jorge Heine

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Beyond Empire and Revolution: Militarization and Consolidation in the Third World. By Irving Louis Horowitz. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. vii + 321. $19.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Horowitz argues for the "essential integrity and autonomy of the Third World" (p. vii). He feels that "those who assert that the Third World is simply on a developmental path toward modernization in accord with the First World or socialization in accord with the Second World are badly mistaken on empirical grounds and sadly misinformed on intellectual and moral grounds (p. vii).

Horowitz divides the nations of the world into four classifications: the First World, the Second World, the Third World, and the Fourth World. The Fourth World is carved out of what has been traditionally viewed as the Third World, and it encompasses the 40 to 50 nations likely to be perpetual recipients of aid because of the lack of sufficient energy and food. The subdivision sharpens the differentiation between the have and have-not nations.

The second section of the book describes several ways in which third- and fourth-world nations are asserting their independence from Western and socialist models. Foremost among their choices are military dominated systems. Horowitz feels that a military formula seems to maximize national control and minimize foreign control in developing nations better than most other systems. Old forms of gaining legitimacy are no longer effective, and new forms of government are needed. Other forms of economic, social, and political systems including multinational corporations are also developing.

In the concluding section of the book, Horowitz suggests that the changes occurring in the Third World have caused the very concept of development to come under attack. He states that "the basis of the ideology of the 1980s is a sense of the limits of modernity and development" (p. 276). The force of tradition in many third- and fourth-world nations, and the degeneration within the advanced nations, has brought about a new fundamentalism which questions development as the ultimate goal. This rise of fundamentalism as yet another way in which third-world nations can seek to establish their own identity.

In general, Horowitz has succeeded in writing an informative book. Unfortunately, he is at times overly ambitious. We suspect that the wide scope of his ambition forced him to unadequately substantiate several interesting themes. Many topics such as corruption are not covered adequately. Corporatism, a major topic in development studies and often associated with military systems, is not even mentioned as an alternative form of government. Many of Horowitz's contentions are controversial. Consider, for example, his assertion that militarism is a necessary and beneficial means to achieve the stability required for economic growth and the transition to democratic politics.

In a book that states that it is concerned with the entire Third World, Latin American countries are given much more attention than African or Asian third-world nations; for example, Nigeria is the only African country examined. Although it is mentioned several times as an example of a military regime in Africa, regrettably it is never discussed fully. Many would argue that Latin American countries are much different from other developing countries and are not representative of all third-world areas. A study of developing nations should look at more countries in greater detail.

Some of the data used are outdated; Nigeria and Brazil are no longer growing economically and are in great financial difficulties. The jacket of the book is somewhat misleading. It states that the major emphasis of the book is on military regimes as the preferred way to achieve economic growth and stability in the Third World. In fact, the book deals with the whole spectrum of development, but especially with alternative routes available for third-world nations to assert their independence. Military rule is only one possible route which third-world nations can choose to follow.

On the overall, however, this is a well-written and worthwhile contribution to the literature on development.

VICTOR A. OLORUNSOLA

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ELEANOR E. ZEFF

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Democracy in Search of Equality: Untouchable Politics and Indian Social Change. By Barbara R. Joshi. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 200. $14.00.)

In liberal democracies committed in public philosophy to the equality of all citizens, the existence of an oppressed minority poses an acute problem: How to ensure equality for its oppressed minority? Is "equal opportunity" enough? Can centuries of oppression and resulting "backwardness" be corrected by simply outlawing discrimination now? How far should government interventions go in correcting past injustices by mandating present preferential treatment of minorities?

In her useful book, Barbara Joshi looks at the experience of India in its search for equality for its large, historically oppressed minority of "ex-untouchables." The main thesis of this book is that whatever marginal improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of the ex-untouchables has taken place since India's independence, it has not been due to industrialization and urbanization, but instead, it has been "in large part the result of political policies developed under unusual historical circumstances, which guaranteed scheduled caste political self-representation (only scheduled caste candidates may stand for office in certain 'reserved' state and national electoral constituencies) and established specific government programs to improve scheduled caste socioeconomic conditions" (p. 2).

It is the policy of reserved constituencies for scheduled cates or ex-untouchables that Joshi is most concerned with in her book. In a short introduction she clearly states her larger concern with minority equality in majoritarian democracies and with relationships between political and socioeconomic change. In the second chapter, she provides a brief introduction to the scheduled castes and their current socioeconomic status and finds their educational, employment, and land ownership position to be "still far below national population averages" (p. 11). The third chapter provides an overview of historical developments in pre-independence India that led to the "preferential" policies. In the fourth chapter Joshi deals directly with the impact of the policy of reserved constituencies on scheduled caste development. She argues that this policy has effected the self-respect of the ex-untouchables and has blocked "the *public* development of modernized myths legitimizing discrimination based on untouchability" (p. 69). In chapter five Joshi looks at industrialization and urbanization as important catalysts of social change and finds them both wanting in the case of India's ex-untouchables. Chapter six summarizes their political attitudes and finds a "recurring set of basic assumptions" that "constitute four alternative paths to equality: political power, economic independence, religious reform, and social reform" (p. 123). In chapter seven, Joshi looks at scheduled caste voters and legislators as political resources and finds them both highly limited in their ability to influence public policies to improve their own castes' lot. She finds low educational and economic status to be major handicaps. In spite of these limitations, Joshi concludes that "there is evidence that the reservation system has helped to build the groundwork for greater self-mobilization" (p. 168).

This book is not an empirical study of the consequences and effectiveness of the political reservation policy. Instead, it attempts to build a case for the policy largely on the basis of published studies and documents on scheduled caste politics and socioeconomic conditions. The evidence, often weak and circumstantial, suggests that the policy's impact has been only marginal. This makes Joshi's case for the policy somewhat tenuous. However, this simply points to the need for carefully designed empirical studies to determine the impact of the policy. The book makes a welcome contribution by pulling together the literature in the area and by sharply focusing on an issue that is of interest well beyond the boundaries of India.

UDAY DESAI

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Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories. By Gershon R. Kieval. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 228. $35.00.)

The ever-present high level of tension in the Middle East punctuated by war is the backdrop to this study of linkage politics. Kieval has revised his doctoral dissertation from The Johns Hopkins University into what is a multipurpose book. For the comparative politics theorist, there is more than enough discussion of the Israeli political party system and the role of interfactional disputes in the foreign policy formation process. The international relations specialist will be pleased with an excellent case study of the linkages between the demands of the Israeli domestic audience for security and the expectations of the resident Palestinian Arabs for self-determination, the hostile Arab world's support for their ethnic brethren, and the varied concerns of the remaining political world. The Middle East area specialist will find the book to be a basic position statement from a relatively noncritical Israeli perspective on the Israeli government's administration of its military-occupied territory.

The study is divided into logical time frames, from the conclusion of the 1967 conflict that resulted in the military occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, until 1981 when the research for the book was completed. The first period ends in October, 1969 with the Khartoum Conference and the perception held by Israeli decision makers that the Arab belligerence would continue. The next time frame concludes with the 1973 War, a military effort on the part of Egypt and Syria in part to regain their respective occupied territories. Kieval characterizes the time from the end of the 1973 War until

May, 1977 as a period of "withdrawal" for both the Israeli military and Jewish civilian settlers, thereby setting the stage for the forthcoming upheaval, the electoral dispossession of the ruling Labor party by the Likud party of Menahem Begin. The narrative and analysis ends in 1981, with the Likud party barely controlling the Knesset and dominating the cabinet.

Kieval describes an Israel in June, 1967 as not ready to deal with military occupation. Given the important factor in the Israeli political culture of civilian control over the military as well as a strong division of opinion on the disposition of the territories, no clear policy emerged from the government. A program of permitting Jewish settlement in the territories was somehow to be balanced against a desire for a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Hence, the policy became one guided by the question of security versus concessions.

Kieval argues that the Labor Party Alignment, a coalition of major and minor political groupings, dominated Israeli politics within the structural context of a British-influenced and styled parliamentary system for so long that it failed to bring about decisive policy. Rather, its political control stifled innovation and instead lent itself to "non-decisions" for the Occupied Territories. Kieval argues further that external constraints by allied powers, primarily the United States, and the idiosyncratic nature of Israeli internal factionalism forced issues to be considered from a party perspective rather than into a traditional parliamentary mold.

Because the purpose of the study is essentially to deal with the internal Israeli polity, there is a dearth of attention paid to events that resulted either from the management of the occupation or the change in the life styles for the Palestinian Arabs. There is, for example, no discussion of the international legal issues or the Israeli government's attitudes towards the standard interpretation of the Geneva Convention treatment of occupied territory. Nor does one find an examination of the allegations of human rights violations. What is presented is rather straightforward and factual. The analysis is not particularly deep or well developed, but it certainly is helpful. As a discussion on the role of political parties in the formation of the government's policy on military occupation, the book is fine. If one looks for a broader perspective on the specific case example, however, it will be necessary to augment the viewpoints as well as the information.

SANFORD R. SILVERBURG

Catawba College

Growth, Shortage and Efficiency: A Macrodynamic Model of the Socialist Economy. By Janos Kornai. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Pp. 143. $22.50.)

The pathbreaking work of Janos Kornai, a leading Hungarian economist, has lain too long on the periphery of political science. Kornai himself is most directly concerned with the problems and dynamics of socialist economies; at the same time, however, his work has rich implications for understanding the practices of public and private bureaucracies in nonsocialist systems, the political economy of nationalized industries and large, oligopolistic producers of all types, and larger, macroeconomic issues involved in the selection of development and growth strategies.

Kornai's theory is laid out far more elaborately in his earlier work, *The Economics of Shortages* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1980), than in his more recent volume, *Growth, Shortage and Efficiency*. The former, frankly, is of much greater interest to political scientists than the latter, which attempts to model the "shortage economy" mathematically as a set of differential equations.

Kornai arrives at his model of a shortage economy by distinguishing initially between "demand constrained" and "resource constrained" economies. In the demand constrained, factors such as economy, output, employment, and investment grow until a demand constraint is reached; its typical "crisis" is overproduction, and adjustment takes the form of unemployment, unused capacities, and deflationary measures. A resource constrained economy, however, has an entirely different dynamic. Growth continues until physical resources are exhausted: There is literally no additional labor, capital, or other resources available to satisfy the "infinite demand" of economic actors. Accordingly, "crisis" manifests itself as shortages, and adjustment takes the form of lower growth until new resources are put into production.

Yet lower growth rates have startlingly different effects in the resource constrained systems than in their demand constrained counterparts. Rather than operate less efficiently during downturns due to idling capacities, socialist firms operate *more* efficiently, as they call on the slack created during expansions to keep operations at full capacity. Rather than causing unemployment, a socialist recession can leave workers better off: As the claims of enterprises on resources diminish, more goods are available for private purchase.

The key to this growth cycle, in Kornai's eyes, is the "infinite demand" for resources created by enterprises. If the consequence of insatiable demand is the hoarding, perpetual sellers' market, overemployment, excessive investment, and bottlenecks so well known to students of socialist economies, its cause is diagnosed by Kornai as the "soft" budget constraints faced by the firms. That is, when enterprise costs exceed enterprise revenues, they face no sanctions; consequently, firms can literally ignore cost factors in their economic decisions in order to meet whatever targets, including profits, authorities give them. Thus, even in the presence of prices, hoarding and the various other symptoms of the sellers' market persist—a highly significant observation in light of Western economists' glib recommendations that merely a price reform and a market will bring efficiency to socialist economies.

Furthermore, it is not only enterprises in the socialist economies that have soft budget constraints. Nationalized firms, public bureaucracies, and even large private enterprises in Western economies all have softer constraints than organizations operating under genuine competition—and their economic decisions typically reflect this.

Kornai himself does not go very far in exploring the political implications of his theory. Rather, he has turned his efforts to putting the theory in mathematical terms so that it can be more rigorously tested and used for economic analysis. *Growth, Shortage and Efficiency* reflects this interest, and Kornai's attempt to design a dynamic macromodel where shortages substitute for prices as signals to planners and producers is a real *tour de force* in this area. For the political scientist, Kornai's theory provides us with a superb starting point for asking questions about the political behavior of economic actors with soft budget constraints and about the political conditions that foster the creation of such economic dynamics. For this, however, *The Economics of Shortages* is the work to consult.

ELLEN COMISSO

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The Democratic Class Struggle. By Walter Korpi. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. vii + 277. $26.95.)

Sweden is at a pivotal crossroad in its economic and political development. The questions of what change is likely to occur and why provide the impetus for Walter Korpi's *The Democratic Class Struggle.* Korpi begins with a discussion of class and power. He views the "democratic class struggle" as a "struggle in which class, socio-economic cleavages and the distribution of power resources play central roles" (p. 21). This perspective is distinguished from three other models explaining modern political change: the pluralist industrial model, the Leninist interpretation of Marx, and the neocorporatist model. The central weakness in the above models is that they fail to incorporate the possibilities for altering the distribution of power resources between the main classes in society. Korpi argues that the working class can decrease its disadvantages in power resources through political and union organization and sees a major shift in conflict resolution occurring as the political arena replaces the market. Specifically, he is interested in what types of policy change will occur when reformist socialist parties are in government.

In *The Democratic Class Struggle,* Korpi sets out to apply his analytical approach to political changes in Sweden. Sweden is a logical choice given Korpi's expertise and the fact that Swedish wage earners are more unionized and politicized than workers in the 18 OECD countries that Korpi briefly surveys. The focus of the study is electoral participation, as it is in the political arena that working-class power resources are not disadvantaged. Although his electoral and survey data are always interesting, the data do not always address the key concepts of the theoretical model. Korpi presents a wealth of information on electoral behavior in Sweden from the introduction of universal suffrage in 1921 to the recent election in 1982 including regional, gender, religious, and urban-rural variation (chaps. 4 and 6) and the relation between social position and electoral choice (chap. 5). All indicators suggest an increase in the volatility of the electorate in the 1960s and 1970s. Korpi attributes this to protest voting, the result of a perception that politicians have failed to solve fundamental societal problems. His data also indicate that the classic left-right dichotomy of economics is being complemented by, rather than replaced with, the new environmental issues.

In chapter 8, Korpi attempts to link the arena of electoral politics to that of the labor market. He examines patterns of industrial conflict in 18 OECD countries from 1870 to 1976 and concludes that the theory of pluralist industrialism is inadequate. He then develops a model of industrial conflict based on the difference in power resources between wage earners and business interests and on the structural conditions for conflict resolution. The model is carefully schematized but key variables, including resources of business interests and national differences in institutions for settling industrial disputes, are not adequately explored because of data limitations. Korpi concludes that as the power resources of labor and capital narrow, societal bargaining will likely result in less income inequality and more economic democracy.

Korpi's theoretical argument and criticisms of other political models is similar to his earlier study, *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden* (Routledge & Kegan, 1978), and his data on electoral participation complement the data on union political involvement and influence presented there. The critique of *The Democratic Class Struggle* will also be similar: The theoretical arguments and the data are somewhat tenuously integrated. Important arguments and conclusions are offered but often remain tangential and weakly related to the data. Despite this shortcoming, Korpi provides an important theoretical perspective, a richness of historical data on electoral activity and public opinion in Sweden, and useful comparative material on elections and industrial conflict in advanced industrial societies.

PRISCILLA M. REGAN

University of Puget Sound

Unions, Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945-1980. By Peter Lange, George Ross, and Maurizio Vannicelli. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1982. Pp. v + viii + 295. $35.00.)

As one could expect of an ambitious, collaborative, and comparative project of the Harvard Center for European Studies, *Unions, Change and Crisis* is clear, thorough, well documented, and sophisticated. In short, it is indispensable for all serious students of trade unions, political economy, and Western European politics. The "first of two volumes reporting and analyzing European trade union responses to contemporary economic crisis" (p. vii), it deals separately and comparatively with France and Italy since World War II. Although quite complex and inevitably somewhat repetitive, such an approach holds great promise. It allows both for sensitivity to subtle national and intranational variations and at the same time for tentative and conditional comparative generalizations.

The emphasis on unions as conscious strategic choosers, as subjects responding to external political, market, economic, and organizational constraints as they evolve historically (especially during critical conjunctures as with the present crisis) is fruitful indeed. The authors argue convincingly that their approach is both empirically and theoretically more satisfying than the "liberal optimist" (pp. 212-218) industrial relations view that predicts increasing convergence between industrial societies in general and the increasing depoliticization of trade unions in particular.

In contrast, the French and Italian cases show clearly that unions have tended to become even more explicitly political since the 1960s, but in increasingly different ways. Starting in the postwar period, when the mixed economy "settlements" in France and Italy consolidated a semireformed capitalism with the unions, and when the Party Left divided and communists were excluded from government, the authors stress the similarity of the French and Italian examples. Over the succeeding 30 years, however, it is argued that the two union movements diverged significantly. The French union movement remained more influenced by the communist-controlled CGT, which subordinated local, militant union activity in the market to a national, centralized, and "maximalist" (p. 231) strategy that pinned its hopes on the Common Program of the political party Left, change in government, and rupture with capitalism. By contrast, the union movement in Italy became more autonomous from political parties (from the more tolerant PCI as well) as early as the mid-1960s; ultimately, and partly as a result, it also became much more unified and active.

Why this process of increasing divergence between Italy and France should have occurred is analyzed and explained as the result not only of differences in objective situations, but also of differing union choices and goals. Objectively, three categories of constraining (but not determining) variables are used (pp. 273-277): political, market, and union organizational. This complex and interacting set of influences constrained, but did not rigidly or wholly determine, union responses. Different union leaderships chose, relatively freely, whether or not to privilege continuity with past strategies (the French CGT) or to take the risks involved in major strategic changes (nearly all Italian unions).

Unfortunately, according to the authors, the French "maximalist" and Italian "interventionist" responses have both, to this point, failed to achieve their goals, despite the new risks and opportunities of the current crisis and despite the authors' beliefs and hopes that unions would be more successful than they were in the Great Depression.

This is a most interesting, important, and complicated story that is very successfully handled, particularly given the usual pitfalls of collaborative and cross-national scholarship. However, some minor flaws do mar the analysis, and the very success of this first volume highlights the overly restrictive limits of what has been attempted.

The book is relatively expensive, and although handsomely produced, has very few statistics or illustrative materials, a short and superficial index, and no bibliography. Although the dead horse of the "liberal optimists" (Clark Kerr, Seymour Martin Lipset) is ritually flogged, no other theory of unions, the state, or political economy (not even neo-Marxism's flourishing varieties) is given anything more than a passing mention. The authors' own "theoretical alternative" (pp. 218-230) is stronger on relabeling, playing with well-known distinctions, and drawing arbitrary, one-way arrows of influence (which should be reciprocal, p. 226) between boxes than in producing startling new insights.

On the second point, the current analysis seems unnecessarily limited. Although the CFDT and CSIL, the major noncommunist unions, are analyzed, the main emphasis is consistently on the communist CGT and CGIL; the smaller unions are almost ignored. This bias shows more about the authors' sympathies than about the objective importance of either the CGT or CGIL; neither represents a majority of workers in either country. Topics such as fascism, Gaullism, Vatican II, terrorism, and the Algerian War would have been analyzed in greater depth. Finally, given the volume's implicit argument that unions' responses are crucial in the real world to solve the current crisis, it is strange that there is neither a diagnosis, even a schematic one, of the causes of that crisis nor of the likely solutions to it. A slightly broader scope to the analysis, where unions are one but only one of a number of interacting agents, might have helped to make this comparative study of European unions even more convincing than it already is.

RICHARD A. DEANGELIS

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National Communism in Western Europe: A Third Way for Socialism? Edited by Howard Machin. (New York: Methuen, 1983. Pp. viii + 232. $22.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The study of Eurocommunism is in a crisis which this work effectively illustrates. The editor, Howard Machin, states "there is no 'conclusion' to this deliberately disparate collection" (p. vii), and there is no common definition of the topic, either. There is a good deal of uncertainty here as to what constitutes Eurocommunism. Machin defines it as a variant of communism which is national, liberal, democratic, and European. But there is no precision about the meaning of these terms in any of the essays. Liberal communism, for those authors who do not ignore the concept altogether, appears to mean only that in some circumstances, some communist parties are critical of the policy of the Soviet Union toward internal dissent. Democratic communism may mean only that these parties stand for election in a competitive system. The "European" nature of Eurocommunism appears, vaguely, to indicate that certain parties are influenced by European ideas (Christianity, the Reformation, rationalism, science: the exact nature of these ideas is unexplored) which distinguish Eurocommunism from the Soviet variant. Only with national communism do all of the authors seem in agreement; by this concept, they mean that these parties are all somewhat different. The causes and consequences of this difference are not examined in detail. Similarly, there is no agreement about the origin of Eurocommunism. It could be rooted in the ideas of Marx (or Engels), the prison notebooks of Gramsci, the Yugoslavian breach in 1948, the destalinization campaign of 1956, or the European crisis in the early 1970s. Wherever Eurocommunism came from, and whatever it is, the authors all believe that it has failed.

Four of the 10 essays examine the Communist party in a particular state. The articles on France and Portugal are descriptive histories. Italy and Spain receive more detailed treatment. Paul Preston's chapter on Spain is particularly interesting. He argues that Santiago Carrillo led the PCE to a moderate position not only in order to make the party more competitive in the Spanish environment, but also to more securely establish democracy in Spain after the death of Franco. One essay in this volume argues that the Eurocommunists had difficulty interpreting the Polish crisis and the role of Solidarity. The remaining five essays all attempt to analyze the problems the European communists have in dealing with the Soviet Union or the Soviets have in relating to what is going on in the West European parties. It is in these essays that the problems of definition are most obvious.

There is a common theme that ties together most of this book. There is a usefulness to the volume that is a disappointing commentary on the current state of political science analysis. The one conclusion supported by all of the authors is that communism is a complex phenomenon. Communists differ on the meaning of their principles and on the most appropriate strategies to put their theories into practice. Communism exists in a political world: Communists relate to one another politically, and they can play a variety of different roles in political relationships with noncommunists. What is sad about all of this is that we are still so influenced by the concept of monolithic, totalitarian communism that such an obvious point still needs to be argued at length. Very little work is being done by political scientists in analyzing the nature of communist politics. This collection of essays is a good example, for there is not much analysis of communist politics here beyond the point that communists have politics. Only when we accept the fact that communists do not exist separate from the world of politics will we be able to turn our attention to the important questions about Eurocommunism.

CHARLES J. NAGY, JR.

Graceland College

Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa. Edited by Philip Mawhood. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983. Pp. xiii + 261. $39.95.)

This book brings together a set of extremely useful essays on the relations of local and central governments in a number of English-speaking countries of Africa. As a whole, the essays present well-informed, succinctly written, and generally sympathetic accounts of the problems faced by local governments as they labor under political and resource constraints, some imposed by central governments, and others aspects of the nature of the situation. Mawhood establishes the thesis and tone of discussion and analysis early: Although "most governments like the *idea* of decentralization" (p. 1), they do not wish to incur the consequences of genuine power-sharing. Central governments argue, and sometimes even want, the benefits of local participation and the ability to adjust centrally formulated plans to local conditions and political interests, yet central governments also fear the inefficiencies, embarrassments, and, most importantly, the political challenges that an independent power base may provide opposition groups. As a result, periods of decentralization and recentralization come and go as the center struggles with the need to be efficient and effective (the precondition of its political legitimacy) and its fear for political survival. Nelson Kasfir concludes, then, that the enduring dilemma of decentralization in tropical Africa will remain the problem of creating an unchallenged national authority "secure enough to cede a range of powers to local communities" (p. 44). Until that day, which does not appear close, local governments will be dancing on short strings manipulated by political interests and conflicts at the center. In short, argues Mawhood, "because it is politically difficult, local government has hardly ever been given a fair trial" (p. xii).

The book bears the stamp of its editor. Chapters are of uniformly high quality, concisely packed with information, and follow the conceptual distinctions and substantive emphases established in Mawhood's introductory chapter. Descriptive chapters on local-central government relations in Sudan (by Malcolm Norris), Tanzania (Mawhood), Kenya (Walter O. Oyugi), Botswana (Wyn Reilly), Cameroon (Mawhood), Ghana (David Harris), and Nigeria (Alex Gboyega) are bracketed by introductory and concluding essays by Mawhood and a general survey of trends in decentralization in Africa by Nelson Kasfir. Mawhood's introduction sets out the terms of the analysis, a contrast between decentralization (authentic power-sharing between central and local governments) and deconcentration (local administration controlled by the center under a variety of institutional arrangements) and describes the various forms, primarily in financial and personnel arrangements, that both distributions of powers have taken. Kasfir summarizes three phases of local-central government relations in Africa since independence (a shift from decentralization to centralization and back again) and sketches four factors leading to the initial dismantling of decentralized government structures inherited from the British: the contradiction between colonial and traditional political practices, poverty, a strong belief in the necessity of centralized planning for development, and the nonlegitimation of political opposition. Failures of centralization have led to a reemphasis on local government—Kasfir outlines recent developments in Tanzania, Sudan, and Nigeria. Country chapters are primarily descriptive; they trace major reorganizations of local governments' structures and authority in various countries since the 1950s and argue some reasons for the frequent restructuring of political institutions that are described.

Local Government in the Third World provides an introduction to a generally underemphasized yet crucial topic in our understanding of political realities and development in Africa and would be useful as a textbook. One can wish that the generally descriptive and institutional emphasis of country chapters had been supplemented by analyses of the process of local government and policy formation and implementation. What is absent from the chapters is a sense of the politics of government at the local level, of the whys and wherefores of decisions made or foregone. If supplemented by case studies, the book will provide a solid core text. Although primarily descriptive, it has the virtues of its modesty; it clearly sets out the terms under which the problems of local government are to be considered and then provides detailed information. There is something to be said for knowing what institutions look like on the ground before arguing why their policies fail or succeed.

OTWIN MARENIN

University of Colorado

Dealing in Votes: Interactions Between Politicians and Voters in Britain and the USA. By Iain McLean. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. x + 209. $25.00.)

It is hard to know from what perspective to review this book. It is not labeled a text and at $25 hardly can be intended for classroom use. On the other hand, it does not present original research, and its coverage of the literature is more a summary than a synthesis, so it offers little to the scholar. McLean certainly writes clearly and provides some agreeable touches of humor—pluses for student use. But he assumes a level of knowledge of British politics that American students do not have. The main strength of what is otherwise a very pedestrian book is very good selection of actual events in British and American politics to illustrate abstracts points.

McLean first sketches three approaches to the study of voting: electoral geography, opinion surveys, and Downsian deduction. He devotes a chapter to summarizing the main points of British electoral studies and then does the same for U.S. studies. The main focal points are the effect of class, region, religion, and race; party identification; party system realignment; and issue voting. Concluding the part of the book devoted to voters is a chapter elaborating the Downsian approach, concentrating on why people bother to vote, how they decide on a party preference, and information costs.

The next part is composed of chapters on pressure groups, party activists, and bureaucrats—all termed by McLean as intermediaries. He explains why, as the Downsian model would suggest, producer groups generally are more powerful than consumer or altruistic groups, but nonetheless, may be defeated by galvanized voters. Among party activists, McLean distinguishes ideological from nonideological entrepreneurs and contrasts both with expressivists, who are active simply for social and psychological satisfaction rather than for political reasons. He decides that activists are more extreme in their views than office holders and briefly discusses some examples of clashes between the two in British politics. As for bureaucrats, the question is whether they are the real governors. McLean thinks they are not, although he grants them considerable policy influence.

The final part of the book is two chapters on politicians. The same distinction is made as for activists, with one chapter on entrepreneurs and another on the motivating effects of an unhappy childhood on politicians. (Curiously, this final chapter cites five times a work by Hugh Berrington that does not appear in the Bibliography, nor is Berrington included in the Index.) Although of only marginal relevance, a discussion of campaign finance is included in this part. Incredibly, these comments (and the Bibliography) totally ignore Michael Pinto-Duschinsky's benchmark study *British Political Finance 1830-1980* (American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

The page-long conclusion says that the book has "two missionary aims: to show that rival approaches to the study of political behaviour are complementary" (p. 187), and that political participants are not as stupid as sometimes is asserted. Were this book in paper at a third the price, introducing students in a political behavior class to a survey of the literature organized to convey such ideas would be worth considering. As it is, this book can safely be ignored because it offers nothing new.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN

Iowa State University

Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics. By Yoram Peri. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 344. $39.50.)

Ever since Israel's founding, the country has been beseiged by enemies, and its very existence has been threatened. Past wars, incidents of terrorism, and the inevitability of more wars have made security "the central problem of Israel's existence" (p. 19). No wonder then that the mechanism for safeguarding the polity, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), occupies a very special place in Israeli society. Until recently, Israel's citizen army embodied the national consensus and served as a focus of national unity. But unquestioning obedience to the Army's dictates began to erode, slowly at first, when a few refused to serve in the military's administration of the occupied territories, and then more rapidly after the expansion of Israel's war in Lebanon, when a bitter debate gave rise to antiwar protest movements and the refusal of some reservists to serve in Lebanon.

This change in attitude toward the IDF came about as a result of two factors: an unprecedented military involvement in politics and the breakdown of national consensus. One can get a better understanding of the forces leading to the present circumstances by reading Yoram Peri's *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics.*

Peri painstakingly and convincingly documents his view that the IDF was not an "instrumental" army. (He defines instrumental as being disconnected from party politics, subject to strict control by state institutions, and serving only as an instrument of government policy.) Peri's thesis is that the centrality of security enabled senior military personnel to play a significant role in Israeli politics and public life, and that the military played a formidable role in shaping national policy. "Since the attainment of independence in 1948 state control over the military has been weaker than commonly perceived. Instead of state control, a unique pattern of civil-military partnership exists. This relationship reflects the inner rivalries of Israel's party politics. Clashes and accommodations between various coalitions of politicians and military leaders occurred throughout the changing Governments from Ben Gurion to Begin" (p. vii).

Peri begins with a review of the approaches to the study of civil-military relations in Israel. He rightly justifies the need for his new analysis because since the mid-sixties there has been a significant entry of senior reserve officers into the higher echelons of politics—for example, Rabin, Dayan, Weizman, and Sharon—and because since the Six Day War of 1967, the IDF has been an army of occupation. Peri describes and analyzes the evolution of the military during the British Mandate, Ben Gurion and the politicization of the IDF, party politics as the driving force of political-military relations, generals as politicians, the nexus of institutional relationships (Cabinet, Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Knesset, the IDF and the Defense Ministry), the state budget and its relationship to the defense budget, and specific crises in political-military relations. These crises—the Lavon and Ben Barka affairs; Eshkol's authority crisis immediately before the Six Day War; the 1973 crisis in command in which Sharon, in a foreshadowing of his role in the Lebanon War, refused to be controlled; and the disagreements between General Tal and Defense Minister Dayan—all contributed to the intermingling of the military and political systems. This intermingling gained momentum under Begin's Likud government. Peri concludes by raising some fundamental questions about the future of military involvement in political affairs and presents a believable and frightening hypothetical scenario of events leading toward a "military democracy."

Between Battles and Ballots is an insightful, analytical, thoroughly researched exposition of what may become a major problem for the continuance of Israel's democratic political system. It is a brilliant and seminal book that deserves a wide readership.

NORMAN L. ZUCKER

University of Rhode Island

The Contemporary Mediterranean World. Edited by Carl F. Pinkele and Adamantia Pollis. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. v + 369. $35.50.)

Carl F. Pinkele and Adamantia Pollis's *The Contemporary Mediterranean World* is an ambitious attempt to provide the reader with an interdisciplinary analysis of an increasingly important region of the world. This edited book of readings certainly reflects the interplay of politics, history, economics, religion, and jurisprudence in the numerous nations and international agencies that constitute the Mediterranean world. Together, the articles confirm the generally agreed upon assumption of the literature that a multiplicity of variables, some more important than others, influence decision makers in the Mediterranean region.

A Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored conference in Bellagio, Italy on the Mediterranean world is the source of the articles in this edited work. Topics covered by the authors range from the impact of superpower rivalry on the Mediterranean region to the region's legal culture. The importance of interdependence and agenda-setting for understanding the Mediterranean world comprises the essence of Pinkele's opening remarks. The assessment that the asymmetrical relationships among the actors in the region under study allows for the interests of the powerful to penetrate the agendas of the less powerful leads Pinkele to conclude that "contradictions abound and the future looks grim" (p. xix). Pinkele, therefore, has set the stage for a more thorough examination of this conclusion in the essays that constitute the balance of the book.

The work is organized into two parts that demonstrate the various factors influencing Mediterranean decision makers. Part 1 concentrates on the international context within which Mediterranean decision makers formulate and implement public policies. Eight essays examine the relationship between particular nations in the Mediterranean region and primarily the United States, the USSR, and the European Community in terms of security, economic, religious, and environmental issues. The roles of the United States and the USSR in this region receive special attention. The assumption made by Betty Smolansky, Oles M. Smolansky, and George Ginsburgs in their essay, "A National-Interest Framework: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean" that "both Moscow and Washington appear to accept as a tenet of faith the notion that the Mediterranean itself is an important key to the stability of the surrounding areas, particularly the

Middle East" (p. 6) explains the record of superpower involvement in the region discussed in other essays on this topic in Part 1. The connection between the remaining essays on the environment and Islam in the region and the contextual factors of superpower competition and the European Community is less clear.

Part 2 consists of 10 essays that focus on the effects of interdependence in the Mediterranean world. This section of the book examines the consequences of monetary integration, labor migration, foreign policy, and legal history for particular Mediterranean actors. Many of the contributors to this section discuss the challenges facing those Mediterranean countries in positions of dependency with either the European community and/or, for example,more dominant powers in the region. In his essay "The European Community in Search of a New Mediterranean Policy: A Chance for a More Symmetrical Interdependence?," Stefan Musto argues that "it is undisputed that further industrial development in the Mediterranean countries and more intensive trade with the community are important prerequisites for any beneficial cooperation in the future" (p. 167). Musto contends, however, that this proposal would depend on actions almost impossible to expect from either side. According to the essay "Monetary Integration in a Twelve-Member European Community: The Implications for Greece, Portugal, and Spain" by Robert Baade and Jonathan Galloway, the effects of a monetary union on Greece, Portugal, and Spain "may serve to frustrate [their] longer-term economic aspirations" (p. 235). The analyses suggest, therefore, that these types of asymmetrical relationships are likely to persist given the poor economic position of most of the Mediterranean nations.

The concepts of interdependence and agenda penetration examined in the Introduction are potentially very useful for understanding decision making in the Mediterranean region. In fact, many of the essays partially incorporate the framework adopted at the outset of the book. At least some treatment, however, of the effects of interdependence and agenda penetration by the balance of the articles would increase the value of this work for students and scholars interested in the world of Mediterranean affairs. The absence of any summary chapter diminishes the relevance of those essays unrelated to the theoretical framework outlined in Pinkele's introduction.

This work exemplifies both the strengths and the weaknesses of an edited book of readings. Individually, the essays are uniformly strong and informative concerning the political, historical, legal, economic, and cultural factors influencing Mediterranean decision makers. Taken as a whole, however, the collection lacks the common theoretical theme that links the essays in a way useful to the observer of Mediterranean affairs.

CRAIG E. HARTZER

South Bend, Indiana

China's Vietnam War. By Hemen Ray. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983. Pp. x + 130. $11.75.)

One of the ironies of recent history is that China and Vietnam engaged in war with each other in 1979, six years after the end of the U.S. war with Vietnam, in which China had supported Vietnam. One reason for the U.S. role in Vietnam had been to "contain" China. In 1979 it was Vietnam's turn to "contain" China. Scholarship that can explain this unexpected turn of events can only be welcome. Unfortunately, the volume under review here only partially fulfills expectations.

Hemen Ray has chosen to begin his study of Sino-Vietnamese relations with the early post-World War II period ending the French role in Indochina and beginning the acceleration of a process to create a Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong party. Ray chronicles Sino-Vietnamese relations through the 1954 Geneva Conference, early Chinese support for the Vietminh against the French and later for the DRV and the National Liberation Front against the Americans. He traces the precarious position of the DRV as the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, the worsening relations with China, and the outbreak of the war between two former allies in 1979.

Ray's account is ultimately unsatisfactory primarily because the discussion omits some crucial issues and fails to explain the behavior and motivation of the various participants in either the U.S.-Vietnam war or the Sino-Vietnamese struggle. Ray seldom deviates from his relentless chronological journey through the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations, and there are far more direct quotes from the press of the various countries involved than can be justified. Ray's analysis is seldom in error or misleading, although one 1965 quote from Chou En-lai on the Chinese alleged willingness to bleed the North Vietnamese in the war almost certainly refers instead to the Americans, but the context cannot be checked because it is not referenced. Ray does make numerous interesting points, and in general the shortcomings of the book are those of omission rather than commission.

The book needs a general outline of the overall goals and strategies of the superpowers, China, and Vietnam. Instead, these questions are treated in passing, often implicitly, and almost always too briefly. One is often left with follow-up questions that do not get answered in the rush to continue narrating the factual developments. Too little attention is given to differences within the leadership in each country, a subject on which a considerable number of secondary sources are readily available, and little attention is focused on the different strategies of war advocated by the Soviets and the Chinese during the U.S.-Vietnamese war and the impact of this squabbling on the Vietnamese strategy. Almost no information is provided on the nature or importance of the Vietnamese treatment of the Chinese nationals living in Vietnam and the impact of this on the outbreak of the war in 1979. This crucial issue certainly deserves some attention. Finally, little explicit appreciation or exploration is directed toward the irony of two major communist states, only recently allied, going to war with each other.

Ray believes that the war has not settled any problems, that the Chinese were responsible for initiating it, and that the Soviets benefitted greatly by strengthening their position in Indochina. In the end, the Chinese suffered because of a divided leadership and people, squandered resources, demonstrated weakness in the Army, and the erosion of the modernization plan. These conclusions are sensible but unexceptional, and that characterization could be applied to the book as a whole. This book is too close to the action, and too little time is spent interpreting the busily researched facts. It is also marred by sloppy footnoting without attribution, including the annoying attribution to original foreign language sources in the translated source.

WAYNE BERT

Reston, Virginia

Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism. By George Ross. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 357. $30.00.)

Trade unions in France have traditionally oscillated between the two dominant dimensions of union behavior—overt, broadly based political activity on the one hand, and what Ross calls "labor market activity" (the concerns of workers in specific conjunctural settings) on the other—and between party-linked organizational structures and autonomous (syndicalist) union-centered ones. The conflicts and tensions between the French confederations, including their occasional problematic *rapprochements*, reflect the weakness of the French labor movement as a whole, seen in its inability to organize effectively (an optimistic assessment would suggest a 15-20% unionization rate) or to bargain collectively, whether with management or the state. And this weakness, in turn, reflects the twists and turns of union activity along the two dimensions mentioned above in the face of fierce management hostility and the superior organization of the state as new conjunctures reinforce the oscillations of weak structures. Only when the social climate provides an independent mobilizing dynamic, dragging the confederations along, are these patterns of tension overcome; but May, 1968 has become the exception that proves the rule.

In this clearly written and wide-ranging study, George Ross provides an overview of the recent history of the largest union central, the *Confederation Generale du Travail* (CGT), in its problematic links with (and its relative subordination to) the French Communist party (PCF). The PCF consolidated its grip on the CGT immediately after World War II, as the cold war crystallized and both the PCF and the CGT were isolated within a ghetto in which labor market considerations were firmly subordinated to a Leninist "transmission-belt" model of union activity rooted in the PCF's firm Stalinism. Post-Stalin changes within the Party (which never really overhauled the Party structure as they did in Italy), plus the changing composition and consciousness of the working class in the period of rapid French economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, led to pressures for the CGT to act less out of pure partisan considerations and more in tune with a labor market that was both unfamiliar and in flux—a phase which Ross labels "relative autonomy," to emphasize that Party considerations were still the bottom line. The upheavals of 1968 and 1969, Ross suggests, might have provided the possibility for a more truly autonomous CGT, acting both within and outside of a more democratized PCF, to push the Party along a more pluralistic and potentially majoritarian path, as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the "Hot Autumn" of 1969 did for the Italian Communist party and labor confederations like the CGIL. However, a combination of internal factors (the residues of Stalinist organizational centralization), external trade union factors (the salience of the neo-syndicalist central, the CFDT with its priorities of local struggle and worker control), and external political factors (the amazing renaissance of the Socialist party under Mitterrand, or the contractualism of Chaban-Delmas) combined to blunt the Eurocommunist dynamic and place the PCF on a downward spiral toward marginalization, a trend that has continued since the Left victory at the polls in 1981. The book stops in 1980, but the current positions of the PCF, both in the government and highly critical, and the CGT, whose members are taking the brunt of the government's austerity program, seem to amply confirm the more pessimistic elements of Ross's analysis.

The book has few weaknesses, and those are arguable. Ross seems to conflate the two analytical dimensions mentioned earlier into one—transmission-beltism versus labor-market trade unionism—which may oversimplify certain conflicts and alternatives, yet he is sensitive to the nuances in his descriptions. And "relative autonomy" seems a bit too grand a term for the flounderings of the PCF-CGT relatiaonship in the 1950s and 1960s. On the empirical side, one might have wished to find a more detailed analysis of internal CGT politicking at certain times, but sources are presumably unavailable. The strengths of the book are in the quality and clarity of the writing, the impressive balance between analysis and historical description that makes the book both a general historical text and a closely focused academic case study, and the critical empathy that Ross brings to his subject. He may disapprove of moralizing (p. 311), but he transcends the mere cost-benefit analysis to which he modestly lays claim. And, incidentally, isn't it nice when a well-produced academic book places the footnotes where one can actually read them, at the bottom of the page!

PHILIP G. CERNY

University of York (England)

Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s. By Bo Sărlvik and Ivor Crewe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 393. $49.50.)

Observers of British elections since 1970 have become aware that voting behavior has changed in important ways and that those shifts stem partly from significant economic and social changes. One of the two primary authors of this study, Ivor Crewe, is among the most highly respected election analysts in the United Kingdom. He regularly publishes his findings in a wide variety of newspapers, magazines, and scholarly journals. Therefore, in this book, few unfamiliar cats are let out of the bag.

Part 1, which was written by Crewe, contains a thorough review of the political and economic problems and controversies during the 1970s. It is a good refresher for the specialist and a very informative introduction for the nonspecialist. It presents an average British voter who has become better educated, more middle class, more prosperous, more likely to own his own dwelling, and less class conscious than was the case in the 1960s and before. His voting behavior is far more volatile than it once was; he is more willing to shift his vote from one election to another in response to short-term factors or to his appraisal of politicians' performance in office. His social class influences his voting less and less, although the link between social class and party choice has not totally vanished. In the absence of significant lingual, religious, or national differences, social class remains the only enduring division of partisan consequence in British society. It still influences voting far more than do age and sex. What Sărlvik and Crewe especially challenge is the "two-class" conception of the parties' social bases, according to which the middle and upper classes vote for the Conservatives and the working class votes Labour.

The weakening of the class determinant in voting has particularly hurt the Labour party, to which the working class no longer remains unswervingly loyal. This especially applies to workers who are *not* employed in mining or in nationalized or traditional "smokestack" industries and who live in their own homes and in the South. Persons in that "new working class," which is more oriented toward the service or high-technology industries, do not hesitate to vote Conservative, Liberal, or SDP. Indeed, as Crewe revealed in a recent article, only two out of five trade union members voted Labour in the 1983 elections. This statistic is a distressing signal to a party established by the labor movement and constitutionally tied to the unions.

In general, none of the major occupational groups provides the same degree of solid and consistent support for one of the two major parties as was the case in earlier postwar era. Sărlvik and Crewe note also that the proportion of the electorate who consider themselves to be "very strongly" attached to any of the parties has declined dramatically, from 40% in 1964 to only 19% in 1979. It is scarcely surprising that this weakening of voter identity has benefitted the minor parties, whose share in the total vote advanced steadily in the course of the 1970s. The regional parties faded quickly after 1974. Because the SDP, to which a six-page postscript is devoted, was not founded until 1981, the authors could not predict its future with any certainty. They note that the Liberal party has steadily advanced since the late 1950s, despite temporary downswings. Even though the two major parties' firm postwar grip over the electorate has been cracked, Sărlvik and Crewe warn that they (especially the Tories) can still powerfully compete with the rising parties for the political middle ground and reattract former supporters and nonaligned voters.

Part 2, written by Bo Sărlvik, seeks in greater detail to explain the precise flow of the vote in the 1970s and its relationship to positions taken by voters and parties on the issues that dominated the period. Sărlvik presents and examines the mass of electoral and opinion data compiled by the University of Essex, and he links that data with actual voting. The issues he examines include the overall state of the economy, inflation, the balance of payments deficit, the real fall in the GNP, the slow but persistent rise in unemployment, further nationalization of industries, the maintenance of a high level of social welfare spending, the British role in the EC, trade union power and the impact of the "winter of discontent" in 1978 and 1979, when the concatenation of strikes seemed to leave the public good unattended. Sărlvik also considers the issues of "law and order," immigration and integration of nonwhite minorities, devolution, and the relative popularity of political leaders. The end product is an exhaustive explanation of the Conservative victory and of the possibility of a significant turning point: the emergence of a conservative electorate.

Sărlvik and Crewe have produced a book that describes the electoral shifts of the 1970s as David Butler and Donald Stokes, in their *Political Change in Britain* (Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1972), described the transformations of the 1960s. They succeed in making the book informative for the academic specialist as well as usable by senior undergraduates and interested lay persons. Political scientists who want to dig deeply into the underlying reasons for dealignment and for the state of British politics in the 1980s will not wish to ignore this study.

WAYNE C. THOMPSON

Virginia Military Institute

North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-Yop Kim. (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983. Pp. viii + 371. $20.00, paper.)

The contemporary study of North Korea often invites comparison to the study of China a decade ago, when scholars dealt with a society into which few Westerners were able to obtain entry and where a leftist leadership imposed a seemingly orthodox veneer. Yet China in the early 1970s exhibited signs of opening to the West and, in addition, supplied refugees who could be interviewed. In the North Korean case, there are few signs of the kinds of changes which would facilitate Western study of its society. Thus, the circumstances facing the researcher in the study of North Korea remain similar to those two decades earlier when Scalapino edited a volume with the same title (Praeger Publishers, 1963).

North Korea Today consists of 16 essays originally prepared for a conference held in 1981 in Berkeley under the sponsorship of the Institute of East Asian Studies of the University of California at Berkeley and funded by the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation. The contributors are scholars in South Korea and the United States, most of whom have written extensively on North Korea in the past. The volume is equally divided between essays on domestic issues and those on foreign policy. Included in the former category are selections on constitutionalism (Chin-wee Chung), the personality of Kim Il-song (Dae-Sook Suh), the rise of Kim Chong-il (Chong-Sik Lee), mass organizations (Chong-Wook Chung), social policy (Changsoo Lee), the military (Young C. Kim), economic planning (Joseph S. Chung), and agriculture (Ki-Hyuk Pak). Essays on foreign policy include industrial and trade policy (Sang-Chul Suh), security policy (Sung-joo Han), policy toward South Korea (Sang-woo Rhee), unification policy (Byung Chul Koh), African policy (Sang-Seek Park), relations with Japan and the United States (Robert A. Scalapino), and relations with China and the Soviet Union (Donald S. Zagoria). An essay, "North Korea: One South Korean Perspective" (Hongkoo Lee) seems somehow out of place.

One expects a collection of essays to be by its very nature uneven. Yet the overall level of scholarship is high, with little disparity in quality among the essays; there is a minimum of repetition, and overt biases are not in evidence. Although it is impossible in the space of a short review to devote adequate attention to each essay, it is nonetheless possible to discern broad themes that appear in several of the contributions. In general, the reader comes away with the feeling that prospects for North Korea in the short run are uncertain at best. Some of this is due to the impending elevation of Kim's son to power. But it is also due to North Korea's need for foreign capital and technology if it wants to keep pace with South Korea. This may require a modification of North Korea's *chuch'e* (self-reliance) ideology and its relations with Western countries. It may also give rise to a new class of technocrats whose revolutionary zeal may be called into question. Thus, the possibility for generational conflict as well as questions of ideology (red versus expert) and foreign policy loom as agenda items whose resolution can only be guessed at.

A final word of praise needs to be uttered for the efforts of the Institute of East Asian Studies to promote the study of North Korea. It also published in 1983 *Journey to North Korea: Personal*

Perceptions edited by C. I. Eugene Kim and B. C. Koh, which can be read with profit as a companion to the volume under review here. In addition, the Institute's sponsorship of another major conference on North Korea in August, 1984 was testament to its commitment to this field.

WAYNE PATTERSON

Saint Norbert College

The Age of Charisma. By Arthur Schweitzer. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984. Pp. xii + 417. $30.95.)

The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership. By Ann Ruth Willner. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 212. $17.95.)

Charisma is *a la mode.* Until about a dozen years ago, books that mentioned charisma explicitly in their titles could probably have been counted on the fingers of one hand, whatever country they were published in. Now one or two such books appear annually in the United States alone, and publicists and journalists have rendered the word almost meaningless by overuse. Does this merely reflect a renewed intellectual interest in the concept, or does it reflect an actual increase in the frequency of appearance of the phenomenon of charisma? Willner's book is primarily in the first category, whereas Schweitzer's argues that because charisma is today much more frequent than Max Weber predicted, we have to review our notion of it.

Although the very nature of charisma—its a-rational, or supra-rational, elements—makes a rigorous definition of it difficult, it is precisely this problem that has fascinated so many scholars, and for very good reasons. Unless we have a clear idea of what charisma is, we cannot legitimately identify who has it (or to whom and by whom it is ascribed), or how frequently it occurs.

Schweitzer's purpose is to answer this question and many more. His is an attempt at a comprehensive approach to the problem, an omnibus type of work that in Germany would be called a *Handbuch* on charisma. Identification, definition, and classification are the dominant themes of this meticulously organized book, which opens with a chapter on "Varieties of Charisma" and closes with one on "Charismatic Rulership," of which six types are distinguished. The volume is rounded out with a 105-item glossary beginning with "Aristocratic Charisma" and "Ascetic Charisma" and ending with "Transitional Charisma" and "Value Charisma." Obviously an admirer of Weber, Schweitzer nevertheless does not shy away from being in part critical of Weber's theory of charisma. For example, he argues for a more extended (some might call it watered down) notion of charisma because the "impure" charisma that is the most frequent type in historical reality tends to combine and ally itself with other types of leadership and legitimacy and thus achieve rulership, which explains why we live in an "age of charisma." Useful as his book is, Schweitzer will not escape the criticism that in his eagerness to clarify he has all too systematically fenced and crossfenced the pastures of a concept that can intrinsically remain alive and stimulating only when left on the open range of broad generalizations that nurture a degree of vagueness and imprecision as virtues, not sins.

Willner's book is just the opposite of a *Handbuch.* A collection of essays, it tries to clarify not by nailing down various characteristics and phenomena into a classificatory scheme, but by challenging ideas with ideas, drawing at the same time on empirical data, some derived from personal observation. Whereas Schweitzer discusses several score of personalities he judges to be charismatic leaders, Willner focuses on just a few and avoids confusing centralized power (as wielded by a Stalin, Idi Amin, or Ceausescu) with the power of charisma. She pays considerable attention to the cultural, psychological, and mythological milieu, arguing at the same time that the charismatic leader is not simply made by circumstances (e.g., a crisis situation), but creates them himself. Several well-chosen historical examples illustrating her case are discussed at length, and her narrative skills further enhance the value of this book.

Although both Schweitzer and Willner speak about charisma in political leadership, neither distinguishes between charisma as such and as political leadership as such, or explicitly denies that there may be charisma in matters political that does not involve leadership. In other words, is it of the domain of political science to inquire what is charisma, or only what is charismatic political leadership? Yet a discussion of this question would seem essential. If we can and should distinguish (in the political context) between charisma and charismatic political leadership, then the former could be understood to be fundamentally a gift of understanding travail in the social fabric: of foreseeing and understanding the nature of the (spontaneous or deliberately caused) changes in a sociopolitical realm and of finding solutions for the ensuing crises that are clearly beyond the problem-solving ability of the existing political system and the grasp of the available political elite. Thus, charisma would be essentially an intellectual attribute, a gift of reason—of superrationality in terms of normal times and normal human beings (hence often perceived as an attribute of gods)—and on the level of "founding" (constituent) ideas and the related grand strategy for a new social order. Consequently, charisma would be a gift that could be attributed to, and belong to for example, an *eminence grise* who neither appears in public nor is known to the masses, yet guides and determines the cause of politics in the way Aristotle and Machiavelli hoped their advice to king and prince would result in the founding of a new polity. The formal (public) political leader would in such a case not really contribute any original ideas, except perhaps in the domain of tactics, but would have to furnish an impressive (charismatic) physical appearance and the ability to communicate with the masses. Briefly, on the one hand, we would have the charisma of the legislator—of his ideas that could become autonomous and timeless, exercising charismatic leadership again and again over the centuries—and on the other, the charisma of the mass manager, who is (as Willner possibly suggests) a spellbinder rather than a political leader in the true sense.

Of course, there are charismatic political leaders, like de Gaulle, who have both original political ideas and the ability to sway the masses in public appearances. There are also, however, artful crowd manipulators who can neither themselves contribute any intellectually worthwhile thoughts, nor discern what is worth borrowing. So they mouth half-understood ideas of great men and slogans supplied by half-intellectuals. Pseudo charismatic leaders tend to be ruled by ideas of pseudo intellectuals, and the power of ideas is growing. As Lord Keynes observed at the very end of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas."

LADIS K. D. KRISTOF

Portland State University

Pluralism in the Soviet Union: Essays in Honor of H. Gordon Skilling. Edited by Susan Gross Solomon. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 179. $27.50.)

With the possible exception of Jerry F. Hough, no scholar has done more than H. Gordon Skilling to introduce to the study of Soviet politics concepts common to broader social science disciplines. Nearly two decades ago, Skilling challenged conventional interpretation of the Soviet political system by suggesting that Sovietologists would profit through the application of the concept of pluralism. His compelling essay sparked a debate that has continued, although somewhat abated, and that remains no closer to resolution today than in 1966.

It is therefore appropriate that Susan Gross Soloman has edited this volume of six essays, *Pluralism in the Soviet Union,* as a *Festschrift* to Skilling. Given the controversy surrounding the use of pluralism by Sovietologists, it should not be very surprising that the book's five principal essays on pluralism and Soviet politics will not definitively resolve the debate. The major readings of this volume can be subdivided into those that place the concept of pluralism into a specific issue-setting (Wlodzimierz Brus's analysis of markets and Frederick C. Barghoorn's study on dissent), and those that evaluate the concept's general utility for Sovietology (the essays by Solomon, Hough, and Archie Brown). Of these, the Solomon and Hough essays deserve closer consideration.

Solomon's chapter offers one of the most cogent and comprehensive surveys of the development of the concept of pluralism to be found anywhere in the literature. She correctly makes note of an important, although often ignored, distinction between the traditional British version of pluralism and the more recent American version. For political scientists particularly, this essay clarifies the critical need to understand and appreciate the relative advantages and disadvantages of applying British pluralism (with its emphasis on systemic change) and American pluralism (with its emphasis on systemic maintenance) to the study of Soviet political system. Moreover, it brings into clearer focus the consequences of juxtaposing "state primary" and "society primary" interpretations of the Soviet polity, a point further elaborated by Brown later in the volume. However, Solomon's final recommendation that Sovietologists temporarily suspend "the passion for comparison" and adopt "a new focus on the uniqueness of Soviet politics" will undoubtedly—and perhaps correctly—leave many readers wondering what motivations lie beyind her essay. In any event, such counsel leaves open the question of whether the comparative study of Soviet politics, or communism generally, has really been useful—an interesting question to raise in the context of a *Festschrift* to one of the more notable proponents of the comparative study of communism.

The most interesting essay, however, is offered by Hough. His is an attempt to place into proper focus his earlier significant and controversial contribution to the literature on pluralism and Soviet politics. Hough's often maligned notion of "institutional pluralism," or later "institutionalized pluralism," frequently has served as the straw man for those often purporting to be the defenders of the traditional faith and the *sui generis* method of analyzing the Soviet political system. Although his overt objective in this essay is to compare the concept of pluralism and corporatism (a task effectively accomplished), he also pinpoints a more important issue in the context of this *Festschrift:* Where do we go from here? In pondering Hough's rather candid essay in the context of the major literature on Soviet politics, one cannot escape the conclusion that in recent years a great deal of effort and energy has been wasted debating the suitability of the concept, rather than using the concept as a vehicle for more productive and assessable efforts at middle-range theory-building.

In criticizing many Sovietologists for being too constrained by the exercise of "destructive polemics" aimed at the concept, Hough underscores the principal weakness of this volume in general: It does little to make a case for or against pluralism as a concept appropriate to middle-range theories and empirical analyses of the Soviet political system. Indeed, perhaps a more fitting tribute to Skilling would have been to provide some of the evidence attesting to his influence on more recent empirical middle-range applications of the concept of pluralism, or its cousin, corporatism. In this regard, it is unfortunate that Valerie Bunce's recent work on corporatism was not included in this volume, because her research indeed is representative of Skilling's broader and more enduring contribution to the study of Soviet politics.

These remarks not withstanding, this edited volume is a welcome addition to the literature, and its recent publication date makes it a valuable replacement for several similar, although somewhat dated, works on the topic. If not convinced about the suitability of either pluralism or corporatism for the study of Soviet politics, the reader is nonetheless likely to reconsider his or her own thoughts about the utility of pluralism for Sovietologists. It is even possible that one may conclude that the use of pluralism as a concept for explaining the Soviet political system is anything but outmoded.

JOHN D. ROBERTSON

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The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. By Michael Useem. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 246. $22.95.)

Michael Useem's book, *The Inner Circle,* makes a major contribution to the literature dealing with the relations between business and government in the United States and Great Britain. For many years scholars have been sharply divided over the extent to which the business communities in these two countries have been economically cohesive, aware of their broad class interests, and effectively organized to act in the political arena. Some authorities maintain that the American and British business communities are dominated by a close-knit national upper class, whereas others claim that there is little unity or cohesion among large corporate enterprises. Useem agrees that business is far from a monolithic bloc in both countries, but he also argues, on the basis of considerable evidence, that there is an influential inner circle, linked by stock ownership, interlocking directorates, and elite peak associational ties, which acts as a key force in major governmental and nongovernmental affairs. Moreover, Useem believes that this inner circle, with its heavy emphasis on institutional affiliations, represents a new phase in economic developmennt, much of which has occurred since the late 1960s and has now eclipsed two earlier stages generally known as family and managerial capitalism.

One of the great values of Useem's comparative analysis of politico-economic relations in these two nations is that it has enabled him to discern significant similarities and differences in the nature and mode of development of these potent corporate inner cores. For example, large corporations in both countries have suffered from declining profits in recent years. But in Great Britain, the emergence of the inner circle also stemmed from the challenge posed by the increasing political demands of a strong labor union movement, whereas Useem says that in the United States this complex was created in partial response to the growing regulatory encroachment of the federal government, especially in the environmental sphere. The areas into which Useem, a Boston University sociologist, probes cover a variety of activities; they include corporate philanthropy, issue advertising, business executive service on government advisory bodies, campaign contributions, and the escalating employment of political action committees.

However, although clearly a major work, there are a number of questions that must be raised about certain aspects of Useem's study. One has to do with his use of the term *inner circle,* which is defined as all corporate executives who serve on the board of directors of two or more big companies (although he also provides some statistical data on the basis of three or more directorships). This takes in a fairly large number of people, not all of whom may actually be active members of the inner core. In America some scholars would, alternatively, place greater stress on corporate executive membership in such elite peak groups as the Business Council, the Business Roundtable, the Committee for Economic Development (CED), and the Council on Foreign Relations (only one of which, the Business Roundtable, is given much weight in Useem's study).

Another perhaps even more important defect in Useem's analysis is the fact that he focuses almost completely on developments that have taken place in the last 10 or 15 years. Were there no interlocking directorates of class-wide or national significance before this time? Also, although I cannot attest to the forging of organizational links in Great Britain over the years, judging from the work of Robert Collins, Kim McQuaid, and Laurence Shoup, it is clear that there were some other groups, such as the Business Council, CED, and Council on Foreign Relations, which have played a very prominent "inner core" role in American politico-economic affairs since the early 1940s. And it is probably for this reason that Useem makes the error of asserting that the conservative resurgence led by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States is in no small part a political reflection of these two corporate inner circles' rise to power, when in fact the latter's administration has been linked closely with such right-wing, non-Establishment groups as the American Enterprise Institute, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution.

Yet, despite these defects, it should be reiterated that this is an extremely important book, for it is the first work that really stresses the makeup and influence of a key segment of the American and British business communities that has been long ignored by political and social scientists.

PHILIP H. BURCH, JR.

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Democracy in Latin America: Promise and Problems. By Robert Wesson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 201. $28.95.)

After reading this book, one wonders at the inclusion of the word "promise" in its subtitle: This is really an essay on the failure of democracy in Latin America. Wesson's judgement is that prospects are grim for the eventual flourishing in the region of liberal democracy *a la* Robert Dahl. Any hope for democracy rests on recognizing that the Latin American variety might only approximate the Western European and North American models. Wesson's prognosis is based on a synthesis of the standard explanations for Latin America's political climate: a heritage of autocratic colonial rule, the Iberian cultural tradition, infelicitous geographical conditions, the tendency toward *caudillismo* and militarism, and a generalized state of dependency all contribute to Wesson's analysis of Latin American politics.

Democracy, Wesson tells us, is "a good word, like 'modern,' or 'science,' with which it is associated. . ." (p. 85), and so Latin Americans of nearly all political persuasions claim to desire it. But although there is a commitment to constitutionalism and much populist ideology in the region, authentic democracy seems "weak, spasmodic, or practically absent" (p. 85). Given the paradoxical conjunction of a rhetorical preference for democracy with a predilection for antidemocratic practice in Latin America, what kind of regimes can we expect to find in Latin America's future? Wesson suggests that because both populist and revolutionary politics have failed to make modern, effective, just societies, we might pin our hopes on the convergence of the Mexican and Brazilian systems and settle for "semi-corporate authoritarianism" (p. 187). He acknowledges that an acceptance of single-party "democracy" would signal a compromise with the principles of pluralism.

The very definition of democracy is at issue here. Wesson states his presumptions clearly: "democracy is related to productivity and good social order" (p. 89), and "democracy is a political condition; to speak of economic democracy is a mix-up of categories, like a blue odor or a virtuous rock" (p. 84). Wesson is frankly skeptical that socialism holds any answers for Latin America, and he is as ardently critical of demagogic populism with its calls for redistribution of wealth as he is of economically inefficient oligarchs.

A free-market system is implicit in Wesson's analysis of democracy. He does recognize the negative impact of foreign economic domination in the region, yet he also suggests that dependency theory provides an "excuse for national failure"

(p. 95). Strict free-market preferences are difficult to sustain in the Latin American environment because of the historical role of the state in economic life—a difficulty that the first two chapters' narration of Latin American political history makes apparent. But Wesson places the fault for Latin America's dismal economic situation with the failure of Latin American leadership to forge innovative policies. He argues that "aid is a disincentive to self-improvement and a reward for economic failure" (p. 106), and hints that the United States should not take responsibility for solving Latin American problems. Indeed, Wesson's final thought for readers is that the Latin American State *could* evolve "if leaders are willing to adapt and improve" (p. 189). After all the detailed discussion of the intricate dilemmas for democracy in the region, this conclusion is somewhat disappointing.

Wesson's tone throughout the volume is even-handed, and his style is eminently readable. The comprehensive survey of politics in several countries is well executed. There could have been a more rigorous treatment of dependency theory, especially of the idea of "dependent development"; and the chapter on "The Third World and Latin America," although suggestive, could have been linked more explicitly to the rest of the book. This is an ambitious volume. Although many Latin American scholars might disagree with the conclusions, the book should be recognized as a significant theoretical effort to clarify the often ambiguous notion of Latin American democracy.

VIRGINIA LEWIS MULLER

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International Relations

Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty. By Robert L. Ayres. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 282. $17.50, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Banking on the Poor is a significant contribution to the literature on international political economy and in particular to that on North-South relations. Ayers, in almost anthropological fashion, has become intimately acquainted with the inner workings and thinking of the World Bank. Based primarily on Bank documents and interviews with Bank officials, the book is a comprehensive examination of the evolution of Bank policy during the McNamara years (1968 to 1981). It focuses primarily on the shift in orientation from that of a traditional bank, which funded economic infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, dams, and bridges), to a development agency whose explicit concern was the funding of projects that would directly benefit the urban and rural poor in developing states.

Ayres provides more than a well-documented history of Bank activity by placing his discussion in the context of the broader controversy over whether to emphasize growth or distribution as the basis of an effective development strategy. The Bank, Ayres argues, has based its poverty-oriented lending on the assumption that the two objectives can be achieved simultaneously. This argument enables him to respond to the conservative critique, found mainly in the United States, that the Bank has become at best, a welfare institution, and at worst a champion of socialism. Ayres contends that the Bank has maintained its traditional commitment to growth and a sound economy, viewing poverty alleviation as an effective means to achieve those ends. Rather than pursuing a radical program, the Bank is essentially supportive of the status quo, both internationally and within recipient states. Its antipoverty work is aimed not at fundamental transformation, but at incremental economic gains and the achievement or maintenance of domestic political stability.

Much of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the formulation and implementation of poverty-alleviation projects in a number of developing states. In the rural sector, the Bank's primary objective has been to increase the output and income of the small farmer; in the urban sector, to provide adequate low-cost housing and to renovate slums. In both cases, the record is mixed. For every instance in which Bank objectives were fully or partially realized, there is a counter-example presented which demonstrates that either the recipient government or the Bank itself hindered the effective implementation of a project. The reader in search of a definitive assessment with regard to the overall success of the McNamara strategy is likely to be disappointed. Ayres does not provide one, noting that it is still too early to make such a determination, and also that any attempt to define success is fraught with methodological and practical difficulties. Rather than a clear sense of the Bank's impact, what emerges from these chapters is an appreciation of the complexity and intractability of development problems and of the difficulties involved in devising and implementing meaningful solutions to them.

Even if Bank projects are implemented effectively, there remain formidable constraints on its ability to serve as an engine of development. Many governments of recipient states do not share the Bank's commitment to poverty alleviation as a growth strategy. Without their cooperation and willingness to facilitate diffusion, Bank projects are likely to become isolated showcases, or as Bank officials might prefer, "enclaves of sanity." Moreover, the Bank is generally either unwilling or unable to press for the fundamental political and economic changes necessary to ensure the adoption by governments of its orientation.

The preoccupation of many recipients with debt problems serves as an additional constraint on the Bank. The burden of austerity measures frequently falls on those groups targeted by the Bank for direct benefit. As noted by Ayres, the debt problem enhances the potential conflict between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which may find themselves working at cross purposes.

Banking on the Poor should be required reading for both students and practitioners of international political economy. It is a careful analysis of one of the key institutions of the postwar economic order and is likely to serve as a point of departure for further research.

MICHAEL MASTANDUNO

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The Fragile Entente: The 1978 Japan-China Peace Treaty in a Global Context. By Robert E. Bedeski. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 245. $20.00, paper.)

Since the early 1970s, much has been written on relations between the United States and Japan and the resumption of diplomatic ties between the United States and the People's Republic of China. What has received less attention, however, has been the evolving relationship between China and Japan. Beginning with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Peking in 1972, the Japanese government has sought to repair the damage wrought by its militarist predecessors in the 1930s and 1940s and establish a framework for positive diplomatic and economic relations with the Chinese government on the mainland. While the last vestiges of the Cultural Revolution leadership were purged from power, the process of Sino-Japanese reconciliation intensified. Deng Xiaoping's commitment to the "Four Modernizations" placed a premium on the technical expertise and trading opportunities that Japan could offer. Conversely, the promise of greater political stability in the post-Mao era made China a much more attractive investment site for Japanese businessmen. Accordingly, in August, 1978, normalization was completed with the signing of a peace treaty between the two Pacific nations.

It is the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty that is the subject of this exhaustive analysis by Robert E. Bedeski. Drawing on government publications, newspaper accounts, and magazine articles, he evaluates the significance of the treaty in the context of the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Pacific and its implications for the security of the region as a whole. Unfortunately, the book suffers from a good deal of repetition and a lack of careful editing, and one suspects that the issues could have been handled adequately within the confines of a journal article or two. Nevertheless, the analysis does offer some interesting perspectives, as well as a provocative argument concerning the historical significance of the Peace and Friendship Treaty.

Bedeski asserts that the signing of the treaty represented the extension of the Sino-Soviet conflict to involve Japan and ultimately was a destabilizing influence in the Far East. Indeed, Bedeski argues that the emergence of a new alliance between the two Soviet rivals in the Pacific contributed to the heightened sense of insecurity that prompted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Changes in the international situation since 1972 attributed greater significance than the Japanese government acknowledged to the treaty as an anti-Soviet move. With the post-Vietnam decline of America's presence in the Pacific, there was both greater pressure and opportunity for Japan to undertake a larger political role commensurate with its economic strength in the region. This political factor, combined with the economic incentives offered by the prospect of enhanced trade with a China undertaking rapid industrialization, compelled Japanese political leaders to move forward with normalization as quickly as possible.

What Japan's political leaders failed to recognize, however, was the threat that the Soviet Union perceived in the specter of an alliance between its historical enemy, Japan, and its massive rival for leadership in the international communist movement and the Third World, China. The Soviet Union, Bedeski notes, was an unacknowledged third party to the treaty. The USSR had outstanding territorial disputes with both nations, and seeing the possibility of encirclement by an "Oriental NATO," vociferously opposed the treaty from the very outset. The reason for this was that the Chinese government insisted that a clause denouncing Soviet "hegemonism" worldwide be included in the treaty, and this appeared to signify that the new link between China and Japan (particularly one that offered to China advanced technology with possible military applications) had military dimensions. It is in making this argument (chap. 6) that Bedeski's volume is at its best, for it offers new insights into the Soviet view of Sino-Japanese relations. Although Bedeski concedes that it is impossible to prove that the treaty was the primary impetus to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—for it probably was not—his analysis provides a more complete picture of Soviet perspectives on developments in the Far East than other studies have produced thus far.

This argument would have been strengthened, however, if it had been more fully supported by documentation. For example, systematic interviews with leading Japanese decision makers would have provided a more solid basis for the analysis of factors leading to the Japanese decision to pursue the treaty despite strongly voiced Soviet opposition. In addition, the study relies almost exclusively on the views of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The Left is given scant attention, and little effort is made to differentiate among its various factions like the pro-Soviet left-wing of the Socialist party and a Japanese Communist party less favorably disposed towards the Soviet Union (see p. 63). Similarly, like the reliance on cliches like "radical" versus "pragmatic" tendencies in Chinese politics, the repeated invocation of "scenarios" (pp. 134-137 and 216-218) is not especially enlightening. The need for greater methodological vigor is especially evident in Bedeski's discussion of Japanese defense policy in terms of a false dichotomy between "pacifist" and "pragmatist" viewpoints on military policy (pp. 208-211) that cannot accommodate the rise of a movement (within the LDP itself) to revise the constitution in order to facilitate military expansion beyond the limits envisaged by American leaders exerting pressure on Japan. These shortcomings notwithstanding, *The Fragile Entente* enhances our understanding of an important event in contemporary East Asian politics.

GERMAINE A. HOSTON

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Henry Kissinger: His Personality and Policies. Edited by Dan Caldwell. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 144. $27.00.)

Recalling his first meeting with the obscure Harvard professor who would soon become the most famous diplomat of our time, Richard Nixon remembers that "I had a strong intuition about Henry Kissinger. . . ." As befits modern political scientists, the authors of this collection eschew both intuition and traditional analysis in their efforts to make good on editor Dan Caldwell's promise of "an analytical assessment, based on relevant academic theories, of Kissinger's personality and policies" (p. ix). It is this fusion of methodological self-consciousness with an endlessly fascinating subject that defines the appeal—but also some of the problems—of this collection.

Harvey Starr's essay continues his systematic analysis of Kissinger's foreign policy perceptions. On one level, the chapter provides a straightforward comparison of Kissinger's memoirs with his earlier writings and concludes that his perceptions of statesmanship, bureaucratic impediments, and relations with the Soviet Union have shown a high degree of consistency over the years. These findings are reasonably interesting, if not very surprising. On the other hand, the essay carries a needlessly heavy ballast of social-scientific ruminations, which are only partially integrated with its substantive concerns. Thus, we are told that "this essay will examine the utility of the memoirs as a research tool" (p. 8), although that utility is in fact presumed (rightly so, I think) rather than examined systematically.

Dana Ward's "Kissinger: A Psychohistory" is bound to be the most controversial essay of the collection. Like blue cheese, the psychohistorical approach is very much an acquired taste. Those not already won over are unlikely to be converted by Ward's highly speculative account. The essay appeared nearly a decade ago; little attempt has been made to incorporate more recent findings for its republication here. In essence, Ward argues that Kissinger displays the standard symptoms of the depressive personality, which arose from early family and societal syndromes and which later affected his conduct of the nation's diplomacy. Citations to the psychological literature are exceedingly sparse, whereas recent research suggesting a hereditary predisposition toward depression is ignored altogether. Ward's essay is immensely suggestive, but many will be troubled by his insistence on revealing psychological portents everywhere. Thus, in Ward's telling, "the army, then, for Kissinger was on one level a means of appeasing his own guilt at blaming his father for not acting against Hitler" (p. 39). Acquired taste, indeed.

Albert Eldridge's chapter is largely of methodological interest. Arguing that the operational code approach of Alexander George and others ignores key aspects of a subject's world view, Eldridge seeks to demonstrate the superiority of a value analysis approach. The chapter is clearly constructed, and the research carefully done and explained, but in the end no one at all familiar with Kissinger's writings and career will find a great deal that is new.

Stephen Walker's is the best essay of the collection in terms of relating Kissinger's much dissected outlook to his actual policymaking behavior. One of the few authors to compare Kissinger's and Nixon's beliefs, Walker does a good job of demonstrating both the consistency of Kissinger's thought and its clear impact on American policy toward the Soviet Union and the Middle East. All graduate students—and most of their professors—would do well to emulate Walker's example of rigor without pretension.

In the final chapter, Caldwell describes the conceptual strands of Kissinger's grand global design and evaluates its success in implementation. Caldwell's is perhaps the least analytical chapter in the volume, but it offers a useful brief overview of Kissinger's policy designs.

Some readers will be put off by the volume's preoccupation with methodological matters and will see its absence of major new findings as proof that we should not yet abandon more traditional forms of understanding, including Nixon's "strong intuition." On balance, though, Caldwell is to be commended for assembling a collection that shows some of the things academic writers can do to shed light on one of the most interesting political personalities of our time.

EUGENE BROWN

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Rich Country Interests and Third World Development. Edited by Robert Cassen et al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 369. $35.00.)

Third World Policies of Industrialized Nations. Edited by Philip Taylor and Gregory Raymond. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xix + 282. $35.00.)

The nature of relations between advanced capitalist countries and the Third World continues to generate theoretical controversy among dependistas, realists, and liberals. Equally important, however, has been the quest for an appropriate level of analysis. Because North and South remain at least in part political fictions and the NIEO debate appears moribund, efforts have increasingly turned to disaggregating the relationship between North and South. One approach is to analyze the southern strategies of key northern states. These two volumes suggest that this may still be too unwieldy, particularly if the South continues to be treated as a homogeneous aggregate.

Inspired by a normative internationalism, *Rich Country Interests and Third World Development* seeks to track the fit between the policies of the advanced industrial states and the mutual interests approach advocated by the Brandt Commission. This creates a disjuncture between the country cases and the Introduction. Although the editors emphasize objective mutualities, interdependence, and the room for globalist policies, national policies are, lamentably, found to mirror historical legacy, ideology, domestic politics, economic interests, and power considerations as well as humanitarian ones.

The implicit conclusions are never squarely faced: The categories of North and South have little analytic value; rich countries conduct their policies toward the Third World largely on a regional, bilateral, and issue-by-issue basis; power continues to matter; and the significance of global negotiations and international negotiations for the conduct of northern policy remains minimal.

The book lacks any analytic framework to guide the comparative investigation of differences in policy. The elusive concept of interest that orients the work receives no careful attention. As with the Brandt reports, we are left unsure whether the interests at stake are global, national, or societal. As a result, the contributions go their own ways with varying degrees of success.

The essay by John Sewell and John Mathieson on the United States, for example, is largely concerned with the broad principles governing U.S. policy and particularly with Reagan's shift of emphasis. Glossing quickly over the politically charged specifics—protectionism, expropriation conflicts, the debt crisis, the political uses of aid, geostrategy—they end with a plea for a more "comprehensive" and "long-run" definition of U.S. interests toward the Third World.

By contrast, Vince Cable's realist assessment of Britain's third-world policy, one of the stronger contributions to the volume, recognizes that North-South relations are an amalgam of conflicting as well as complementary interests in which domestic politics is central. With no support for Brandt's global Keynesianism, British policy uneasily balances the dictates of liberal ideology and an imperial legacy with the domestic pressures associated with industrial decline and increasing competition from the newly industrializing countries. Ronald Dore's discussion of Japan also reveals clearly the limitations of globalism. Acutely aware of their stake in the Third World, the Japanese have pursued their interests effectively through a combination of bilateralism, particular attention to Southeast Asia, and various domestic measures such as industrial restructuring.

Other contributions discuss Canada, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Scandinavia.

The book lacks a conclusion, but two themes reappear: the fragmentation of the policy process and the importance of elite ideologies. Given that the NIEO package is an unwieldy conglomeration of economic and foreign policy issues, the first should come as no surprise. Equally interesting are the wide ideological differences among the advanced states. Roughly similar economic interests—Britain and France, for example—are seen to elicit variable responses, although such observations receive no explanation.

Third World Policies of Industrialized Nations presents only a thin analytic framework, and its attempt to theorize is overplayed. Nonetheless, the book's starting point, frequently attacked in the country studies, is basically sound. In opposition to Sewell and Mathieson's call for "comprehensiveness," Gregory Raymond notes that the conflict between societal interests and the constraints of interdependence will make a consistent long-run foreign economic policy difficult to maintain in all of the democracies. These political constraints are likely to lead to the dominance of efforts to reduce vulnerability over the pursuit of developmental goals. National policies reflecting only delicate political compromises will prove difficult to coordinate into a global effort. Although the outcome of these constraints is somewhat vacuously labeled as "preservative adaptation," their basic assumptions provide some baseline for comparison and impart a different tone to the book.

The contrast can be seen in the books' treatments of France. Albert Bressand's chapter in *Rich Country Interests and Third World Development* begins with a digression on French intellectuals' preoccupation with the Third World, skipping lightly over France's concrete political and economic stake and treating the South as an aggregate. By contrast, J. Barron Boyd, Jr.'s chapter in *Third World Policies of Industrialized Nations* focuses squarely on the all-important African connection. Confronting the question of neocolonialism, Boyd discusses the role of the military and arms sales, the country's neomercentile trade strategy, and the historical significance of empire, as well as France's distinctive posture toward the NIEO. The result is a more compelling portrait, even if it runs counter to the expectation of "preservative adaptation."

A similar contrast can be drawn between Sewell and Mathieson's policy-oriented treatment of the United States and that by Michael Stohl and Harry Targ in the Taylor and Raymond volume. Mathieson and Sewell see U.S. policy as more myopic than malign, arguing that the United States has to recognize its real interests in the Third World and deemphasize security preoccupations. Adopting a more historical and radical stance, Stohl and Targ already see U.S. policy as "comprehensive," and reiterate the familiar argument that the United States has promoted a political-economic order centered on itself in which security and a particular form of development are in fact closely tied together.

Other chapters in the Taylor and Raymond volume deal with Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada, and the Netherlands. Lee Farnsworth's historical account of Japan's third-world policy is straightforward and useful. The book also includes a brief chapter on the EEC's policies and a useful summary of the Soviet Union's economic relations with the Third World.

The two books have different purposes. Cassen et al. are interested in making an assessment of the fate of the Brandt reports. Taylor and Raymond strive for some theoretical statement, and although falling short, impart a more historical flavor to their book. The main problem (aside from the typical unevenness of edited volumes) is in the level of analysis itself. "Third world policies" and "rich country interests" are catch-alls for a broad range of policies from the strategic, political, regional, and bilateral, to trade, finance, aid, and even industrial restructuring. With such an agenda, and without clear comparative frameworks, characterizations tend toward the highly general.

STEPHAN HAGGARD

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How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer. By Israel W. Charny. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 430. $25.50.)

This is a book with noble intentions, but problematic execution. Devoted to the explanation and ultimate prevention of genocide, Charny, executive director of the Institute of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, presents important information in a confusing and redundant narrative.

Starting with an analysis of the process that turns "normal man" into "genocider," Charny begins by pointing out that, from a psychological perspective, "genociders are not generally distinguishable as 'sicker' than most other people" (p. 10). In fact, they are generally quite "normal" citizens of their culture who believe that the monstrous acts they commit are justified. Marshalling evidence from various case studies of genocide, as well as from psychological studies by Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo and the replications of these, Charny argues that "genocide is a complex of forces that can be set off in virtually any society of normal human beings" (p. 18).

Despite this pessimistic assessment, Charny takes pains to point out that there are people who are willing to resist genocide. Thus, he forsakes the usually simplistic analysis that often argues that genocide is perpetrated by psychopaths for the more complicated and controversial view elucidated by Hannah Arendt in her famous notion of the "banality of evil."

The problem with this book is that the analysis that follows this presentation of the complexity of genocidal behavior is presented in a series of disjointed, short statements which are repeated throughout the book. Thus, when Charny sets out to examine "What Are the Origins of Human Destructiveness?" (p. 33), the reader is presented with statements such as:

> 1. We are alive!
> 2. We are dying!
> 3. We wish to feel alive.
> 4. We wish to die well. (p. 35)

Each of these is followed by a brief analysis that is usually not more than a paragraph or two in length and is, generally, oversimplified. As a result, Charny is unable to construct a coherent theory of human destructiveness.

Further hampering such an effort is the tendency to be drawn off into a digressive search for what Charny refers to as "basic life energy or built-in natural force 'aggression' " (p. 47). By this, he means to argue that aggression is "ever-present, purposeful, pulsating energy or strength for *being* that charges the very spirit of living organisms" (p. 47). This forms the basis of an attempt to develop a model of "psycho-atomic energy" (p. 48) that ultimately becomes a series of propositions designed, one supposes, to argue that life is primarily a dialectical process of creation and destruction, good and evil.

As an attempt to build a theory to explain the repeated occurrence of genocide, or as an account of the numerous examples of genocide, this book suffers in comparison with works such as Helen Fein's *Accounting for Genocide* (The Free Press, 1979) and Leo Kuper's *Genocide* (Yale University Press, 1981).

The strength of the present work, however, lies in the fact that it attempts to do more than explain why genocide has occurred in the past. Charny also examines the possibility for hope in the future and attempts to construct a "genocide early warning system." These efforts differentiate this book from most others.

Directly confronting the question of whether or not there can still be "hope," Charny posits "nonviolent aggression" as an antidote to destructive violence (chap. 19). But planned aggression such as international sports events always flounder when confronted by the reality of national interest or state sovereignty. The power of nation states and the desire for political and economic supremacy seem to preclude successful implementation of some substitute for war. Unfortunately, as long as nation states operate on the basis of the traditional imperatives of power and national interest, and as long as cultural and national myths of superiority and inferiority are passed to succeeding generations via the process of political socialization, so long will humanity be subjected to the horrible evil of periodic mass murder.

Even more interesting from the perspective of circumventing future genocide is Charny's attempt to construct a genocide "early warning system" (chap. 13). This early warning system is supposed to create "an information feedback system" (p. 287) that would involve three different levels of data collection.

First, it would begin by assembling "the facts of ongoing genocide around the world in a comprehensive and systematic way" (p. 287).

Second, it would catalogue the "wide range of human rights violations that fall short of genocide. . ." (p. 287).

Third, a "broad spectrum of social indicators" would be tracked as an attempt to get some indication as to the likelihood of a state committing genocide. These would include "the valuing of life in a society, the valuing of the quality of life, a culture's orientation to the distribution of power, . . ." as well as indicators on patterns of dehumanization and the legitimation of violence (p. 288).

Although measurement problems would be difficult, there is little doubt that such a system could be implemented and that it would be very valuable. The primary question, however, remains what can be done, and by whom, when an early warning is triggered. If the system were, for example, to warn that genocide is likely in some nation state, what avenues could be pursued to prevent the occurrence?

One might hope, however, that this is too pessimistic and that Charny's optimism is more justifiable. As he notes,

> In the final analysis, if a Genocide Early Warning System someday serves 'only' to save

> several thousand potential victims by enabling them to flee the clutches of a genocider headed toward their homes, the effort and cost of building such an early warning system will have been justified. (p. 331)

Certainly, Charny is correct, and although this book suffers from a redundant and confusing narrative, it does attempt to confront the complex roots of genocide and to put forth suggestive proposals to insure that these seemingly endless atrocities do not reoccur. It may, consequently, act as a first inoculation against human beings continuing to become, as Genet characterized Goring, "a brain without a conscience."

HERBERT HIRSCH

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America's New Immigration Law: Origins, Rationales, and Potential Consequences. Edited by Wayne A. Cornelius and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya. (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1983. Pp. vi + 182. $9.00, paper.)

U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues. Edited by Mary M. Kritz. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xxi + 415. $25.00.)

These two volumes are similar in that they are anthologies resulting from conferences where one finds many of the same authors. There similarity ends, however. The Cornelius-Montoya volume, despite its impressive cast of authors, demonstrates the inherent weaknesses in publishing conference proceedings, not the least of which is an uneven set of papers. Even more, however, the volume suffers from the problems associated with placing a premium on reaching a target audience (the policy community) in the shortest possible time. In contrast, the editing of *U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy* exhibits extreme care in presenting balanced, comprehensive, and scholarly essays on a topic where emotion, superficiality, and advocacy usually prevail.

The contrasts between the two volumes become even sharper when one reviews the contributions of both projects: Footnotes, sparse in the Cornelius-Montoya book, abound in the Kritz volume; presentations by such respected authors as Lawrence H. Fuchs, Aristide R. Zolberg, and Charles B. Keely are full of generalizations in the former volume, but move in the direction of thoughtful analyses in the latter; and the editors' chapters both set the tone and further distinguish the two projects. Kritz is brief and limits herself to bringing together the many strands that run through the volume while outlining the components of the policy debate. Cornelius opts for presenting a substantive topic, which leaves the volume without an introductory chapter. Furthermore, he contrasts the terms of the still-pending Immigration Control and Reform Act with the "realities of Mexican immigration." He then proceeds to condemn the U.S. political and legislative process for failing "to provide an *adequate* legal-entry option for enough people from those countries most likely to export low-skilled labor to the U.S." (p. 140, emphasis added) without either explaining the term "adequate" or attempting to come to terms with the implications of that statement. His subsequent denouncement of "employer sanctions"—a key feature of the pending legislation that would penalize employers for knowingly hiring illegal aliens—as a "quack remedy" (p. 142), and the evidence he uses to support that assertion, further weaken the credibility of that chapter and reflect the tone of much of the volume.

Such unnecessary polemics severely undermine the book's more important contributions. For example, Cornelius himself makes a strong case for reducing the legal vulnerability of undocumented aliens. Manuel Garcia y Griego includes among the intolerable costs of employer sanctions the "intergovernmental conflict that could result between the U.S. and the source countries of undocumented migration, such as Mexico" (p. 155), but then abandons this intriguing line of argument and with it the opportunity to make a genuine contribution to this debate. Carl Schwarz offers a rare review of the enforcement record of those states that have employer sanctions legislation of their own. And in the best essay in this otherwise-unexceptional anthology, Alejandro Portes lucidly analyzes the reasons for the current groundswell for immigration reform, finds them in the challenge that clandestine immigration poses for the ability of the state to "defend the basic attributes of its sovereignty" (p. 24), and offers a sensible three-step alternative to the pending Act.

In contrast, most of the contributions to the Kritz volume commend that book as required reading for advanced students and laymen who are serious about immigration. Aristide Zolberg leads the first section of the book with a superior presentation of immigration as a global field of social interaction. His historical insights are useful, as are his admonitions against getting lost in the details and apparent uniqueness of different population movements. His otherwise sensitive treatment, one that includes recognition of the dilemma facing affluent societies about whether to allow international migration to effect a limited redistribution of benefits in the knowledge that this contribution to global equity is "imposed on the most disadvantaged in their own midst" (p. 47), is marred by occasional lapses also evident in his essay in the Cornelius-Montoya volume. For example, he states that "states of origin commonly believe migration drains the most valuable segments of their population, whereas states of destination think of themselves as dumping grounds for the burdensome offspring of irresponsible progenitors" (p. 18). It is inconceivable that such a blanket statement can be defended, regardless of how broad the brush and how large the canvas on which one is painting.

Portes offers another insightful essay, this time going beyond his well-known reservations about the analytical utility of push-pull theories of migration and his usual predisposition to assign to the state a key role in the migration process. He develops the thesis that a state's choice of development strategy and the degree, speed, and depth of its subordinate incorporation into the world economy induces emigration the closer this strategy adheres to the export-led growth model.

The essays on Caribbean migration and on the demography of international migration are generally strong and competent treatises. Also of interest is the essay by Kennell Jackson, who questions the assumption of cooperation between blacks and Hispanics on the immigration question both on historical grounds and on an analysis of the ongoing antagonism between these two groups. Finally, the articles by Lawrence Fuchs and Anthony Maingot complete the cycle of strong essays. Fuchs thoughtfully explores the question of how immigration affects U.S. culture and politics, what he calls the "challenge of the *Pluribus* to the *Unum*" (p. 289), and calls for a new theory of "civic unity" that allows a plurality of "private beliefs and behaviors, while insisting on conformity to core civic values for participation in public institutions" (p. 312). In a somewhat similar vein, Maingot argues that America's failure to reach consensus on the immigration issue reflects the inability of the issue to command the moral depth, and evoke the collective national guilt, that the race issue evoked. Instead, immigration, and the central issue of citizenship which it involves, evolved along lines of "politically acceptable procedural justice" (p. 363) which reflects the changing patterns of ethnic political power and the process of acommodation between elites and ethnic minorities.

Among the book's less insightful essays are those by Charles Keely, David North, Charles Killingworth, and the Rand Corporation's collective effort, signed by Kevin McCarthy and David Ronfeldt.

DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU

Population Associates International

The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico. Edited by Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 228. $20.00, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

This second volume in Stanford University's Project on U.S.-Mexican Relations is a critical and comparative assessment of recent U.S. and Mexican policy towards Central America. Each of the chapters contained in this anthology is the product of a binational meeting of scholars during the summer of 1982 in Guanajuato, Mexico. The essays are selective and, for the most part, specifically focused on the policy differences between Mexico and the United States with regards to Central America. They recognize first the profound role of the United States in shaping basic policy dimensions on the Isthmus and, second, Mexico's emergence as a major regional actor since 1979.

The bulk of the essays fall into five topical categories, including the nature of the Central American crisis, views of the crisis and policy responses in the United States, Mexico's Central American policies and their implications, and case studies of contending policy approaches and problems with respect to Nicaragua and Guatemala. Excluded from this inventory of problem cases is El Salvador which, the editors argue, has already received considerable attention elsewhere. Also excluded are studies of countries that have not, at least yet, become problem cases (e.g., Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama) and studies of the roles of other important regional actors (Cuba and Venezuela, for example) as these bear on U.S. and Mexican policies, except in passing.

Although students of inter-American affairs will find many of the essays useful, several are worthy of special comment. Isaac Cohen and Gert Rosenthal's essay, "The Dimensions of Economic Policy Space in Central America," stands out as one of the most succinct explanations currently available of the economic constraints on Central American governments seeking to pursue moderate reformist policy options. An essay by Xabier Gorostiaga provides a thorough inventory of the internal and external policy objectives of the Sandinista government and a cogent arument that the Reagan administration is forcing the Sandinista regime into a self-fulfilling prophecy of closer consort with the socialist bloc.

Articles by Olga Pellicer and Mario Ojeda cautiously attempt to unravel an explanation for Mexico's new policy activism in the region. Mexico's new role, they argue, is a function of its belief that substantial social change is long overdue in the region and prerequisite to political stability, contrary to the views of the Reagan administration. Its activism is also a function of its basic confidence that it can coexist with revolutionary change in the area. More specifically, Ojeda argues the Mexican decision is related to its primordial fear of U.S. intervention in the region, the absence of another country that might function as an acceptable mediator between major power contenders, and Mexico's singular legitimacy with revolutionary movements in Central America.

Finally, the essays by Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer and Piero Gleijeses on the Guatemalan case perform an admirable service in detailing the failure of successive U.S. policies towards that country and explaining why Guatemala is the special exception in Mexico's current orientation towards Central America.

The dating of wisdom in the field of foreign affairs is one of its constant perils, as much for the academic analyst as the zealous practitioner. Nowhere has this become more evident than in the fast-breaking world of Central American politics. Useful as these essays are, they are unfortunately marred by the lapse of time in publication. The discerning reader will be annoyed by lack of reference to the Contadora initiative, the Mexican devaluation and economic crisis of late 1982, the De la Madrid government, the Grandero exercises in Honduras, or implications arising from the invasion of Grenada. Would that the editors had made a more energetic effort to update these essays before they were published.

STEPHEN P. MUMME

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The US, the UN, and the Management of Global Change. Edited by Toby Trister Gati. (New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 380. $37.50, cloth; $15.00, paper.)

This book succeeds in achieving its primary purpose: to simulate "serious thinking" about the role that the United Nations can play in the international system and about the United Nation's usefulness to U.S. foreign policy. It does so through the juxtaposition of 16 essays, originally written for the UNA-USA's National Policy Panel on the United Nations' system after 35 years.

Unfortunately, many of the essays are too brief to more than stimulate thought; that is, they aren't elaborated sufficiently to make sustained and convincing arguments. Most obvious in this regard are Steven Krasher's and Donald Puchala's contentious and stimulating but very different essays, with Krasner portraying the fundamental challenge to the United States as the management of the decline of hegemony and Puchala suggesting that continued support for the United Nations and even deepened involvement in its policies, programs, and processes remain in the American national interest. In addition, much of the overlap between the essays could have been eliminated, and perhaps they could have been organized in a clearer fashion. Indeed, given the title and purposes of the volume, one can even raise some question about the inclusion of some of the essays, noteworthy as they might be in other regards. Most obvious in this context is Ivor Richard's essay on "Major Objectives and Functions of the UN: The View from Abroad" (read Britain) and Nigel S. Rodley's revealing case study on the role of nongovernmental organizations in the field of human rights. A more effectively edited volume may also have resulted in a systematic application of the framework of analysis that is implicit in several of the essays, which appropriately emphasizes the effects of international systemic conditions on the UN's past, present, and future potential. None of this, however, is meant to demean the value of some of the important insights of this collection.

For example, Robert W. Cox is right to challenge politicians, negotiators, and academics not to ignore the potential impact of social forces on the world system, for, as he perceptively suggests: "The viability of present international organizations can be gauged by the widening or narrowing of the hiatus between the demands of emerging social forces and the responses of international institutions" (p. 79). In a much less abstract, but no less useful and original contribution, Sidney Weintraub convincingly argues that the United States has never "known how to use the United Nations. . . . For the most part, our ambassadors to the United Nations have been distinguished persons, but we do not know whether we want them to be spokesmen or initiators, the good cop or the bad cop, to behave like Moynihan, who was chosen because he would go into opposition or like Young, who would present a sympathetic side to the Third World, or somewhere in between" (p. 184). Likewise, Ronald Meltzer presents an up-to-date chronicle of the frustrating efforts at reforming the nonsecurity end of UN activities, and Robert Meagher offers a useful discussion of the long-standing financial problems confronting the global body. Meagher also provides a valuable discussion of many of the causes of recent American congressional disillusionment with the United Nations.

An additional strength of this volume is the attempt to give the reader a flavor for the UN's past, present, and future in both security and nonsecurity areas, and to focus on both institutional and process variables. Accordingly, Leon Gordenker provides a useful overview essay, and Debra Miller and Jock Finlayson and Mark Zacher systematically review much of the organization's record in the security area, although these essayists stray a bit from the UN focus and both essays need some updating.

This work provides a series of important insights and reflections on the United Nations' strengths and limits, particularly relevant at this time in American history wherein people at all levels of government and academe are rethinking the organization's value, and particularly its worth to the United States.

MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER

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Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War. By Stanley Hoffmann. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. Pp. 312. $24.50.)

Dead Ends constitutes Stanley Hoffmann's third book-length foray into American foreign policy. The 12 essays are sorted into four thematic groups—detente, Reagan, NATO, and Hoffmann's policy advice—a tactic that adds some structure to these overlapping and frequently redundant essays written between 1979 and 1982.

The themes that weave through these pages are familiar enough: the growing complexity of the international system, the demands and opportunities of global interdependence, the multidimensional and nonfungible nature of power, the limited utility of military force, the relative decline of the United States, the weaknesses of previous American diplomacy, and the need for a "mixed" strategy toward the Soviet Union. But at the heart of these essays lies Hoffmann's assertion that the foreign policies pursued by Kissinger, Carter, and especially Reagan have led American foreign policy into a series of dead ends.

For Hoffmann, Kissinger's detente strategy was little more than a elaboration of the discredited policy of anti-Communist containment: "the struggle between Moscow and Washington is not just global in scope, it absorbs . . . every other conflict or issue. . . . Every crisis anywhere tests our ability to stand up to the Soviets. And the credibility of the United States depends on our capacity to meet every test" (p. 35). Kissinger substituted "for the real world an artifically simple and tidy one, in which friends and foes, radicals and moderates are neatly lined up, and . . . nationalism—surely as important a force as communism—gets thoroughly discounted. . ." (p. 35). Not only did the strategy require an "extraordinary capacity" for swift and flexible global action that proved incompatible with the American system of government, but it also "left room for only two options: a constant manning of barricades, permanent crisis management, an endless vista of confrontations and tests, or else Soviet acceptance of the inevitable U.S. dominance" (p. 33). Although the first vision was bleak, domestic and international conditions made the alternative extremely unlikely.

Whereas Kissinger's design suffered from the fatal flaw of hegemonic pretension, Carter understood that the diffusion of power to new actors insistent on asserting themselves and on rejecting neocolonial dependencies had created a world in which American "leadership without hegemony" could be our only possible role. Furthermore, Hoffmann applauds Carter's early emphasis on such long-term global issues as human rights, nuclear proliferation, arms sales, and the law of the sea, and he credits the administration with appreciating "that this ever more complex world could be neither managed by the superpowers nor reduced to the relationship between them" (p. 69). But in its eagerness to reduce America's traditional obsession with communism, Carter's administration never offered a strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. This disastrous omission constituted, in Hoffmann's memorable culinary metaphor, "the hole in the doughnut" of Carter's world order outlook: "it failed to decide and to communicate . . . which Soviet activities were intolerable, and which were compatible with Washington's concept of the bipolar contest" (pp. 73-74). In short, "never did the administration succeed in integrating its excellent intuitions and assumptions into a strategy" (p. 73).

In the book's angriest essay, "The New Orthodoxy: A Critique and an Alternative," Hoffmann ridicules Reagan for his dangerous and pathetic reembrace of a global containment strategy that again reduces the world to an ideological and military confrontation between the superpowers and for his dubious claim that America had merely lost the *will* to employ its power. Such nostalgia will surely result in a dead end at best, as allies grow alienated, an arms race spirals, and Moscow refuses to capitulate.

Unfortunately, Hoffmann fails to balance his perceptive diagnoses with a realistic alternative. Beyond suggesting that the United States must engage the Soviets in a "mixed game" of competition and cooperation while simultaneously demonstrating sensitivity to pervasive global change, Hoffmann says little about the purposes of American power. Rather, he bombards us with elaborate lists of factors that allegedly make that power unusable even as he reminds us of America's "obviously huge" international responsibility. Hoffmann had once likened the new world of complex interdependence to an omelette (*Primacy or World Order*, McGraw-Hill, 1978, p. 111), but his innumerable policy guidelines resemble a recipe for an incredibly fragile souffle whose actual flavor can be but dimly perceived, for Hoffmann offers no firm idea of what sort of world he envisions after we add and blend all his ingredients. What he does suggest often borders on the platitudinous: America needs "statesmen capable of tolerating, appreciating, and exploiting complexity—not simple-minded leaders. They should be capable of recognizing and pursuing long-term interests, not momentary advantages" (p. 5).

Yet Hoffmann admits that the greatest obstacles blocking his intricate strategy "lie within the United States—in the national psyche and style, in the political and economic systems, and the organization of the government" (p. 13). If so, then we confront more than a dead end; for if the only policy that will save us bears little relation to our history, values, and institutions, then the United States faces real tragedy.

RICHARD A. MELANSON

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Cognative Dynamics and International Politics. Edited by Christer Jonsson. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. vii + 210. $27.50.)

Approaches to international relations that concentrate on both psychological and political factors have witnessed something of a resurgence in recent years. Jonsson's edited volume, which has its roots in a 1980 Florence conference, is one example of this trend.

In the volume, Jonsson presents seven research chapters plus an introductory and a short concluding chapter. Although the introductory chapter provides a useful, brief overview of "cognitive" studies, it misses two opportunities. First, although Jonsson points out such thorny but central issues as data problems and unit of analysis choice, he chooses not to delve into contending positions relative to these issues. Second, the rubric cognitive approaches has been used by scholars in a number of related areas. The overview nature of the introductory chapter could have provided a forum for explicating differences between the research efforts of this volume and, for example, such cognitively based approaches as cognitive science or artificial intelligence.

In Michael Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham's chapter 2, the authors attempt to apply their cognitive mapping approach to collective rather than individual decision making. They also shift from the assumptions of their previous work to the more phenomenological assumption that "there is no situation apart from the various construals of it" (p. 20). The shift, although significant, is not as radical as it may seem on the surface, because by situation the authors appear to mean the anticipated consequences of potential actions. Shapiro and Bonham spend most of the chapter explicating a carefully thought out strategy for calculating which "causal" view is likely to prevail in a particular group. Although not faulting the assumptions, it seems to me that anyone who could provide the required estimates of power and control might well be able to identify the likelihood of any view prevailing even more quickly. Under any circumstances, the chapter is certainly worth reading as a serious attempt to deal with the troublesome political psychology issue of moving from individual cognitive structure to group dynamics.

Gunnar Sjoblom's chapter 3 discusses a number of difficulties associated with employing an operational code approach. Because it provides an effective overview of such difficulties, the chapter would be helpful reading material for those debating whether to employ such an approach. Ole Holsti's response to Sjoblom in chapter 4 should also be read by the researcher considering using an operational code design.

In chapter 5, Robert Cutler sets out to combine cognitive mapping and operational code through a variant of Robert P. Abelson's conceptual dependency analysis. Cutler's example whets my appetite for more details of how some of the seeming contradictions between these two approaches can be resolved. In his conclusion, Cutler himself refers to "the incompatible marriage of the mathematical model of logic (cognitive mapping) with the linguistic one (conceptual dependency analysis)." I look forward to seeing further work by this young scholar to see whether his initial integrative zeal can survive the radical contrast between the fundamental premises and building blocks of conceptual dependency and the other two approaches.

Applying role theory to foreign policy analysis is the endeavor of Christer Jonsson and Ulf Westerlund in chapter 6. After a readable introduction to role theory, the authors apply their framework to the comparison of superpower foreign policy. Although the patterns that they observe are thought provoking, their work is basically descriptive. Systematically comparing some of their patterns with what would be expected by some theories of international political behavior would seem to be a next logical step. Additionally, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using UN General Assembly speeches as a basis for determining role conceptions would have been helpful.

Frank Edmead, in chapter 7, suggests a set of paradigms designed to explain changes in perceptions of individuals and of collectivities during the course of a conflict. The framework is a modified version of Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky's subjectively expected utility approach. Although cases are cited periodically in presenting the rationale behind particular posited relationships, the true test of the framework's ability to help us understand perceptions in conflict will lie in any yet-to-be-performed empirical tests.

In the spirit of a cautionary research note, Thomas Hart sets out "to consider some of the problems of analysis in the Afghanistan case. . ." (p. 179) in chapter 8. Hart's frustration in acknowledging the subjectivity of psychological data will be read empathetically by virtually all scholars who have worked in this area.

In summary, this volume presents studies using a variety of cognitive approaches in international politics. Like all of our research, many of the individual chapters could benefit from conceptual and empirical development. As a creditable sample of work in a burgeoning field, though, the book is recommended.

DONALD A. SYLVAN

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Nigeria and the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By Festus Ogboaja Ohaegbulum. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1983. Pp. 190. $20.00.)

This book addresses two questions: What was Nigeria's role in the Congo crisis?, and What determined Nigeria's Congo policy in particular and its foreign policy in general? Although Ohaegbulum provides a precise and well-written answer to the first question, his response to the second is inconsistent and unconvincing. The weaknesses of the book, however, are interesting ones and provide insight into the intellectual milieu in which Nigerian foreign policy is formulated.

Ohaegbulum summarizes the complex events of the Congo crisis with clarity and describes Nigeria's participation in the U.N. mission there. Although the crisis began before Nigeria's formal independence, Nigeria soon became a significant actor in the long struggle. By the end of the mission, Nigeria had provided approximately 2,000 troops to the U.N. forces. Over the span of five years, Nigeria contributed the services of 4,000 policemen who provided civil order and trained Congolese counterparts. The total cost of Nigerian operations was $44 million. Ohaegbulum judges Nigeria's policy to be generally successful in that it helped to maintain the territorial integrity of the Congolese state, Nigeria's first priority. Furthermore, it established Nigeria's "positive image and constructive presence in world affairs, confirming that Nigeria has the potential to become an effective power for good on the international scene" (p. 118).

Despite these successes, Nigeria's policy is also viewed as idealistic, legalistic, pro-Western, and somewhat naive. Both strengths and weaknesses are attributed mainly to the personality of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, prime minister of Nigeria's first republic. Nigeria achieved independence only three months after the eruption of the Congo crisis. It itself, therefore, was only beginning to establish bureaucratic and political mechanisms for policy formulation. Thus, it is argued that an institutional vacuum allowed the prime minister to create policy almost at will. In Oghaebulum's view, Balewa established precedents of caution, compromise, and pragmatism that were followed by subsequent Nigerian leaders. The author's view of Balewa, however, is ambiguous and contradictory. Although he sometimes regards Balewa as almost a free agent in foreign policymaking, Ohaegbulum also notes that Nigeria's Congo policy was "in no small measure due to the development and composition of Nigeria as a federation of several nationalities. . . . In the Congo Nigeria pursued a policy of moderation and pragmatism because it knew what that policy meant at home" (p. 147). This is doubtless correct. Still elsewhere, however, Ohaegbulum deplores this same caution. Balewa's government "regrettably was not the one to develop the material and moral resources of Africa and fashion them into a striking force. Contrary to the early optimism of many, his government came to manifest a lack of the adventurous spirit and decisiveness such a task demanded" (p. 136). Ten pages later, the point of view shifts again. Here Ohaegbulum deplores the failure to discern in the Congo crisis the roots of Nigeria's own tragedy. "It is a sad commentary on the Nigerian leadership . . . that, by not using the same spirit of accommodation and compromise that characterized . . . its policy toward the resolution of the Congo crisis, they failed to resolve the series of political crises that threw Nigeria into civil war" (pp. 145-146).

The discussion of policymaking, then, is inconsistent. It does not develop firm conclusions. Analysis of the Congo crisis, however, does serve as a base from which the author leaps to broad and unsubstantiated reflections on Nigerian affairs. Ohaegbulum analyzes politics in the Congo, but he moralizes about politics in Nigeria. When discussing Congolese matters, he is consistent in seeing the struggle for domestic political power as the primary cause of events and policy. When he turns to Nigeria, both consistency and precision fade. His discussion of "policy formation" in Nigeria is merely a description of Tafewa Balewa. The basis and limitations of the prime minister's influence are not addressed systematically. Although Ohaegbulum admires Balewa for his success in bringing prestige to Nigeria with his Congo policy, the nature of his power is ignored. The complexity of Nigeria's power structure is similarly ignored when lamenting Balewa's failure to prevent coup and civil war at home. In discussing the Congo, Ohaegbulum is a careful observer of realpolitik. In discussing Nigeria, he is a frustrated nationalist.

The contradictions of this book, however, are illuminating ones. The strength of Nigerian nationalism is demonstrated not only by the nature of its Congo policy, but also by the author's inability to apply the same standards of judgment to Congolese and Nigerian politics. As the personification of Nigeria, Balewa is alternately admired and lamented. He is treated not as a politician, but as a symbol. In sum, the book provides evidence of the strength and complexity of Nigerian nationalism as well as analysis of Nigeria's policy in the Congo.

LAWRENCE P. FRANK

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The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin American Perspective. Edited by Francisco Orrego Vicuna. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. 188. $18.00, paper.)

The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) had its origin in Latin American legislation and practice and subsequently received general international community approval at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The EEZ, extending control of the coastal state over resources and related activities beyond a 12-mile territorial sea out to 200 miles offshore and occupying more than one-third of total ocean space, has great economic and political importance. This book surveys the major juridical and political aspects of the EEZ concept more systematically than previous studies, and the authoritative nature of the essays by nine Latin American jurists and diplomats reflects their personal involvement in the law-of-the-sea negotiations. Because the negotiations were largely informal in nature, the descriptions of the participants about the evolution of EEZ negotiating alignments and postures constitute a major contribution to the literature. Various essays focus on the origins of the EEZ, negotiations leading to the EEZ, the legal status of the EEZ, and specific aspects of the EEZ including military uses, fisheries, and the settlement of disputes.

As the subtitle of the book indicates, a Latin American perspective of the EEZ is also presented, which, it should be emphasized, is done exclusively by Latin American contributors. Because Latin America provided the original impetus for the EEZ, and because the concept was long polemical in nature and in some respects remains so, it is fitting that the book is committed to this vigorous regional perspective. Nonetheless, the EEZ regime, as embodied in the 1982 law-of-the-sea convention, is global, not regional, in nature and reflects a compromise between various diverging interests, not just one regional point of view. Other points of view are stated by the authors, such as those of the maritime powers and of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, but these views are always contrasted unfavorably with those of third-world coastal states. What is lacking is an assessment of how the EEZ is likely to evolve as an emerging global regime for control of offshore areas. In part, this inadequacy stems from the concern of the Latin American authors with advocacy of the regional and third-world case. Moreover, the heavy juridical thrust of the essays focuses attention on legislative history and textual analysis rather than on state practice as an indicator of how the EEZ is being implemented.

Related difficulties of the book include considerable repetition and a style that is often not easy to follow and at times is unclear. At the same time, the English-language reader has not heretofore been exposed to such an articulate Latin American/third-world view of the EEZ or how this shaped the global EEZ regime. Those familiar with the Spanish and Portuguese-language literatures on the law of the sea will be more familiar with the themes expressed therein, and more specifically will recognize the resemblance of a number of the essays to previous writings of the contributors.

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Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma. Edited by Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron, and Charles L. O. Buderi. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983. Pp. x + 184. $21.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

The average reader of the Law of the Sea Convention is well aware that the draft treaty was finalized in December, 1982 after 16 years of active negotiations. The convention was signed by an overwhelming majority, including major maritime nations such as the Soviet Union, Japan, France, and China; however, some important Western nations including the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy have refused to do so. The primary reason for this refusal was their concern over the deep seabed mining provisions. The fundamental objection of the Reagan administration was its view that the treaty was a threat to Western economic and political philosophy, namely, the questions of private property rights, the meaning and effect of national sovereignty, and the nature and purpose of international law itself. As typical of multilateral treaties, the convention was a chain of compromise but did not meet the basic ideological principles Americans bargained for.

Because of the significance of the U.S. policy position and the implications of the precedence of the treaty, the Reagan administration policy was rather controversial. The main aim of the book under review is to ponder and illuminate this controversy. For this purpose, the editors have put together nine articles and a summary of the Law of the Sea Convention. The book is organized under five general headings: the Introduction; "Rights, Interests and International Equity"; "Practical Differences: Seabed Mining"; "Law of the Sea and the Future of International Order"; and the Appendix. Most articles are written by individuals who participated in the negotiation of the treaty.

Four essays under the second heading examine the value and implications of the deep seabed mining regime from the perspectives of U.S. policy and world order. The first essay by Arvid Pardo criticizes not only the American policy, but also the convention itself, because the treaty failed "to mold the legal framework governing activities . . . in a way that contributes effectively to a just and equitable international order in the seas. . ." (p. 25). Two essays that follow focus on the perspective of U.S. policy and were written before the Reagan administration decided to withdraw from the negotiations in March, 1981. The essay by Leigh Ratiner urges the United States not to withdraw from the negotiations, but rather to fight for American principles within the system, because, "if the Western industrialized powers, minus the United States, join the Soviet bloc and the Third World, they will create a historic global organization . . . without American influence, participation, or leadership, [thus] our nation will suffer a much more serious adverse precedent than any . . . we fought against in the treaty negotiation itself" (p. 41). Opposed to this scenario, another essay argues that the deep seabed authority would be under the tyranny of third-world nations, proving counterproductive to both the independence and interests of the United States. In his essay, Robert Goldwin contends that the treaty not only would gradually legitimize institutional settings that would be contrary to American economic and political philosophy, but would also hinder the achievement of a just world order.

Two articles under the third heading examine the possible deep seabed authority from the point of American practical interests. One article by Lance N. Antum and James K. Sebenius focuses on commercial incentives for ocean mining under the convention. They conclude that although there would be a number of problems and uncertainties, there would be no significant deterrence of ocean mining "at least through the first two decades of the next century" (p. 99). The other article, by Lewis I. Cohen, focuses on the possibility of mining under coordinated national regimes, the so-called "mini-treaty" option. Cohen concludes that the treaty "has done nothing to create the confidence necessary to make seabed mining a reality" (p. 101).

Two final articles under the fourth heading focus on future American policy and its implications on international order. Bernard Oxman outlines issues posed by the treaty and examines the actual threat to American principles and world order. Joseph Nye contends that the United States has learned some valuable lessons from its leadership role in the multilateral regime formation. Readers will find his observations stimulating (see pp. 113-126).

With the exception of the last two articles, most of the book is now of historical interest. The Appendix is an excellent summary of this long and complex treaty (a total of 44 articles). In my opinion, any general reader will greatly be benefited by reading this summary.

ROBERT S. JUNN

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Interaction: Foreign Policy and Public Policy. Edited by Don C. Piper and Ronald J. Terchek. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983. Pp. xii + 235. $16.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The domestic political context of American foreign policymaking is a focus of inquiry that raises questions of both theoretical import and political relevance. These include the effect of public opinion, Congress, and organized interests on policy; the extent to which domestic policymaking differs from foreign policymaking; whether various issue areas approach a pluralist or elite model of policymaking; and the domestic political consequences of international interactions. These questions provide a backdrop for the collection of essays in *Interaction: Foreign Policy and Public Policy.*

Norman A. Graebner makes the much needed points that, in the cold war era, government has been very successful in getting public opinion to support its policies, and that every major foreign policy failure has been the product of errors of official judgment rather than domestic intrusions. By systematically examining data from 1945 to 1976, Frank Feigert analyzes how Congress responds to presidential vetoes. Ronald Terchek discusses the implications of what he sees as the increasing linkage between foreign policy and domestic political issues. The remaining chapters summarize the policy questions involved in gathering intelligence, immigration, foreign direct investment in the United States, law of the sea, human rights, and arms control.

Despite the obvious expertise of each of the contributors, no new knowledge (with the exception of Feigert's analysis) or fresh insights are provided by this book. Rather than adding to our knowledge, the focus on the domestic political context is merely a thematic veneer to hold the volume together. Indeed, only Terchek makes any effort to analyze the domestic political context in a theoretical fashion. His argument that today the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy is becoming blurred because of new linkages between domestic and foreign policy overlooks the fact that such issues, although often of only moderate salience or of a technical nature, have arisen throughout American history. Nevertheless, Terchek's suggestion that this linkage will make foreign policy more a product of compromise and pluralist politics is a good starting point for research, but he never gets beyond Rosenau. This is unfortunate, because some of the raw material for such an analysis might have been marshalled from the other chapters. Gerard Mangone's chapter, for example, provides a plethora of examples of how organized interests shaped and changed America's position on the law of the sea. Yet his analysis is completely descriptive without any concern for theoretical questions. Ultimately, the editors must take responsibility for not providing a concluding chapter that would utilize the individual chapters to assess from either a theoretical or a policy perspective the domestic impact on foreign policy.

Instead, what we are left with is a set of essays that in a nonpolemical and fairly objective manner summarize some of the policy areas within U.S. foreign policy. Yet, what is accomplished by this effort? The book will not be of any interest to scholars. Many of the chapters have the tone of briefing papers for the most inexperienced and uninformed who suddenly find themselves thrust into positions of responsibility. One might wonder if the book was intended as an undergraduate text, but there is no indication that it was intended as such, nor would it be competitive with the better texts. Because the audience for which it is intended is never adequately defined, the book falls between the cracks.

Collections of this sort are perilous undertakings. The contributors have succeeded in providing background papers, but never really get to the serious theoretical or political questions facing them.

JOHN A. VASQUEZ

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The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubenstein. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 275. $27.95.)

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 after 150 years of "presence" there has led to a race toward the area not only by the superpowers, but also by mediums-sized powers such as those in Western Europe and the Indian subcontinent. These factors have led to the book under review, an examination of the geopolitical and strategic problems of Southwest Asia as they relate to the Gulf and India.

The Great Game is a result of a 1982 conference sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Bellagio, Italy. The book contains 11 separately written chapters that focus on the theme of security in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean from internal and external threats. Two chapters deal with regional dynamics, two with U.S. and Soviet rivalry, three with Western European and Indian interests in the area, one with arms transfers, and three with prognoses for the future.

I found the two most interesting chapters to be that by Gary Sick on the evolution of U.S. strategy toward the Indian Ocean and the Gulf and that by Alvin Rubenstein on Soviet policy toward the region. After tracing in detail the increased U.S. involvement in the Gulf states, Sick convincingly demonstrates that America still lacks "a sense of direction" toward the area (p. 80). Posing the critical question, "Just what price is the United States willing to pay to defend what it believes to be its interests in the region?" (p. 79), Sick sees no answers but rather "uncertainty" and "improvisational politics" (p. 79).

Rubenstein thoroughly examines the relations of the Soviet Union with the states of the region and concludes that one should not assume the inevitability of a Soviet push toward the Gulf through Iran. To support this conclusion he cites the anticommunist policies of Khomeini and emphasizes that Russian policy in fact has been directed toward encouraging nonalignment of the Gulf countries, normalization of their relations with the Soviet Union, and, interestingly, closer relations between these countries and India (p. 111). However, all of these steps, if realized, would enable the USSR to strengthen its presence in the Gulf.

If there is a "great game" among the superpowers, there is also a minor game among medium-sized powers. The role of India in this respect is given considerable attention. Bahabanisen Gupta and Aswini Ray analyze Indian-Gulf relations, concluding that India faces two obstacles in its desire to play a greater role in the Gulf. One lies in its own economic difficulties; the other problem is India's differences with its Muslim neighbor, Pakistan, a strong country highly regarded in the Gulf and the Arab Middle East.

Although this work is quite thorough in its survey of relations between the superpowers and Western Europe in the Gulf area, there are several omissions. There is no mention of developing commercial ties between the Gulf and Eastern European countries, a factor which can only serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Another omission concerns the security of the Red Sea, closely related to that of the Gulf, especially in the view of the Gulf rulers. Finally, there is little emphasis on South Yemen, a Soviet client capable of seriously affecting both the stability and security of not only the Gulf, but also the Red Sea.

Although the assumptions and logic of most articles are sound, some authors do not show profound understanding of the history or contemporary politics of the Gulf. For example, the assumption that "the lower the arms' level, the lower the likelihood of war" by Sherin Tahir (p. 194) does not suffice for an explanation of regional conflict. Border disputes and tribal and family conflicts are more important. How else can we explain the serious threats of war exchanged in 1982 and 1983 by Qatar and Bahrain, two of the least armed countries in the Gulf?

With its detailed information, this book will be of more use to the specialist on the Gulf and Southwest Asia than to the generalist, but both will gain much from reading it.

Louay Bahry

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Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis. By Lewis Sorley. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983. Pp. xiv + 231. $22.00.)

Between 1969 and 1976 the United States contracted to sell more than $49 billion in weapons around the world. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, arms sales agreements with Iran and Saudi Arabia alone exceeded $24 billion. From this phenomenal growth it is apparent that during this period arms sales became a primary component of U.S. foreign policy and the source of large profits for U.S. arms manufacturers.

The implications of this policy also triggered a debate concerning the ethics and wisdom of this policy. Critics point to the inability to control the use of these weapons once they have been delivered and the potentially disruptive effects of arms sales for recipients, as in the case of Iran. The failure of Saudi Arabia to contribute significantly to the Middle East peace process and the role of U.S. arms in the violence in Central America are also seen as evidence of inadequacies in this area.

Lewis Sorley attempts to provide a history, explanation, and defense of the policies that led to such large increases in U.S. military sales around the world. He lists 26 separate objectives that arms sales in general are designed to meet and demonstrates the degree to which these sales became closely linked to the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations. In particular, large increases in arms sales are shown to follow from limitations on the use of American troops in the wake of Vietnam. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States replaced its troops and bases around the world with regional allies that received large numbers of advanced weapons.

Unfortunately, the emphasis on individual recipients of U.S. arms is unevenly distributed in this study. Arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Latin America receive perfunctory analysis.

Instead, the central chapters are devoted to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, reflecting Sorley's opinion that U.S. arms sales policies achieved "spectacular successes" in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Egypt received only jeeps and transport aircraft during the period under examination as Sorley notes, the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger created the conditions for the larger subsequent arms sales to Egypt. As a result, the United States was able to pry Egypt away from its close link with the Soviet Union, which until 1975 had been Egypt's major arms supplier. By replacing the USSR in Egypt, the United States was in a position to influence the direction of Egyptian foreign policy and to press for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, as Israel's main arms supplier, the United States sought to use its leverage to influence Israeli policy.

This analysis is flawed, however, by the omission of several pertinent aspects and consequences of U.S. policy. For example, the United States' attempt to control arms deliveries to Israel in order to change Israeli policy led Israel to accelerate development of a highly sophisticated indigenous arms industry. Sorley fails to mention this consequence of U.S. policy. Similarly, Sorley fails to remind his readers that before the 1973 War, Israel complied with U.S. requests not to launch a preemptive attack against Egypt and Syria. Subsequently, when the full force of the Arab attack became clear, the United States was obliged to replace Israeli losses. Indeed, the delay in meeting this obligation has increased the Israeli proclivity to preempt.

Although called a policy analysis, this study provides few clues to the roles of various governmental and nongovernmental actors in the conflicts that surround the decision-making process in this sensitive area. Brief mention is made of the State Department Office of Munitions Control and of a data base created to provide information on the potential implications of these arms sales decisions, but it is not clear what, if any, role they played. Similarly, although the activities of the "Israel lobby" are highlighted, there is no discussion of the activities of the large-weapons manufacturers and middlemen in pushing U.S. arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

GERALD M. STEINBERG

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The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans. Edited by Stephen F. Szabo. (Boston: Butterworths, 1983. Pp. viii + 184. $45.00.)

The book addresses the "growing concern among policymakers in both the United States and Europe that a generational changing of the guard will weaken the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, which has provided peace and stability to Western Europe since 1945" (p. 1). The task of the seven authors is to analyze available public opinion data on foreign and defense policy attitudes in order "to discover what postwar Europeans think about the nature of security, the need for alliances and the extent, if any, to which these attitudes differ from those of the prewar generations" (p. 2).

After a methodological first chapter, a chapter is devoted to each of the five largest Western European countries: France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain. Another chapter uses the Radio Free Europe audience and opinion research data (interviews with East European visitors to West European countries) to investigate the successor generation on the other side of the iron curtain. In all these chapters, the authors describe the historical experiences of the prewar and postwar generations and then present results of public opinion surveys to trace trends across time or differences between the prewar ruling generation and the postwar successor generation. Because political and opinion leaders are drawn almost exclusively from university-educated citizens, attention is often focused on those subunits within each generation.

The findings cannot be interpreted to favor the existence of a deep generational cleavage across Europe. Wherever they appear, age group differences are a matter of degree. For example, NATO is favored over neutrality across the board. However, the younger cohorts usually include a larger minority of neutralists than are among the older cohorts. Only among the university-educated in Germany and in Italy is generational discontinuity perceptible. In the prewar generation, the better educated elites are more pro-American and pro-defense than the general public; in the postwar generation the similar elites are more critical of the United States and NATO than the general public.

On the contrary, the specificity of each country plays a more important role in the behavior of its citizens. Thus, the Gaullist legacy has prevented pacifism from spreading in the otherwise radical French public opinion, and the Gulag has totally discredited the Soviet Union. In Germany, however, the contemporary pacifist, if not accommodating, trends are to be traced back to the historical resistance to cultural Westernization and the more recent "culpability complex" because of World War II. Anti-Americanism, blended with Europeanism, forms the Spanish political tradition. Finally, British public opinion is preoccupied with that country's link with the Common Market, leaving little room for other foreign policy concerns.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the troubled partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic is because of certain events or trends that have influenced not only the new generations, but also the public at large. As a corollary, wherever suitable time series were provided, there was no evidence of any dramatic attitudinal change since the fifties. I thus disagree with Szabo's conclusion that there is enough evidence of generational change, although it is not uniformly distributed across countries.

In fact, if the authors had presented the data in the tabular form suggested by Kenneth Alder (p.

13), the disproof of the successor generation argument would have been more convincing visually. Unfortunately, data presentation is not a strong point of this book: Less data, but better displayed, would have helped the uninitiated reader to better master the consecutive statistical tidal waves. This problem is particularly pronounced in the chapter on France, which also includes many contradictory statements.

Overall, this comparative study of public opinion attitudes on foreign and security policy is rare but mandatory reading for all observers of international relations, who usually rely only upon the attitudes of the most visible elements in each society: elites and protesters.

PANAYOTE DIMITRAS

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Contending Approaches to World System Analysis. Edited by William R. Thompson. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 311. $28.00, cloth; $14.00, paper.)

Contending Approaches to World System Analysis, according to William R. Thompson's introductory essay, supports three propositions:

> One, world system analysis represents a definite advance on the various ways in which we have collectively attempted to account for 'international' political and economic behavior.
>
> Two, there is more than one way to approach the analysis of the world system.
>
> Three, [given two] . . . we might do well to consider avoiding an exclusive commitment to any prevailing orthodoxy on how the world system has developed and is developing. (p. 7)

Readers of this volume will be mildly persuaded of the second and third propositions, even though several of the authors themselves are entirely unconvinced and, indeed, antagonistic toward the enterprise. The evidence presented in *Contending Approaches,* however, will and should leave readers deeply skeptical of the first proposition.

The volume, composed of 13 original essays, provides a review of the current and admittedly underdeveloped state of theorizing in world system analysis. It also presents an overview of the principal impediments to further progress and an examination of the outstanding questions. In short, the book is extremely useful as a review of the important and growing literature on world system analysis.

There are three common denominators, according to Thompson, in world system analysis. First, "it is asserted that a world system exists, that the system is characterized by more or less interdependent political, economic, and cultural subsystems, and that the modern . . . world system began to take definite shape sometime around the late fifteenth century" (p. 8). Second, it is assumed (rather than concluded) "that behavior within the system can best be explained in terms of world system structure and its critical processes" (p. 9). Third, it is characterized by "its willingness . . . to cross traditional disciplinary frontiers" (p. 10).

Within this common framework, Thompson argues that two contending approaches exist. Part 1 of the volume supports the "world-economy" approach primarily associated with Immanual Wallerstein. Among these essays, two stand out for their theoretical ambition and rigor. In a speculative essay, Christopher Chase-Dunn seeks to uncover the "deep structural tendencies of motion . . . [in] the capitalist world-economy" (p. 57). The second essay of note is a report from David Sylvan, Duncan Snidal, Bruce M. Russett, Steven Jackson, and Raymond Duvall on their collaborative attempt "to test a formal model of 'dependencia' theory" (p. 79). Although their methodology is open to criticism, this ongoing project provides a welcome relief from the often-ambiguous analysis that typifies dependency theory.

The essays in Part 2 largely derive from George Modelski's research on long cycles of world leadership. After a summary essay by Modelski, the remaining articles in this section examine the relationship between the world system and war from both supportive and critical perspectives. The section concludes with an excellent review by Richard Falk and Samuel S. Kim of the World Order Models Project (WOMP). Unfortunately, it is left to the reader to discover how and if the WOMP relates to world system analysis.

In Part 3, "Discussion and Debate," David P. Rapkin presents a preliminary but useful attempt to integrate the world economy and long-cycle approaches and to demonstrate how each can learn from the other. In contrast, Immanual Wallerstein writes opposing this effort, arguing that his world system approach subsumes long-cycle theory. In the most critical essay of the volume, Aristide Zolberg is primarily troubled by the reinterpretations of history made by world system scholars.

Good theory, as Zolberg must recognize, should allow us to understand history and events in new ways. World system theory clearly succeeds on this score. Yet to provide a "definite advance" on the current international relations literature, world system analysis must explain parsimoniously what we already can understand and more. This is not demonstrated in *Contending Approaches.* World system analysis does not yet provide the "progressive problemshift" to which its proponents, and this volume in particular, aspire.

DAVID A. LAKE

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The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979. By Saadia Touval. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 377. $30.00, cloth; $11.50, paper.)

The Peace Brokers is a study of nine mediation attempts of the often arcane and still festering Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike other types of third-party intervention, Touval's mediators "may not employ violence; their intervention is acceptable to both sides in the conflict" (p. 4).

A successful mediator is defined as "one who is believed [by whom?] to have contributed to the abatement or resolution of a conflict" (p. 4). Three of the cases examined here are accordingly considered successful: UN Acting Mediator Dr. Ralph Bunche, whose efforts culminated in the 1949 Armistice between Israel and her neighbors; Henry Kissinger's 1973 through 1975 diplomacy, which led to the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagements; and President Carter's 1978 Camp David Accords, which paved the way for the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Touval also examines five unsuccessful mediation attempts. These range from the well known attempt of Folke Bernadotte, "assassinated by Jewish extremists" in 1948 (p. 24), to the little discussed ones such as the Robert Anderson mission in the mid-fifties and the 1971 African presidents' initiative on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. The latter failed because of "the conflicts among its members," Touval concludes, and because of the paucity of resources at its disposal (p. 224). Additionally, one chapter discusses both the 1970 Rogers Initiative, which succeeded in stopping the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal, as well as the subsequent American mediation, which failed primarily because "the timing was unpropitious" (p. 198).

Effective mediators, Touval argues, "need not be impartial; indeed," he adds, "being perceived as biased may sometimes be an asset. . ." (p. 16). Touval demonstrates this by analyzing the reasons behind the amazing success of the United States in the post-1973 negotiations, this despite its well-known tilt towards Israel. Yet, as Touval points out, Israeli-American relations have often been strained. Not infrequently, the two countries pursued divergent objectives. In the 1973 War, for instance, "the U.S. prevented Israel from winning a clear-cut victory. . ." (p. 232). For one thing, Washington made sure that supplies reached the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Then, too, military supplies badly needed by Israel were delayed until Israel signaled its acceptance of a ceasefire. Thus, although Israel was eager to score a total military victory, "the U.S. sought a stalemate" which it considered the most propitious condition for negotiations (p. 228). Like other mediators, Touval stresses, the United States was motivated by self-interest: weakening Soviet influence in the region, oil, and a concern that the Sadat regime might not be able to withstand a military defeat. The destabilization of a regime that only recently had left Moscow's orbit would be a serious setback to American Mideast diplomacy.

Touval overstates the extent of American-Israeli tensions. Oddly, his book gives the distorted impression that the United States was the main supporter, not of Israel, but of the Arabs. Still, it is well-known that Washington opposes Israel's settlement policy in the Occupied Territories, considering them "illegal" (p. 310) and an obstacle to peace. Moreover, Sadat's flexibility was in stark contrast with Begin's rigidity and self-righteousness. It is significant to recall that Ezer Weizman, Israel's Defense Minister, resigned due to Begin's inflexibility, whereas some top Egyptian officials resigned because of Sadat's over-generous concessions. Under these circumstances then, it is understandable that "American requests for concessions were directed much more frequently at Israel than at Egypt," but it is simply outlandish to talk of any "American-Egyptian collusion" (p. 302).

Much has been written about the astonishing feats of Kissinger the mediator. Although Kissinger's "personal charm," "strong will, personal ambition, and aversion to failure" are acknowledged, Touval thinks such traits have been overemphasized. Instead, he attaches more importance to the "resources" that were at Kissinger's disposal by virtue of his position. "His arguments moved governments not because of their logic," Touval affirms, "but because he was the American secretary of state" (p. 281).

In sum, according to Touval, the primary ingredients for successful mediation are ample resources, appropriate timing—a factor that includes such elements as "a military *stalemate*" or "*political crisis*"—although the latter is only vaguely defined (pp. 328-329), negotiating skills, acceptability to both sides even though impartiality is not necessary, and a narrow scope of the agreement. Kissinger's step-by-step approach is hailed here as the apotheosis of a limited settlement. Indeed, it is obvious that Touval strongly believes that a comprehensive settlement, especially one involving "core values," is more difficult to achieve than a limited one. Yet, Touval seems unaware of the paradoxical incongruity presented by the real situation. For, despite the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, few would argue that the level of tension has in fact been reduced. Still fewer believe that a genuine peace is now established in the region. In view of the Lebanon invasion, annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights, the continued deracination of the Palestinian people, the validity of an incremental approach to Mideast peace has yet to be demonstrated.

SHAWKY S. ZEIDAN

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Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies toward the Soviet Union. Edited by Aaron Wildavsky. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983. Pp. xi + 264. $21.95.)

As the title suggests, *Beyond Containment* is an attempt to examine the options open to American statesmen for dealing with the Soviet Union today and in the future. In principle, containment is the correct policy idea towards an aggressive country whose leadership constantly tries to make the world more dangerous for Americans. What is needed, in essence, is a containment approach to American foreign policy that is not correspondingly defensive (really "unsatisfactory" in regards to stemming, much less challenging, increased Soviet power and aggression), but one that is assertive and dynamic by our national leadership in relations with the Kremlin.

According to Wildavsky, the United States is in a "box" because it is not consistent towards the Soviets in deed or determination. American foreign policy—particularly the " 'Nixinger' policy" (p. 7) of cooperation, competition, and then containment—is partly premised on the assumption that the USSR is a state subscribing to American-styled balance-of-power rules and interests. The last 30 years alone, Wildavsky argues, indicates that the Soviets really are not status quo-oriented with regard to the United States (except when convenient), nor are their intentions clearly known and understood by American policymakers. So what are the alternatives?

Wildavsky and his colleagues not only explore possible varieties of containment strategies, but they also try and explain how any kind of an assertive foreign policy "could be implemented within the American political system as it exists now" (p. 7). Underlying their concerns, then, is how popular support can be achieved, directed, and sustained for a newly invigorated approach to American national security by those in government responsible for this country and its citizenry.

Wildavsky posits two types of containment strategies: maximal containment and containment plus. Maximal containment is the opposite of minimal containment, it is aggressive and not passive, and it uses all the resources needed to check Soviet expansionism by being consistent and vigilant. Containment plus, however, aims at pluralizing the Soviet Union itself (turning loose those domestic forces that are now controlled by an extremely capable repressive regime onto the system to make the Soviet rulers contend with pressures at home instead of adventures abroad). The other essayists review past containment policies and, in one fashion or another, call for more debate on what containment must do (Paul Seabury), or proffer prescriptive suggestions on how to contain the Soviets dynamically (Max Singer), or when to contain (Ernst B. Haas, Charles Wolf, Jr.), or why contain (Robert W. Tucker, James L. Payne). The ideas that are presented concerning the present state of Soviet-American relations, the various strategies of containment possible that can be tried, how Soviet foreign policy differs substantively from its American counterpart, and the role containment plays with respect to deterrence and conflict, certainly deserve serious attention by proponents of and opponents to the views *Beyond Containment* presents.

The real question this book raises is more troubling. Can any dynamic containment-oriented foreign policy coexist with popular democracy without endangering that very same liberty and freedom it protects? James L. Payne puts forward an answer that illustrates the "troubling" nature of *Beyond Containment* rather succinctly. "The challenging foreign policy problem of the era is not what to do about the Soviets. The answer is simple, almost inescapable. The real conundrum is how to keep the domestic opposition from undermining containment" (p. 212). This issue of security versus democracy instead of security serving democracy will interest some readers, and taken as a whole, *Beyond Containment* does what Wildavsky had in mind in that it "will spur debate instead of drift in regard to American policy toward the Soviet Union" (p. 237). But in what directions?

JOSEPH RICHARD GOLDMAN

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Normative Theory

Public and Private in Social Life. Edited by S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 412. $35.00.)

It is fitting that, at a time when there is considerable and renewed interest in defining the character of liberalism, a collection such as this should appear. For as Benn and Gaus's introductory remarks make clear, our understanding of what is "public" and what is "private" is crucial to the way we both perceive and act within the world. More to the point, the concepts of "publicness" and "privateness" are constitutive of the liberal vision. They help to compose the liberal's normative universe.

Hence, several of the early articles in this three-part collection focus on clarifying one or another of the diverse senses of public and private which led to and define modern liberalism. Paul Finn's essay, for example, traces the changing balance of public and private in the common-law tradition, whereas the work of Alice Erh-Soon Tay and Eugene Kamenka sketches the evolution of the public law-private law dichotomy in the West. S. I. Benn addresses the Machiavellian problem of whether the norms of private morality should govern the behavior of public actors, whereas the liberal political economists' understanding of private and public interests captures Gaus's attention. Aside from the individual merits of these essays, what they bring out is the complexity of the concepts of private and public, and the diverse uses to which these concepts are put. It is a complexity even more directly addressed in several of the other early essays. Benn and Gaus themselves, for example, speak of two inherently incompatible views of the public and private that comprise the liberal conception. One of these views stresses an individualist, Hobbesian perspective, the other an organic, Hegelian approach. Both are necessary to a robust liberalism, but both, so Benn and Gaus contend, cannot live together peaceably. Ruth Gavison's chapter on information control forces us to confront the tentativeness of any liberal answer to the question of what information is appropriately public, and what is rightly private. In so doing, Gavison intimates the intractability of many, characteristically liberal, problems. Finally, Alan Ryan's discussion of property stresses the temporally and culturally limited relevance of the liberal vision of the public and private.

In so doing, Ryan's discussion provides the basis for the second part of this collection. Here Benn and Gaus gather several essays that directly challenge the liberal view. Anthony Walton's sketch of the Hegelian perspective argues—as opposed to Benn and Gaus—that Hegel provides a vehicle for integrating the public and the private, while still respecting the integrity of each. It is, nonetheless, a vehicle built on nonliberal premises. In short, Walton suggests, Hegel overcomes the atomistic reifications to which liberalism so often succumbs. Kamenka's essay on Marxist theory then contends that Marx does Hegel one better. Put bluntly, Marx, so Kamenka believes, rejects the "private" realm altogether, because this realm is nothing but the defensive fortress of the bourgeoisie. Finally, Carole Pateman's discussion of feminist responses to the public-private dichotomy suggests liberalism's continuing links with an unacceptable, patriarchal set of premises —premises that will need to be rejected if a humane polity is to emerge.

The third part of this collection focuses on nonliberal conceptions of the public and private. Martin Krygier examines public and private in primitive societies, whereas Leslie K. Haviland and John B. Haviland bring an anthropological approach to their sketch of life in a Mexican Indian village. And Arlene Saxonhouse, with characteristic clarity, presents an overview of the various conceptions of the public and private in classical Greece.

Collectively, all of the essays in this work go far toward reaffirming both the centrality and complexity of our notions of the public and the private. Many of the diverse senses in which these concepts are employed—and the diverse roles they play in structuring our lives—are clearly brought to the fore. Although there are those who will, no doubt, quarrel with some of the arguments presented in this collection, there is no denying the value of the book as a whole. Likewise, although there are some who may question the analytic schema with which Benn and Gaus introduce this book, none can doubt their editorial abilities. They have brought together a number of fine pieces of scholarship that should serve as both resources for and stimuli to further work on the nature of the private and the public.

J. P. GEISE

Clarkson University

Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. By Richard J. Bernstein. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. Pp. xix + 320. $25.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The issue that Richard Bernstein raises is among the most crucial for contemporary social theory: the attempt to find "some support for being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge" in order to escape the Cartesian anxiety which, at bottom, is characterized as "ontological." In the Preface to *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,* Bernstein explains how he came to see that themes from his articles and earlier books "were gravitating toward the complex network of problems concerning the character, dimensions, and texture of human rationality and irrationality" (p. x). The problem at its deepest point is to avoid the spectre of Descartes' seductive Either/Or, the temptation to choose either objectivism or relativism.

Social theorists and those concerned with the philosophical foundations of the social sciences will find Bernstein's discussions of the epistemological problems in the philosophy of science and social science to be comprehensive and penetrating. The truly problematic aspect of his own thesis is clear to him. He writes that "there may be legitimate suspicion that the interrelationships of science, hermeneutics, and *praxis* [may appear to be] more suggestive than substantive" (p. 46). The challenge of this book lies with the question of whether, and in what way, Bernstein may be understood to succeed in showing that there is a revision of rationality being hammered out in contemporary debates. I do not think that he does show this; the reasons why failure is inevitable are so complex that the remarks here can only be indicators of a line of questioning and argument.

It seems that the problem with critiques of instrumental rationality, the technical application of manipulation and control of thought and action, has been plagued by the absence of solid, convincing statements of what "we" stand to lose by the ultimate triumph of an instrumental reason that neutralizes all moral standards for the apprehension of good and evil, for the sense of intrinsic worth, for the meaning of personality, experience, the sense of higher enjoyment, and even, dare I say it, love. Bernstein's attempt to link up the debates about the scientific understanding of natural and social reality with the problems of social theory—especially work toward a credible theory of *praxis* and *phronesis*—is subject to these same difficulties of finding convincing language and criteria for stating these concerns and overcoming the standard objections of objectivism in the positivist mode. For whatever the textual-philosophical objections to the Aristotelian view of order, that closed universe, the unity of knowledge and action, is not available to us. The fragmentation of knowledge and the discontinuities of action familiar in the modern world make it difficult to identify the "we" who stand to lose by the total objectivization of life.

In spite of the common themes and concerns Bernstein discovers in the philosophy of science and social theory, these strands alone do not point a way to link up the problems of science with the problems inherent in a social hermeneutic. Working through the texts of Habermas, Gadamer, Arendt, and Rorty, Bernstein identifies in this "new conversation" (p. 47) a Hegelian inversion in which "the character of rationality in the sciences, especially in matters of theory-choice, [appear] closer to those features of rationality" that have been characteristic of practical philosophy. Yet, to believe that a discursive argument alone will solve the problem of modern consciousness is to engage in wishful thinking.

This book is at once a touchstone for what can be achieved to tie together knowledge and action and a vision of "the glimmerings of solidarity and the promise of dialogical community." We will still need a guide to take us beyond the paradoxes that fill this rich and suggestive book.

STANLEY J. WEINSTEIN

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Sociology and Socialism. By Tom Bottomore. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. 212. $25.00, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

With this collection of essays, Tom Bottomore reaffirms his stature as an outstanding chronicler and analyst of socialist, particularly Marxist, theory and of social thought in general. Bottomore is committed to Marxism as both a theoretical paradigm and a model for social reconstruction and personal liberation. He examines the historical development of Marxism and its place as one of several competing paradigms within sociology as well as the extent to which Marxism, or some form of socialism, has been or promises to become actualized in social reality. His obvious socialist leanings do not impede his equally careful review and evaluation of works of those who tend to support his disposition and those who are critical (Durkheim, Weber, Schumpeter).

Much attention is devoted to varieties of theoretical forms: differences within Marx's own writings (relative emphasis assigned to economic determinism and to matters of the human spirit) and differences in reinterpretations and reformulations by Marxist thinkers who have responded to critical attacks, new intellectual formulations, and developments posed by changing historical circumstances. Some recent formulations tend to emphasize cultural and intellectual factors, deep inner structures, and voluntaristic modes of action (modern Structuralism, Critical Theory-Frankfurt School). Marxism is no longer, if it ever was, a completely unified theory, but rather a general paradigm within which exist resemblances between specific modes which may have connections with other non-Marxist models (p. 105).

That political values often interact with social science Bottomore underscores in his discussion of Durkheim's commitment to social solidarity through strengthening the Third Republic and opposing socialism's organizing the working class against capitalism and Weber's support of nationalism, imperialism, and effective political leadership toward promoting German power. Ideological commitment, as part of the milieu within which knowledge is created, shapes social thought which, in turn, provides enlightenment and guidance in action for those political causes to which allegiance is given. Bottomore laments that a great part of sociological theory is discipline-oriented rather than action-oriented and is devoid of political significance (pp. 116-117). He calls for new theoretical schemes that do relate to the current major political issues. The guiding political outlook may be socialist, defining in some part the image of human nature and society and its main theories of inquiry (p. 9).

This work is a collection of 11 essays, many of which have been published elsewhere over the past decade or so. As such, some integration and continuity is sacrificed, but not much. Either a brief introduction or an epilogue would have been helpful in interrelating the essays around central themes. Within the introduction, a statement would have been welcome concerning the relationship or distinction between Marxism and socialism as used in the different essays.

Political scientists should not avoid this publication when noting "sociology" in the title. Bottomore's conception of the discipline, as is that of many European-trained sociologists, is very broad, encompassing "anthropology, social history, political economy, and philosophy of science" (p. 7). The book will be of greatest value to those well-read in historical and contemporary social thought. For class use, it would serve as an adjunct to a graduate seminar in Marxist or socialist thought or major trends in sociopolitical theory.

For one so attuned to social trends and so committed to social justice as is Bottomore, I am surprised at his failure to mention the female within capitalist and socialist systems. All pronouns and other references are to males.

INA A. JEFFERY

Florida A&M University

Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory. By Jean Cohen. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 264. $22.50.)

The stated goal of this book is to contribute to the creation of a new critical theory, one that builds upon and simultaneously goes beyond Marx. Cohen's criticisms of Marx are familiar: She takes Marx to task for allocating the non-economic dimensions of civil society—the political, juridical, normative, and cultural dimensions—to an alleged substructural base; for adopting a view of needs that reduces the individual solely to the role of producer; for failing to provide a means to account for contemporary social movements such as the feminist or ecology movements; and for failing to address the complexity of stratification patterns in contemporary Western societies. Cohen focuses her criticisms around the concept of class, arguing that class became Marx's own fetish in that he projected a class analysis into all historical epochs without regard for their particular form. She outlines and rejects the two major models of communism that she sees as drawn from Marx—the romantic, utopian "fisherman-in-the-morning" model and the statist, authoritarian "administration-of-things" model—because they both entail the denial of politics.

Cohen claims that her book is not intended to be a work in Marxology, but in fact it is just that. The criticisms that she makes of Marx are so standard that they are well known to most undergraduate political theory students, and Cohen adds little that is new. Her efforts to build a post-Marxian critical stratification theory would be strengthened if she had actually analyzed contemporary stratification patterns rather than simply discussing other Marxist and neo-Marxist theorists of stratification. Cohen's discussion of the various neo-Marxisms—the "new working class" theorists, the structural Marxists, the "new working class" theorists, the structural Marxists, the "new intellectual class" theorists, plus Habermas, Marcuse, Offe, Touraine, and others—are well documented and scholarly, but they are discussions about other theorists (who in turn are often discussing other theorists) rather than about the world.

This kind of tertiary literature plagues the enterprise of political theory. It is sometimes useful if it provides clear and precise summaries of contemporary thinkers, which can serve as shortcuts for the reader. Unfortunately, this book is written in that peculiar Germanic style that is overly complex, tedious, and wordy. Further, an underlying problem of epistemology persists throughout the text. Cohen makes casual references to universal values as though these could be unproblematically identified and repeatedly uses the term normative in opposition both to objective and to rational. These terms are never identified or explored, but such use suggests a crude positivism that sits uneasily (or at least should sit uneasily) with the search for a critical social theory.

KATHY E. FERGUSON

Siena College

Marx's Social Critique of Culture. By Louis Dupré. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 299. $25.00.)

The title of Dupré's book accurately announces its contents. He analyzes core elements of Marx's critique of culture under five equally descriptive chapter headings: "Cultural and Social Alienation," "Culture as Historical Process," "The Structural Dialectic," "Economics as Sociocultural Activity," and "The Uses of Ideology." The chapters share a pattern. Dupré first attends to the historical roots that nourish Marx and shows how he responds to earlier thinkers' insights and dilemmas. Dupré discusses Marx's ideas with attention to the developmental stages of his theorizing and discovers varying emphases among at least the *1844 Manuscripts,* the *German Ideology,* the *Grundrisse,* and *Capital.* In presenting Marx's thought, Dupré maintains a sympathetic but critical stance. In the final analysis, Marx is, according to Dupré, a critic with discerning vision into the culture of modernity (pp. 51, 213) and the need for a reintegrating culture that will unify human beings in their several relations (p. 278); but he ironically falls prey to asserting the priority of the economic and of praxis (p. 287), priorities that are historically relative and no longer accurate, derived by Marx from his observations of his own century and uncorrected by Marx's usually acute historical consciousness (p. 13). Finally, Dupré frequently emphasizes important facets of post-Marx interpretations, and so he can stress continuing problems and alternative Marxist understandings (and failings).

Dupré fits these chapters within an interpretation of modernity. Modern culture entails the separation of man from nature because it aims to create a new, second nature for human beings (and not, as did Greek culture, to cultivate human and nonhuman nature). So the modern project commences with bifurcation, and its fulfillment requires further divisions, such as the division of labor; for Dupré, the crisis of modern culture is precisely this fragmentation.

Dupré's cogent sketch of modern culture presents a diagnosis he shares with many theorists since Rousseau and Hegel. Each chapter of the book manifests intensive examination of Marx's texts and extensive thought about Marx's ideas, their validity, and their current value. Together, the chapters provide an intelligent, discerning, and carefully nuanced reading of Marx.

Especially worthy of note, I think, are three specific interpretations Dupré offers. One lies in his discussion of the development of Marx's thought. Dupré sees a multifaceted development, in which the many important elements of Marx's overall theory undergo changes, enrichments, and even reversions to earlier positions. So Dupré presents a fluidity and diversity that is lacking in many other interpretations of Marx, such as those that insist on a sharp *coupure,* see only a monolithic unity, or use (and abuse) a single passage or text as the master key to unlock all Marx's mysteries.

The second is Dupré's portrayal of Marx's dialectic and its attendant problems, ambiguities, and value. Although sometimes seen (especially by those who view Marx as a natural scientist or a determinist) as an embarrassing recrudescence of a Hegelian Marx, the dialectic is, Dupré shows, integral to Marx's critical thought and to the resolution of what are otherwise irresolvable conundra in it (pp. 236-237). The third is that, in opposition to the simplifications involved in presenting Marx as an economic determinist (pp. 197-200) or a structuralist (p. 244), Dupré analyzes Marx's view of economics as a sociocultural activity and implies the richness of critical comprehension involved in this stance. Indeed, I think Dupré does not develop these implications far enough and fails to question strenuously enough the meaning of the "priority of economics."

Dupré's interpretation is open to criticism on some other issues as well. Space permits mentioning only two. I think his treatment of ideology slights Marx's perception on a matter crucial to modernity's malaise. As Dupré argues, ideology for Marx is both dependent and illusory (because it is dependent). But, perhaps because—inexplicably—in this chapter he fails to give due consideration to the later writings, Dupré does not stress how ideology mystifies, either by mystifying reality or by accurately reflecting a mystified reality (see "The Trinity Formula," chap. 48 of *Capital,* vol. 3).

More central to the book, from his title onward

Dupré fails to include Marx's ideas on revolution—even though it is, I think, the proletarian revolution that gives Marx's dialectic the teleological structure that Dupré criticizes Marx for merely positing or assuming (p. 141), and even though revolution figures throughout Marx's thought. The consequences of Dupré's omission are somewhat skewed views of Marx's thought and of the praxis that, Marx thinks, can overcome the crisis of modernity. But these problems are minor by contrast to the value of Dupré's thoughtful, scholarly, and insightful book.

PETER G. STILLMAN

Vassar College

The Limits of Liberalism: Josephus Daniels, Henry Stimson, Bernard Baruch, Donald Richburg, Felix Frankfurter and the Development of the Modern American Political Economy. By Larry G. Gerber. (New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 425. $40.00.)

Although it cannot be said to have been free from ideological conflict, the American experiment with democracy has indeed been a limited one. A major premise of *The Limits of Liberalism* is that the American democratic experience has proceeded from a consensus of liberal values that excludes conflict over fundamental socioeconomic issues (p. 5). However, the study concludes that despite the best efforts of some twentieth-century public figures to eradicate it, recent experience demonstrates that contemporary American social life is beset by manifestly unequal distribution of power and wealth, a maldistribution that is stinging evidence of the failure of social egalitarians to foster by their efforts any real alteration of social and economic stratification.

Gerber employs a somewhat unique approach to demonstrating the shortcomings of the liberal ideal in the first half of the twentieth century. After a brief introductory chapter, he sketches an intellectual biography of each of five representative figures in the Progressive Movement and the New Deal: Josephus Daniels, Henry Stimson, Bernard Baruch, Donald Richberg, and Felix Frankfurter. In their approach to problems of social change, the ideology of Daniels, Stimson, and Baruch represents the late nineteenth-century ideal of a free-market economy characterized largely by individual competition and a limited role for government. Richberg and Frankfurter, belonging as they did to "a different generation" (p. 47), were tied to the earlier vision of liberalism and its economic premises, but their ideals took shape within the framework of a different macroeconomic landscape. With the advent of the large corporation and the development of labor unions, the liberal vision was retooled in their hands to meet the demands of a new demographics. However, the vision of each of the five remained essentially unchanged: Individualism and the free market were the touchstones of an ideological consensus that spanned these two generations of liberal reformers.

The greater part of Gerber's survey is a chronicle of the contributions of each of his subjects to the revamping of American social and economic life from the rise of Progressivism (1900 to 1914) through and including the New Deal (1933 to 1939). The book ends in remorse—perhaps despair—at the inability of these reformers to achieve little more than "incremental" modifications of the social order. Gerber chides his subjects for their failure to move beyond liberal ideology in their attempts to make America "a more just and democratic society" (p. 349). But, Gerber concludes, their failure need not be for nought, for if we recognize the inherent limitations of liberalism we afford ourselves at least the possibility of transcending those limits.

DENNIS M. PATTERSON

University of Southern Maine

The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1, **Reason and the Rationalization of Society.** By Jurgen Habermas. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. Pp. xlii + 465. $29.95.)

This work is the most ambitious single study in social theory to appear in recent memory. The entire work is an attempt to recast the most important and enduring concerns of Marxism—social justice and human liberation—within a framework of post-Marxian social theory. Jurgen Habermas wants to determine the possible conditions for free and nonrepressive communicative actions. He outlines a theory of communicative action, and then proceeds to integrate it into the corpus of modern social theory. He thus sets before himself an extraordinarily complex and comprehensive task.

For Habermas, the domination of instrumental rationality in modern societies is a problem closely associated with communication. The conditions under which communication occurs are dramatically affected by the exercise of power and by the shared communicative assumptions of the participants in communicative actions. Thus, he begins his study with a critique of various approaches to the problem of the rationalization of society. Then, moving beyond critique, he attempts to reconstruct rationality on the basis of a theory of communicative action. He argues that a close examination of the structure of shared language use of a society can yield valid criteria for criticizing legitimation claims of those who dominate society. Social relations, a "life-world" examined most by phenomenologists but neglected by social action theorists, is for him the context out of which a reconstructed sociology becomes possible. The products of the partial reason of instrumental rationality—reification, relativism, strategic communication, the loss of reason's grounding in the absence of metaphysical standards of truth—can only lose their domination over social life if we first have a fuller understanding and appreciation for the intersubjective dimension of social relationships.

In the succeeding chapters, Habermas uses "a history of theory with systematic intent. . ." (p. 140) to develop his theory of communicative action. He reads the works of Max Weber, some of the more prominent English and American analytic philosophers, and selected Marxist predecessors such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Georg Lukacs, and analyzes their theories in light of the thematic role he gives communicative action. From this perspective, Weber's shortcomings lie in his reliance upon an action theory that is too subjective in origin and end. For Habermas, strategic, or instrumental actions will always dominate such a sociology. Instead, it must be possible to account for the communicative actions of participants who "pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions" (p. 286). Lukacs's tendency toward "objective idealism" is corrected by an emphasis on the intersubjective possibilities for justification that only a theory of communicative action can provide (p. 365). A deficiency that Habermas sees in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer (he believes that they rely too heavily on the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness) can be overcome by the theory of communicative action as well. By reformulating Adorno's observations concerning mimesis in terms of communicative action, Habermas believes that the mimetic faculty, originally conceived as being no more than an impulse, can be understood as more fully rational (p. 390).

Unlike most secondary studies, Habermas's exegetical technique for developing his theory is sophisticated and innovative. His theory of communicative action proper is more difficult to evaluate fully, particularly until Volume Two is available to the English-speaking world. Habermas's continuing stress on communicative competence as a prerequisite for a rational society has been criticized by many commentators as being overidealistic. Such attitudes are exacerbated when the focus of the work on conditions for a more completely rational society contributes to the neglect of a discussion of existing distortions and strategies used to reinforce existing powers. At times, one must remind oneself that Habermas's expressed intentions are ultimately in support of a politics of liberation, intentions only obliquely referred to in the book (pp. xli-xlii). A final criticism is that too often this work rambles, with secondary considerations leading to tertiary explorations of minor points, much of which distracts the reader from the more important flow of the argument.

These reservations are made within an overall context of appreciation for the immense scope and complex intentions of this work. On balance, it stands as an important accomplishment. Habermas's continuing project is crucial reading for anyone who wishes to remain conversant with the most advanced work in social theory today.

THOMAS L. DUMM

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Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Edited by Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983. Pp. xix + 332. $54.50, cloth; $26.00, paper.)

Gender epistemology is extremely difficult and at times resembles the activity of extricating oneself from quicksand by pulling on one's own hair. Janice Moulton,one of the contributors to this collection of essays, argues that the "adversary paradigm" in philosophy associates aggressiveness with positive qualities and that, further, the male gender possesses such aggressive dispositions "naturally." Moulton goes on to suggest that some feminists have challenged the latter claim while urging females to behave more aggressively. She wishes to challenge the adversarial paradigm and replace it with versions of a "good reasons" form of argumentation (pp. 149-165). Another contributor, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, wishes to institutionalize feminist criticism within science and "make it an explicit part of 'scientific method' " (pp. 165-183). A third contributor, Ruth Hubbard, argues that the truth or falsity of Darwinian biology will remain unsettled as long as his animals "are cast into roles from a Victorian script" (p. 53). Finally, a fourth essayist, Judith Hicks Steihm, finds the Aristotelian Household alive and well in Norman Nie and Sidney Verba's *Participation in America* (Harper & Row, 1972).

The quagmire of gender epistemology (in its male manifestation) is fairly well documented as the object of critique of all 16 contributions to this volume. The manner of escape remains unclear. Few reasonable persons would deny the domination of males in the development of philosophy, science, and political theory in the West. Few also would deny the predominance of various versions of patriarchal social arrangements. It does not follow that these facts (accessible to male and female experience alike) entail a retroactive discrediting of the reality claims of the traditions in question. The burden assumed by those who would argue for such a discreditation is to show that the social and biological conditions of maleness deform the reality discovered. The biological origins of perceptions and thoughts is never really confronted either in the case of men or women. Indeed, for several of the feminists writing in this volume it would have been impossible. If Engles is to be invoked as an ally against Darwinian biology, or Kuhn against versions of scientific objectivity and philosophical reasoning, something other than gender epistemology accounts for the alleged distortions.

What that something else is turns out, I think, to be a politics of traditions or communities of researchers in which men outnumber and coerce women. Restating the issue in this fashion, however, runs counter to the argument of this book. A feminist metaphysics and epistemology, peculiar to the female of the species, is the objective of the reflections in these essays. The prospects for the fate or persuasiveness of such a perspective, should it be developed and enjoy agreement with the feminist community, is another question. It is not likely to be resolved by the institutionalization of a feminist perspective within an existing scientific community. The very nature of such a perspective is likely to be purchased at the price of commensuration of reasoning or experiential intersubjectivity. In a word, reality is plural.

A difficulty with the volume in question is that the most urgent issues somehow are not confronted. Is there a peculiar male perspective? Does it exist even independent of patriarchal social arrangements? What are the characteristics of female experience relevant for science (kinds of science? biology? physics?) and philosophy? If the language of current philosophical and scientific disclosure is sexist, what must the feminist alternative look like? Is mathematics and symbolic logic exempted? Why?

The concluding essay of the volume, Sandra Harding's "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?" (pp. 311-322), comes closest to confronting the central dilemmas of a feminist epistemology. It does so by arguing the inadequacy of three dominant epistemological perspectives, empiricism, functional-relativism, and Marxism. When the construction of a feminist alternative is advanced, we are told that a feminist perspective "must begin from the politically activated perspective of women in the division of labor by sex/gender," and, further, that "the feminist standpoint must be analytically impartial and epistemically non-relativist" (p. 321). The feminist science and epistemology reconciling those two preconditions is not yet on the horizon.

To the editors' credit, most of the essays in this volume are extremely provocative and succeed in outlining an agenda that should encourage further argument and refinement.

GERARD P. HEATHER

San Francisco State University

Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism. By Nancy C. M. Hartsock. (New York: Longman's, 1983. Pp. x + 310. $22.50, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

Nancy Hartsock's *Money, Sex, and Power* is an erudite and exciting contribution to political theory. Her working hypotheses are that theories of power are theories of community, that they have class and gender dimensions, and that they are rooted in differing ontologies and epistemologies. By looking at the interweavings of these aspects, we can criticize existing theories and develop more liberating theories, as well as more humane communities.

Hartsock's analysis proceeds in two stages. She starts with readings of contemporary theories of power, from Homans to Lukes. Although noting differentiations, Hartsock argues that all are based on "unsound and truncated theory of human nature and human sociability" (p. 10). Their paradigm is the market, or exchange, model, that is, the capitalist's economic experience of manipulating money in the market. Power, like money, becomes a means of getting others to act in ways they would not otherwise act. The resulting community consists of isolated, competitive "rational economic men," who come together only to exchange things. Once workers "freely" give up the only thing they have to exchange—their labor—power takes the form of domination. And domination is legitimized, even by those power theorists who lament the resultant inequality and suffering, because of the flawed epistemology.

Hartsock is expressly indebted to Marx for her critique and for an alternative paradigm, that of workers' activities in production. Here power is productive energy and achievement. This model points toward a community based on unalienated production and free of class domination. Part 1 could stand alone as a critique of capitalist and liberal-democratic societies. But Hartsock's most creative work is in Part 2. Marx, says Hartsock, is flawed to the extent that he is gender-blind. To tell the truth about power, we must weave together Marx's method and the historical, managerial data of women's daily, lived experiences.

A Marxist and feminist approach offers a deeper analysis, not only of market and Marxist theories, but also of that dimension of power that has received little analytic attention, eros. There are similarities between the epistemologies of patriarchy and capitalism, between "economic abstraction" and "abstract masculinity." The latter model leads to theories of power and community driven by a negative, crazy form of eros: a masculine sexuality that flees from intimacy and sensuality; glorifies competition, aggression, fetishism, rape, and revenge; deifies violent death; and denies our material, mortal, reproducing bodies. This hostile dynamic structures both private and public realms, as evidenced in that great, flawed agonal community, the Athenian *polis*.

What is new about Hartsock's feminist argument is the way she supports it with material from three disparate sources of data: studies of pornography; theories of power by women; and classical Greek texts from the *Iliad,* through the *Oresteia,* to Plato's *Republic* and *Symposium.* Here is Hartsock at her brilliant, provocative best, suggesting that the allegedly progressive transition from the Furies to the Homeric warrior-hero, to the rational citizen-philosopher can be seen as the unfortunate founding of a *polis* in opposition to women, to nature, and to oneself (the mind-body dichotomy).

Less satisfying, because they are less developed, are Hartsock's chapters on women theorists of power such as Arendt; appendixes on Levi-Strauss, DeBeauvoir, and Rubin; and her final chapter suggesting the paradigm of womens' activities in production and reproduction as the most promising epistemological base for theories of power and community.

Hartsock has grown in analytical sophistication since her early essays, without losing the passion and practicality that come from feminist consciousness-raising and organizing. In *Money, Sex, and Power,* Hartsock speaks to new audiences with clear, precise prose, a firm grasp of a broad-ranging literature, and vision.

JOY HUNTLEY

Ohio University

Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift. By G. W. F. Hegel. Edited by Dieter Henrich. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983. Pp. 389. DM30.)

This book is the published version of a recently discovered, hitherto unknown, manuscript of lecture notes based on Hegel's 1819 and 1820 course on the philosophy of right. The manuscript was discovered in Indiana University's Lilly Library, where it had apparently laid in obscurity since the late 1890s.

Of course, the definitive version of Hegel's political and social theory is the book we now call the *Philosophy of Right (PdR),* which Hegel published in 1821 as a text for his students. But we also have extensive lecture notes that have recently been collected and impressively edited by the important Hegel scholar, Karl-Heinz Ilting. Most of these notes, though, come from courses taught by Hegel after the publication of *PdR.* Thus, the present manuscript is an important source of information about Hegel's political thought before the appearance of his book.

But the significance of the manuscript may be much greater than that, for Hegel's course in the winter term of 1819 and 1820 began just as the famous Carlsbad Decrees were being implemented. These later, of course, imposed a serious program of censorship in Prussia and elsewhere, and scholars have long debated their impact on Hegel's published work. The present manuscript appears to provide a relatively full version of Hegel's thought unaffected by the censorship and by the general climate of Prussian reaction.

In a lengthy and excellent introduction, Dieter Henrich outlines several key respects in which the present manuscript perhaps sheds a new light on Hegel's political thought. For example, in dealing with ethical theories *PdR* focuses almost exclusively on Kantianism and its critique, whereas the present manuscript considers and criticizes various more common moral views, thereby updating analyses found in much earlier writings including the *Phenomenology.* Similarly, these lectures consider in greater detail than elsewhere the problem of poverty in "civil society," and even raise the prospect of a legitimate revolution of the poor.

Perhaps more importantly, the manuscript helps to clarify Hegel's views on monarchy. Scholars have long debated Hegel's position as presented in *PdR.* Was his support for monarchy genuine or merely an attempt to appease the censor? Did he regard the monarch as a figurehead or as a true political leader? The present manuscript supports the view that Hegel genuinely favored monarchy, but that he did nonetheless regard the monarch himself as essentially a symbol whose signature is merely the last, formal step in the decision-making process.

Finally, the manuscript seems to cast a new light on *PdR*'s famous *Doppelsatz*: "What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational." In the present version, the principle reads: "What is rational becomes actual, and the actual becomes rational" (p. 51). This rendering thus highlights the principle's historical and developmental aspect, while perhaps deemphasizing its more grandiose implications (in Henrich's words, it lacks the published version's *imperial-deklamatorischen Klang,* p. 15).

Still, in this latter respect and in general, we might do well to be extremely cautious. This set of notes is different from most of the others in that the identity of the student who took them is unknown, hence his reliability cannot be checked. Indeed, Henrich himself raises questions about the student's competence, diligence, and even interest in Hegel's course. Thus, one wonders for example if the manuscript's rendering of the *Doppelsatz* can be accepted as fully accurate and authoritative.

Nonetheless, the discovery and publication of this manuscript is a significant event for Hegel scholars. The work done by Henrich and his associates is exemplary and includes extensive and very informative explanatory notes and commentaries.

PETER J. STEINBERGER

Reed College

Dissent and Affirmation: Essays in Honor of Mulford Q. Sibley. Edited by Arthur L. Kallenberg, J. Donald Moon, and Daniel R. Sabia, Jr. (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1983. Pp. 278. $17.95.)

This collection of 15 essays by friends and students of Mulford Q. Sibley is a fine tribute to him. As in any work of this kind, some essays are stronger and others are weaker. All of them, however, are examples of the kind of scholarship encouraged by Sibley. They are serious essays, and they are infused with a concern for justice.

The book is divided into three parts reflecting themes suggested by Sibley's work: pacifism and the control of violence, images of utopia, and the nature of political theory. The first section of the book concentrates on issues raised by Sibley's contention that "all war, as a type of violent coercion, is morally unjustifiable, whatever its objectives" (p. 14). The essays on this topic range from an analysis of Niebuhr's critique of pacifism to some reflections on what academicians can do to encourage the development of a "nonviolent social order." Sibley's pacifism leads him naturally to propose certain ideas which he refers to as "utopian." The second section of the book presents his ideas about participatory democracy and also treats utopian thought generally. An essay by Lyman Tower Sargent, for example, deals with the way in which different utopias have approached the institution of the family. Finally, the last section of the book explores the nature and purpose of political theory. All of the essays here stress its practical orientation. One essay, that by David Spitz, criticizes Marx for failing to solve the problems generated by the view that theory and practice should be united. Marx was not truly practical because he did not give enough attention to "the programmatic requirements and consequences" of his theory. None of the authors completely rejects what is labelled "meta-political theory," but the focus of their remarks is clearly on practice. A person should engage in utopian speculation for the purpose of making the world a better place, not just for the sake of understanding the world.

The major problem with this book is that almost all of the articles are too broad in their scope; they attempt too much. One is struck by the fact that they do not offer careful, detailed analysis of the texts upon which they depend for their arguments. Sargent's essay on "Utopia and the Family," for example, covers utopias before More, More and sixteenth-century utopianism, the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century. His conclusions may be correct, but he does not offer us a thoughtful analysis of any single work. And the essay on "The Structure of Argument in Political Theory" by Arthur L. Kalleberg deals with Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and Toulmin. One is left with a clear sense of the argument being made by the author, but one is not given enough of an argument to be convinced. However, the strength of the book is that it is characterized by an admirable concern for justice. These essays assert either explicitly or implicitly that considerations of justice are a necessary part of political science; they encourage serious argument about politics because they assert that argument is possible.

Sibley taught that one must be concerned with the ends or purposes of the political community and with the relationship of the individual to the political community. These are enduring political issues. The essays in this book may not address these issues in ways which all will find satisfactory, but they do have the virtue of keeping the issues alive. This book shows us that Sibley has inspired others with his conviction that politics is more than "who gets what, when, how?"

DENNIS STEVENS

Knox College

Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics of Utopianism. By Aileen Kelly. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 320. $29.95.)

There has been a longstanding interest in the life and thought of Mikhail Bakunin. In large measure this interest can perhaps be explained as a result of efforts to account for the rather striking contrast between the libertarian (in part as exemplified in his political feud with Marx) and the authoritarian tendencies in his thought—the latter as revealed especially in his secret and controversial correspondence with Sergei Nechaev, "the most cynical and despotic revolutionary of his time" (pp. 1, 268-269). How can we account for this duality in Bakunin's politics? It is especially important to address this question because the public and private sides of Bakunin often appeared to be contradictory. Scholars have traditionally offered responses to this question ranging from the political to the psychological.

Aileen Kelly claims to offer a "new interpretation," but it seems clear that her work is well within the established tradition. The essential strength of her book is the use she makes of the most recent material on Bakunin to clearly and unmistakably demonstrate the two-sidedness of his politics. Thus, while heaping considerable public abuse upon the Marxists for what he regarded as their plan to establish a proletarian dictatorship (directed by a Marxist elite) after the socialist revolution, Bakunin was privately plotting to establish what he called an "invisible dictatorship"—which, of course, would be directed by his elite and secret organization—after the revolution (pp. 193, 218-219, 243-244). How does Kelly attempt to explain this fairly widely accepted assessment of Bakunin's politics? Her basic explanation is one that is grounded in psychology. Stripped of all rhetorical trappings, such as her references to Bakunin's "millenarian vision of politics," Kelly seeks the answer, in the final analysis, in Bakunin himself. She describes his personality, traceable to his family background, as "introverted, divided, and unfilfilled" (p. 4). In an extended discussion of Bakunin's "inner disharmony"—that is, his urge for self-assertion and overcoming a sense of isolation—Kelly associates this with his "quest for wholeness" through revolutionary activity on behalf of the people. Revolution, in short, ultimately became the stage from which Bakunin sought—although unsuccessfully—to resolve his "inner conflicts" (pp. 139, 143-144, 194, 245).

On these issues concerning Bakunin's personality and its relationship to his revolutionary politics Kelly's work is less substantial than when she is assessing the contradictory dimensions of his politics. She simply does not establish the specific link between his troubled personality and his revolutionary politics that she sought to establish. Yet the above criticisms aside, Kelly's well-researched, well-written, and very readable book clearly adds focus to the contours of Bakunin's thought.

CURTIS STOKES

Michigan State University

Socrates and the State. By Richard Kraut. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. 338. $20.00.)

Kraut has written a perceptive, ambitious, and tightly argued book that has two basic goals: first, "to understand the political theory Socrates adopts when he refuses, in Plato's *Crito,* to escape from jail" (p. 3); and second, "to clarify the politics of Socrates as they are presented throughout Plato's early works" (p. 7). Chapters 2 through 6 focus on the *Crito,* and Kraut strongly denies that it advocates a political philosophy of rigid law and order at the total expense of citizen dissent and disobedience; that it equates the blind allegiance to legal command with justice and virtue; or that it envisions citizens as analogous to children who have no true rights against unjust parental commands.

To harmonize the loyal, conciliatory Socrates of the *Crito* with his arrogant, defiant counterpart of the *Apology* requires Kraut to explicate fully the logical conditions that must be present for Athens to expect obedience as legitimate, as opposed to those logical conditions that must prevail for the city to accept justifiable violation of its laws and commands. The opposing attitudes of Socrates towards the demands of law are unified for Kraut at a deeper level; his contradictory demeanors of defiance and acceptance are appropriate expressions given differences of circumstance in the *Apology* and *Crito.* For Kraut, the *Crito* contains a richly subtle political theory that attempts to reconcile two seemingly incompatible ideals that both Socrates and Athens shared. Kraut's great merit is to explore the conceptual complexities of this theoretical alchemy, and his discussions of persuasion and obedience, satisfaction and agreement, private and public acts, unjust treatment and disobedience, deeply illuminate the complex character of Socrates' relationship to Athens.

Chapters 7 through 8 discuss Socrates' general political views, and Kraut claims that he had "a more complex and interesting attitude towards democracy than scholars have realized" (p. 194). Socrates equated rule by the many with rule by the immoral and ignorant (pp. 197-199), and he preached that moral experts ought to be unconditionally obeyed because they alone would have knowledge of the virtues and the ability to apply standards to the complex situations of political life (pp. 208-210). Yet Socrates' authoritarian political outlook is tempered by his love of Athens and its laws (p. 308), and he believed that "in Athens the law is in many cases a correct guide to behavior" (p. 222).

What principles for Kraut harmonize Socrates' acceptance of democracy with his authoritarian stance that the wise few ought to rule and be obeyed? Finding moral experts for Socrates was merely a "theoretical possibility" and not a practical one because neither he nor his followers were able to give justifiable definitions of the virtues (p. 208). If knowledge of the nature of the virtues was lacking, then Socrates could teach no wisdom, and his irony and ignorance were real, not masks disguising his holding the truth (pp. 247-249). Socrates accepts democracy from *weariness.*

Kraut states that the "founding of a new political order was not the sole or even most important aim of Socratic conversation. To fulfill such a utopian fantasy, the limits of human nature "would have to be transcended" (p. 309). Kraut's views raise some fundamental questions. How could Socrates love Athens and its laws if such laws were made by the many who were judged immoral, vicious and ignorant? Why was Socrates arrogant and defiant if he truly lacked wisdom? Are not arrogance and defiance the marks of a person who indisputably claims to possess the truth? Could Socrates accept basic tenets of Athenian law and custom when these often sprung from the teachings of Homer, that is, from a poetic tradition that Socrates judged deformed Athenian life? If Socrates truly lacked wisdom as Kraut claims, then how could he reject *Crito*'s arguments for escape as indisputably wrong while going to his death on the basis of secure moral convictions? And if Socrates was truly not wise, then why is he so *certain* that the "unexamined life is not worth living," that one should never return injury for injury, that the virtue of the soul is far more important than prestige and material possessions, that basic elements of Athenian law and custom are quite harmful, and that knowledge is the foundation of virtue and lasting happiness? Could Socrates have preached the merit of the private over the public life when he likely taught that the political order shaped for good or evil the souls of the citizens? Kraut depoliticizes Socrates by introducing a dubious split between politics and morals, between public and private regeneration, and fails to consider that Socrates' "caring for souls" might be a new form of politics, that is, a public activity.

Socrates remains an enigmatic figure despite Kraut's herculean effort to fathom the principles of his secret unity. Nietzsche's thought that a multiplicity of eternal contradictions marks the higher soul would seem to apply to Socrates.

HAROLD SARF

San Francisco State University

The Party and the Masses: An Interorganizational Analysis of Lenin's Model for the Bolshevik Revolutionary Movement. By Lennart Lundquist. Translated by Kjersti Board. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1982. Pp. 336. $32.50.)

Was Lenin a cynically expedient tactician? Or was he the brilliant organizational theorist of Marxian revolution? Lennart Lundquist defends the latter view in this oddly unpolitical treatment of Lenin, that most political of political theorists. Ironically, even while Lundquist highlights Lenin's position that concepts emptied of historical content are meaningless, he derives his defense from Lenin's writings about "how the revolutionary movement *should* be organized" (p. 13). The result is a study that divorces Lenin's theory from Bolshevik practice, telling readers nothing about Lenin's organizational norms in action.

The Party and the Masses is actually two books. Chapters 1 through 3 are exercises in literature surveying and model building, exercises that are stale and superfluous respectively. These first 100 pages contain rehashes of interpretative controversies familiar to students of writings about Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and Lenin's part in that organization, and a five-step analytical model that Lundquist introduces but then abandons in chapter 4. Readers would do well to proceed directly to chapter 4.

There Lundquist propounds the hypothesis on which his defense rests: "Lenin's objective is always to achieve an optimum [organizational] combination of party and masses" (p. 118). Lundquist's analysis of "Lenin's actual statements" (p. 16) is conveniently summarized in two figures, 13 (p. 118) and 26 (p. 308). Figure 13, "Party masses: range of variation in the organizational model," displays the differing degrees of emphasis Lundquist discerns that Lenin placed on the Party, or on the masses, in his theorizing about the Bolshevik revolutionary movement. Figure 13 shows a range from great importance being placed on the Party, exemplified by *What Is To Be Done?* (1902), to great importance being placed on the masses, exemplified by *The State and Revolution* (1917). Figure 26, "Party-masses: changes in emphasis," graphs shifts in Lenin's textual emphasis from 1900 to 1922 "according to the situation and the function [of the revolutionary movement]" (p. 307). Lundquist acknowledges there is "nothing controversial" (p. 307) about noting fluctuation in Lenin's writings. "What has been added in this study," Lundquist continues, "is that the shifts in emphasis have been tied to a theory which views them as the consequences of changes in the situation and the function of the movement" (p. 307). "The main point is . . . that Lenin does possess a theory concerning the correlation between situation, function and organization, and that he confronts his perception of the situation with his theory" (pp. 315-316). In other words, Lenin acted on the basis of an organizational model hinging upon "mutuality in the relationship between the party and the masses" (p. 317).

For what it is, Lundquist's reconstruction of Lenin's texts is insightful and persuasive. As a defense of Leninist politics it is deficient. But politics is the crux: Can Lenin as Marxian organizational theorist be treated in isolation from Lenin, Marxian organizer? Can any work be judged adequate that splits praxis, the Marxian *raison d'etre*? Lundquist's defense fails because it confines Leninism to Lenin's books.

Writing of what he believes is the inevitable "vulgarization" required to convert Marx's political thought into a political movement, Shlomo Avineri poses the crucial issue: "Marxist parties may thus become the grave diggers of Marxism, and Marx's theory may thus be denied by the very historical processes he foresaw" (*The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,* Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 251). Marxism may well be a tragic theory of history. As played out in the Soviet Union, Leninism certainly is tragic. Lenin's organizational dialectics led to Stalin's machinations. Presently, dialectics is but a Party weasel word. Lundquist's book demonstrates the futility of scholasticism, no matter how scholarly. It whistles into history's winds.

JAMES C. FOSTER

Emory & Henry College

The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory. By Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson. (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1984. Pp. xxiii + 308. $16.95.)

Political science has had to take motives and emotions into account since even before Harold D. Lasswell's 1930 *Psychopathology and Politics* (University of Chicago Press). Masson's brilliant book furthers this inquiry by laying bare a struggle within psychoanalysis at its inception and the renewal of this essentially political conflict in recent years. His is not just a case study in the realm of group politics, because it is about the roots of emotional derangement, and so is about public policy as it bears on the management of irrational behaviors and on the prevention of violence to children and women.

Masson was projects director of the Freud Archives, a position that (along with some other sleuthing) gained him access to previously unpublished documents. He is persuaded by passages edited out of Freud's published works and by the correspondence with Fliess and diaries of Ferenczi that:

> (1) the overwhelming evidence of Freud's early analyses had pointed him to the repressed, albeit pandemic, practice of physical and sexual abuse of women and children;
>
> (2) disturbing memories of actual assaults were closely connected with later outbreaks of hysteria and other psychoneuroses;
>
> (3) although Freud stuck to his hypothesis for some time in the face of collegial ostracism, by about 1905 he bowed to the pressure and convinced himself that his patients had been lying or phantasizing; and
>
> (4) the evidence of actual abuse was for the most part relegated to the phantasy life and genetic disposition of the victim.

If Masson is right, or even approximately right, this book is significant to political science for the light it sheds on authoritarianism, on the denial of basic human rights to women and children, and on the political risks of delegating this aspect of public health policy to a professional guild and to the nuclear family. Moreover, Masson's account of Freud's ostracism and recantation, his exposure to the corpses of battered children while a student of Charcot, his involvement in Fliess's nose-surgery experiments and numerology—not to mention his quashing of Ferenczi's hapless efforts to revive the seduction theory in the early 1930s—all read like a detective novel.

Overall, the drama resides in the long-term consequences of Freud's reconversion. Having been warned not to publish his seminal paper, "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1896) lest his reputation be damaged beyond repair, he evidently became unnerved by the "void [that] is forming around me." By 1903 to 1905 he was offering publicly a universal or genetic model, most familiar to us in the form of the Oedipus complex. What followed, or continued as common practice, was that only the grossest cases of physical injury or homicide were taken seriously by forensic medicine, especially where the perpetrator had some power and status.

Having constructed a plausible explanation for Freud's reformulation of psychoanalysis so as to pose "no threat to the existing social order," Masson touches upon the matter of public responsibility toward defenseless and disadvantaged persons. This larger issue is emphasized already in Freud's 1896 paper, where he anticipated for his audience of Viennese doctors the objection that there is among the "lower classes" more sexual assault and at the same time less hysteria. Seven paragraphs elapse before Freud starts to answer the objection, but then he immediately interrupts himself with a discourse on repression, concluding lamely that the lower orders are morally and intellectually backward. This we must take to mean either that they are emotionally healthier precisely because they are otherwise inferior, or that they suffer something worse than hysteria.

D. A. STRICKLAND

Northwestern University

Property and Power: Towards a Non-Marxian Historical Materialism. By Leszek Nowak. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983. Pp. vii + 384. 157.00, cloth; $24.50, paper.)

In the first pages of this work, an editor's note emphasizes the significance of the date on which Professor Nowak's manuscript was received: August, 1980. On December 13, 1981, Nowak was interned with the imposition of martial law in Poland. As the editor implies, the thesis of *Property and Power* bears some relation to the events of those days.

Of two parts, the book first attempts to sketch the theoretical elements of a historical materialism that endeavors to retain the valuable contribution of Marxism while pursuing the inclusion of fundamentally new factors, factors unrecognized by Marx himself. In the second part, Nowak turns this new historical materialism to the task of radical critique of Marxian explanations for the origin and development of the so-called socialist states—the Soviet Union, in particular. The result, despite the Marxian ambiance, and despite the homage Nowak pays to Marx's categories and methods, is a sensitive and comprehensive repudiation of Marxian historical materialism and its incumbent political economy. Nowak determines that Marx ultimately fails to understand the full reality of the class struggle. For reasons of his own unacknowledged ideology, it is argued that Marx mistakenly establishes his historical materialism upon the dialectic of property and blinds himself to the (at least) equally potent dialectic of power. Perceiving the state merely as a superstructural manifestation of the relations of production, vulgar Marxism then only unclearly comprehends contemporary capitalism and utterly miscomprehends the phenomenon of the socialist state—which represents a politically dominant fusion of power and property, coercion and production.

The vehicle for Nowak's repudiation is an elaboration of what is termed a "non-Marxian historical materialism." As point of departure, a purely economic model of history is postulated whereby its unfolding is seen to occur according to the dynamics of class antagonism. Unlike Marxian theories, however, it is the exploiting class seeking to maintain and maximize surplus value that is revealed as the effective agent in history. The revolutionary activity of the exploited serves only as a single moment in the process wherein the exploiters come to transform the relations of production. This purely economic model, while generally explanatory of slave and feudal societies, proves incapable of fully accounting for the operation of capitalism. Accepting the analysis, but not the solution, from Rosa Luxemburg, Nowak contends that it is only the consumptive power of the state, the role of coercive power, which would enable capitalism to overcome its cyclical problem of overproduction. Any historical materialism relying solely upon the dialectic of property, it would seem, is insufficient explanation for modern societies. A reinterpretation of the concept of class struggle is thereby required; in addition to the class division between owners and direct producers, Nowak would include a division between rulers and ruled.

For Nowak, the failure to appreciate this power-based class division is the fundamental error of Marxian historical materialism. As exists between economic classes, there stands an inherent antagonism between rulers and ruled that imparts its own stamp upon the development of history. Yet, because coercion seeks nothing from the coerced save their submission, the political class struggle points toward a stage in history that far exceeds the repression of the proletariat by owners. Accordingly, what is occurring in history, and what has occurred in the East, is the inexorable evolution of the totalitarian state. Confirming the claims of their own apologists, on this account the socialist state is no aberration, but an image of the future for the West. Bolshevism only shortens the path trod by capitalist society in the continuing cooptation of the owner class by the power of the state. The repression of the owners and the rulers when merged under the dominance of the rulers is the true origin of the socialist state. Neither the end of classes nor the cessation of the class struggle, it is the totalization of class division and a totalization of repression that is seen represented in this fusion. Yet, Nowak asserts, although the division exists, the struggle has not ceased and (contrary to vulgar Marxism) the socialist state is not the culmination of history.

The most troublesome aspect of Nowak's work might be cited by some as its strength. A Marxist-like pastiche of formal theory and impassioned polemics, the seamless joining of tidy theory with an analysis of the origin of Soviet state socialism is rather worrying. Likewise, it remains unclear how cleanly Nowak's own historical materialism fits atop the foundation he claims in Marxism. Although he spurns the "praxistic" Marxism of the early Lukacs for its reliance on the subjectivity of the proletariat, does Nowak remain within historical materialism himself when history is seen to unfold finally from the value maximizing and rational actions of individuals engaged in class struggle? Indeed, the thesis is burdened with its Marxist label, when its Marxism consists of no more than the idea of class struggle in history. Despite these hesitations, the book is thoroughly provocative. Surely, the modern state can no longer be explained in the categories of nineteenth-century political economy. Nowak's carefully reasoned inclusion of the dialectic of power within historical materialism lends a valuable perspective to current efforts to understand anew the state in modern society.

STEPHEN FREDERICK SCHNECK

University of Notre Dame

Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks. By Ofelia Schutte. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. xiii + 233. $22.00.)

In *Beyond Nihilism,* the masks Ofelia Schutte relentlessly questions "are not so much Nietzsche's as our own" (p. ix). Although many interpret Nietzsche using the very philosophical concepts he condemns as nihilistic, Schutte engages in a distinctive Dionysian reading, one which integrates poetry with philosophy in substance and style. This reading not only exposes the limitations of purely philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche, but also questions their characteristic separation of his philosophy and politics, a separation used to dismiss the latter as philosophically uninteresting, even fascistic. After appropriately accusing such interpretors of "self deceit" or "censorship" (p. 186), Schutte argues that the release of Nietzsche's Dionysian potential requires recognition and transcendence of his repressive politics. To illuminate Nietzsche's contradictory progressive and regressive moments, she again distinguishes herself from standard interpretations by emphasizing his responses to nihilism—the "trinity" eternal recurrence, will to power, and over-man—rather than his analysis of its causes and characteristics.

At the core of her new Nietzsche is the important distinction between his two "paradigms of power": power as recurring energy and power as domination. Power as recurring energy transcends the metaphysical dualities (being/becoming, self/world, will/cause, and eternity/temporality) which negate life by dividing it against itself, and thereby affirms the totality of life. Power as domination represents Nietzsche's own unconscious reversion to dualism, one most apparent in his distinction between master and slave morality. Schutte argues that Nietzsche's paradigm of power as domination must be read critically (p. 91) in light of his own ontological presupposition of totality which it disrupts, even suspends (p. 102). She suggests that Nietzsche can only actualize his desire to affirm the totality of life by affirming human life without authority.

Schutte develops this argument systematically. She begins by distinguishing the Dionysian as progressive/regressive continuity with life from static, discontinuous ego-consciousness (chap. 1). She then examines Nietzsche's Dionysian critique of traditional metaphysical identities—subject, object, and their correspondence in successive truths—as egoistic negations of life (chap. 2). In chapter 3, she refines and develops the Dionysian, introducing two models of continuity with life, recurrence or repression. Her examination of the dualism between these models manifest in Nietzsche's will to power follows. She argues that various forms of this dualism appear in Kaufmann's, Stern's, Heidegger's, and Deleuze's interpretations of Nietzsche, and that he and they must overcome dualism if they would transcend nihilism (chap. 4). Her remaining chapters evaluate Nietzsche's revaluations of morality (chaps. 5-6) and politics (chap. 7), contrasting his liberating potential with his repressive relapses. They include interesting analyses of his racial, sexual, and class biases.

After arguing that Nietzsche's transvaluation of values is insufficiently radical because authority remains, Schutte asks whether dualism can be entirely transcended. She answers with a tentative "Yes": "One must question whether the meaning of authority remains the same and whether the need to appeal to authority is even applicable once the understanding of value has shifted to a life-affirming foundation" (p. 191).

Only here does Schutte's analysis become somewhat unsatisfactory. She needs to clarify to what exactly Nietzsche succumbs and what exactly we must overcome. Although she accurately refuses to portray Nietzsche as a bourgeois imperialist (p. 185), her remarks on his more complex capitalist, liberal, patriarchal roots remain vague (pp. 139, 184). She refuses to follow him beyond reason (p. 28) and to affirm his exploitative world (p. 70), but argues that nihilists would correct reality to conform to reason, rather than simply let it be (p. 192). In short, Schutte unintentionally, I think, suggests that not only Nietzsche's solution, but also the very problem of nihilism, reflects an alienated world. She begs the question: Might understanding and control of reality—if properly directed—be the release, not the repression, of life? Still, this is a superb work, significant for Nietzsche scholars and others who "accept the challenge to arrest nihilism" (p. 2).

NANCY S. LOVE

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Empirical Theory and Methodology

Dialectical Logics for the Political Sciences. Edited by Hayward R. Alker, Jr. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982. Pp. 96. $11.50, paper.)

Is dialectic logic logical? The essays in this collection, based upon contributions to the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Moscow in 1979, seek to demonstrate that it is. Although the papers are interesting, I remain unconvinced that the task is readily resolvable. Indeed, the editor, Hayward R. Alker, Jr. of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, calls the linkage "paradoxical."

Dialectics is, by definition, a higher order of conceptualization than is "ordinary" logic. It is all about resolving logical contradictions. Thus, it is not surprising that the attempt by Dwain Mefford to represent Hegelian views of interpersonal relations by formal models based upon Boolean algebra should, by Alker's own admission, fall short. The difficulty is that Hegelian dialectics imply a recursivity that Boolean analysis cannot encompass. An application of Kenneth Burke's formal *Grammar of Motives* and *Rhetoric of Motives* to Lenin's dialectic, as revealed in his speeches, is somewhat more successful. Charles Roig employs formal logic to represent Lenin's arguments and shows that it can be done. But what has been accomplished? We get only the translation of Lenin's arguments into a system of formal logic. No deductions are made, nothing novel about Leninist claims is revealed. The final essay, by Franz Loeser, argues in a page and a half that we must not separate dialectical and symbolic logics. But we need more than exhortation. What is to be done?

This brings us to the two most interesting chapters in this short volume. The only self-committed Marxist to write a longer essay, Leszek Nowak of Poland, comes to grips with a key problem in Marxist theory: Why has the state in socialist nations not withered away? The answer is that socialist states have undergone fundamentally different social transformations from capitalist ones. Existing theory is inadequate because it does not consider this perspective. Thus, a correct view of the world would recognize that in socialist economies, the fundamental force pushing for the ultimate dissolution of the state, the concern of capitalists for establishing the most efficient means of production (and, hence, coercion), has vanished. The thesis is novel, but the logic is still wanting. Were not socialist states originally capitalist ones? Why, then, did those superstructures not wither away?

Alker's chapter focuses on metatheoretical issues, specifically the war games fought in the philosophy of science. He presents a clear picture of the similarities and key differences among logical positivists/empiricists (Russell, Carnap, Nagel, and, although not discussed, Hempel), falsificationists (Popper, Lakatos), and ordinary language theorists (Kuhn, Toulmin, Feyerabend). A later section of the essay includes dialectical thinkers (Adorno, Apel, Radnitsky). Alker's essay is lucid and to the point; I finally have something to assign to graduate students to give them a once-over view of the world of philosophy of science. Even better, his arguments are the same ones I would make! Although Alker is clearly sympathetic to ordinary language theorists (and to dialecticians), I wish that he would have been somewhat more inclusive. Toulmin is mentioned only in passing and Hanson, even though he thought that there was an underlying logic to scientific discovery, is not mentioned at all. Because Alker is specifically concerned to establish a linkage between scientific thinking and the dialectic, Feyerabend's views notwithstanding, a consideration of Hanson would have been most useful. The greatest omission is Wittgenstein, who first was a positivist and then launched ordinary language philosophy. One can understand this only by noting that Alker's major concern was the logic of science, not the logic of language.

The two are, of course, intricately connected. Perhaps they will be discussed in a future essay of the same high caliber as this one. At the conclusion, Alker sets out a framework for "taking the best" from each of the four perspectives. But the scheme remains only an outline at this time. There is clearly much work to be done.

I must admit that I find it difficult to believe that the twains of Hegelian dialectics and a logically perfect language shall ever meet. This short volume does not convince me otherwise. However, the zeal with which its proponents advance their cause should convince us that this cause is far from lost.

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Political Economics. By James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 276. $22.50, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

In recent years there has been a significant revival in the study of political economy. One tradition found in contemporary political economy centers around the development and testing of formal economic models of the political economy. Political economists in this tradition have been particularly interested in how economic optimization is constrained by a variety of factors including political processes, institutions, and ideas.

Political Economics represents a significant attempt to come to terms with some of the most important issues raised in this tradition of modern political economy. The aim of the book "is to give those acquainted with economics and politics a framework for analyzing the making of economic policy" (p. xii). Alt, a political scientist, and Chrystal, an economist, seek to do this by focusing attention upon the theories developed by contemporary political economists and evaluating them in light of their logical consistency and their empirical support.

The book is divided into four major parts. In the first part, Alt and Chrystal briefly consider the thought of a diverse group of economic theorists in order to identify the key issues that have been raised in the history of modern economic theory relating to the behavior of the state in the modern Western economies. In the second part, they discuss the way in which political institutions, macroeconomic ideas, and the international economy provide major constraints on economic policymakers.

In Part 3, Alt and Chrystal turn to consider the conceptual consistency and empirical validity of the existing politicoeconomic literature on the political business cycle and on voting behavior. In the process, they provide a forceful argument as to why reaction functions can provide a useful tool for empirical economic policy analysis. Part 4 encompasses a detailed consideration of the problems involved in studying the growth of government in the twentieth century. Following a cross-national study of governmental growth, Alt and Chrystal develop their own theory which focuses attention upon the important role played by national income in determining that growth.

The strengths of *Political Economics* are many. It contains an excellent summary discussion and critique of the political business-cycle literature. It also provides an informative analysis of the current debate over the scope and growth of the public sector and offers a powerful explanation of the factors lying behind this growth in the form of a "permanent income model of government expenditure." Finally, there is an excellent bibliography that is well integrated into the textual material.

Despite these strengths, there are some problems with the book. It does not always hold together as a whole. Neither the introductory sections which precede each part of the book nor the concluding chapter satisfactorily integrate the chapters of the book. Moreover, it is not intuitively obvious how the themes taken up in Parts 1 and 2 relate to the themes considered in Parts 3 and 4. For example, the discussion of the constraints provided by political institutions in Part 2 is little more than a literature review of other empirical studies of possible constraints on economic policymaking. Nowhere in Part 2 or in Parts 3 and 4 is there a systematic attempt to explain how these particular constraints are related or which of them predominates. The reader is often left wondering why some topics in the first two parts are taken up in considerable detail, whereas others are hardly discussed.

These problems aside, *Political Economics* is an insightful contribution to the growing political economy literature. It should prove to be quite useful to both introductory and advanced students of political economy.

EDWARD J. HARPHAM

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Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know. By Steven J. Brams. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Pp. xviii + 202. $21.95, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

"If there existed a superior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us, and would these differences be knowable?" (p. vii). This is the central question posed by Steven J. Brams in this book. Brams is best known as one of the leading scholars in the application of game theoretic concepts to the study of political science and international relations. *Superior Beings* is a departure from that line of work and is closer in spirit (no pun intended) to his *Biblical Games: A Strategic Analysis of Stories in the Old Testament* (MIT Press, 1980).

Brams endows his Superior Being (*SB*) with rationality and at least partially conflicting interests with a Person (*P*). *SB* is involved in various kinds of "games" with *P*. For example, in the Revelation Game, *SB* has two strategies (which are possible courses of action from which he chooses): (1) reveal himself (establish his existence), or (2) don't reveal himself (don't establish his existence). *P* also has two strategies: (1) believe in *SB*'s existence; or, (2) don't believe in *SB*'s existence. The intersection of these strategies define the four outcomes in this game. A preference rank order is assigned to each outcome for each player, with "4" representing the best outcome for each player, "3" the next best, "2" the next worst, and "1" the worst. These rank orders are based upon assumptions about the goals of the players. In the Revelation Game these assumptions are that *SB*'s primary goal is wanting *P* to believe in his existence while secondarily preferring not to reveal himself, and *P*'s primary goal is wanting his belief (or nonbelief) in *SB*'s existence confirmed by evidence (or lack thereof) while secondarily preferring to believe in *SB*'s existence.

Besides the Revelation Game, Brams also explores the Knowability Game, the Paradox of Omniscience, Moving and Staying Power as it relates to Omnipotence, Threats and Immortality, the Truth Game and the Problem of Evil, Newcomb's Problem, and solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. All of this is with the aim of inquiring into the meaning of superiority in games and the effects that different superior abilities have on the outcomes of such games (p. vii). A major point of this inquiry is the problem of "decidability," the ability of a human being in a game-playing relationship with a superior being to decide whether that being is indeed superior. As it turns out, such a determination cannot be made because the superior being cannot improve upon the (inferior) outcome that an ordinary player in his position could also achieve. This conclusion suggests to Brams "a new and strange kind of logic and may underlie agnosticism" (p. ix). Furthermore, the problem of undecidability also suggests to Brams that it may be rational in certain games for the superior being to obfuscate his choices by acting arbitrarily. This in turn raises a theological issue of whether such behavior is consistent with a benevolent and righteous God, that is, the "problem of evil."

Brams charactrizes this book as "first and foremost a philosophical investigation of characteristics of superior beings and their possible impact on games played with human beings. It differs from a conventional philosophical inquiry in its relentless use of mathematical theory that I have tried to adapt in order to (i) facilitate the conceptualization of superiority, (ii) deduce the consequences superiority has on game outcomes, and (iii) explore theological issues raised by a disciplined inquiry of this sort" (p. 2). The reader interested in this sort of inquiry will find the arguments fascinating. However, following the logic of some of these arguments through the game-theoretical analysis may be tortuous for the novice to game theory.

CHARLES M. BENJAMIN

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Power, Theory and Value. By Gunnar Falkemark. (Lund, Sweden: Liber Gleerup, 1982. Pp. i + 246. Price unavailable.)

This book by Gunnar Falkemark illustrates that the pluralist-elitist community power dispute is still simmering and not parochially limited to players in the United States. The book also illustrates both why the dispute, circa 1960, continues to the present, and how it might begin to be resolved. To his immense credit, Falkemark addresses the latter point specifically and with some creative, if debatable, solutions for moving ahead in community power research. Less fortunate is his tendency, shared with an entire genre of community power analysts, to lump pluralist analysts into one camp and alternative researchers into another. This artificial homogenization of researchers and, by extension, research paradigms merely prolongs the debate; in fact, in some circles this artificial duality has become the debate. Ergo, the community power research question has become a stand-off between researchers preferring to focus on the key issues or big decisions, and elitists focusing on non-decisions and the choice queueing role of political culture and socialization mechanisms in given communities.

Falkemark contributes to this analytical box canyon in which authors and approaches are grouped into camps and homogenized in blenders with the results reified into two opposing paradigmatic camps. Thus, the varied approaches of Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, and Raymond Wolfinger are reduced to "the pluralist theory (PT)" (pp. 95-101, 110-137), and William Domhoff, Matthew Crenson, and Steven Lukes et al. become adherents of "the theory of a ruling class (TRC)" (pp. 101-137). These generalized and presumably inconsistent jerry-built competing paradigms have done much to keep apart scholars whose research methods and normative values are, when considered non-monolithically, often similar and mutually reinforcing. The pluralist-elitist differences are overblown. A study of key issues is enhanced by a study of political culture and influences on community socialization mechanisms.

If we adopt such a unified approach, the question then becomes what is key, when is an approach circular, and how (if at all) can one study non-decisions (community decisions not taken because they advantage community influentials). This is the realm in which Falkemark makes a genuine contribution to community power research. His ideas are speculative and will, no doubt, be criticized, but they represent some of the most original thinking on community power research in decades. Falkemark's treatise does include a wider discussion of power and a discussion of the concept of paradigm (pp. 95-137), but neither discussion moves substantially beyond earlier treatments of the same topics by Dahl ("The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science,* 1957, *2,* 201-215) or Thomas Kuhn (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1970).

Power, Theory and Value tackles three of the most basic community power issues: circularity, centrality, and non-decision making. Circularity is the problem involved with community power and false consciousness. How does one know if community members have been prevented from deciding in favor of policy *p* because of *p*'s lack of support by community influentials (non-decision making), or because community members did not know any better (false consciousness)? Falkemark revives Frederick Frey's approach ("Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power," *American Political Science Review,* 1971, *65,* 1081-1101) and adds a "falsifiability hierarchy" (pp. 186-192) to guide researchers in reducing the problems of subjective judgment. The approach is novel but unconvincing. The problem of infinite regress remains generically attached to the false consciousness problem. The falsifiability hierarchy notwithstanding, falseness remains largely within the eye of the beholder.

Falkemark is more creative and more successful in providing a standard for determining what are key issues in communities, and how researchers might determine if non-decision makers have been successful in given communities. Falkemark proposes using Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs to determine the centrality of key or big decisions in communities and to test for the presence of nondecisions. To oversimplify Falkemark's argument, the more basic the need, the more key the community decision associated with it. Thus, housing and survival decisions precede life-style needs. Second, if a given community appears to outside observers to not be meeting basic needs *a la* Maslow, then *ipso facto* non-decision-making forces may be at work. Falkemark issues two caveats. The problem may be objectively less basic than it appears, or it may not be "technically solvable" (p. 208). Falkemark argues convincingly for viewing Crenson's study (*The Un-Politics of Air Pollution,* University of Chicago Press, 1971) in a Maslowian light. Given that the need for clean air is an undisputed physiological need, why would a community not enact policies resulting in clean air?

Power, Theory and Value would be a welcome addition to any list of required books for graduate and undergraduate courses on community power, urban politics, methodology, or the philosophy of science.

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Organizational Theory and Public Policy. Edited by Richard H. Hall and Robert E. Quinn. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 304. $25.00, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

It is the potential utility of organization theory as a means of informing public policy studies that concerns the editors and authors of this volume. On the face of it, organization theory should have much to contribute to the study of public policy, inasmuch as public organizations commonly carry out public policy, public policies are typically formulated within public organizational settings, and organizations are often the object of public policies. It was precisely this *prima facie* centrality of organizations to the public policy process that occasioned a conference on this topic in April, 1982 at the State University of New York at Albany; *Organizational Theory and Public Policy* is based upon the papers prepared for this 1982 meeting.

The book contains a sizeable collection of 17 original contributions organized into five major subject areas. The first section deals with the topic of "Purpose, Process and Reason" in organizational phenomena, bringing into focus the discussion of the potentialities and limitations of the "rational action" assumptional orientation. The second section deals with the "Evolution of Organizations," bringing together the contributions of those authors directly concerned with the degree to which endogenous and exogenous factors determine the character of organizational development and behavior. The third section focuses attention upon "Interorganizational Networks," inquiring into the question of the extent of conditioning of individual organizational behavior and form to be attributed to interorganizational linkages. The fourth section deals with the familiar topic of "Implementation," within the particular context of penetrating the "black box" of organizational actors in the public policy implementation process. The final section deals with the equally familiar issue of organizational "Performance," inquiring in some detail into the problems of appropriate conceptualization and measurement.

As is too often the case with the publication of symposia or conference collections, the contributions to this volume are somewhat uneven and in several instances only peripherally relevant to the central topic. The book lacks an index for either authors or subjects and contains numerous typographical and proofing errors. These detracting characteristics aside, however, the volume contains a substantial core collection of highly useful and insightful pieces of scholarship.

In the area of appropriate analytical frameworks, the question of the utility of the rational actor construct is investigated with imagination by both Andrew H. Van De Ven and David P. McCaffrey. Van De Ven argues convincingly that neither the extreme of rational nor the extreme of random behavior is likely to characterize organizational behavior as well as the concept of reasonable behavior. He argues that the "reasonable man" standard in tort law offers a detailed, jurisprudentially sound concept for use in organizational analysis. In a similar spirit, McCaffrey proposes that the rational actor model and a rival "stochastic" model should be used in tandem to determine "which makes the most sense" (p. 68) in the analysis of organizational decision making.

In the area of environmental effects upon public organizations, Hal G. Rainey and Brinton Milward present an excellent review of the literature. Drawing upon the insights of Downs, Warwick, and Meyer, Rainey and Milward note that the proper "unit of analysis" in organizational studies and public policy analysis should be the interorganizational policy network that links public agencies to their broader surroundings. In a related argument, Paul Di Maggio suggests that "policy fields" exist in most areas of public policy, and it is often the nature of these fields rather than the character of organizations within those fields that determines the content of public policy.

In the area of implementation, David E. Duffee and John Klofas and the team of Janice Beyer, John M. Stevens, and Harrison M. Trice offer useful insights into the seemingly inherently problematic process of public policy implementation. Duffee and Klofas suggest the utility of employing "client biographies" as a means of diagnosing policy results and identifying breakdowns. Beyer and her colleagues suggest that the organizational "black box" can best be penetrated by investigating the effects of "loose versus tight coupling" phenomena. With some thought to creating a typology of policy classifications together with the development of measures of coupling tightness, the beginnings of the generation of testable implementation propositions are well in hand.

Finally, in the area of organizational performance, John Rohrbaugh presents a very interesting "competing values" approach, and Quinn and Hall build upon this framework to construct a contingency theory which links environmental conditions, organizational forms, and leadership styles into a single analytical scheme. The postulation of congruent and incongruent combinations based upon the contingency theory, then, constitutes the first step in the testing of the phenomena at the core of organizational studies. As J. E. Oliver has so aptly observed, "A prevailing assumption in the literature is that effectiveness follows a fit between environment, form, and personal style and suggests that our task is to facilitate the search for this state" (p. 295).

Although *Organizational Theory and Public Policy* contains some weaknesses, it nevertheless contains numerous contributions worthy of serious consideration. It is a worthwhile addition to the libraries of advanced students and researchers in public policy studies interested in the contributions to their field to be derived from organization theory.

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Washington State University

Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation. Edited by Lester B. Lave. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983. Pp. xi + 264. $26.95, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

This is another of those books that argues that scientific study should replace much of what passes for political judgement in government decision making. The book would be easy to pass up, except that its arguments are dramatically correct and substantially important. The regulation of risk producing compounds in the environment, the workplace, and in products we use or consume ought to be based on rigorous review and methodologically thorough use of scientific evidence. Such is not always true.

The chapters in this book began as papers presented at a conference on risk assessment held in 1981 under sponsorship of The Brookings Institution, Carnegie-Mellon University, and the American Petroleum Institute. There are two chapters by Lave that introduce the concept of quantitative risk assessment, explain the methodological issues, and draw some conclusions about making better use of quantitative risk assessments in federal policy settings. There are six chapters by various authors that present case histories of the use and abuse of, as well as the failure to use, quantitative risk assessment in federal regulation of environmental quality, occupational health, and consumer products.

Two major findings result from these presentations and are succinctly summarized by Bruce MacLaury, president of Brookings, in an introduction (p. vii). First, "risks cannot be assessed by rote procedure and . . . uncertainties, always unavoidable, will often dominate the estimates." Risk assessment is a complex activity involving severe problems of data inadequacy and procedural ambiguity. Epidemiological studies may require a generation to complete, are frequently conducted using sample populations that differ from populations of interest, and are difficult to control for interactions with other toxological agents. Laboratory experiments with animals may not be validly transferable to humans and involve dosages far above probable human exposures. Combinatorial methods, including those which set out to "conservatively bias" the analysis, may distort the comparison of benefits and costs. Second, "Even so, it is clear that such assessments provide valuable insights and are essential to sensible regulation." When a federal agency sets a standard in response to congressional mandate, the choice is between basing the level of the standard on interest group pressure, no-effect or "zero-discharge" decision rules like the Delaney clause, or a data-based evaluation of risks and benefits. The cases here support the data-based evaluation of risks and benefits.

The cases concern regulation of ambient concentrations of ozone, workplace and ambient concentrations of benezene, workplace and ambient concentrations of coke oven emissions, population exposure and emissions of ionizing radiation, pesticide use of chlorobenzilate, and brief treatment of the food additives and contaminants sodium nitrite, aflatoxin, and diethylstilbestrol. We are shown repeatedly that federal agencies may have designed standard-setting analyses to support standards arrived at by political means. In the case of ozone regulation, Christopher H. Marraro presents considerable evidence that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency responded to pressure from other executive agencies in both setting the standard and in determining which scientific studies to use in their deliberations. In the case of U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration regulation of benzene, a standard was selected at the lowest feasible level, ostensibly because scientific data did not permit selection of a risk-determined standard. In the absence of clear guidelines as to what was feasible, OSHA chose one part per·million. Whether the development of better risk assessment methods will reduce agency responsiveness to nonscientific-based political pressure is debatable. But, the reexamination of the scientific evidence in these cases histories shows that substantial improvements in method are possible.

The work is well written, carefully edited, and well substantiated. A high degree of uniformity is present in the six separately written case studies. The industrial process and health effects issues are presented with enough detail for the unfamiliar, but without burden to the nontechnical reader.

A disappointing omission is a clear statement of how quantitative risk assessment should actually be done. There is a comparison of the merits of various forms of scientific evidence and a brief discussion of the problem of uncertainty. But there is no textbook-like summary of what a thorough quantitative risk assessment should look like. The decision analysis literature gives a variety of methods for handling risk and uncertainty. Characterization of these methods and advice on selecting among them based on the case study findings would have been welcome.

The arguments in this volume show that quantitative risk assessment can be a viable method for improving what are too often improperly influenced government decisions. Quantitative risk assessment can be abused, however, in much the same way that cost-benefit analyses have been. Considerable methodological development and standardization will be required to protect against such abuse.

BRUCE STIFTEL

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The Tares and the Good Grain: Or, the Kingdom of Man at the Hour of Reckoning. By Tage Lindbom. Translated by Alvin Moore, Jr. (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1983. Pp. xviii + 143. $11.95.)

The comparatively prosaic subtitle of this fundamentally poetic work conveys its subject matter more clearly than the biblical allusion contained in its title. It is an attack on the modern, secularized world, the kingdom of man, in the name of a somewhat unorthodox vision of the kingdom of God. It is interesting for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it is the product of a former servant of the kingdom of man. After completing a dissertation on the Swedish Trade Union movement, Lindbom served 27 years as director of the Central Library for Labor Questions of the Swedish Social Democratic party. The book is also interesting in that it frequently shows a perceptive grasp of modern political thought. Yet although it is strangely compelling, the book is not developed in a rigorous or systematic fashion. It frequently asserts where greater development is required, and its allusive presentation ends ultimately by being vague and illusive.

Lindbom presents the post-World War II era as the final flowering of the modern longing of man to take dominion over all things, to be liberated from nature, other men, and God, to master all the oppositions and contradictions of existence, and to usher in the unlimited sovereignty of man, free from guilt, sin and responsibility to anything other than himself. For Lindbom, this has brought as its necessary harvest "a secularized generation for which material existence is everything and spiritual life is nothing" (p. 3). And this spiritual decay inevitably manifests itself in political and social chaos. Hence, Lindbom asserts that the contemporary generation does not live in a viable society and has destroyed all "limits" such as are contained in distinctions such as adult-child, beautiful-ugly, man-woman, good-bad, and true-false (p. 105). Similarly, all notions of patriotism, family, and responsibility are overthrown. As a result, all authority is seen as illegitimate and in need of destruction.

Finally, the claims of *ratio,* reason, are raised so high that man has lost all contact with *intellectus,* the apprehension of a transcendent, created ground of order. Hence, all symbolic "knowing" is cast aside in search of an "objectivity" which is a mirage and ultimately seen as such by the most sophisticated of contemporary physicists. Hence, in place of an external ground for order, man is increasingly driven to cybernetics, and thereby the destruction of human dignity, in an attempt to find any possibility of order. But for Lindbom, we must transcend this "horizontal" search for truth and meaning in the imminent world, and seek instead on the "vertical" plane of faith, revelation, and tradition (p. 43). Our horizontal reason must be subordinated to this vertical faith.

For Lindbom, the entire democratic epoch, the faith in progress, positivism, Marxism, and Liberal-Capitalism, all share in this damaging horizontality (p. 103). In attempting to make man totally at home in his material world, both East and West generate a herd of "well ordered mechanical workers functioning as perfectly as ants, and creatures abandoned to vegetative leisure" (p. 102). In this way, universal secularized man loses his identity. This is the product of the "Third," silent revolution, which follows the French and Russian revolutions, in which there occurs a total internal disintegration of man. The only way to overcome this disintegration, the only ground for personality, is by "grasping" that there is an ordered creation and aligning ourselves with it. When this occurs, we will again become healthy and "childlike." (The final chapter of the book is titled "To be Like Children." Oddly, one might compare this with the section in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* "On the Three Metamorphoses.")

One cannot help but see much in Lindbom's attack that corresponds with the existentialist indictment of the modern world—the sense of inner spiritual decay, of existential chaos, of the loss of a sense of historical roots, of the metaphysical equality of East and West, of the general collapse of faith in the power of reason. There is even an intimation of that pessimism that culminates in the observation, "only a god can save us now." And in this book there is a clear turning away from philosophy in the direction of religion as a solution to the modern problem. Certainly modern philosophy has lost, if it ever had, that sense of the limitations of reason and the extent to which philosophy cannot but ultimately point beyond itself, perhaps in the direction of religion and revelation. But Lindbom in his despair is a manifestation of that contemporary predilection to lose sight of the fact that religion itself must ultimately point back in the direction of philosophy. In his assault on the modern attempt to overcome all contradiction and opposition within human existence, Lindbom ultimately succumbs to the same temptation to overcome a necessary tension. Consequently, he opens himself up to other political and moral dangers than the ones he opposes, the ones that modern political philosophy so one-sidedly tried to confront. Lindbom's attempt to subordinate reason to religion as a means to overcoming modern excesses is the ultimate ground of his book's vagueness and illusiveness.

GREGORY B. SMITH

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Concept Formation in Social Science. By William Outhwaite. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. vii + 255. $30.00.)

Since the mid-sixties social scientists have become increasingly self-conscious of their theoretical assumptions and frameworks. Many would still accept, however, Durkheim's dismissal of such "philosophical" juxtapositions as individualism and holism or empiricism and conventionalism as involving largely definitional questions and ultimately arbitrary. It is this casual dismissal of such questions, Outhwaite feels, that has led to the present intellectual disarray in the social sciences. Social scientists must "support their choice of concepts" (p. 2), even if this involves metatheoretical reflections. Although Outhwaite discusses a number of variations on the theme of concept formation, the central issue seems to turn on conventionalism in concept formation—definitions are stipulated and their value judged by their "usefulness"—as contrasted with some version of realism—reliance on real definitions and the belief that there is a systematic connection between science and the world. The first chapter offers a "brief survey" (p. 22) of alternate philosophical views on concept formation in the traditions of positivism, hermeneutics, and realism. In the second chapter, which is "largely expository" (p. 67), Outhwaite tries to glean from a series of brief expositions of the key figures in continental social theory and philosophy a version of concept formation that is both sensitive to the mediating role of language between us and our social world and contains a realistic and critical component. The third chapter, often retracing the same ground, centers on the social world as constituted by its agents. Outhwaite asserts the need for a modified form of "constitutionalism" conjoined with realism. In the fourth chapter, Max Weber is discussed and criticized in some detail with the object of providing "negative support for the realist programme" (p. 4). In the Conclusion, Outhwaite peruses the threads of his argument and finds an "interesting convergence" (p. 153).

This work has all of the weaknesses of a revised dissertation and then some. There is excessive footnoting accompanied by an unwillingness to range very far from the cited authority. The analysis of various positions often consists of little more than long strings of quotations tied together by a sentence or short paragraph. Except for the fourth chapter on Weber, there is no sustained critique or argument. Characteristically, although Outhwaite finds that various strands of social theory are now pointing to some version of realism, his reasons for favoring one version over another "can not be elaborated here" (p. 117). In the Conclusion, he somewhat tentatively allows that he has "concentrated on furnishing subsidiary arguments in favor of the realist programme" (p. 155). These arguments seem to involve tracing in capsule summaries of a page or two the various shifts and currents in continental social theory over the past 100 years, acknowledging that there have been deep and abiding conflicts, but concluding nevertheless that in one current there is an "encouraging convergence between [realism] . . . and some of the most interesting contemporary sociological writings on the relation of action and structure" (pp. 153-154). Although I am sympathetic to the call for a "realist programme," the work contributes little even to the modest objective of opening a dialogue. If the reader needs short summaries of the key figures and arguments on concept formation, the work can serve a limited function. (There is also a fairly extensive bibliography.) If the reader needs sustained argument with the use of relevant examples from the social sciences, then the work has little to offer.

CHARLES HELM

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The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention. By Elliot Turiel. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 240. $39.50, cloth; $13.95, paper.)

Political socialization scholars deploring the nonexistence of important work in their subfield should take solace from the neighboring discipline of psychology, where important and creative research on the development of social cognition and moral judgment is in a ferment. The long-awaited publication in book form of Lawrence Kohlberg's influential essays has been accompanied by a spate of research challenging his conclusions on social and moral development. These disputes illuminate a number of essential concerns in political socialization, particularly the development of children's understandings of law, authority, and justice, all of which now appear to evolve in fundamentally different ways than political scientists have usually assumed.

The generally accepted model of moral development from Piaget and Kohlberg contends that children begin from a heteronomous perspective; rules are unalterable and legitimized by the unilateral respect felt for authority. By this scheme, judgment becomes more complex, autonomous, and democratic only gradually with age. But this approach is vulnerable to criticism. Piaget, asking children about rules in general, overlooks their potential to distinguish between different kinds of rules. Kohlberg, posing a dilemma forcing a choice between the adult values of devotion to one's spouse and concern for private property, ignores the possibility of children making moral determinations in their own worlds and terms.

Recent studies have provided evidence at odds with the traditional portrait of the child as exclusively authoritarian and egocentric. Key among this new research is this thoughtful and ambitious book by Elliot Turiel. It argues two central points. First, children, far from being amoral, can be "intuitive moralists," even at an early age. Second, children do not perceive all rules similarly, but instead evaluate them differentially according to their domains and functions. In particular, they distinguish between moral proscriptions that cannot and should not be changed, and social conventions that serve only to coordinate particular societies and are thus relative and alterable.

Such seeming sophistication among children might initially be surprising. Yet Turiel persuasively marshals his evidence drawn from a series of interviews and hypothetical situations with subjects ranging from preschool to college. For example, when told of a fictitious school where children would be allowed to hit and push each other, even the youngest respondents saw such a rule as wrong and envisioned authorities enforcing that rule as illegitimate. However, presented with a similar scenario concerning a familiar social convention (e.g., not undressing in public), the subjects found such practice acceptable if the rules permitted it at the other school. An ability to distinguish between moral and conventional rules is not then age-related. Instead, what develops are the capacities to generalize to unfamiliar events, to understand the purposes of social conventions, and to coordinate the moral and conventional domains.

Turiel occasionally makes more of his findings than his data allow, which he almost gets away with, because the reader often must look up the original articles to examine the precise empirical findings. More importantly, he establishes a false dichotomy at the outset between socialization and social understanding with the question, "Are individuals shaped by the social world, or do they develop conceptual systems for understanding and transforming the social world?" (p. 2). Turiel, being unwilling to accept that both could occur at once, does not accord adequate credence to a socialization explanation that fits his data. For example, the distinction between moral and conventional rules, which he attributes to children's almost natural capacity for taking the roles of others, could easily be reinforced, if not caused, by the greater punishment children receive for moral infractions. Like many Piagetians, Turiel fails to give equal time to accommodation to outside reality alongside assimilation to individual schemas, and underestimates the impact of culture not only on conventions, but also on morality.

Nevertheless, this is an exciting book. A brief review cannot do justice to the range and depth of the problems raised and addressed in a literate, interdisciplinary fashion. It forces political scientists to doubt the standard assumptions that children—and, at base, all persons—are authoritarian and amoral. Moreover, by focusing on the skills children possess rather than emphasizing those they lack, Turiel implicitly questions the benificence easily ascribed to the socialization process when children are seen as social incompetent. In sum, *The Development of Social Knowledge* deserves a wide audience for its thought-provoking conclusions.

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Annotations

Works of Fisher Ames as Published by Seth Ames, 2 vols. Edited by W. B. Allen. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983. Pp. lii + 841 and xxxvii + 773. $30.00/set, cloth; $15.00/set, paper.)

Based on the 1854 edition by Seth Ames, this reprint has been rearranged and enlarged to include additional essays, speeches, and correspondence not found in the earlier edition. Volume 1, Part 1 includes essays on social class and character, the transition from confederation to nation, nation-founding and patriotism, monarchy versus republican government, political parties, equality, support for the Federalists and opposition to the Republicans, the French Revolution and European politics, and a few eulogies. Volume 1, Part 2 reprints speeches and letters chronologically between 1788 and 1790. Volume 2 continues the speeches and letters from 1791 to 1807. Text includes earlier edition prefaces by J. T. Kirkland and Seth Ames, a foreword by the present editor, and an index.

International Inventory of Current Mexico-Related Research. Edited by Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya and Wayne A. Cornelius. (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1983. Pp. xii + 223. $5.00, paper.)

The third in its series, this volume attempts to provide a compendium of advanced research in progress relating to Mexico. Text provides abstracts of some 451 projects underway in Australia, Austria, Colombia, France, West Germany, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Categorized topics include Mexican studies, Mexico and the world, border studies, Chicano studies, agricultural sciences, biological sciences, health studies, marine sciences, and physical sciences. Entries include mailing address of the principal investigator; project title; and project description, beginning date, and expected date of completion. Text includes subject index and listing of institutions where the various projects are based.

Marx and Engels: A Conceptual Concordance. By Gerard Bekerman. Translated by Terrell Carver. (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983. Pp. xxxi + 205. $33.50.)

This volume is a translation of Gerard Bekerman's *Vocabulaire du Marxisme/Worterbuch des Marxismus* (1981). The text distills central concepts from Marx's thought, arranges them alphabetically, and illustrates their meaning with selected passages from the writings of Marx and Engels. The volume includes a table of entries, a brief bibliography, the concordance itself, and an index.

Setting Municipal Priorities, 1984. Edited by Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton. (New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 194. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The fifth in its series, this continuing project on New York City includes chapters on the local economy and local revenues, intergovernmental aid, expenditures, aid to the poor, economic development, and privitization. Volume also includes an introduction to the annual review and an index.

State of the World 1984: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society. Edited by Lester R. Brown. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984. Pp. xvii + 252. $15.95.)

The first in a projected series, this volume proposes to measure worldwide changes in the global resource base and its relation to the economy. Text includes an overview of the state of the world in 1984, essays on stabilizing population, reducing dependence on oil, conserving soils, protecting forests, recycling materials, reassessing the economics of nuclear power, developing renewable energy, reconsidering the future of the automobile, securing food supplies, and reshaping economic policies. Report contains detailed index.

Recession in Africa: Background Papers to the Seminar "Africa—Which Way Out of the Recession?" Edited by Jerker Carlsson. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983. Pp. xi + 203. SEK 95.)

Prepared as background papers for a seminar sponsored by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, the Center for Development Research (Copenhagen), and the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex), these essays explore the economic crisis in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The individual analyses were related, in turn, to the World Bank's report on "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa—An Agenda for Action." Text contains a brief preface and introduction, but no index.

Courts and Modern Medicine. By Anthony Champagne and Rosemary N. Dawes. (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1983. Pp. xi + 260. $29.75.)

This casebook reviews several areas of judicial policymaking in the general field of medicine. Topics include abortion, genetics, and birth control; informed consent; the right to refuse treatment for religious reasons; the patient in confinement; the right to choose treatment; the right to die; wrongful life; and the right to treatment. Each chapter has a brief overview of the basic issue and reprints relevant case material. Volume includes brief index.

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1984: Vol. 1, **Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; Status of the World's Nations; U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Foreign Service Posts; Background Notes: Afghanistan-Luxembourg.** Vol. 2, **Background Notes: Macau-Zimbabwe; Foreign Travel; International Treaty Organizations; Climates of the World.** (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xi + 753 and ix + 769. $80.00/set.)

This huge compilation includes the *Background Notes on Countries of the World* prepared by the United States State Department for nearly 170 foreign countries. Other sections include country listings of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Ministers, an update of the State Department's "Status of the World's Nations," listings of U.S. embassies, consulates, and foreign service posts, information on foreign travel, international treaty organizations, and climates of the world.

The Papers of John Marshall: Vol. 4, **Correspondence and Papers, January 1799-October 1800.** Edited by Charles T. Cullen. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Pp. xxx + 365. $35.00.)

This volume includes Marshall's correspondence and papers between January, 1799 and October, 1800. Letters include some to and from George Washington, Thomas Pickering, John Adams, and many others. Papers include various deeds, law papers, resolutions, addresses, motions, speeches, legislative bills, committee reports, a statement of accounts, and more. An appendix lists additional miscellaneous papers received but not reprinted during Marshall's tenure at the State Department. Text includes index.

Political Dissent: An International Guide to Dissident, Extra-Parliamentary, Guerrilla and Illegal Political Movements. By Henry W. Degenhardt. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. xiii + 592. $90.00.)

This survey covers more than 1,000 extralegal political opposition movements. Contents are arranged by nine regions and by country within region. Country entries include brief constitutional overviews followed by synopses of both internal and external opposition movements. Where possible, the synopses provide information on the organization's leadership, its manifesto or aims, its origins and history, its current base of operations, and its tactics. Volume also includes a select bibliography, subject index, and name index.

Thinkers of the Twentieth Century: A Biographical, Bibliographical, and Critical Dictionary. Edited by Elizabeth Devine et al. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 643. $75.00.)

A dictionary of more than 400 scientists, philosophers, and social scientists in the twentieth century, this reference work provides information on each thinker's vital statistics, publications, and signed essays reviewing and assessing the individual's major contributions. Those covered include T. W. Adorno, Gordon W. Allport, Louis Althusser, Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Kenneth Arrow, Charles A. Beard, Daniel Bell, Julien Benda, Isaiah Berlin, Hugo L. Black, Niels Bohr, Berthold Brecht, Jacob Bronowski, Martin Buber, Albert Camus, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Rudolf Carnap, Morris R. Chen, John Dewey, Emile Durkheim, Albert Einstein, Mircea Eliade, T. S. Eliot, Erik H. Erikson, Frantz Fanon, Herbert Feigel, Enrico Fermi, Felix Frankfurter, Sigmond Freud, Milton Friedman, Erich Fromm, Clifford Geertz, Erving Goffman, Antonio Gramsci, Jurgen Habermas, Robert Maynard Hutchins, C. G. Jung, Karl Kautsky, John M. Keynes, Thomas S. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Harold Laski, Walter Lippmann, Bronislaw Malinowski, Herbert Marcuse, George Herbert Mead, Margaret Mead, Robert K. Merton, C. Wright Mills, Gunnar Myrdal, Reinhold Niebuhr, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Vilfredo Pareto, Talcott Parsons, Charles S. Peirce, Jean Piaget, Karl Popper, Roscoe Pound, John Rawls, Ernst Rutherford, Jean-Paul Sartre, Joseph Schumpeter, George Bernard Shaw, Herbert A. Simon, Stanislavsky, Leo Strauss, Igor Stravinsky, Henry Stack Sullivan, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, W. I. Thomas, Paul Tillich, Friedrich von Hayek, Graham Wallas, Alfred North Whitehead, Norbert Wiener, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Frank Lloyd Wright, and many many more.

Our Endangered Rights: The ACLU Report on Civil Liberties Today. Edited by Norman Dorsen. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Pp. xvi + 333. $22.50, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

Conceived as a report to the American people on the status of their freedoms from the American Civil Liberties Union, this volume contains a number of essays on the processes of rights generally, the rights of groups, and changing concepts in the struggle for rights. Specific chapters address such matters as making constitutional rights work, the Supreme Court and the judicial process, Congress and the legislative process, racial justice, sexual justice, economic justice, justice for aliens, academic freedom, criminal justice for the accused, prisons and penology, privacy, religious liberty, national security, international human rights, and an historical view of crises in civil liberties. Volume includes index.

Facts and Figures on Government Finance. (Washington, D.C.: Tax Foundation, Incorporated, 1983. Pp. 364. $20.00, paper.)

The twenty-second in its series, this edition contains almost 300 tables on such general matters as government revenue, expenditure, and debt at various levels of government; selected economic series on population, employment, national output, income, and prices; more specific tabulations on budgetary receipts for the federal and state and local governments; and budgetary expenditures for various governmental units. Tables include variable time-series information. Volume includes glossary and index.

Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. Pp. xii + 591. $19.95.)

This collection includes about one-half of Harry Truman's letters to Bess that are known to have survived after she destroyed others in 1955. The selected, edited, and sometimes excised letters are divided chronologically into topical sections beginning with Truman on the farm, Truman in the army, local and national politics, and the presidency. Text includes a complete list of letters in the Truman library, editorial notes, and an index.

Canadian Legislatures: The 1983 Comparative Study. Edited by Robert J. Fleming. (Toronto: Office of the Assembly, 1983. Pp. 96. $8.50, paper.)

The latest volume in a series begun in 1979, this study reports interviews with the Premiers of Canada's 10 provinces, examines recent election results, discusses the state of Canadian legislatures in 1983, and provides such legislative information as member indemnities, salaries, allowances, benefits, support services or private members, administrative structures, and House statistics. Volume contains no index.

Fighting Armies: Vol. 1, **NATO and the Warsaw Pact: A Combat Assessment;** Vol. 2, **Antagonists in the Middle East: A Combat Assessment;** Vol. 3, **Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies: A Combat Assessment.** Edited by Richard A. Gabriel. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xxiii + 252, xxi + 176, and xxi + 276. $95.00/set; $35.00/vol.)

These three volumes assess the combat abilities of fighting armies in various regions of the world. Profiles attempt to qualitatively analyze modern armies and examine their performance in light of imaginary but possible scenarios. The volume on Middle East antagonists includes chapters on Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Algeria and Morocco, Libya, and Egypt. The volume on nonaligned and third-world countries includes chapters on India and Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Thailand, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Rhodesia, South Africa, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. The volume on NATO and the Warsaw Pact contains two parts, one devoted to NATO and another to Warsaw Pact countries. NATO chapters cover the United States, Canada, England, France, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey. Warsaw Pact chapters cover the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland. All volumes contain an index and notes on individual contributors.

Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1983-1984. By Raymond D. Gastil. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Pp. x + 474. $35.00.)

The sixth yearbook and eleventh comparative survey, this volume provides comparative measures of freedom for political rights, civil rights, and economic freedom; contains essays on information freedom, the future of democracy, and judging the health of a democratic system; and publishes papers presented at the Freedom House on "Supporting Democracy in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)," plus comments and discussion. Text also contains brief country summaries that illustrate the information utilized in constructing the comparative measures. Volume has an index.

Congressional Districts in the 1980s. Edited by Martha V. Gottron. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983. Pp. xx + 632. $80.00.)

This reference guide provides a state-by-state analysis of congressional districts for the 1980s. Information includes a brief synopsis of the district, district maps, various demographic data, and election returns for president, Senate, House, and governor between 1976 and 1982. Volume also includes an essay on redistricting in the 1980s, an appendix on reapportionment and redistricting more generally, and a list of House members for the 95th through 98th Congresses. Volume has no index.

Philosophical-Political Profiles. By Jurgen Habermas. Translated by Frederick G. Lawrence. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xxv + 211. $25.00.)

The essays collected here are translations from portions of Habermas's *Philosophisch-politisch Profile* (1971) and *Kultur and Kritik* (1973). Included are essays on Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Bloch, Karl Lowith, Theodor Adorno, Arnold Gehlen, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Gershom Scholem. Text also includes "Does Philosophy Have a Purpose?" and "The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers." Volume contains a translator's introduction, but no index.

The Soviet Union through Its Laws. Edited and translated by Leo Hecht. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. 272. $28.95.)

This text reviews the basic Soviet legislation affecting the lives of average citizens. Volume includes an introduction to Soviet law and how it is made, the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, labor legislation, legislation on public education, public health legislation, laws on marriage and the family, laws concerning religious associations, legislation on the use of historical and cultural monuments, and Party statutes. Text concludes with an annotated bibliography and an index.

Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons. By Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait. (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983. Pp. v + 62. $5.00, paper.)

This occasional paper examines the size of public-sector employment at various levels of government, wages and salaries of government employees, public- andprivate-sector comparisons, inequalities in the salary structure of governments, wage patterns across different occupations in the public sector, and factors that might help explain observed differences. Appendixes contain comparative statistical tables and charts and a listing of data sources.

Comparative Public Administration: An Annotated Bibliography. By Mark W. Huddleston. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984. Pp. x + 245. $43.00.)

This selected bibliography primarily covers materials published between 1962 and 1981 in the English language on non-American public administration. Topical divisions include concepts and paradigms of comparative public administration, administrative history, bureaucracy and politics, personnel administration, organizational theory and behavior, public budgeting, development administration, local and field administration, and citizens and administration. Text includes an author and country index.

Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments: 1 July 1982-30 June 1983. Edited by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. (Geneva: International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation, 1983. Pp. 120. Price unavailable.)

The seventeenth in its series, this chronicle briefly outlines new legal and political actions affecting parliamentary government and analyzes 29 legislative elections held between July, 1982 and June, 1983. Entries are arranged by country for new actions (Part 1) and for legislative elections (Part 2). Text contains no index.

State Political Action Legislation and Regulations: Index and Directory of Organizations. Edited by the Interstate Bureau of Regulations. (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1984. Pp. x + 818. $185.00.)

This massive volume compiles information on state legislation and regulations governing political action committees, fund raising, and state-level campaign financing. Each state's chapter includes a transcription of state laws on political action committees and campaign finance; agency regulations, if any; a PAC listing; and an index for that state. Volume also includes a master PAC listing and index.

PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents. Edited by Raphael Israeli. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. 316. $25.00.)

This book includes facsimiles, translations, and editorial notes on documents seized by Israel at the PLO headquarters in South Lebanon plus oral reports on PLO activities in Southern Lebanon. Sections include the PLO ideology and practice;

its connection with the communist bloc; inter-Arab, inter-Islamic, and third-world connections; the PLO's modus operandi; and a chapter on eyewitness reports and comments. Volume includes index.

Foundations. Edited by Harold M. Keele and Joseph C. Kiger. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Pp. xvii + 516. $49.50.)

This encyclopedia includes accounts and historical sketches of the 234 American philanthropic foundations with assets of $38 million or more. Appendixes rank these foundations in order of assets, arrange foundations by family name, list foundations by state location, order these foundations chronologically, and show genealogy changes. Volume also contains extensive index.

The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdansk Negotiations, 1980. Translated by Anthony Kemp-Welch. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. 213. $25.00.)

Designed as a historical record of the negotiations between the Polish government and strikers at the Gdansk Shipyard in 1980, this volume includes the full text of negotiations, a memoir of one participant on behind-the-scenes negotiations, the agreement reached, profiles of participants, notes and references, and an index.

Television and the Presidential Elections: Self-Interest and the Public Interest. Edited by Martin Linsky. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. x + 137. $19.95.)

Sponsored largely by the three major commercial television networks in the United States, the conference from which these proceedings emerged focused primarily on network coverage of presidential elections. Chapters include discussions of a hypothetical presidential campaign, the networks looking at themselves, how managers manage the media, and who should produce the presidential election show. Text includes brief bibliography, but no index.

Public Choice Theory in Public Administration: An Annotated Bibliography. By Nicholas P. Lovrich and Max Neiman. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984. Pp. xxvii + 122. $27.00.)

This select bibliography examines the use of public choice theory as it has been applied to the study of public administration. Text includes a section on the normative advocacy and critical assessment of public choice theory and a section on empirical studies in public choice theory. Entries are selected for balance and usefulness. Each of the 200 entries encapsulates the work's core argument and, when possible, companion or contradictory pieces are also cited. Volume contains author and subject listing.

Lyndon B. Johnson: A Bibliography. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 258. $25.00.)

This compilation by the staff of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library of some 4,000 books, scholarly and popular articles, papers, and dissertations covers Johnson's life and career chronologically. Excluded are citations from foreign publications, newspaper stories, government documents, audiovisual items, fiction, humor, and other sources. Part 1 includes references on Johnson's own writings and interviews, biographical works, materials on the early years (1908 to 1937), the congressional years (1937 to 1948), the senatorial years (1948 to 1960), the vice-presidential years (1961 to 1963), the presidential years (1963 to 1969), and the post-presidential years (1969 to 1973). Part 2 provides a similar chronological compilation for Lady Bird Johnson and the family. Volume includes an author index.

Political Marketing: An Approach to Campaign Strategy. By Gary A. Mauser. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiv + 304. $34.95.)

This book is a practical guide to political campaign strategies utilizing marketing research methods. It includes chapters on marketing and campaign strategy, reviews frameworks for campaign analysis, discusses strategic analysis for new products, examines the positioning of candidates, reviews applications in California and France, shows procedures for estimating share-of-the-vote, and evaluates similarity and competition and the stability of perceptions and preferences. Text includes bibliography and index.

Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, vol. 21. By John Stuart Mill. Edited by John M. Robson. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Pp. lxxxiii + 502. $60.00.)

This volume of the collected works includes Mill's famous essay on the law of libel and liberty of the press. Other topics include marriage, educational reform, punishment, the Negro question, the prevention of assaults on women and children, nonintervention, the American civil war, Austinian jurisprudence, the subjection of women, treaty obligations, and the contagious diseases act. Ancillary texts by Harriet Taylor Mill are provided in appendixes, including essays on marriage, women's rights, and the enfranchisement of women. Text includes a general introduction to Mill's thoughts on equality, law, and education by Stefan Collini and a textual essay by the editor. Volume also includes a bibliographical index of persons and works cited and a general index.

Max Weber Today—An Introduction to a Living Legacy: Selected Bibliography. Edited by Vatro Murvar. (Brookfield, Wis.: Max Weber Colloquia and Symposia at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1983. Pp. 129. $9.00, paper.)

This selected bibliography excludes materials devoted exclusively to Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Included are a bibliography of Weber's writings, some symposia on Max Weber, a few biographies, and an alphabetical listing by various authors of works on concepts and issues in Weber's writings.

American Women and Politics: A Selected Bibliography and Resource Guide. By Barbara J. Nelson. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984. Pp. xii + 255. $38.00.)

This select bibliography includes more than 1,600 citations to books, articles, reports, and public documents, most written between 1970 and 1982. Topical divisions include social movement approaches to feminism and women's rights, the political and social history of feminism and women's rights in America, the nature-versus-nurture debate, women in the family, political socialization and attitude formation, women at work and leisure, women and education, democratic political participation, dependent political participation, women and political leadership, social policy in America, feminist theory and classical political theory, and reference resources on women and politics. Text includes both an author and a subject index.

Decision Making in the Public Sector. Edited by Lloyd G. Nigro. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984. Pp. 336. $35.00.)

Written for students and practitioners of public administration, this collection of essays examines decision-making processes in complex organizations. Topics include benefit-cost analysis and program evaluation, the limits of cost-benefit anaysis, multiattribute utility analysis, staffing standards, research on decision making in organizations, the use of productivity criteria in local government cutbacks, decision making in complex sociotechnical environments, implementing reorganization, decision making and information systems, and improving the usefulness of analytical techniques for public-sector decision making. Text includes a brief introduction and index.

Nineteenth Century Short Title Catalogue: Series 1, phase 1, **1801-1815, A-C.** (Newcastle upon Tyne, England: Avero Publications, 1984. Pp. xviii + 547. $1,495.00/5 vol. set.)

The first volume of a major project designed to index English-language publications of the nineteenth century and catalog them by subject, this book includes authors from A through C between 1801 and 1815. Volumes 2 through 4 cover the remaining authors in this time period, and a fifth volume includes directories, ephemerides, the United Kingdom, Ireland, London, Scotland, and periodical publications. A second phase of publications is scheduled for the period from 1816 to 1870 and a third phase for 1871 to 1918. The Nineteenth Century Short Title Catalogue Project aims to cover all books, serials, and pamphlets held by six major libraries in the UK (Bodleian Library, the British Library, the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, the National Library of Scotland, and the University Libraries of Cambridge and Newcastle) which have been published in Britain, its colonies, and the United States, plus all books in English or translated from English for the specified time period. Text is author-ordered, and each entry includes a reference number, author statement, brief title, subject classifications, edition statement, and location. A subject index uses an abbreviated form of Dewey decimal classification, which permits up to three classifications per entry.

The Making of Marx's Critical Theory: A Bibliographical Analysis. By Allen Oakley. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. xii + 143. $8.95, paper.)

In this analysis, Oakley provides a guide to the chronological and substantive situation surrounding each of Marx's major critico-theoretical works. Topics include Marx's early critique of philosophy and society, his criticism of capitalism and the formulation of historical materialism, the *Grundrisse* and its consequences, the "Critique of Political Economy" and *Capital,* and the fate of the manuscripts for *Capital* beyond 1883. Text includes index.

Government Budgeting and Expenditure Controls: Theory and Practice. By A. Premchand. (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983. Pp. xxi + 530. $18.00.)

This review of fiscal policies includes sections on the theory and practice of budgeting; its administrative dimensions, and the budgetary relationships among central governments, enterprises, and state and local governments. Chapters include discussions of fiscal policy parameters, budget purposes and public expenditure determinants, a functional approach to budgeting, approaches to decision making, organizational aspects, development planning and budgeting, expenditure planning and forecasting, inflation budgeting, short-term adjustments in public expenditures, structural aspects of budgeting, budget innovations, budget execution and cash management, government accounting and financial information systems, public enterprises and autonomous agencies, and intergovernmental fiscal management. Text includes bibliography and index.

Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform. (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1984. Pp. x + 326. $7.00, paper.)

This report analyzes federal regulatory programs implemented by state and local governments. An introductory chapter examines the origins and growth of such intergovernmental programs, distinguishes them from subsidy ones, and examines such techniques of intergovernmental regulation as direct orders, crosscutting requirements, crossover sanctions, and partial preemptions. Other chapters examine the legal foundations of such regulatory federalism, its legislative origins, the implementation of federal intergovernmental regulation, its impact on state and local government, and federal initiatives for reforming intergovernmental regulation. The report also includes a chapter on recommendations, charts, exhibits, figures, graphs, and tables.

The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984. Pp. 158. $7.95, paper.)

This report of the 12-member commission headed by Henry Kissinger examines the hemisphere in transition, provides a historical overview of the crisis in Central America, assesses the problems of democracy and economic prosperity, considers issues in human development and Central American security, and assesses the search for peace. Text includes brief notes by individual commissioners, but no index.

The Analysis of Public Policy: A Bibliography of Dissertations, 1977-1982. Compiled by John S. Robey. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Pp. x + 225. $35.00.)

Based on more than 1,000 dissertations reported in *Dissertation Abstracts International,* this volume provides brief annotations for entries listed under such topics as policy analysis; policymaking at the state level; policymaking at the local level; public administration and the making of public policy; agricultural policy; civil rights and the status of women; domestic taxing and economic policy; educational policy; U.S. foreign policy; government regulation of morality; housing policy; energy and the environment; international trade and economics; judicial policymaking; military policy; and social, health, and welfare policy. Volume includes both author and subject index.

Public Policy Analysis: An Annotated Bibliography. By John S. Robey. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984. Pp. x + 195. $39.00.)

This annotated bibliography contains some 700 current (i.e., published during the past five years) references to books and scholarly articles in the more prestigious political science, public administration, and public policy journals. Entries are alphabetical by author under the substantive headings of agricultural commodities policy; civil rights, minorities, and women; economic and monetary policy; educational policy; energy and the environment; military and foreign policy;

municipal, state, and local government; sex, drugs, and the regulation of morality; social welfare policy; taxing and collecting public revenues; policy analysis; and policymaking. Volume includes author and subject index.

Cluster Analysis for Researchers. By H. Charles Romesburg. (Belmont, Calif.: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1984. Pp. xiii + 334. $36.00.)

Designed as a handbook on frequently used methods of hierarchical cluster analysis, this text assumes little mathematical or statistical background and provides some 100 applied examples of cluster analysis. The book begins with a conceptual introduction to cluster analysis, introduces various clustering techniques, illustrates how cluster analysis might be used for classifications, and examines the possible role of cluster techniques in research decision making. Appendixes provide a bibliography on cluster analysis and an introduction to selected computer programs for cluster analysis. Text includes exercises and index.

Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. Edited by Alex P. Schmid. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984. Pp. xiv + 585. $34.95.)

This guidebook reviews such concepts as terrorism, political violence, political crime, and the relation of terrorism to guerrilla warfare, anarchism, assassination, and terror. Other concepts include the victims of terrorism, its purposes, motives, acts of terrorism, terrorist actors, and more. A second section reviews theories of terrorism and political violence, including psychological, conspiratorial, communications, sociological, and domestic causation perspectives. A third section examines data bases generally and by country and government agency. The final section provides an extended bibliogrpahy on the literature of terrorism.

Political Ideas of the English Civil Wars 1641-1649: A Collection of Representative Texts with a Commentary. By Andrew Sharp. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xvi + 253. $11.95, paper.)

These original texts, drawn from the political debates in England between 1641 and 1649, are presented here as an introduction to the English political crisis of that era. Sections include instructions to the people on their duties, the dangers of disorders, the law and the people's safety, royalists against resistance, parliament's resistance, sovereignty, royalist arguments, parliamentarian arguments, the voice of a moderate, varieties of radicalism, political ideas of the English civil wars, and the independents' revolution. Text includes bibliography and references, but no index.

Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. By Richard H. Schultz and Roy Godson. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. Pp. x + 211. $19.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This book discusses Soviet techniques of overt and covert propaganda against the free world in general and the United States in particular. Chapters include discussions of foreign policy perspectives, strategy, and bureaucracy; Soviet organizational structure for active measures; overt propaganda and covert political techniques; general propaganda themes; a descriptive analysis of Soviet foreign propaganda directed against the United States and NATO; a longitudinal analysis of Soviet propaganda themes; and a comparative longitudinal analysis. Text includes glossary and index.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 1, Part 1 and Part 2: **General, Economic and Political Matters.** Edited by William Z. Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xxi + 1,887. $27.00.)

This addition to the official record of United States foreign policy begins with documents relating to the administrative transition from Truman to Eisenhower and also includes documents on general foreign economic policy, international trade and commerce policy, foreign investment and economic development policy, international monetary fund financial policy, international transportation and communications policy, and foreign assistance policies under the Mutual Security Program. Part 2 of this volume arranges documents topically under economic defense, the development of policy toward the applicability of antitrust legislation to international petroleum companies, foreign policy aspects of congressional loyalty and security investigations, immigration and migration groups, law of the sea, policy regarding Antarctica, and the Bricker Amendment. Volume contains index.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 4, **The American Republics.** Edited by William Z. Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xxxvii + 1,727. $23.00.)

Yet another addition to the official record of United States foreign policy, this massive volume includes documents on multilateral relations between and among the United States and Latin American countries, including general policy, hemisphere defense, economic and technical assistance, the Tenth Inter-American Conference, the fourth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and U.S. policy on political developments in Central America. Individual country chapters include documents on U.S. relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Volume includes index.

Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics. By Georges Sorel. Translated by John L. Stanley. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984. Pp. x + 339. $39.95.)

Sorel completed *Insegnamenti sociali della economia contemporanea* between 1903 and 1905. This English translation now makes that classic available to a wider audience. The text offers Sorel's analysis of the rise and fall of socialism and liberal capitalism and serves in part as a precursor to his *Reflections on Violence.* This edition includes an editor's introduction to Sorel's political thought and an index.

American Indian Policy. By Theodore W. Taylor. (Mt. Airy, Md.: Lomond Publications, 1983. Pp. vii + 230. $14.95.)

Designed as an overview of and reference source for policy and administration regarding the American Indian, this book describes participants, programs, and policies in this arena of American politics. Chapters include a review of American Indians today, an examination of the dynamics of Indian policy through several case studies, a catalogue of federal government services to Indians by department or agency and another for state and local government services to Indians, a description of Indian interest groups, and an assessment of future needs and problems. Text contains several appendixes; a bibliography; an index of Indian tribes, groups, and reservations; and an index of names and subjects.

The Third World and International Law: Selected Bibliography, 1955-1982. (Geneva: United Nations Library, 1983. Pp. 100. Price unavailable.)

This bibliography includes the writings of authors whose works are thought to reflect their countries' attitudes toward matters of international law and those of authors in the Western world whose works analyze or critically assess the positions adopted by third-world countries. Excluded are materials related to nonaligned conferences, regional organizations, and international ones, case studies of third-world countries, historical studies on pre-independence matters, and studies on the legal aspects of conflicts between third-world countries. Topical sections include third-world and global questions of international law, principles of friendly relations and cooperation among states, the new international economic order, the law of the sea, and other matters such as boundaries, diplomatic law, elaboration of international law, human rights, humanitarian law, international waterways, recognition, state responsibility, succession of states, and treaties. Text includes a list of related bibliographies and a regional and country index.

Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol. 5. Edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. x + 310. $25.00.)

The fifth in its series, this review contains essays on incapacitation as a strategy for crime control, prison labor and prison industries, prisons for women, and sex offenses and offending. A separate section on the organization of criminological research presents country-based reviews on criminological research in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Council of Europe, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Volume contains a brief introduction and no index.

America's Golden Bough: The Science Advisory Intertwist. By Thaddeus J. Trenn. (Cambridge, Mass.:' Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1983. Pp. xxviii + 305. $27.50.)

Designed as a historical overview of the linkage between science and public policy, this text reviews the relation of science and government through the Office of Scientific Research and Development, examines the emergence of a network of science managers between 1945 and 1956, its institutionalization between 1957 and 1963, the President's Science Advisory Committee, the questioning of scientific advice between 1968 and 1973, and retrenchment and conflict between 1973 and 1981. Additional chapters assess science advice to the American government, democracy in policy and decision making, and the current state of science and government in America. Volume also includes appendixes, postscript, selected bibliography, and index.

UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies, 1982. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 269. $35.00.)

The third in its series, this volume includes essays on teaching and research in peace and conflict studies, applications of peace research, data collection, and the promotion of peace and conflict studies through United Nations agencies. Specific chapters include a typology of conflicts in the Third World, methodological approaches to peace and disarmament education in the USSR, peace and the apartheid system in South Africa, descriptions of selected data collection projects, and discussions of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations University Sub-Programme on Peace and Global Transformation, UNESCO consultation on disarmament education, and UNESCO's regional training seminar for university teachers on disarmament. Text includes index.

Bibliography on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, 1981-1982: With Annotations. Compiled and edited by Nada Verbic. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 299. $27.50, paper.)

The third in its series, this annotated bibliography contains chapters on the new international economic order and cooperation among developing countries, developing countries' collective self-reliance, the theory economic integration and the developing countries, the movement of nonaligned countries, regional cooperation among developing countries, economic cooperation among developing countries, and the process of economic integration among developing countries. The text includes entries for more than 2,000 books, articles, studies, reports, and official documents for the time period indicated. Text also includes author index and list of 283 periodicals utilized in the compilation.

New Directions in Federal Tax Policy for the 1980s. Edited by Charls E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. Pp. xix + 381. $35.00.)

This volume has three parts: The first focuses on the political and economic challenge for tax reform, the second on reforming the federal income tax, and the third on restructuring the federal tax system. Chapters include the political environment, the challenge for tax reform, fiscal policy, monetary policy, the accelerated cost recovery system, saving incentives, capital gains, the corporate income tax, the value added tax, income versus consumption taxes, the comprehensive income tax, the flat rate tax, and international tax issues. Volume includes index.

Political Opinion Polling: An International Review. Edited by Robert M. Worcester. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 246. $25.00.)

This review examines the history and international applications of opinion polling. Separate chapters discuss political polling in Australia, France, Germany,, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. An appendix reprints the code of professional ethics and practices adopted by the World Association for Public Opinion Research. Text includes index.

World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1984. Pp. ix + 222. $12.00, paper.)

The fifth in its series, this report includes a general survey of the world economy, examines economic recovery in industrial countries, assesses growth and adjustment in developing countries, discusses external debt and balance of payments adjustments, and reviews exchange rates and policy interactions. Appendixes include numerous statistical tables, supplementary notes, and charts. Volume contains no index.

Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice: The Data. Edited by Marianne Zawitz. (Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1983. Pp. iv + 108. Free, paper.)

Described as the first comprehensive statistical portrait of crime and justice in America, this report includes a nontechnical review of the definition, perception, measurement, and reporting of crime, a look at victims and offenders, a discussion of the American response to crime, and a general assessment of the costs of justice. Volume includes index.

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

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

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
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

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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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
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
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